on changes in East-West relations and the North-South relationship: role of the Community and the Twelve

The European Parliament,

-having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mrs Dury on joint actions by the Twelve, the countries of Eastern Europe and the developing countries to expand cooperation with the Third World (B3-0059/90),

-having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation and the opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations (A3-0392/91),

I. On multipolarity and large regional blocks

1.Warmly welcomes the economic and political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe insofar as they represent the end of the negative impact of the bloc politics which had prevailed since the Second World War, the positive effects of which are already visible in certain countries of the world, and contribute to the creation of a common European home and a new international order;

2.Believes that the ending of East-West opposition reveals more clearly that the divisions of the world are between development and underdevelopment, rich and poor, and that the North-South relationship represents the key to all international relations;

3.Notes that current international relations are dominated by a multipolar world structured around three pillars (EEC/United States/Japan) whose composition and weight varies and which have well-defined regional preferences, and warns against the possible risks that intra-bloc protectionism might pose for two-thirds of the world (Africa, Latin America and Asia) which is trapped in underdevelopment and injustice;

4.Notes with concern that, despite the end of bloc politics, regional military powers still exist, supported by dictatorial regimes and armed by developed countries, which continue to jeopardize world peace and security; notes also that international relations are increasingly affected by ethnic considerations which exacerbate the North-South problem and may prevent the construction of an international order on new foundations;

5.Stresses that progress achieved in European integration (single market, EEA) and the changes in Central and Eastern Europe should lead to a joint European initiative, by the current Europe of the Twelve and a larger Community in the future, in the field of East-West-South cooperation within a wide-ranging Community cooperation programme which should balance the weight of the remaining regional blocs and entail the sharing of responsibilities and burdens by the industrialized countries, the countries of Eastern Europe and those of the South;

6.Takes the view that, to this end and in spite of the progress made since the entry into force of the Single Act, the Community should undertake major reforms at institutional level which will meet the requirements of the common foreign and security policy and coordinate development cooperation policy as an integral part of the Community's external influence, with a view to enabling the Community to act on the international stage with an influence commensurate with its size;

7.Is convinced that political union, economic and monetary union and the European single market are closely linked processes which have the potential to transform the Community into a partner and negotiator at international level vis-à-vis third countries and organizations and international fora (UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT) with a view to shaping action in the fields of democracy, human rights, development, the environment, disarmament and interregional trade relations;

8.Takes the view that an East-West-South Community initiative must be approached from an internationalist angle and that there should be greater political will regarding Africa, Latin America and Asia in addition to Europe's current priority interests (Central Europe, CSCE, the Mediterranean and the Middle East);

9.Considers that such an East-West-South Community initiative should help revitalize or establish links between regional communities in the South (ECOWAS, SADCC, South Pacific Forum, CARICOM, Central American Common Market, ASEAN, Gulf Cooperation Council, etc), safeguard the environment, establish a mechanism allowing the prices of commodities to be stabilized on world markets, regulate international trade in favour of the developing countries, control arms dealing and drugs and finally stimulate equitable and sustained development in Eastern Europe and the South in the wake of a serious reassessment of the European development and cooperation model followed to date;

II. On development policy and East-West-South cooperation

10.Is aware of the fears and doubts expressed by developing countries in all the international fora regarding the possible diversion to Eastern Europe of aid originally intended for the South due to the speed with which aid has been mobilized;

11.Is convinced that aid for the countries of Eastern Europe from the Group of 24 is both desirable and necessary and considers that financial and technical cooperation should be continued in support of economic and democratic changes and be accompanied by greater cultural and environmental cooperation;

12.Regrets that, in contrast to this aid, many countries, financial institutions and private investors devote insufficient economic and political attention to the countries of Latin America and Africa in particular and deplores the reluctance to raise North-South issues in the Group of Seven and the lack of agreements on the problems of developing countries in the various international fora (commodities, debt, GATT);

13.Notes that:

-the figures laid down by the UN requiring that 0.7% of the developed world's GNP should go to developing countries and 0.15% to LDCs have not yet been reached by the OECD countries as a whole (0.36% of GNP) and only three members of the Community have achieved this objective; the combined value of bilateral aid from Community Member States and Community aid fails to reach 0.5% of GNP,

-the bilateral and multilateral international financial effort to date by the Group of 24 countries in favour of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe amounts to 1% of the combined GNP of the former countries,

-in 1989 only one fifth of private investment went to developing countries,

-private investment has been withdrawn from the most needy regions of Eastern Europe and the South in the face of the generalized situation of foreign debt, the lack of investment guarantees, political uncertainty and social violence,

-the transfer of resources from the South to the North as a result of debt servicing is equivalent to public aid to the countries of Eastern Europe;

14.Affirms that at the moment it is premature to conclude that bilateral and multilateral public aid to Eastern Europe is being granted to the detriment of the countries of the South, but insists that neither the EC nor its Member States must charge assistance to Eastern Europe against the development cooperation budget, with the exception of those countries whose level of development meets the ODA criteria;

15.Welcomes the EIB's intervention in the countries of Eastern Europe and recalls that the European Parliament has repeatedly called for a modification of the EIB's statutes to allow it to intervene in other areas of the world, above all in Latin America; therefore calls on the Council to urge the Board of Governors of the EIB to embark on the appropriate steps with a view to making such intervention possible;

16.Takes the view that the risks for the countries of the South stem less from the sum of capital than from other factors which should be tackled by the international community as a whole and the Community in particular, such as the formation of large regional blocs, the future of the Uruguay Round, the GSP, the reform of the CAP and market access, and the Community should therefore advocate a new approach to development cooperation policy in an East-West-South context;

17.Considers that the Community should take consistent and positive measures to mitigate the possible negative effects of the single market so as to ensure that developing countries can benefit from the opportunities offered by the 1992 extended market;

18.Welcomes the analysis contained in the Commission communication of 25 March 1991 (SEC(91) 0061), the resolution of the European Council of 29 June 1991 concerning an overall approach to democracy, human rights and development and the Council resolution of 28 November 1991 on human rights;

19.Considers that if these resolutions are to be implemented in a fair and impartial manner the Commission must propose to Parliament and the Council the conditions under which they may apply and notably:

-specify the criteria and means it intends to use to evaluate respect for democracy and human rights,

-specify the sanctions that may be applied in case of non-compliance;

20.Considers that the development cooperation model followed to date by the Community as a whole, its Member States at a bilateral level and other bilateral or multilateral donors has led to some progress in correcting a number of social and economic imbalances but that its effects have been weakened because it has been centred on assistance-type aid, which has sometimes contributed to a massive tax deficit (very high public expenditure, financing of military expenditure, prestige infrastructures), an environmental deficit, a trade deficit and a social deficit arising from structural adjustment measures implemented in order to remedy the debt situation;

21.Takes the view that the causes of such deficits are the joint responsibility of donors in the North and East and recipients in the South, and that the frequent recourse to 'interference in internal affairs' has been a major obstacle to the discussion of fundamental questions, particularly those relating to human rights;

22.Suggests that the new cooperation model should adopt an internationalist approach, end the linking of aid to bilateral political or economic interests and eliminate military assistance and conditions imposed by international financial institutions when they represent an actual restriction on development;

23.Is aware of the internal and external difficulties being experienced by the countries of Eastern Europe (balance of trade problems, debt, disintegration of regional trade within COMECON, border disputes etc.) but trusts that these issues will not hinder cooperation with the countries of the South and appeals to the countries of Eastern Europe at least to maintain their provision of technical aid and, as far as possible and with increasing intensity, to shoulder their political responsibilities and join other nations in their solidarity with the countries of the South;

24.Urges the Commission and the Member States during a transitional phase to give special assistance to those developing countries which are confronted with a discontinuation or substantial reduction of economic and technical assistance from Eastern European countries;

25.Calls on the Commission, the Council and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union, to give joint consideration to strategies aimed at coordinated cooperation in countries and regions of the South, and expects the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to play a major role in international bodies and organizations (GATT, UNCTAD, UNDP, IMF, etc.);

26.Regrets that the Community, as a multilateral body, represents its Member States only in part and, with regard to external cooperation, channels only between 10 and 20% of Member States' cooperation funds;

27.Considers it increasingly necessary, therefore, that progress be made within EPC towards a larger Community role in development aid, that past achievements in coordinating aid with other donors be continued and that the ties frequently attached to aid be reduced, since the value to the recipient of such aid is between 20 and 30% less than that of aid which is not tied;

28.Urges the Community to shape an overall Community development policy chiefly based on the following pillars:

-political cooperation in defence of human rights and democratization,

-political support for regional peace-making,

-aid to those sections of society which have been most adversely affected by structural adjustment (women and children),

-the promotion, within the Community and in other international fora, of an overall trade policy which takes account of the interests of developing countries and the countries of Eastern Europe,

-cooperation for the fostering and protection of the environment,

-the strengthening of regional cooperation and economic integration among developing countries,

-priority consideration for the least developed countries;

29.Calls on the Commission and Council, through existing cooperation facilities and others to be created, to introduce a new development cooperation model based on political and social change which will enable progress to be made by the most disadvantaged groups and regions, which takes account only of the needs of the beneficiaries, which strengthens control mechanisms to ensure that aid in fact reaches those in need and which takes account of the capacity to receive aid of the countries concerned;

30.Welcomes the positive elements of the fourth Lomé Convention, particularly with regard to social measures in connection with structural adjustment (ECU 1.1 thousand million), protection of the environment, and the impulse given to regional integration, and considers this to be one of the best instruments of North-South cooperation; nevertheless takes the view that the Commission and the ACP States should make extra efforts to fill the gaps, both quantitative (discrimination within the GSP, lack of resources within STABEX, fall in private investment) and qualitative (inadequacy regarding the environmental impact and administrative inertia);

31.Regrets that the Community has not proposed under Lomé IV its own strategy for structural adjustment, the principal objectives of which would be to avoid the waste of natural resources in the North, to release the savings which the countries of the East and the South need and to help the ACP countries to implement the necessary reforms meeting their specific needs;

32.Considers that technical and financial assistance, trade concessions and fortuitous price rises must be accompanied by appropriate technology transfers to supplement such measures;

Debt

33.Welcomes the debt-rescheduling facilities granted to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former USSR, and highlights the contrast between these facilities and the scant mechanisms made available to the countries of the South in this connection;

34.Congratulates the Commission on the decision to cancel a part of the ACP countries' debt to the Community, although this measure should be the first step towards cancelling the bilateral debts of the poorest countries in the context of a programme of financial and socio-economic reorganization aimed at encouraging political and economic reform in order to manage the available resources democratically;

35.Calls on the Commission and Council, in coordination with the Group of Seven, to instigate an international conference on the cancellation of debt, currently amounting to 1.3 billion dollars (countries of the South and Eastern Europe), which should eliminate the causes of debt, find new sources of funding, resolve the problem of commodity prices, set interest rates and foster democracy based on structural adjustment which will draw up social programmes (health, education, population) aimed at the most disadvantaged sectors of the population (children and women);

36.Stresses that the international mobilization of funds towards the countries of Eastern Europe, combined with the enormous demands for capital on the part of the United States and the capital needed for the reconstruction of the countries affected by the Gulf War, may lead to significant tension on international capital markets, thus leading to a rise in interest rates, which would increase further the debt of developing countries; considers also that it is necessary to reduce the public sector deficits of the developed countries;

37.Calls, therefore, for the mobilization of funds for Eastern Europe and those intended for the South to form part of a wider framework of cooperation which combines technical transfers, structural changes, training and access to the markets of the North;

Liberalization of trade, 1992 and GATT

38.Considers that the liberalization of world trade requires a thorough consideration of North-South preferential arrangements in relation to the liberalization of trade with the countries of Eastern Europe, taking account of the consequences which the accession of a number of Eastern European countries to the GSP will have for the benefits that developing countries enjoy from the preferences, and the effect on the developing countries' outlets on the European market caused by the association agreements with a number of East European countries;

39.Recalls that the main demand of the countries of Eastern Europe and the South is for access for their products to the markets of the North;

40.Notes that the Community's preferential arrangements vis-à-vis the various developing regions of the South are contradictory and that the preferential relationship envisaged in the Lomé Convention has had little impact on ACP trade and has perpetuated the pigeon-holing of the countries of the South as mere commodity producers;

41.Calls on the Commission, in view of the discriminations which the GSP has introduced between countries of the South and those of Eastern Europe and the scant advantages which it has offered to ACP countries, in view of the comparative advantages enjoyed by the North in relation to almost all goods and services, and in view of international competition between the countries of Eastern Europe and the South and NICs, to carry out an in-depth study of preferential access arrangements to Community markets and, in the current GSP offer, to offset the consequences of participation of the Eastern European countries by increasing the total maxima and ceilings by the quantity of preferences accorded to these countries;

42.Takes the view that the Community, in its dialogue with the countries of the South and Eastern Europe, has not yet responded to future developments in the structure of Community imports and the question whether, in view of the single market, it will continue its current import policy, which presently favours the ACP countries for political rather than economic reasons;

43.Calls on the Commission and Council to give a political impulse to the multilateral negotiations within the GATT framework and, by defending their interests, uphold a stance in that body which is consistent with the aspirations of developing countries, whose negotiating power is constantly diminishing;

44.Considers that the lack of an agreement in the GATT negotiations may lead to the fragmentation of the international economic system into large regional trading blocs, posing the threat of intra-bloc protectionism;

45.Regrets that GATT's attempts at liberalization are frequently slowed down by the lack of understanding between the United States and the EC, by certain Community anti-dumping measures and by voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs) and notes that, according to GATT sources, the Community currently accounts for half of the VERs subscribed to by industrialized countries, 50% of which affect developing countries;

46.Observes that, according to data gathered by the World Bank, unhindered access to the markets of industrialized countries would imply around $55 000 m in new income for exports, which is approximately equivalent to the aid received by developing countries;

47.Calls on the Commission to develop intitiatives and grant the necessary financial assistance to bring about trade flows between the Eastern European countries with a potentially high demand and the developing countries;

The Mediterranean

48.Takes the view that the Mediterranean should be a priority for the Community and considers that cooperation agreements with the countries of the Mediterranean and the accompanying protocols require quantitative (overall regional agreement, Euro-Arab Development Bank) and qualitative changes (cultural cooperation, immigration and clause on human rights);

49.Calls on the Commission and Council to take the necessary initiatives with regard to the convening of a conference on security and cooperation with the Mediterranean;

Immigration

50.Points out that, according to UN calculations, 10 million immigrants from Eastern Europe and the South may seek to enter the Community by the year 2000 and takes the view that the question of immigration should be tackled at Community level and not by the Member States individually; calls on the Commission to consider the possibilities of greater cooperation to assist the economic development of the countries most affected by emigration;

51.Points out that the Community must be aware that protectionism and immigration are linked and that any restriction on the opening up of Community markets to products from the developing countries helps to cause an additional inflow of migrants from the South to the countries of the North, in particular those of the European Community;

52.Considers that the Community must find a democratic solution with regard to all those now expelled by hunger, civil war and nationalism and should find positive solutions to the repercussions which immigration might have on clandestine employment, non-contractual working conditions and inadequate social security;

53.Condemns all acts of racism, xenophobia and discrimination based on nationality, race or religion and calls on the Member State governments to introduce and/or apply stringent laws against such acts; invites the Member States of the Community to deal democratically with the aspirations of minorities and nationalities;

54.Considers that immigrants from other countries should be given the same protection against racism and xenophobia as EC citizens including as regards fundamental rights;

III. On the peace dividend

55.Regrets that, according to SIPRI sources, one billion dollars are currently being spent on arms throughout the world and that military expenditure in developing countries has increased at an annual rate of 7.5% over the last 25 years (more than double the growth rate of military expenditure in the industrialized countries); observes that, in the majority of developing countries, the percentage of GNP used for military expenditure is equal to or higher than expenditure on health and education, demonstrating that the volume of military expenditure absorbs scarce resources and slows down growth in developing countries;

56.Deplores the 30 or so unresolved conflicts involving more than 40 countries;

57.Observes that an annual reduction of 10% in military expenditure in the Community, the United States and Japan would enable aid to the South to be doubled; considers that the governments of these countries should take steps to foster the reconversion of the arms industry to industries with civil purposes and calls on these countries and the former members of the Warsaw Pact to aim at least for a similar reduction in military expenditure;

58.Welcomes the conclusions of the European Council of December 1990 which, on the basis of guidelines for political union, included the coordination of policies regarding the export and non-proliferation of arms within the remit of the Intergovernmental Conference;

59.Urges the Member States and other international donors to draw a clear distinction between development aid and military aid, to restrict arms sales in general and, within the framework of European Political Cooperation and common external security, to reduce bilateral or multilateral inter-state cooperation with all countries whose military expenditure exceeds social expenditure (education, health, etc.) and furthermore to subject the granting of export licences for arms to the strictest possible criteria;

60.Takes the view that the concepts of peace and security refer not only to the military sphere and that there is a close connection between disarmament, development, human rights, democracy and the environment which should be taken into account by a Community policy on external security;

61.Takes the view that peace and security do not depend solely on military supremacy but that other factors are required to lend it stability:

-political agreement through international peace conferences,

-prevention through restrictions on and an international register of arms sales under the auspices of UN institutions;

62.Emphasizes the importance of tripartite cooperation in the field of development cooperation between the East, West and the South, and therefore calls on the Commission, given the lack of a broad social basis for development cooperation policy in the Eastern European countries, to take initiatives and to support those leading to greater consideration for these problems within Eastern European society, so that reorientation of policy is expedited;

63.Calls on the Commission, Council and Member States wherever possible to involve the existing and frequently unused expertise in the Eastern European countries in development cooperation policy, both directly and in planning, particularly in those developing countries which came within the sphere of influence of the former Eastern Bloc;

IV. On the new world order

64.Reiterates the need for a political union which should coordinate the Community's foreign, security and development policy and enable Europe to become fully involved as a catalyst in the construction of a new world order;

65.Stresses that the transformation of planned economies into market economies represents an unprecedented step in world history and recalls that the end of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe does not in itself imply the end of social injustice either in the West or in the South, and urges the adoption of a common policy to resolve the North-South conflict within the Community itself: xenophobia, religious fanaticism, cultural arrogance, nationalism and neo-nazism;

66.Is convinced that conflicts cannot be resolved if the states concerned are not based on the rule of law; stresses that the Community should be a guarantor of human and economic rights within international institutions;

67.Takes the view that current international relations are shaping a process which might result in a new and revitalized United Nations, offering the opportunity of a UN-EEC link which should lead to both the Community as such and developing countries forming part of the Security Council with a view to ensuring that the principles of its charter are applied;

68.Notes that the increase in poverty, social inequalities and absolute deprivation among most of the peoples of the developing countries confirms the gaps in and failure of development cooperation as hitherto conceived and believes that it is becoming urgently necessary to define a new development cooperation policy in favour of the countries of the South, based on new North-South relations which are politically more democratic and economically more egalitarian;

69.Considers that the Rio Conference (UNCED) could be an opportunity to make the world order progress in this direction, providing the prosperous countries play a decisive political and financial role and the Rio decisions are taken up in major international negotiating fora such as GATT and multilateral economic organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank;

70.Takes the view that construction of the new international order depends on monitoring the processes of democracy and on the relationship between sustained development and democracy which must appear on the agenda for relations between states, and considers that there are still countries which have an alarming history of human rights abuse and cannot therefore claim any right to involvement in the new international order;

71.Takes the view that human rights clauses should form part of cooperation agreements with third countries and calls on the Commission to submit an annual report on the observance of human rights in countries with which the Community cooperates;

o o o

72.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, European Political Cooperation, the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.