Date: Wed, 19 Feb 1997 14:25:05 -0800

From: Bhuchung Tsering International Campaign for Tibet

To: Multiple recipients of list TSG-L (Tibet Support Group List)

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

Washington, D.C.

Backgrounder: A Personal Legacy Left Untouched. Reflections on Deng Xiaoping's Role in Tibet

by Lodi Gyari

No top leader in post-revolutionary China has had a more preeminent role in Tibet policy than Deng Xiaopeng. Even Mao Tse Tung deferred to Deng on major Tibet decisions. Today, Deng's leftist line remains intact, seemingly enshrined as China's perennial position on Tibet.

Deng was personally involved in all of the major campaigns in Tibet - the "liberation," "democratic reforms," squashing the 1959 "rebellion," "socialist reconstruction," purging Tibetan leaders including the Panchen Lama, the "opening," and after 1987, the suppression of Tibet. To him, Tibet was not only a matter of sovereignty, principle and policy. It was also a very personal matter, and Deng has never been willing to admit that the policies he pushed for regarding Tibet were wrong, because he knew that his reputation - his "face" - was at stake.

With the passing of Deng from the Chinese political arena, the new leadership does not have the same personal involvement in Tibet, and does not have to take responsibility for what happened over the last 45 years. Chinese nationalism, concern for stability and the claim of sovereignty will still be the major concerns for the Chinese leadership on Tibet, but they do not have the personal attachment and long-term involvement in Tibetan affairs. They have less of a historical burden to carry and are more likely than Deng to find a new approach to solving the Tibet problem.

The importance of Deng's role in Tibetan affairs is little known in the West, and would be even less so were if not for a document penned by Deng's nemesis, Wei Jingsheng, China's most famous dissident prisoner. In a letter written in 1992, Wei charged that "it was your one-sided propaganda that has resulted in this national discrimination against the Tibetans" and that "you will be laughed at and condemned by history" for your Tibet policies. Wei laid the preponderance of the blame for China's misrule of Tibet on Deng, and did not hesitate to say so: "The director of this tragedy is no other than you, Mr. Deng Xiaoping." Deng's hard-line, "leftist" legacy in Tibet stemmed from ideological fabrications and distortions, which in Wei's opinion, made an accurate analysis of the situation in Tibet impossible: You have all along advocated anti-colonialism and national independence. In fact, you do not understand what anti-colonialism and national independence are. You have only taken it as a convenie

nt tool and do not really want to understand it or genuinely believe in it. This is exactly the root cause of your leftism.

Deng Xiaoping's paramount role in Tibet began with the invasion. By the end of 1949, the Red Army had already entered some parts of Tibet, but the main task of "liberating" Tibet was given to Deng in a telegram from Mao, who was in Moscow, on January 2, 1950. Mao entrusted the "liberation" to the south-west bureau of the Party. Deng Xiaopeng was the secretary of the Party's south west bureau, as well as the political commissar of the 2nd field army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The other principal figure was Marshall Liu Bocheng, commander of the 2nd field army. On Jan. 10, 1950, Mao sent another telegram from Moscow, ordering that the preparation of the liberation should be accelerated, and agreed with Deng Xiaoping's proposal that the liberation of Tibet should be started simultaneously from all directions - from Sichuan in the east, from Yunnan in the south, from Qinghai in the north and from Xinjiang in the west.

By the fall of 1950, the 18th corps of the 2nd field army had marched through the Kham Tibetan area and at the battle of Chamdo defeated the ill-equipped Tibetan army. After the signing of the 17-Point Agreement, again it was the south-west bureau which was responsible for sending the PLA to Lhasa and throughout Tibet.

In the 1950s, Deng was the leading advocate of an early start of "democratic reforms" in the Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo, which are now under Qinghai and Sichuan provinces. These "democratic reforms" were aimed at dismantling the existing Tibetan social, political and religious structures. This lead to the revolt against the Chinese by the Kham and Amdo Tibetans and finally to an uprising throughout Tibet. Deng's hard-line position on instituting the so-called democratic reforms in the 1950s surpassed Mao's, and made Mao's policy look moderate and cautious in comparison.

Mao feared that an early start of "reform" in these areas might trigger wide-spread unrest in Tibet and further alienate India. He supported a more cautious approach and preferred to postpone the reforms. However, Deng was persuasive, and finally Mao agreed to Deng's approach.

The "reforms" caused tremendous resistance in the Tibetan areas, leading many Tibetans to take up arms and revolt against the forced "reform." China sent more troops to put down the rebellion, which made it worse. The unrest then spread into central Tibet. After some unsuccessful negotiations between the Tibetan government and Peking, in late 1956 the Dalai Lama went to India, ostensibly on a pilgrimage, and planned to stay there.

Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Vice-Prime Minister He Long were specially sent to India to persuade the Dalai Lama to return and gave assurances through Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru that China would not turn Tibet into a province of China and that its autonomy would be respected. In addition, Mao reached a compromise with Deng that in central Tibet democratic reforms would be postponed for six years, but in other Tibetan areas, the reforms would continue. The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet, but fled again in 1959 during a popular uprising against China, and has never returned. In 1962, Mao admitted his differences with Deng, identifying Deng and Li Jingquan, then party secretary of the south west bureau, as leftists (radical), and himself and Li Weihan, head of the central committee's united front department, as rightists (conservative).

Many purges of Tibetan leaders, including the Panchen Lama, were initiated by Deng Xiaoping himself, indicating that he retained control over this issue. For example, on August 24, 1962, the CCP central committee secretariat, headed by General Secretary Deng Xiaoping issued an order to the Tibet Party Working Committee to criticize the Panchen Lama and "isolate" him. Again on September 17, 1962, the Central Committee Secretariat issued an order directly to the Tibet Party Working Committee to "launch a comprehensive class struggle against Panchen, to expose his reactionary nature of the serf-owner's class." Thus started the purge of the Panchen Lama and his close associates.

In 1962, another high ranking Tibetan leader, this time a veteran Tibetan communist and vice-governor of Qinghai province, Tashi Wangchug, was purged because of his complaints about widespread killings and destruction during the 1957-1959 "squashing rebellion" movement. Deng Xiaoping personally orchestrated his purge and made it clear that "people like Tashi Wangchug should never have been appointed high position, and should never be rehabilitated."

One of the most important Tibetan purges was of Phuntsog Wangyal, a high ranking Tibetan communist who was purged in the late 1950s for "local nationalism," the Chinese term for ethnic nationalism. Even though there is no clear evidence that Deng himself directed the purge of Phuntsog Wangyal, it is inconceivable that his purge could have happened without at least Deng's support because he worked directly under Deng. When most of the important purged leaders were rehabilitated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Deng refused to help with the rehabilitation of Phuntsog Wangyal, even though he was the only prominent leader still alive who was personally familiar with Phuntsog Wangyal's case.

In the late 1970s when Deng made his comeback as China's paramount leader, some of his first steps were encouraging, and his own personal experience during the Cultural Revolution may have made him more sympathetic to the situation in Tibet. He established contact with the Dalai Lama but his bottom line was always clear - Tibet's future and its relations with China would be on China's terms. In 1979 he took the initiative of establishing contact with the Dalai Lama with the offer of negotiated settlement of the Tibetan issue as long as independence was not placed on the agenda.

However, when Hu Yaobang pushed a bolder reform program in Tibet to let the Tibetans enjoy more autonomy, it was met with stubborn resistance and criticism within the Party and the government. Deng may have also felt Hu's recommendations were too risky at that point, and ultimately Hu had to abandon them. In 1987, when Hu was ousted by Deng, one of Hu's major "mistakes" was his overly liberal approach towards Tibet.

After 1987, when the situation in Tibet became more repressive, and the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan movement gained greater international support, Deng's personal reputation, and that of China itself, were jeopardized. Deng returned to his hard-line positions, remarking to a West German leader "the Dalai Lama and a few members of US Congress created some trouble for us. It has no effect on the overall excellent situation we have now". Then, almost losing his temper, he said "some people wanted to split Tibet from China and wanted to take Tibet away. I say to them, you are not capable of doing this."

Regarding the controversial population influx issue, Deng took a similarly hard line. On June 29, 1987, when meeting with former US President Jimmy Carter, Deng said "Tibet is a thinly populated area, it has a vast territory. Two million Tibetans are not enough to carry out development. There is no harm if Han people go there and help them. You can not come to the right conclusion if you judge China's policy and the Tibet problem by counting how many Han people are in Tibet. ...Judging right and wrong in the minority areas should take into account whether they can be developed. If a bit more Han people can help develop their economy, this is not a bad thing".

Since 1989, there has been no movement on the dialogue with the Dalai Lama, even though there have been periodic gestures by Beijing in response to international pressure. No Chinese leader has been prepared to make a move on the Tibet issue without the approval and participation of Deng.

Deng's passing will mark the end of an era in modern Tibetan history. The absence of Deng provides new opportunities and challenges for both the Tibetans and the Chinese. However, how each side will play their hand in the post Deng era remains an open question.

Washington, D.C., February 19, 1997

Lodi Gyari is a former member of the Dalai Lama's Cabinet and is a member of his negotiating team to China. He is currently the President of the International Campaign for Tibet, a non-profit advocacy organization for human rights and democratic freedoms in Tibet.