A3-0387/93

Resolution on the independence of the national central banks in the context of the second and third stages of EMU

The European Parliament,

-having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

-having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A3-0387/93),

A.whereas the Treaty on European Union makes the adaptation of national central bank legislation a precondition for moving to the third stage of economic and monetary union and whereas, under the Treaty, a move to the third stage before 1 January 1999 is possible only if a majority of Member States have brought their national central bank legislation into line with the Treaty on European Union,

B.whereas, in accordance with Article 109e(5), each Member State shall start the process leading to the independence of its Central Bank during the second stage,

C.whereas the recent monetary crisis in Europe has shown that even countries with sound basic economic indicators may get into difficulties if the markets do not regard their stability-oriented monetary policies as credible in the long run, and convinced that the independence of a central bank is an important guarantee of its credibility,

D.convinced that enhanced credibility is an important prerequisite for restoring narrow margins of fluctuation,

E.whereas price stability is a prerequisite for sustained growth in the medium term and an inflationary monetary policy can at best achieve no more than illusory short-term successes,

F.whereas, however, the speed with which disinflationary goals are pursued can have an important impact on employment and growth, and therefore requires political as well as technical judgement,

G.whereas the exercise of such judgement must be as transparent as possible,

1.Calls on the Member States to make their national central banks independent as quickly as possible, using the Treaty on European Union as a model, which means that the Member States, when reforming their national central bank legislation, must meet the following minimum requirements in particular:

(a)price stability must be named as the primary objective, for which the European Parliament declares its unqualified support. While abiding by this objective, however, support must be given to the other objectives of economic policy, such as full employment and economic growth;

(b)institutional independence in monetary policy making and implementation must be put into practice, ruling out directives from outside sources;

(c)operational independence calls for freedom of decision-taking on the use of monetary policy instruments;

(d)independence in terms of staffing must be ensured in particular through a sufficiently long term of office for policy-makers. The statutes of the European System of Central Banks lay down a minimum term of office of five years for national central bank governors;

(e)material independence is necessary, in particular in the budgetary field, in order to counter the possibility of exerting indirect pressure;

2.Takes the view that the existence of a central bank with private shareholders runs counter to the principle of independence. The inevitable need for financial investments to produce results which goes hand in hand with the involvement of private shareholders is a factor which would be bound to influence the management of monetary policy;

3.Takes the view that at present no national central bank statute meets all these very strictly defined criteria;

4.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.