by Marco De Andreis

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Following is the report presented at the Radical Party's 3rd Italian Congress (Rome, 14-17 February) on "War, disarmament and nonviolence", by Marco De Andreis, member of the Radical Party and IRDISP researcher (Institute of Research on Defence, Development and Peace).

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The fact that war is the negation of reason is proved, in my opinion, by the fact that many people stopped using their own reason on the 16th of this month, and have engaged in another war, a war of absolute opinions, principles and choices, with their friends and companions. The Gulf War has already ruined one party Congress. I would like to prevent it from spoiling another one, this one, and I therefore prefer to concentrate on post-war perspectives, on the opportunities that will arise and on the problems that will remain when (and I hope it will be soon) this war will conclude itself with the expulsion of the occupiers and the reinstatement of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

I am optimistic

I am optimistic. I believe that the chances of asserting nonviolence through legality, as the regulatory element of international relations, are increasing. The Gulf War is an accident, but the premises are all there: the general repulsion of the recourse to force, the quest for an agreement, the supremacy of democracy in the domestic politics of the States and that of legality in relations between States. Saddam Hussein's mistake has been precisely this: to have behaved as if this trend did not exist. As if nothing had happened between 1989 and 1990.

Instead, something did happen: the Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe crumbled away one after the other - in a fundamentally nonviolent (and in any case mostly bloodless) way, replaced by democratic governments. Germany is united once again. The Soviet Union was also moving in the same direction - perhaps with greater hesitation, and with stronger resistances; but basically it was moving in the same direction. In the meanwhile, some extremely important agreements on disarmament had been concluded - on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) - and others were about to be concluded - on Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Chemical Weapons. The message to the world was and remains clear: security cannot be one-way (the greater mine, the lesser yours); security means common security; reason, democracy and legality are asserting themselves.

To avoid the miscalculation made by Saddam Hussein

I wish we could avoid making the same miscalculation as Saddam Hussein, and focussed also on other things occurring in the world, the positive events occurred in the past months, between August and January: a wide consensus in the United Nations, expressed by a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions; an embargo against Iraq of unprecedented effectiveness; the support to the continuation of the embargo against the recourse to force in the U.S. Congress itself, which almost achieved the majority on the eve of the war.

I think these are solid bases on which to develop a nonviolent policy. So solid that five or six years ago I would have hardly believed it.

I mentioned the opportunities; now I will handle the problems: to make myself clear I will divide them into major areas: disarmament, regional conflicts, the reform of the international institutions, the global contention.

1. Disarmament

Disarmament and the control of armaments have finally come out of the standstill that had been going on since 1979, when SALT 2 was signed. But the two agreements concluded in the past three years - INF and CFE - concern Europe, or in any case the Northern part of the World. The Gulf war has suddenly taken the risks connected to the proliferation of all weapons to the forefront: obviously, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. But also conventional weapons, which - we should keep this in mind - still represent the greatest part of the military efforts of every country of the world.

Military use of nuclear energy

For that which concerns weapons of mass-extermination, the international community has long since deemed it wise to create regimes that halt their proliferation. The nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 is a typical example. Its effectiveness could be widely questioned: for example, many countries who have or intend to have a nuclear arsenal did not sign it (the best known cases: Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, etc). Other countries, that adhered officially, have continued to pursue military nuclear programs more or less secretly: the most blatant example is Iraq itself. Nonetheless, due consideration should be given to the fact that the NPT was signed by over 140 countries, and that in over twenty years there have been no cases of violations or withdrawals on the part of the adhering countries. In 1995 there will be the problem of renewing the NPT, which will otherwise expire. The question is to do all that is possible to see that it is not only renewed, but also enhanced

. This is possible, and I will mention two particularly promising cases: the government of Israel has repeatedly stated it is ready to discuss the creation of a denuclearized area in the Middle East. The abolition of apartheid and the passage to a full democracy in South Africa will eventually, so we hope, have repercussions on that country's foreign and military policy. Lastly, the agreement on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., which seems to be imminent, will no doubt rekindle the widespread rejection of atomic weapons.

Chemical weapons

As far as chemical weapons are concerned, a positive outcome of negotiations which have been dragging on for thirty years is also imminent. The probable agreement will in many respects be shaped on the regime of the NPT: the adhering countries will refrain from developing, manufacturing and stockpiling chemical agents, at the same time accepting to submit their industrial activities in that field to the control of an international agency that will see that they are not diverted toward military uses.

Allow me to say something obvious: the fact that the conclusion of the treaties I mentioned above is imminent does not mean that they

will necessarily be concluded. On the contrary: I wish to underline that it would be absurd if all the political forces (and the Radical Party especially) that have been struggling for years to obtain agreements such as these did not operate now to urge the governments to overcome the remaining obstacles.

Conventional weapons

As far as the proliferation of conventional weapons is concerned, there is nothing, absolutely nothing: neither treaties nor negotiations nor talks. This is simply preposterous: everyone can see the absurdity of indiscriminate arms export policies. We have seen how easily these weapons are turned against the suppliers themselves; we have witnessed blatant paradoxes, such as the French forces in the Gulf warding off French-built Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighters and Exocet missiles, which they had sold to Saddam Hussein, while our U.S. allies risk blowing up on Italian-manufactured Valsella mines.

The paradox of the arms export

The paradox increases if we consider that the wealth produced in the North of the world through the export of arms is negligible: it is estimated that the income from arms exports accounts for 0.1 percent of the Italian GNP, 1 percent of the French GNP and so on for all the other countries, except possibly the Soviet Union. This reality is completely reversed if we look at it from the importers' point of view: the military expenditure of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Israel has never dropped, in the past ten years, below 10 percent of their respective GNPs, with peaks of almost 30 percent. In other words, for the industrialized countries these traffics are an economic trifle, whereas for the importing countries they are a tragedy, in that they subtract resources from the satisfaction of primary needs and the development of the same countries.

In another outburst of optimism, I could also say that the only positive aspect of the Gulf War is that of having made these paradoxes (...) explicit and visible. The problem now is to fill the gap and create an initiative. We are already operating in this sense: a few days ago, a group of European Federalist parliamentarians submitted a motion on the matter to the Italian Parliament, the contents of which I will mention at the end, in the part devoted to the "global contention".

2. Regional conflicts

The causes for war and rearmament in the Third World lie in a series of rivalries and local problems (including the unsolved problems of national identity, the most evident of which is the Palestinian problem). Great opportunities have opened up on the matter: before the end of the cold war, the solution of regional conflicts was subordinated to the spheres of influence of the opposite fields. This was true in both directions: both the super-powers and their clients took sides on the basis of the growth of their influence to the detriment of that of the opponents. Iraq had a treaty of friendship and cooperation with U.S.S.R. not because it preferred Soviet weapons to Western weapons (and in fact, it purchased weapons in the West whenever it could), but to counter the protection granted by the U.S. to its main opponents: Iran and Israel. For their part, the Soviets played blind to the physical elimination of their Iraqi communist comrades - not to mention the elimination of all the other forms of opposition t

o the regime of Saddam Hussein - as long as it could offset the U.S. presence in the area.

Resorting to justice and to dialogue

The Iraqi dictator mistakenly concluded that the end of the bipolar pattern would mean a sort of green light to the use of force for the solution of his problems. The reaction of the international community, regardless of individual judgements on the war in progress, clearly proves that Saddam Hussein was mistaken. But if the spheres of influence have largely fallen into disuse, and military force is not an acceptable means to solve regional controversies, the only other feasible way is resorting to justice and dialogue.

To remain in the Middle East context, the end of the Gulf war must be immediately followed by the summons of that conference made impossible by the linkage, attempted by Saddam Hussein, with the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The problem is that the negotiations cannot be centred on the Palestinian issue only, no matter how important and urgent it is. Shaped on the different Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it must first of all embrace the problem of human rights and democracy in all the countries of the area; we should not forget the principle according to which democracy is the most potent antibody against war, if it is true (and it is) that democracies do not engage in war against one another. In parallel, it is necessary to solve the problems of security and disarmament and those of cooperation in and out of the region.

A conference on democracy in the Middle East

It is a model, that of the conferences on democracy, security and cooperation, which can be exported to other regions and areas, in addition to the Middle East. What's more, it could have the effect of relaunching regional institutions (such as the Organization of African States, or, once the war is concluded, the Gulf Council for Security and Cooperation) which are experiencing a period of inactivity and hardship, or to create new ones where such institutions do not exist - institutions which can represent an important nucleus for the reform of international institutions.

3. The reform of international institutions

A goal which seems to be more realistic today compared to the past is the full implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and the consequent transformation of this organization into a real world Federation of States. A federation charged with the monopoly of the use of force in the solution of international controversies according to the rules of international law - just as in democratic regimes the police is the only institution authorized to use weapons to enforce and restore legality.

A military and U.N. Armed Forces Command

In parallel with the reduction of national armies - or the military efforts of the alliances - I consider it perfectly conceivable for the U.N. to establish not only a military command, but even its own armed forces. The problem would no longer be that of accepting units from member states, integrating them somehow, but of creating a special agency with its own recruiting system. The U.N. employs economists, demographers, agronomists and a variety of other professionals in its specialized agencies, hiring them from all the adhering states, mostly without intermediaries. Why not follow the same pattern for the creation of an international police Corps?

The reform of the Security Council

On a more general basis, the process of enhancement of the United Nations will eventually place the question of the reform of the Security Council on the agenda; at present, the five nuclear powers are charged with the role of permanent members with the right of veto. Many have remarked that if the system were abruptly changed according to a one State-one vote pattern, the U.N. would be governed by a majority of non-democratic countries. Once again, the principle of democracy in the domestic life of the States becomes a fundamental element for the achievement of international order.

But there is more: any representative body, if it wants to avoid being supplanted and ignored in facts, must somehow take into account the real relations of force. The question, in this case, is to balance the pure principle of representativeness with factors such as population, income, etc. But even similar, more realistic solutions inevitably create resentment and charges of discrimination. One solution could be to charge the regional institutions with the role of permanent members in the Security Council. The first candidate for a position of this kind could be precisely the European Community.

An extension of the jurisdictions

All in all, the point seems to be that of encouraging whenever possible a process leading to a gradual extension of the jurisdiction, mitigating and eventually removing nationalist thrusts and outbursts. The solutions, once again, are always the same: nonviolence, legality, democracy. No matter how tortuous, wavering and fragile, the European integration is progressing on such bases. On the other hand, half a century of violence, of negation of legality and absence of democracy make it unacceptable for Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians to demand part of their sovereignty to a broader jurisdiction called the Soviet Union.

4. The global contention

I confess it is a rather brutal definition: but I found nothing more suitable. What I would like to include in this chapter is the clash of interests on global commons, be they raw material or energy sources, the environment or technology. These are all essential elements for the quality of life, on the plenty or scarcity of which largely depend the wealth or poverty of the people.

The disappearance of the palingenesis

Another positive consequence - and I promise it is the last I mention - of the end of the cold war is the disappearance, with very few exceptions, of the expectation for a drastic renewal. At this point, we all now that market economy is the only feasible mechanism for the distribution of wealth. We can amend it, modify it, mitigate it, but we have to stick to it. As a consequence, it is best to tackle problems immediately, as soon as they appear, rather than postpone their solution to judgement day.

This has important practical consequences: for example, it should be clear by now that the reasons for the exchange between the South, which produces raw materials, and the North that consumes them, cannot be changed overnight. Otherwise, private economic subjects will adapt to the situation by reducing the demand. At that point, either the producers boost the demand by lowering prices, or they will have to be content with smaller profits as a consequence of its contraction. With an oversimplified example, this is what happened with the oil market.

The South, net exporter of financial resources

The decline of the palingenesis called New International Economic Order must not, however, lead us to accept misery, hunger and injustice, nor to accept the absurd situation whereby the South - owing mainly to its debt - is now a net exporter of financial resources that head toward the North. It is up to the States to mitigate the effects of the market and invert the direction of the flow of capitals.

To fight against poverty

For our rich and industrialized countries, to fight against the poverty and underdevelopment of the South of the world means investing in security. The money necessary for this purpose should logically come from the so-called peace dividend, that is, the savings resulting from the end of the East-West arms race. In its issue of September 1, 1990, the Economist (which is positively not the press organ of British pacifists) stated that NATO could cut its military expenditure by about $100 billion a year, whilst remaining capable of intervening in the Third World and at the same time defending itself from possible reprises of the Soviet threat.

Four years of such savings would enable to cover the debt of the most highly exposed Third World countries at a nominal value. Expressed in dollars, the long-term credits associated to the Marshall Plan - the plan that reactivated the economies of Western Europe destroyed by World War II - amount to approximately $150 billion: one and a half years of the savings which The Economist deems realistic for NATO. Lastly, with seven years of such savings, we could achieve that which the Worldwatch Institute refers to as "an environment-compatible development".

I will conclude with another example of how disarmament and solution of the global contention can complete one another. It is the motion recently presented at the Chamber by some Radical parliamentarians.

The arms trade

At the beginning of this report I mentioned the blatant absurdity of an indiscriminate trade of conventional weapons. How can it be stopped? As far as the demand is concerned, it is obvious that it is necessary to remove the political, local and especially regional causes of the conflicts. But what can be done on the supply side? It is necessary to break the apparently logical pattern according to which "even if I don't export weapons my neighbour will". How can this be done?

One possibility would be to follow the example of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The latter is based on an explicit exchange: the countries that renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons receive assistance and transfers of technology in exchange, if they choose a peaceful use of atomic energy.

Such model could be applied to the transfer of the major weapon systems (aircraft, helicopters, warships, armoured vehicles, missiles, electronic systems and guns with a calibre exceeding 100mm) and of the technology necessary for their manufacture. The producing countries could offer guaranties for the transfer of civilian technology (parallel to the creation of a system of safeguards to block diversions toward military uses) and economic aid to those countries that: a) renounce the acquisition of sophisticated conventional weapons and their relative technologies; b) reduce their military expenditures; c) make their domestic policies conform to democratic principles and the respect of human rights.

Realistic and feasible solutions

From all the above it can be deduced that the solutions for some of the most urgent global problems exist, and that they are both realistic and feasible. Moreover, the decline of the blocs has brought about the most favourable political conditions since the end of World War II in order for legality, democracy and nonviolence to regulate international relations.

And yet, we are forced to witness a war. We see that the real solution to all the problems mentioned above is continually postponed, or comes fatally late - when other issues, maybe more complex ones, have emerged and call for immediate solutions. In all democratic countries we see the political leadership engaged in domestic trifles, blocked by the short periods between elections and re-elections. Viewing problems in a broader or global perspective is something far removed from this political leadership - especially the Italian one.

We need something new and different

It is obvious that we need something new and different: a political instrument proportioned to the nature and the scale of the problems. What characteristics should such political means have?

Nonviolent

First of all, it must be nonviolent. It's too bad for Machiavelli, but on the whole the means are always coherent with the ends. And if we want an international order based on nonviolence and legality, it is with nonviolence and legality that we must create it.

Transpartisan

It should also be transpartisan: no ideological label contains a particular inclination toward what I called "thinking long-term and in a global perspective". If we tried to establish a statistic correlation between a good administration and the ideological position of the different executives, in those democratic countries in which alternation was successful, we would discover that there is none. Clairvoyance and near-sightedness take roots everywhere and practically in the same proportions, to the detriment, unfortunately, of the first: an invitation for all to provide themselves with spectacles.

Transnational

Lastly, it must be transnational: problems can no longer be restricted to a single country, and almost nothing can be solved in this way. Let us take the motion on the conventional arms trade, for example: even if all the Italian parliamentarians and the government signed it in perfect good faith, all the aims which it intends to achieve would be missed without the support of other Parliaments and other governments. Hence the necessity to have a means capable of operating in all parliaments and in all governments.

Nonviolent, transpartisan and transnational: this instrument exists: it is the Radical Party. The problem is that it is small. Clearly, it is not a dwarf. Rather, a child of politics. Let's hurry up and make it grow.