A3-0108/93

Resolution on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security

The European Parliament,

-having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Poettering and Mr Sakellariou on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security (B3-0150/91),

-having regard to its resolution of 14 March 1989 on European arms exports,

-having regard to its resolution of 13 July 1990 on disarmament, the conversion of defence industries and arms exports,

-having regard to its resolution of 9 October 1990 on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II Conference),

-having regard to its resolution of 18 April 1991 on the arms trade,

-having regard to its resolution of 17 May 1991 on the role of Europe in relation to security in the Mediterranean,

-having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991 on the outlook for a European security policy and its implications for European Union,

-having regard to its resolution of 11 July 1991 on the CSCE,

-having regard to its resolution of 12 September 1991 on reductions in arms spending and troop withdrawals and the impact of these developments on employment in the hardest hit regions of the Community,

-having regard to its resolution of 17 September 1992 on the statement on the Helsinki II summit,

-having regard to its resolution of 17 September 1992 on the Community's role in the supervision of arms exports and the armaments industry,

-having regard to its resolution of 9 February 1993 on disarmament, energy and development,

-having regard to the Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed at the CSCE meeting in Paris on 21 November 1990, which expressly calls for disarmament and confidence-building measures, warns against the new dangers and provides for the further development of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes,

-having regard to the Final Document of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki on 9-10 July 1992, which was signed by 51 States and provides for further progress in the field of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a new CSCE forum for security cooperation,

-having regard to the Treaty on European Union and its resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the intergovernmental conferences,

-having regard to the report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0108/93),

A.whereas, in view of the far-reaching changes which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, there is now a new basis for European security policy and for the first times for many decades there exists the possibility of a European security policy,

B.convinced that Western Europe and the European Community must boldly address themselves to the changes that are needed and that, despite the general failure of its Yugoslavia policy, the Community can make a significant contribution to a new European security architecture;

C.whereas European security policy in East-West relations is currently primarily a matter of pursuing the pan-European integration process and offering all Europeans the firm and early prospect of a 'common European home'; whereas the Community can be the motive force to achieve this, if it also is prepared to change;

D.convinced that the Community's influence in the pan-European process as a whole will be enhanced if it succeeds in pushing ahead with the unification process to create a genuine European Union,

E.convinced that European security can form part of a global security policy in which regional security systems, in the context of the United Nations and regional integration processes, can ensure peace and prevent or solve conflicts throughout the world;

F.determined to fulfil the Community's responsibilities in respect of a common foreign and security policy as a contribution towards peacekeeping in Europe,

G.convinced that the Community can best contribute to European security if it makes clear that any Community military capacity will be used exclusively in the framework of United Nations decisions, in a UN or regional context, and under United Nations command,

1.Takes the view that, in addition to the threats to European security in East-West relations which existed until recently, new trouble-spots are emerging and that action should be taken accordingly;

2.Considers the increasing tendency of armed forces and weapons systems to be beyond political control, the breaking up of nations, border conflicts and the ethnic or national tensions and conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the social and economic disparity between East and West, impending environmental disasters or those which have already occurred, in particular those caused by past malpractice, for example in the field of nuclear safety, and the continuing effects of the dissolution of the former area of Soviet influence to be the most serious threats to security in East-West relations in Europe;

3.Takes the view that action should be taken against such destabilizing factors primarily by political means by working resolutely towards a pan-European process of democratic, political, economic and institutional convergence, and that a new European policy for East-West security must above all move in this direction;

4.Considers that any common security policy must be conceived in a purely political perspective, and that its objectives must consist in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, substantial reductions in armed forces, the effective limitation of arms exports and the promotion of a ban on nuclear, chemical and biological warfare in accordance with the undertakings entered into at the most recent meeting of the CSCE;

5.Demands, as an essential pre-condition for a Community security policy, the full democratization of the decision-making and parliamentary supervision processes within the Community, failing which the common foreign and security policy would risk exacerbating the already worrying democratic deficit;

6.Considers it essential that tensions be reduced by the creation of an economic, social, ecological, political and military balance and is aware that the richer and more stable parts of Europe must make a particular contribution to bring about this state of equilibrium, which in the long term will prove economically beneficial to all the states of Europe, in both East and West;

7.Further emphasizes that economic regeneration in Central and Eastern Europe is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining peace and stability in Europe as a whole and supports, first and foremost, efforts towards the promotion of economic development in the region;

8.Regards simultaneous and balanced disarmament and arms conversion throughout Europe as a security policy priority; support must be given to conversion of the arms industry, of arms production and of military research throughout Europe as a matter of urgency by providing appropriate economic compensation and subsidies;

9.Calls, in particular, for the present historic opportunity for nuclear disarmament throughout Europe not to be missed;

10.Considers that the preconditions for further significant reductions of arms and troops in Europe already exist and calls for the existing relevant agreements (START, CFE, NPT, etc.) to be ratified or extended, and signed and observed by all countries, including newly formed countries;

11.Stresses that in the future, too, an American security contribution will be welcome and needed in Europe in the context of the transatlantic partnership;

12.Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to give priority to developing a non-military security policy based on the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

13.Considers the desire of all European countries to participate on full and equal terms in a European security system to be entirely justified;

14.Considers that the governments of the Member States should make efforts to ensure that the CSCE is more active in the present conflict in Europe;

15.Nevertheless regards the CSCE as an appropriate instrument to become a regional organization of the United Nations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and an effective and exemplary regional security system under the United Nations;

16.Hopes that one of the results of defining a common foreign and security policy will be that the Community speaks with one voice in the CSCE and the UN (in particular the Security Council) and helps to strengthen these organizations;

17.Wishes to see the Community and its Member States, in the context of the CSCE, helping to strengthen and implement mechanisms for preventing and solving conflicts and for bringing about peaceful settlements of crises which would be binding on all sides, and lending political and financial support to the CSCE process to the best of their ability;

18.Calls for the role of civilians (including those from non-governmental organizations) in conflict reduction, conflict settlement and crisis management mechanisms to be studied and tested in the context of a common foreign and security policy, and for support to be given to appropriate institutions and organizations;

19.Calls upon the European Community to commit itself at all levels to building up a common, concordant, pan-European security system involving the existing security organizations (NATO, WEU, NACC, etc.) within the framework of the CSCE; in the Mediterranean area a similar peace and security policy should be founded on a CSCM (Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean);

20.Calls on EPC and the Member States to take initiatives along these lines within NATO and the WEU;

21.Considers that admission to a system of this sort should be open to the countries of the former Soviet Union, provided there is evidence that they satisfy the Community's conditions;

22.Criticizes the large-scale arms sales by Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, which encourages an arms build-up in other regions of the world (in particular the Near East and the Middle East);

23.Regards the measures decided by the CSCE's 1992 Helsinki Summit on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes as an important step towards improving confidence and increasing security in Europe, and hopes to see further progress in this connection in the near future;

24.Regards the early despatch of observer missions to crisis areas as very important, but takes the view that it is not sufficient to retain the consensus principle: desirable though the consensus and cooperation of the state concerned are, it must be possible to act without it under certain conditions;

25.Regards the involvement of non-governmental organizations and the resources of civil society as an important factor in a security policy designed to build confidence and preserve peace and therefore calls for these instruments to be increasingly used and supported;

26.Takes the view that effective steps should be taken in the CSCE without delay to provide appropriate training for civilian and military personnel for deployment on observer missions and in connection with measures to keep the peace, build confidence and promote dialogue;

27.Attaches the greatest importance to the further development of the peaceful settlement of disputes, inter alia by setting up bodies to act as intermediaries, conciliators and possibly arbitrators, and calls upon EPC to promote a coordinated move in this direction by the Member States in the CSCE and emphatically support appropriate proposals;

28.Welcomes the new round of negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures decided upon by the CSCE, the planned setting-up of a new CSCE forum for security cooperation and the decision to strengthen the conflict prevention centre;

29.Regards the potential for conflict which may arise from tensions with an ethnic and/or national aspect and inspire a desire for ethnic cleansing as a growing and very serious threat and calls for every effort to be made to help people and ethnic groups to live together without antagonism and to promote good-neighbourliness between states, before a policy of ethnic homogenization and cleansing can wreak any further havoc in Europe;

30.Is convinced that this is an area in which the activities of non-governmental organizations can be particularly helpful in promoting inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation and calls for systematic support for them;

31.Welcomes the appointment of a CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities announced in Chapter II of the Helsinki Decisions; regrets, however, that his terms of reference are very narrow; hopes that the preparatory work at the CSCE conference of experts in Geneva in July 1991 will lead to the early adoption of common binding principles for the protection of ethnic, national and linguistic minorities and ensure that people can live together in multi-ethnic societies under just conditions; calls upon the Community to provide impetus and bring pressure to bear to this end at all levels (CSCE, Council of Europe, UN);

32.Is convinced that the establishment of a binding system of law and appropriate conciliation bodies could defuse many threats to security in this field; calls on the Member States of the Council of Europe, and in particular those of the Community, to sign and ratify without delay the draft convention for a European charter of regional and minority languages which has been submitted to the Council of Europe and which has already been adopted by the Committee of Ministers;

33.Stresses the fundamental importance of impartial, non-nationalistic information in connection with confidence building and conflict prevention and calls upon the Community to take every possible step to support such information;

34.Is convinced that a binding and monitored disarmament process and willingness to participate in a system of solving conflicts by political and legal means rather than military force are the political preconditions for full participation in an all-European security system of this sort;

35.Believes that in extreme cases where military force must be brought to bear on lawbreakers to prevent even greater violence and to secure or maintain peace, this should be carried out as an international police action, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, and calls on the Community and its Member States to make an appropriate contribution;

36.Wishes organizations such as NATO and the WEU to be involved as far as possible only in this work, and hopes that an effort will be made towards the further development of the United Nations as a peacemaking organization;

37.Calls for a policy of convergence and burden-sharing between the various European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in the light of the above principles, and considers that institutions which have become superfluous could be wound up entirely (following the example of the Warsaw Pact);

38.Desires effective parliamentary participation in the process of pan-European security and integration, in the context of both the CSCE parliamentary assembly and through the establishment of a permanent forum for discussion between the European Parliament and the parliaments of European countries outside the Community which desire to take part and which represent countries with which the EC has concluded agreements (on the model of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly), and advocates simplification of the various institutions working towards convergence in Europe, and more links between them;

39.Calls on the Council and Commission to take prompt and resolute action to support a pan-European security system of this sort, before the new threats become acute and the possibility of European convergence perhaps recedes again into the distance, and to draw up and put forward appropriate proposals, and calls on EPC to coordinate and implement the policies of the Member States to this end in international bodies, particularly the UN, the CSCE, NATO and the WEU;

40.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission, EPC, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and WEU.