Published by World Tibet Network News - Friday - June 27, 1997 - SpecialAs Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997 and its people ponder their fate with increasing anxiety, journalists and political analysts debate the future of this capitalist bastion. The question on everybody's mind is: Will Beijing really respect the one-country, two-systems formula promised to Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint declaration?
If the past is any pointer to the future, one needs only to look at the "17-Point Agreement" which, in essence, promised one- country, two systems formula for Tibet. The "17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was forced on Tibet by China on 23 May 1951 after defeating the small Tibetan army in 1950. China followed this up by establishing a preparatory committee which was soon to violate each and every provision of the "Agreement" that was favourable to Tibet. In the case of Hong Kong also, China has already set up a preparatory committee which has been meeting in Shenzen over the past few months and which has already been passing laws and making decisions to be implemented immediately after the 1 July handover.
Different historical contexts:
At the time of signing the "17-Point Agreement", Tibet was an independent country in fact and law. Through this "Agreement", the Chinese government forced the Tibetan delegation to cede the independence of Tibet. Naturally, the Tibetans have disputed the legitimacy of this "Agreement" on the ground that the Tibetan delegation was compelled to sign it under duress and threat of a large-scale military invasion of the remaining part of Tibet.
As a matter of fact, the Tibetan delegation had no authority from its government to sign any agreement with China. Speaking to the Star Television's Chinese-language channel in the early 1990s, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme =FE the head of the Tibetan delegation, who subsequently became the vice chairman of Chinese National People's Congress =FE said unequivocally that he had signed it at his own discretion and without "authority from the Dalai Lama" and that, therefore, the Agreement was not legally binding on the Dalai Lama.
However, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government were told in no uncertain terms that the price for its rejection would be an outright military invasion of the remaining part of Tibet. The Tibetan leadership was, thus, left with no alternative but to accomodate the Chinese wish. This, it did by making sincere efforts to see how a new relationship could be built on the basis of this "Agreement". For its part, Beijing used the "Agreement" only as a strategy to buy time until its forces were well ensconsed in Tibet to effect the total assimilation of the Himalayan nation.
"The 17-Point Agreement", therefore, was not a valid international agreement both because of its substantive contents and the procedure leading up to its signing.
The case of Hong Kong, however, is fundamentally different in the sense that it had been an integral part of China until the end of the Opium War, when victorious Britain forced China to lease it. Similarly, Britain and China have put in many years of elaborate and painstaking negotiations in preparation for a smooth transfer of Hong Kong's rule to China. As a result, this agreement has all the trappings of an international agreement.
Abrogation of the "17-Point Agreement"
The "17-Point Agreement" promised to leave Tibet's political system, culture and religious belief unchanged by communist reforms. Under the terms of this Agreement, China undertook to respect Tibet's internal autonomy and the traditional status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.
However, as China gained stronger military foothold in Tibet, it started abrogating the "Agreement". To cite a few examples, in 1952, barely a year after its signing, the Chinese government exerted immense military and political pressure on the Dalai Lama and forced him to remove the two prime ministers of Tibet. This was an abrogation of the fourth point which stated that the power of the Dalai Lama would be respected.
By late 1954 China's confidence was buoyed considerably by the fact that the international community was not willing to extend any concrete support to Tibet. As a result, the Chinese Preparatory Committee in Lhasa started seizing political authority from the Tibetan government, an act which went directly against the provision guaranteeing that the "Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet".
In tandem with this, monasteries and religious institutions in eastern and north-eastern Tibet were destroyed and thousands of monks and nuns were tortured, jailed and executed. Sweeping communist socio-economic reforms and mass killing in these areas of Tibet brought thousands of refugees to central Tibet. The people of central Tibet saw only too well that it would not be long before they too would suffer the fate of their countrymen in the east.
Now active guerilla movements, led by the Tibetans from eastern Tibet, began to fight the Chinese troops. In its turn, the Chinese government pressured the Tibetan government in Lhasa to send the eastern Tibetans back home and to crush the "anti-China elements" in Lhasa. Of course, the Tibetan government could not give in to this outrageous demand. Incensed with this, Chinese General Dan Guansan stated in early 1959 that "the flies would invariably gravitate towards petrifying meat. If the meat was got rid of, the flies would naturally go". The "meat" was a direct reference to the Dalai Lama and "flies" resistance fighters. Naturally the people of Tibet became concerned for the safety of the Dalai Lama.
Tibetan concern was heightened when the Chinese general in March 1959 invited the Dalai Lama to come for a theatrical show at their military camp in Lhasa. The Chinese said that the Dalai Lama must not be accompanied by his usual armed body guards. This was not only a breach of protocol, it also confirmed the worst Tibetan fear that the Chinese planned to abduct the Dalai Lama. It was an open secret in Tibet that many lamas and community leaders in Kham and Amdo in the eastern part of Tibet had disappeared mysteriously after being invited to Chinese theatrical shows.
By now China had violated every clause of the "Agreement" and an unbridgeable chasm had developed between the Chinese occupying forces and the people of Tibet. Almost the whole of Lhasa populace came to Norbulingkha, the summer palace of the Dalai Lama, and surrounded it to prevent the Dalai Lama from visiting the Chinese military camp. The Chinese reacted by firing two mortar shells in the direction of the Norbulingkha on 17 March 1959. Fortunately, the shells fell in a nearby pond. In the evening of the same day, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa secretly and made his way to the freedom of India. Two days later, on 19 March, a rain of mortar shells pounded the Norbulingkha, the Potala and other strategic places in Lhasa. The shelling continued for three days leaving some 15,000 Tibetans dead. The soldiers then searched the dead bodies in the hope of finding the Dalai Lama's body.
The Dalai Lama, on reaching India, repudiated the 17-Point Agreement on 20 June 1959. He said that this "Agreement" was thrust upon the Tibetan Government and people by the threat of use of arms".
Apprehensions for Hong Kong
Unlike Tibet, Hong Kong is historically an integral part of China and no one disputes this fact. The fear here is that China may not remain faithful to the human rights and democracy provisions of the transfer agreement.
Britain was a detached overlord of Hong Kong and China has pledged to play the same role rather than becoming an intrusive boss. "Not everyone believes that promise, basically because they do not think that the powers-that-be in Beijing can make a distinction between the two roles," according to Harvey Stockwin in The Sunday Times of India (New Delhi, 11 May 1997).
The terms of the Joint Declaration which shaped the Basic Law makes the same kind of promises to Hong Kong as did the "17-Point Agreement" to Tibet. Simply stated, the Declaration provided that save for the transfer of sovereignty, nothing will change in Hong Kong. The territory will continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. Communist policies applied in the mainland will not be enforced there. Hong Kong will continue to maintain its capitalist system of life for 50 years after the handover.
These, then, are the promises. But one can't help wondering if China can be trusted to adhere to any agreement which does not serve its purpose. Certainly, the Tibetan experience with the "17-Point Agreement" does not give the people of Hong Kong much cause for optimism. As it is, China has already started interfering politically in the economic life of the territory. It refuses to recognize the new Container Port 9 contract awarded to a consortium in which the Jardine Group held a stake. The Jardine Group fell out with the Chinese government, because it switched its corporate domicile from Hong Kong to Bermuda.
In short, when Beijing cannot tolerate the one-country, two systems model for a country like Tibet which is culturally, racially, linguistically and politically distinct from China, it is hard to imagine that it will be different in the case of a territory like Hong Kong which is historically its part.
It is worth noting here that the "17 Point Agreement" was actually suggested by officials of the People's Republic of China as a model for the one-country, two-systems formula for the "reunification" of Taiwan. The Taiwanese rightly rejected this by pointing to the fate of Tibet as an example of what would befall them if they accepted the PRC's suggestion. The people of Hong Kong and all those concerned with their fate will do well to understand the Taiwanese fear.
Early signals of bad faith
The ominous signals of China's bad faith are there for all to see. Tung Chee-hua was elected the Chief Executive of Chinese Hong Kong in a dubious manner under the Communist machination. There are indications that the Chinese government's interpretation of the Basic Law will be different from the way many people in Hong Kong understand it. China has made it clear that it will replace the democratically-elected legislature of Hong Kong with one dominated by its handpicked nominees. The Chief Executive has alluded that human rights and democracy activists will find the going tough under the new master of Hong Kong. His proposals for legal reforms provides for the curtailment of democratic rights and civil liberties in the territory. The reforms envisage a strict curb on the international contact of the territory's political organizations and a ban on gatherings of more than 30 people.
Britain is already protesting that these actions of the Chinese government violate the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. A monthly China-watch journal, Zheng Ming, reportedly said that President Jiang Zemin recently ordered a preparation for "decisive action" in the event of "turmoil, riots or rebellions" in Hong Kong. This was the term used by China to describe the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and subsequent crackdown.
The endgame
The imposistion of "17-Point Agreement" and its subsequent violation by Beijing led to the mass uprising of Tibetans in March 1959. Beijing crushed the uprising brutally and forced the exodus of thousands of refugees and the total enslavement of a nation and its people. Over a million Tibetans had lost their lives and the Tibetan culture suffered genocidal destruction. Today, the very identity of Tibetans as a distinct nation and culture is on the verge of being wiped out from the face of earth.
In Hong Kong human rights and democracy will be the first casualty of reunification with China. The Chinese power structure does not have a history of tolerating dissent and criticism. It is totally alien to the idea that the government should exercise power by the consent of the governed. Is it, therefore, any wonder that fears for a Tiananmen Square-type of massacre persist despite the assurance of Tung Chee-hua to the contrary? Pro- democracy and human rights activists in Hong Kong have made it amply clear that they will gather in strength every year to observe the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 4 June 1989. It is hard to imagine that Beijing, which strongly criticizes other governments for allowing protests against it, will remain passive when the very same thing happens on its own soil.
In the meanwhile, Tung Chee-hua is transforming himself into the mould of communist Chinese leaders in the mainland. Having stated at a press conference on 11 December 1996 that a part of Hong Kong's culture will continue after 1997, he now says that the Hong Kong people are more concerned about livelihood issues than civil liberties. When interviewed by CNN, he said that concerns about housing, education and care for elderly are real problems and that the Hong Kong people care more about these issues than political liberty.
It seems quite certain that as the Communist rule becomes more and more entrenched in Hong Kong, the people of this former British colony will see the promised "two systems" coalesce into one Communist system. What remains to be seen is how far the people of Hong Kong, used to enjoying democracy and human rights, will put up with new dispensations from Beijing. The coming events in Hong Kong will involve not just Hong Kong, but the whole of China, and possibly many other countries and peoples by virtue of the territory's status as an international commercial capital. What all these portent is simply impossible to predict. We can only hope that it becomes the spark that will kindle the democratic flame for China and self-determination for Tibet.