A4-0112/95

Resolution on the introduction of the ecu as legal tender (Maas Group report)

The European Parliament,

-having regard to the interim report of the group of experts on the introduction of the ecu as legal tender (Maas Group),

-having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

-having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A4-0112/95),

A.whereas the third stage of EMU should be introduced at the earliest opportunity,

B.whereas a single internal market cannot be allowed to function fully with fifteen different currencies which can continually change in value with regard to each other,

C.whereas it is to the advantage of businesses to have a single currency, which would eliminate exchange costs and exchange rate risks in internal trade,

D.whereas it is to the advantage of consumers to have a single currency, especially when shopping or travelling in other Member States, as it eliminates exchange costs,

E.whereas the Treaty on European Union provides that the European Council shall decide on 31 December 1996 at the latest whether a majority of the Member States which wish to participate meet the criteria for introducing the third stage of the EMU,

F.whereas it is still possible that such a majority will actually be attained by the end of 1996,

G.whereas if the European Council were to decide that a majority of Member States do meet the criteria, it would also have to decide by a qualified majority whether it would be appropriate for the Community to introduce the third stage,

H.whereas the Union will probably be able to decide on the transition to the (third stage of) EMU only at the end of 1996, if some Member States which will themselves be unable or unwilling to join still give their assent, since this also requires a qualified majority,

I.whereas it would be desirable for the Union to enter the (third stage of) EMU with all 15 Member States simultaneously, though this will unfortunately not be achievable by 1997 or 1999,

J.whereas postponement of the decision on the start of the EMU until 1998, if such a decision is possible in 1996, does not therefore provide a solution to the disagreeable problem of integration at different speeds into a single market,

K.whereas a favourable economic climate may allow a decision to be taken in 1996 on the actual start of the EMU in, say 1998, but a change in the economic climate before 1999 may render the start of the EMU in that year pointless since not enough Member States would meet the criteria to make it credible,

L.whereas according to the European Monetary Institute a year is needed between the European Council adopting a decision to enter into the third stage of the EMU and the actual start of the EMU, inter alia because of the need to recruit and appoint the president, board and staff of the ECB,

M.whereas the Treaty gives the European Council a completely free hand in deciding when it wants to enter into the third stage of the EMU, so that the date could easily be set for one year after the European Council decision,

N.whereas the actual possible dates for a decision by the European Council are thus the end of 1996 (for a possible start on 1 January 1998) or the end of 1997 (for a start on 1 January 1999),

O.whereas the European Monetary Institute considers that the issuing of ECU banknotes on a large scale would take three years,

P.whereas an agreement has already virtually been reached as regards the shape and classification of ECU coins and notes,

Q.whereas it is important for everyone concerned (users, banks and businesses) to know, as soon as possible, the actual date of introduction of the ECU, so that they can prepare for using it,

1.Notes that the first possible opportunity for a European Council decision on the start of the EMU will present itself at the end of 1996; this decision can only be taken if the convergence criteria are satisfied; stresses that the earliest realistic and feasible opportunity to effectively go ahead with the third stage of EMU must be seized;

2.Considers that this opportunity must not be lightly cast aside since it is uncertain whether a second opportunity will arise; considers nevertheless that 1 January 1997 is now becoming more and more unrealistic as the date on which to take this decision, taking into account the small number of Member States that are likely to comply with the convergence criteria by that date and the fact that the basic fundamentals have to be right from the beginning; considers also that the European Monetary Institute, all the central banks, the Commission, and the Council should engage in proper, constructive consultations in 1996 so that - should a majority of Member States meet the convergence criteria - the EMU may be brought into being with the aim of supporting the internal market, the economy, and employment; calls on those Member States which have yet to do so to announce by 30 June 1996 at the latest whether they will be willing to join;

3.Accepts the European Monetary Institute's position that there must be one year between the Council's decision to begin EMU and the actual start of EMU, partly in order to allow for the appointment of the president, board and staff of the European Central Bank and to secure recognition for the concepts of Community monetary policy and Community-wide regulators;

4.Notes that the first possible date for the start of the EMU is therefore around 1 January 1998 and calls for plans for pegging the ecu or for a new-style EMS to be devised as a matter of urgency, so that those Member States which cannot join the EMU at the first possible date may be given opportunities to benefit from monetary integration under predetermined conditions;

5.Points out that, in accordance with the Treaty, the third stage of the EMU must in any event start by 1 January 1999;

6.Notes that in the latter case the European Council must therefore adopt a decision before 1 January 1998 on which Member States are to take part in this third stage; this decision can only be taken if the convergence criteria are satisfied;

7.Notes that the name of the common currency is of the utmost importance as regards the acceptance of the changeover by citizens, that it (i.e. ECU) is already established in the Treaty (in Article 109l(4) and (5)) and that further discussion on this matter does not make sense;

8.Considers that, in accordance with the Treaty, which refers to the rapid introduction of the ecu as the single currency of the Member States (Article 109l(4)), the period from the start of the EMU to the introduction of the ecu should be as short as possible and in no case longer than six months;

9.Calls for the period of three years specified by the European Monetary Institute to be cut and for an early decision on the design of the notes and coins and other preliminary technical and technological measures that are essential in order to prepare the business world and the financial system for the EMU and could enhance the credibility of Europe's progress towards the EMU;

10.Considers a delay of three years for the complete introduction of the ecu not only to be contrary to the Treaty, but also disastrous for the credibility of the whole of the EMU project in the eyes of the general public, as well as dangerous for the financial markets, which would not be convinced that the participating currencies had been locked together irrevocably; believes that if every available resource is committed to it, a period of one and a half to two years for the complete introduction of the single currency notes and coins should be within reach; urges, therefore, every authority involved to make sure the shortest possible period of time for the complete introduction is achieved;

11.Is therefore of the opinion that the ecu should be introduced to the general public on 1 July 1998 (with a European Council decision at the end of 1996) or on 1 July 1999 (with a European Council decision on about 1 January 1998);

12.Points out that, immediately on the introduction of the ecu to the general public, the European Central Bank will conduct its monetary policy in ecus and transactions between the ECB and other banks will be expressed in ecus, as probably will inter-bank transactions be also; notes further that in value terms 90% of all transactions will thus be expressed in ecus from Day One;

13.Is of the opinion that introduction of the ecu to the general public, although it only represents a limited percentage of all the transactions in value terms, is the most important move politically and that all the available means should be deployed, making use of electronic means of payment from the very beginning, to ensure its timely introduction, and that the date of introduction should therefore be made known as soon as possible;

14.Considers that the Treaty empowers the European Monetary Institute to decide on the production of ecu banknotes even before the decision on the date of the start of the EMU and on the participant countries is adopted; considers, however, that authorization for the issuing of such notes must be given by the ECB; considers that the minting of ecu coins may similarly begin as soon as full agreement is reached on their design;

15.Is surprised and concerned that three years after the signing of the Treaty and one and a half years before a possible start of the third stage, no list has been published of the decisions to be adopted in connection with the start of the EMU nor has an appropriate scenario been published; notes that the Commission and the European Monetary Institute have seriously failed in this regard and demands that clarification be provided and decisions taken immediately by the Finance Ministers, as called for in the report on the EMI;

16.Considers that as soon as a list and scenario are available for all the measures to be adopted for the start of the EMU and the introduction of the ecu, all those measures must be immediately prepared or adopted which have sufficient merit even without the EMU ('no regrets strategy'), including notably the large-scale promotion of electronic methods of payment;

17.Considers that businesses and banks themselves must judge on commercial grounds whether they want to make early preparations for the changeover to the ecu, with the risk that some of the costs incurred may be wasted, or whether they want to wait before preparing for the changeover until there is absolute certainty, in which case they may well incur additional costs in order to be ready in time, and that the necessary legal and financial instruments should be established in order to ensure that businesses and banks are ready at the start of the EMU;

18.Points to the need, not least where liability is concerned, to clarify the situation as quickly as possible as regards ecu clauses in contracts;

19.Notes that the currencies of the Member States which are at present likely to come into consideration for membership of the Monetary Union are already practically as strong as the German mark, so that the prospects for a strong ecu are very good;

20.Calls for a comprehensive information campaign on the EMU, jointly sponsored by the European Parliament and the Commission, to be conducted in all the Member States;

21.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European Monetary Institute

and the national parliaments of the European Union.