Phew. The Irish electorate has not followed the bad example of the Danes and this has enabled the Heads of State and of Government meeting at the European Council in Lisbon to confirm the commitment made by their Ministers in Oslo not to delay the ratification procedures so as to present Denmark with a "fait accompli" of the Treaty accepted by its Eleven partners. There are however two clear legal questions to which neither the Ministers nor the Heads of State and of Government have been able to give an adequate reply. In the first place the central part of the Treaty of Maastricht relates to changes to the Treaties of Paris and of Rome (including the Single Act) according to procedures which require the unanimity of twelve governments and the unanimity of twelve ratifications. In the second place the Danish Constitution prevents the calling of a second referendum in the absence of formal or substantive amendments to the Treaty rejected on the 2nd of June last. The debates currently taking place in all Mem

ber States and particulary in those holding a referendum would have been facilitated by a clear signal from the governments on the legal and political "imbroglio" created by the Danish "no". Our national representatives prefer an ostrich-like policy which unfortunately could strengthen the hand of the advocates of rejection.

We would like to make a modest contribution to clarify this situation by, reiterating briefly the position which we took a few hours after the Danish vote ("For those willing", Crocodile, May 1992). The Eleven could propose to Denmark a "consensus" solution which would save the marriage of twelve, that is to invite the Danes to express themselves by a second referendum. Different formulae have already been canvassed: a protocol annexed to the Treaty which would in respect of Denmark and of the entire scope of Community Law apply the "opting out" method granted to the United Kingdom in the specific case of social policy; a general protocol which would lay down a restrictive interpretation of certain provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht (subsidiarity, Commisssion powers, etc.); a solemn declaration with the same purpose as this protocol, etc.. None of these formulae is much removed from a "downard" renegotiation dismissed by the foreign Ministers in Oslo, but everybody knows that at least one government is

working on this seriously and that all national foreign services have no little sympathy for these formulae. The Eleven could study and implement a "conflictual" solution which would modify neither the substance nor the form of the Treaty of Maastricht and which would oblige Denmark to re-join the group of countries adhering to the European Economic Area.... until these countries join the Union. In order to achieve this objective all twelve governments would have to change Article R of the Treaty of Maastricht in order to permit ratification with less then twelve Member States. If Denmark refuses they would have to resile from the Communities Treaties, leave the Community unilateraly, and without Denmark sign the Treaty of Maastricht as an international treaty. It is in this way that thirteen states of the American Confederation paved the way to the Constitution of USA and this is certainly the hypothesis envisaged by President Mitterrand before the political science students of Paris a few days after the D

anish "no".

We are convinced - as we were before the Danish referendum - that European Union will have to be realised "among those willing" just as we have emphasized that the preliminary question which all Europeans ought to answer is "is it in the interests of Europe in its entirely that a union with a federal goal be established by a core of countries ready to accept all its consequences?". It is for these reasons, not to force Danes against the wall, that we advocate the second solution. However this requires something which the Governments did not have the courage to subscribe to in Maastricht: a clear committement on the federal deepning of the union after Maastricht which will have to be realised by means of more open and therefore more democratic procedures than those used up until now.

The danger is great that in the absence of such commitment the Copenhagen syndrome could influence European society as a whole.