Published by: World Tibet Network News Wednesday - May 14, 1997

May 13, 1997

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on U.S. policy

toward Tibet. This hearing is particularly timely coming in the immediate

wake of the April 21-24 visit to Washington of the Dalai Lama.

Background

There are over two million ethnic Tibetans living in the Tibetan Autonomous

Region of the People's Republic of China, and perhaps another two to three

million living in adjacent areas in China, notably in Qinghai, western

Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan. About 125,000 Tibetan refugees and their

descendants live in India and Nepal, and a few thousand others are

scattered in other countries. There are about a thousand in the U.S.

For the Tibetans who live in Tibet, the last 50 years have been tumultuous.

The entry of the People's Liberation Army into Tibet in 1951 brought to an

end the period that began with the 1911 revolution in China and the

collapse of any effective Chinese presence in Tibet. In 1951, Tibetan

representatives signed a 17 point agreement, which opened the way to the

PLA despite the reservations of the Dalai Lama and his advisors.

Chinese inroads into the traditional Tibetan way of life touched off

violent opposition by the late 1950's, leading the Dalai Lama to flee to

India in 1959. Guerrilla warfare continued in some areas for a few years,

but was effectively suppressed. The Cultural Revolution in the 1960's hit

Tibet early and hard. The Panchen Lama, who had been supportive of the

Chinese authorities, was imprisoned for 15 years. Thousands of monasteries

were closed and destroyed. Tibet suffered irreparable cultural damage, and

Buddhism came under attack as a feudal relic.

With the end of the Cultural Revolution there was a policy review leading

to liberalization, beginning with the visit of the late General Secretary

of the Communist Party Hu Yaobang to Tibet in 1980. The inflow of Han

Chinese into Tibet slowed. More Tibetans were elevated to positions within

the Region's political leadership. Greater sensitivity was shown to Tibet's

religious and cultural traditions. Monasteries were rebuilt and reopened.

Many prisoners were released. The Dalai Lama sent a series of delegations

to Tibet, and discussions with the Chinese began. Beijing indicated a

willingness to accept the return of the Dalai Lama and his followers to

Tibet under certain conditions.

Nineteen-eighty-seven saw a major alteration in Chinese policy toward Tibet

toward a harder line. The Dalai Lama placed a new emphasis on seeking

contacts in the West in order to rally support against the weakening of

Tibetan culture and religion. Late in the year, serious riots broke out in

Lhasa in support of independence, followed by other outbreaks over the next

few years. The Chinese responded with increased security measures,

including crackdowns on monasteries. Martial law was declared for a time.

Discussions with the Dalai Lama's representatives halted. This trend has

continued since then. A Work Conference on Tibet in 1994 placed heightened

emphasis on economic growth over accommodation with the Dalai Lama and

preservation of Tibetan culture.

Although reverence for the Dalai Lama appears to be near-universal, this is

not to say that Tibetan politics are without fault lines. Factions,

regional and sectarian loyalties, differences between religious and civil

authorities, arguments between modernizers and conservatives, and other

splits have plagued the Tibetan polity, among Tibetans inside and outside

Tibet, throughout this century. Some Tibetans have worked with the Chinese

even in the most tense of times. Other young Tibetans today are

contemplating the use of violence in their frustration, despite the Dalai

Lama's clear and consistent advocacy of non-violence and efforts to reach a

negotiated solution with the Chinese over Tibet's rights and status. Two

generalizations appear beyond dispute: 1) There is considerable animosity

between Han Chinese living in Tibet and ethnic Tibetans; and 2) Most

Tibetans are dissatisfied with current political arrangements and

institutions in Tibet.

Efforts by the Dalai Lama and Beijing to reach accommodation have been

on-again off-again for the last two decades. During the period of

liberalization inaugurated by the 1980 Hu Yaobang visit, the Dalai Lama

sent several delegations at Beijing's invitation to observe conditions in

Tibet. Subsequently, for reasons described above, the atmosphere for talks

has soured. The Dalai Lama tried to revive a basis for discussion by

putting forward a new proposal in a speech in Strasbourg in 1988, in which

he declared Tibet would accept autonomous status within the People's

Republic of China, with the Chinese retaining certain defense and foreign

policy rights. China rejected the proposal as disguised independence for

Tibet. The Dalai Lama declined a Chinese invitation to visit Beijing for

the Panchen Lama's funeral in early 1989, and the Chinese hardline policy

culminated in a Politburo meeting late that year that decided the Dalai

Lama would not be part of the solution in Tibet. Talks with the Dalai Lama

have effectively been sidetracked since then, though contacts continue

sporadically.

The Chinese government has devoted substantial resources to Tibet over the

years: a 1980 report stated that China had given Tibet subsidies equivalent

to 4.2 billion dollars since 1952, and Beijing claims to have given a

further 2.4 billion dollars since then for economic development.

Nonetheless, substantial economic problems remain. Tibet is China's poorest

region. While Tibet has experienced a substantial growth rate in recent

decades, its growth has been slower than most other regions in China.

Not all Tibetans view Chinese investment and economic development in Tibet

in totally positive terms. Many maintain that employment in investment

projects disproportionately benefits ethnic Han Chinese and other

non-Tibetans. Hundreds of thousands of non-Tibetans have come to Tibet in

recent years to work either on development projects or to serve those who

do. The "floating population" of Lhasa, the main city in Tibet, was

recently estimated at over 200,000, as compared to its registered permanent

population of 400,000. Inflows of non-Tibetans have increased tension and

raised concerns over the loss of Tibet's special character.

The autonomy that China grants to Tibet has resulted in some benefits or

privileges, notably relaxed family planning norms, use of ethnic Tibetan

cadres in a majority of government jobs, and Tibetan representation in the

National People's Congress. Perhaps 10,000 Tibetans have gone to secondary

or tertiary study in China's 10 Nationalities Institutes in other parts of

China.

The human rights situation in Tibet is highly unsatisfactory. Chinese

authorities commit widespread human rights abuses, with instances of death

in detention, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial,

long sentences for Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing their

religious and political views, and intensified controls on religion and on

freedom of speech and the press. The authorities permit many traditional

religious practices, but not those seen as a vehicle for political dissent.

The government continues to closely supervise monks and monasteries, which

it sees as breeding grounds for Tibetan nationalism. Chinese authorities

are seeking to increase the use of Chinese in education, down to the first

grade, a practice which has offended Tibetans in the past. A fuller account

of the situation is contained in the State Department's human rights report

published early this year.

The U.S. Role

What is U.S. policy toward Tibet? The United States considers the Tibet

Autonomous Region or TAR (hereafter referred to as "Tibet") as part of the

People's Republic of China. This long-standing policy is consistent with

the view of the entire international community, including all China's

neighbors: no country recognizes Tibet as a sovereign state. U.S.

acceptance of China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet predates the

establishment of the People's Republic of China. For instance, in 1942, we

told the Nationalist Chinese government then headquartered in Chongqing

(Chungking) that we had "at no time raised (a) question" over Chinese

claims to Tibet.

Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United

States does not conduct diplomatic relations with the representatives of

Tibetans in exile. However, the United States does try to maintain contact

with a wide variety of representatives of differing political groups inside

and outside China with views on Tibet. This includes contacts with

individuals in Dharamsala, Tibetans in the U.S., and visits to Tibet by

Embassy and Consulate General Chengdu staff.

The United States has urged China to respect Tibet's unique religious,

linguistic and cultural traditions, and the human rights of Tibetans as it

formulates its policies for Tibet. The United States encourages China and

the Dalai Lama to hold serious discussions aimed at resolution of

differences at an early date, without preconditions. We have consistently

asserted that any questions surrounding Tibet and its relationship to

Chinese authorities in Beijing should be resolved by direct dialogue

between the Tibetans, in particular the Dalai Lama, and the Chinese.

The United States stands for the protection of human rights throughout the

world, and the human rights issue remains a key element of our bilateral

relationship with China. Our policy seeks to improve respect for the human

rights of ethnic Tibetans, and for all Chinese citizens. We have appealed

for the release of Tibetan prisoners of conscience. We have called upon the

Chinese government to cease using force against peaceful demonstrations in

Tibet. Most recently, we spoke out when the conviction and sentencing of

Tibetan monk Chadrel Rinpoche and two others was announced last week,

apparently for his role in selection of a new Panchen Lama designated by

the Dalai Lama as the successor to the second-most revered position in

Tibet's Buddhist hierarchy. We have also called upon China to improve

prison conditions and to end the abuse and torture of prisoners.

We have raised our concerns about Tibet consistently during bilateral

talks. Secretary Albright raised concerns over human rights, including

Tibet, both during her visit to Beijing in February, and during Vice

Premier Qian Qichen's visit to Washington in April. She repeated our call

for a dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.

The U.S. Embassy in Beijing has frequently raised our human rights

concerns. It has raised the case of the Tibetan ethnomusicologist Ngawang

Choephel, who was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment late last year on the

charge of endangering China's national security. We have said that we

cannot understand why such a sentence should have been imposed when there

has been no public explanation of why his activities were unlawful. Embassy

and Consulate General Chengdu personnel visit Tibet from time to time to

discuss the situation there with local officials and observe conditions.

Ambassador Sasser visited Tibet April 16-18 and made a strong presentation

of our views on human rights in all of his official meetings there.

In addition to our bilateral efforts, we have also addressed our concerns

about human rights in Tibet through multilateral channels. We worked with

like-minded countries at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva this

year to table a resolution on the human rights situation in China,

including Tibet. Unfortunately, the Chinese countered with a no-action

motion which effectively blocked discussion of the resolution and a vote on

its provisions. The mere fact that a resolution was tabled signaled our

concern. The effort that the Chinese put into defeating the resolution is a

measure of their awareness and sensitivity on this issue.

The Dalai Lama would obviously be a key player if discussions develop

between the PRC and Tibetans living outside China. As a sign of the great

respect the President and Vice President have for the Dalai Lama as a

religious leader, they have met with him on a number of occasions, most

recently on April 23. Secretary of State Albright and Assistant Secretary

of State Shattuck met with the Dalai Lama on April 24, when he shared his

views and concerns with some members of the Secretary's Advisory Committee

on Religious Freedom Abroad.

Other U.S. Activities

The United States provides humanitarian assistance to Tibetan refugees in

India and also contributes to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) to assist Tibetans transiting Nepal. Most U.S. government funding

to the refugees in India goes to the Tibet Fund, a U.S. private voluntary

organization, to underwrite assistance programs for Tibetan refugees in

India. These programs support reception centers, preventive health care,

and income-generating projects, and they supply basic food, clothing, and

clean water.

As part of the Immigration Act of 1990, 1,000 "displaced Tibetans" were

given special immigrant visas, and have since resettled throughout the

United States. The United States Information Agency provides scholarships

for Tibetan students and professionals to study in the United States. Over

140 students have participated in this program since 1988, and almost all

have returned to India and Nepal upon completion of their studies to

contribute to the welfare of the Tibetan refugee communities there.

The Tibetan Service of the Voice of America broadcasts two hour-long

programs in the Tibetan language each day. Often, it interviews ethnic

Tibetans, and has interviewed the Dalai Lama on at least five occasions.

VOA Tibetan Service broadcast signals have been subjected to interference,

with mixed success, almost from the first VOA Tibetan language broadcast.

We have pressed the Chinese to cease interference with those broadcasts and

have sought to resume technical-level talks to resolve the dispute over

interference with VOA broadcast signals. Although China agreed to resume

these technical talks during our October 1994 bilateral human rights

dialogue, the dialogue and the technical talks have remained suspended.

Radio Free Asia began broadcasting to China in Mandarin September 29, 1996,

and in Tibetan December 2, 1996. The RFA signal is rated as fair or good,

and no jamming has been noted. I would add that the Chinese Foreign

Ministry in Beijing and Embassy here formally protested at the time of

RFA's initial broadcast operations, terming the broadcasts a relic of cold

war mentality and interference in China's internal affairs. We replied that

RFA is a U.S. nonprofit private corporation, which receives grant funds

from the Broadcasting Board of Governors, part of USIA, the purpose of

which is to provide accurate and comprehensive news and commentary, not

propaganda.

Conclusion

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the treatment of Tibetans by the

Chinese government in the 48 years since the founding of the People's

Republic of China has been harsh, inconsistent with international human

rights norms, and unacceptable. There have been moments, notably in the

early 1950's and the early 1980's, when it seemed a more enlightened policy

by Beijing might prevail, but these moments proved short-lived. The U.S.

Government will continue to speak out, publicly and privately, about the

abuses of human rights that mark PRC policy in Tibet.

At the same time, we do not believe that a challenge to Chinese sovereignty

or resort to violence offers a way to improvement of the situation. No

Chinese government for centuries has been prepared to accept the idea of an

independent Tibet. There is no reason to believe this one will. The Dalai

Lama has shown courage in accepting the impracticality of insisting on

independence, whatever his views on Tibet's historical status, and calling

for an autonomous Tibet within China. Chinese spokesmen have responded by

stating their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Dalai Lama if he

renounces independence and pro-independence activities. The gap between the

stated positions of the two sides would appear to outside observers to be

bridgeable. The problem appears to be one of will, especially on Beijing's

side. We hope that the parties will resume the dialogue that looked so

promising in the 1980's. Preservation of Tibet's unique cultural and

religious traditions depends upon it.

But it is not only Tibetans who would benefit from more equitable

treatment. China as a whole would as well. Tranquillity and public order

may be jeopardized by failure to satisfy fundamental needs of China's

minority peoples. Maintaining order over a restive population is a drain on

the scarce resources of a still developing country. And finally, what we

hear so often from Chinese leaders is that, after a century of humiliation

at the hands of Western powers, China demands above all respect. Chinese

leaders will find that a different, more enlightened policy toward Tibet

would be a long step toward enhancing the respect they have earned from the

economic transformation of their country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.