The Indian Express, November 28, 1996

When Indian and Chinese leaders meet, one says Namaskar and ther other asks, "Where do you stand on Tibet?" Or so it would seem from the last encounter. Rather than wait for the standard joint communique on the subject during President Jiang Zemin's visit to New Delhi this week, Li Peng the Chinese Premier, collared Deve Gowda at the FAO meet in Rome on the 17th to be assured that the UF Government, like its Congress predecessors, recognised Tibet as a part of China.

One imagines the Chinese would have satisfied themselves about the new Indian Government's policy long before this, using the usual diplomatic channels. It is the public restatement of India's position as often as possible that the Chinese are also interested in. They obtained from Rajiv Gandhi in Beijing, 1988, and Narashima Rao in New Delhi, in 1991, and in Beijing 1993. So it is that alongside "mutual cooperation and mutual benefit"this too comes to be seen as one of the internal varieties of the Sino-Indian relationship. Not that New Delhi has given any cause for anxiety on this score. What Beijing wants is a message to deliver to restive Tibetans at home and aborad and to countries who express concern about conditions in Tibet and sympathy for the Dalai Lama's exertion to improve them. Historically the major powers perception of the Tibetan question has been influenced by the government of India's stand. It is matter of record that in the crucial days immediately after Chinese troops marched into Lhasa,

New Delhi advised a cautious policy and recognising India's primary interest in the issue, the US and Britain held their hands.

The trouble starts with the minimalist position Indian adopts. There are continuities within departures from the approach Jawaharlal Nehru favoured in 1950, "We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it my bring greater trouble to it..... however, we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy..... this can only be done at the diplomatic level," he said. Nehru's policy of avoidance continues, avoiding making trouble for Tibet, avoiding tension between India and China. Avoidance is all. Precious little has been done to help the Chinese seetheir way to giving Tibet even a small measure of autonomy.

There is much to recommend a cautious policy. It is only the last few years that border tensions have been contained by a series of physical and pyschological fire-breaks along the sector. But caution is being carried too far. Why is there so little emphasis on the word "autonomy" in the official text on Tibet or in bilateral discussion? The formal status Beijing still accords Tibet is "autonomous region of China" and that is how it has always been understood in India.

But as time goes on, autonomy is a word Chinese authorities in Tibet like to hear less and less. Today they view it as a dangerous concession to the protestors in Tibet. Although there was never any intention to grant Tibet an iota of political autonomy, the arrangement was understood to permit a certain degree of cultural and religious freedom. Today even those meanings are being squeezed out of the word. There are reports of another crackdown in Tibet, this one encompassing all the symbols and institutions that nourish Tibetans' distinctive identity, their schools, their monasteries, their religious leaders, their language, anything that smacks of autonomy.

Should New Delhi steer clear of troubled waters, mindful of the recent demonstration of Beijing's hypersensitivities on territorial matters (the intimidatory missile tactics in the Strait of Taiwan until the US sent in a gunboat)? Should it, once more, in the greater interests of Asian solidarity blot Tibet out of its consciousness altogether? Or is there a way for two mature countries, both as inspiring to big power status in the next century, both hoping to contribute to Asian peace and security, to discuss difficult subjects, Tibet among them.

Given that India itself grapples with the form and content of autonomy in Kashmir and elsewhere, an exchange of views should be possible on what measure of distinctiveness. There is an unexpected opportunity to turn the dialogue in this direction if, as reported, the Chinese delegation is to include the governor of Tibet. It would be the first time someone so senior with specific responsibility for Tibet comes visiting. Rather than get into a diplomatic flap about how exactly this is to be interpreted, it should be seized as an invitation to talk about conditions in Tibet. Surely it is recognised everywhere that it is not good for Tibet, or China or India that the region be ruled with a hard hand.

Proof of the maturity of the relationship would lie in the two countries being able to discuss contentious issues without fear of bringing down the structure like a house of cards. The world is changing too fast for the timorous movement that characterises progress towards strengthening the relationship. Trade is growing but it will be a decade before it is a healthy fraction of the potential. Economic links will not expand rapidly or provide the basis for a stronger relationship without simultaneous improvement on the political front.

It is extraordinary, to say the least, that India's constant disquiet about China's nuclear relationship with Pakistan ricochets off Washington instead of being discussed and resolved directly with the Chinese. There was a single question in Parliament after Pakistan acquired ring magnets to which Pranab Mukerjee gave a predictable answer. The matter had been taken up with China; India was assured no such sales had been made. Thus, New Delhi is left to make what it can of Beijing's latest promise to the US that comprehensive controls on nuclear transfers will be put in place.

If the Jiang visit result in agreement on mutual troop reductions on the border it can be considered a success but not nearly enough. The quality of the dialogue needs to be dramatically improved. If the two cannot engage each other on subjects of great concern and equal sensitivity - Tibet and the nuclear issue - they will be no nearer managing the competition between then which history and geography makes inevitable.