A3-0041/94

Resolution on future relations between the European Union, the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance

The European Parliament,

-having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Bourlanges and Mr Roumeliotis on future relations between the European Community, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance (B3-0276/92),

-having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991, on the outlook for a European security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for European Political Union,

-having regard to its resolution of 24 October 1991 on the intergovernmental conference on a common foreign and security policy,

-having regard to its resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the intergovernmental conferences,

-having regard to Title V (Provisions on a common foreign and security policy) of the Treaty on European Union,

-having regard to the Declaration of the countries which are members of the WEU and also members of the European Union on "the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" and to the Declaration of the countries which are members of the WEU, included in the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union,

-having regard to the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Ministers of 19 June 1992,

-having regard to its resolution of 18 December 1992 on the establishment of the European Community's common foreign policy,

-having regard to the report of the WEU Assembly of 6 November 1992, Part 1, on "European Union, the WEU and the consequences of Maastricht", (Doc. 1342),

-having regard to the final document of the CSCE Summit held on 9 and 10 July 1992 in Helsinki, signed by 51 countries, setting out fundamental guidelines for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts and setting up a new CSCE forum for security cooperation,

-having regard to the Final Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 11 January 1994,

-having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

-having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0041/94),

A.whereas proposals on the future relationship between the European Union, the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance need to be based on a thorough analysis of the changing European geopolitical landscape and security architecture,

B.whereas the end of bipolar East-West confrontation has resulted in a fundamentally different European geopolitical situation now characterized by a proliferation of conflicts and areas of instability; whereas such overt or latent conflicts are closely related to economic problems, the lack of stable regimes, the rights of minorities and the rise of nationalism and religious fanaticism,

C.whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes a new framework for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of which the WEU forms an integral part by virtue of its inclusion in Article J.4 of the Treaty; whereas the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference is to pave the way for the full integration of the WEU into the EU after the expiry of the WEU Treaty,

D.whereas the WEU can make a major contribution to solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance as the EU's defence component,

E.whereas, until the WEU is fully integrated into the EU, cooperation between the institutions of the WEU and the EU must be increased as far as possible to ensure efficiency, democracy and transparency,

F.whereas the EC has consistently endeavoured to develop a CFSP since 1987; whereas it cannot become a genuine Community policy until the Member States abandon the intergovernmental approach and take decisions that can be democratically controlled,

G.whereas the war in the former Yugoslavia has amply demonstrated the need for a clearly defined concept of a European security structure and a common security policy,

H.whereas the European Union is responsible for making a strong, united contribution to a new European security architecture,

I.whereas the Yugoslav and Gulf crises have strengthened the de facto relationship between the European Union and the WEU, with the WEU, in several cases, holding meetings immediately after meetings of the Council and taking decisions on the basis of guidelines of the European Council,

J.whereas the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has again underlined the difficulties experienced by the WEU in assuming its responsibilities, which are the result of its decision-making process and of its not possessing military instruments of its own,

K.whereas the North Atlantic Council clearly emphasized the WEU's role as the European defence component for the first time on 11 January 1994 and thus underlined European responsibility for united and coherent action in the security sphere,

L.whereas Franco-German military cooperation has, since the La Rochelle meeting in May 1992, assumed a potentially more European dimension with, firstly, the decision by France and Germany to create a military corps with a European orientation, with other WEU countries being invited to join, enabling the Member States to take their responsibilities in the framework of the European Union and, secondly, the decision by Belgium in June 1993 to participate as an equal partner in this Eurocorps,

M.whereas the role of the UN has increased as an organization that can intervene with peace-keeping forces of its own and has not hesitated to legitimize actions, including even the use of force, against aggressors in a conflict,

I.The European security architecture and the new challenges

1.States its conviction that the changed geopolitical situation in Europe requires a thoroughly redefined security concept, which must include both new instruments and new objectives in the military and non-military spheres (such as economic relations and measures, environmental protection, financial aid, diplomatic initiatives, support for the respect of human rights);

2.Stresses that the success of a future European security policy, in which equal account must be taken of the military and non-military aspects, crucially depends on an efficient institutional framework that enables the EU to take and implement decisions quickly;

3.Calls for a common foreign and security policy to be formulated that will enable the European Community to adopt unanimous positions within the framework of the CSCE and the United Nations and calls on the European Community countries to undertake to strengthen the CSCE as a body capable of establishing a political basis for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts on a Europe-wide basis, in association with existing security organizations (especially NATO and the WEU);

4.Regrets the fact that the provisions of the Treaty on European Union entrust a large part of the common foreign and security policy to a separate agency, the WEU, rather than including it fully among the policies of the European Union with no provision for delegation;

5.Notes that under Article J.4(1) TEU the CFSP includes from the outset all questions related to the security of the Union, even though the establishment of a common defence policy will be subject of a longer-term development;

6.Notes that the Treaty on European Union contains a dual structure, that the objectives of the Union are not formulated in a sufficiently binding manner, that the possibility of using majority voting is very limited, that Parliament and the Commission are not sufficiently involved, and that the political predominance of the Union over the WEU is not stated clearly enough;

7.Considers the WEU Declaration adopted in Maastricht on 10 December 1991, and especially the "Petersberg Declaration" adopted by the WEU on 19 June 1992, to be important steps whose full implementation should be completed as soon as possible;

8.Points out that, from now on, the WEU has to develop from a protective alliance of its member states into a European security instrument through the Maastricht decisions and the subsequent decisions of the WEU;

9.States its conviction that the Eurocorps, which includes French, German, Belgian and Spanish forces, must be integrated into the WEU and the European Union as much as possible, so that it may become a genuine operational instrument of European security policy;

10.Emphasizes the need for procedures to prevent existing differences in opinion among the Member States blocking any progress in the fields of security and defence; calls therefore for the application of Article J.3(2) TEU as an interim measure;

II.The need for a coherent single institutional framework

11.Recognizes the need to define a long-term view and short- and medium-term measures to overcome the different attitudes of the Member States about the scope of European foreign, security and defence policy and structure as well as the pace at which they should be developed;

12.Emphasizes the importance of a coherent single institutional framework in view of, firstly, the coherence required by the Treaty on European Union and, secondly, the demands of the new security situation, which call for coherence between all aspects (military and non-military) of security policy, and, thirdly, the transparency and clarity of institutional structures necessary for public understanding and democratic control;

13.States its conviction that this basic principle of a coherent single institutional framework implies for the European Union that majority voting should be more widely used in the field of foreign, security and defence policy, that a single uniform administrative structure should be established, that Parliament should acquire the authority to exert democratic control over all aspects of this policy and that the Commission should have a larger role;

14.Welcomes the fact that all European Union Member States belong to the WEU either as full members (including Greece), or as observers (Denmark and Ireland), and emphasizes that the basic principle of a coherent single institutional framework also implies that the primacy of the European Union over the WEU should be confirmed unambiguously, with the European Union taking the political decisions concerning security and defence, with the WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications, and with the WEU being incorporated into the European Union by 1998 when the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to an end;

15.Expects associate members and states with observer status at the WEU to respect international law and UN resolutions and refrain from acts or omissions inconsistent with the legitimate rights and concerns of WEU members so as not to undermine the community spirit and action of the WEU;

16.Takes the view that this basic principle also implies that all aspects of the relationship with the United States should come under the responsibility of the same political authority, which implies that the European Union should become responsible for defining the European position in the Atlantic Alliance; considers that this will allow the development of a more consistent attitude towards the United States as well as a less ambiguous relationship between the Union and the US;

III.The EU-WEU relationship and the institutional consequences of the establishment of a coherent single institutional framework

17.Recognizes that the establishment of a coherent single institutional framework for the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union requires a gradual approach in several stages;

18.Takes the view that:

-in the first stage, the Union should reorganise its own institutional structure, bearing in mind that the WEU is from now on part of the Union;

-in the next stage, the institutions of both the Union and the WEU should define precisely their integrated relationship and merge at a practical level;

-in the final stage, as a result of a new intergovernmental conference and at the end, in 1998, of the period of 50 years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels, the Union should fully incorporate the WEU, taking full responsibility for foreign, security and defence policy as well as for the relations with the Atlantic Alliance;

19.Believes, therefore, that the institutions and procedures of the CFSP should be developed on the basis of the following principles:

(a)With regard to the Council

-the Council, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, should make all the political decisions on security and defence on the basis of the overall guidelines defined by the European Council, with the WEU Council (which should meet immediately after Council meetings) being asked to implement the military aspects of these decisions and with the European Commission being asked to implement the other aspects;

-the Council should take its decisions by qualified majority votes as much as possible; the Political Committee provided for in Article J.8(5) of the Treaty on European Union will have to merge in practice with COREPER during this stage so as to be incorporated finally into COREPER in the next stage;

-in the next stage the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence should meet at the same time as the Council of the European Union and the WEU Council, with the use of qualified majority voting becoming common practice for foreign, security and defence policy, taking into account the specific nature of this policy area;

-in the final stage, the Council should - in accordance with the conditions defined by the intergovernmental conference referred to in paragraph 18, third indent, above - take full responsibility for foreign, security and defence policy;

(b)With regard to the European Parliament:

-the European Parliament should draw up its own proposals on security and defence policy and scrutinize the relevant decisions of the WEU Council.

-the European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the WEU Council;

-representatives of the WEU Council should be regularly invited to report on its activities to the committee of the European Parliament responsible for security and defence matters;

-the directly elected European Parliament should monitor scrupulously decisions and actions taken under the CFSP not only by the Council in the context of Article J.7 but also by the Commission, and should use all the instruments conferred on it by the Treaties;

-Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and the WEU committees should intensify their cooperation and Parliament should establish a full committee on security and defence;

-in line with intentions expressed in the declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union, the European Parliament should strive to establish close cooperation with WEU bodies, particularly its parliamentary assembly;

-in the second stage, Parliament and the WEU Assembly should hold joint sessions, with their competent committees holding simultaneous meetings;

-Parliament's rights of supervision should be further developed and become comparable to those available to national parliaments with respect to national security policy;

-Parliament should adopt procedures to allow the Committee on Security and Defence or its Bureau to meet without delay in the event of a sudden international crisis, to have consultations with representatives of the Council and Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council;

-the provisions of the Treaty on European Union on the assent of the European Parliament for international agreements should be broadly interpreted;

-in the third stage, the European Parliament should replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety at plenary and committee level, the powers and voting conditions of Parliament being defined by the intergovernmental conference referred to in paragraph 18, third indent, above;

-assent by an absolute majority of Parliament's component members should be required for fundamental decisions on foreign policy, security and defence (and especially on military intervention), and be extended to the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence agreements in which the Union is involved;

-given that security and defence will continue to grow in importance as a subject to which the European Union must address itself, Parliament should be equipped with adequate administrative support to deal with these matters;

(c)With regard to the Commission

-the Commission, and especially its new Member responsible for the CFSP, should further develop its contribution to the Union's CFSP, in view of the autonomous co-responsibility of the Commission for CFSP based on its right of initiative (Article J.8(3)), its full participation in the work carried out in the CFSP field (Article J.9), its responsibility for ensuring the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies (Article C), and the participation of the President of the Commission in the European Council (Article D);

-a Directorate-General for External Affairs and Security should be created and should gradually develop a close relationship of cooperation and trust with the foreign affairs departments of the Member States as well as a working relationship with the WEU agencies to allow increased coherence between all aspects of security;

-the Member of the Commission responsible and the Secretary General of the WEU as well as the Director-General for External Affairs and Security and the WEU Secretariat-General should work even more closely together;

-finally, and according to the conditions defined by the intergovernmental conference referred to in paragraph 18, third indent, above, the Member of the Commission responsible should assume the powers of the WEU Secretary-General, with the WEU Secretariat-General being incorporated within the Commission's DG for External Relations and Security, which should be renamed the Directorate-General for External Relations, Security and Defence;

20.Is aware that, with regard to security and defence, a gradual and differentiated development should be adopted, as is allowed by the possibility for any Member State not to participate in the implementation of joint actions (Article J.3(7)) and the reference to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States (Article J.4(4)); calls on the Union nevertheless to retain the greatest possible unity in CFSP questions, a unity to which all the Member States have committed themselves under Article J.2(2) according to which each Member State has to ensure that national policies conform to the common positions;

21.Proposes therefore that, if a certain number of Member States, although accepting the objectives and principles of the common foreign and security policy, prefer not to take part from the outset, those Member States that are willing to implement the CFSP should be able to use the institutions of the European Union, while Member States preferring not to take part in this policy or action would not be entitled to vote;

22.Points out that participating Member States, under certain conditions and following prior deliberation in the Council, may choose, owing to major difficulties that are commonly acknowledged, not to participate in certain decisions or in the implementation of certain decisions, but may not thereby prevent the other Member States from making decisions and properly implementing them (opting-out clause);

23.Emphasizes that the final objective is to have all Member States participating fully in the European Union's foreign, security and defence policy;

IV.The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance

24.Notes that, as the WEU has to implement the political decisions of the European Union which have defence implications, it has to strengthen further its operational capabilities to enable it in time to act, if necessary, independently from NATO after consultation with the NATO allies;

25.Observes that the required operational independence of the WEU implies that it has to be able to rely on its own military forces and that it must have its own transport facilities (principally aircraft), observation facilities (particularly by satellite), research, information and planning facilities and command structures; believes, however, that initially this should be pursued in cooperation with NATO, through the development of a combined military command structure and of a double-hatting formula; considers, however, that a European security entity should not necessarily duplicate all NATO capabilities;

26.Takes the view that the WEU, as it strengthens and supports the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, increasingly has to introduce common positions into the process of consultation in the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of the political options adopted within the European Union;

27.Believes that the European Union must take into account the policy laid down in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and that, if possible and appropriate, the European countries should make their decisions and act in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but that if consensus cannot be found within the Alliance, the European Member States should be able to take decisions and actions within the Council of the European Union;

28.Believes that a division of labour between the Atlantic Alliance and the Union would be profitable, and that different categories of actions should be defined, with some actions being under the exclusive authority of the Alliance, some under the exclusive authority of the Union, and other actions under their concurrent responsibility;

29.Considers it important that ultimately, together with the revision of the Treaties leading to the full incorporation of the WEU into the European Union, the existing North Atlantic Treaty is adapted or a new treaty signed between the USA and the European Union to reflect better the new equal relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic;

V.The involvement of European countries which are not members of the European Union

30.Considers that the European Union's security and defence dimension should be given a pan-European perspective, taking due account of the relevant interests of the states of central and eastern Europe, as well as those of north-east and south-east Europe, including Russia;

31.States its conviction that the involvement of European countries which are not members of the European Union has to be stimulated as this may have a significant stabilizing impact on the European security situation; suggests that these countries can be invited to participate in the implementation of the decisions taken by the Council;

32.Considers that the European Union can pursue closer security and defence cooperation with other European states through common participation in the CSCE; believes that procedures to facilitate this cooperation within CSCE have to be elaborated; reiterates its demand that the Union become a full participant in the CSCE also for matters of security policy;

33.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the WEU, NATO, the CSCE, and the member states of the CSCE.