per cui viene inserito nella sola conferenza segreteria che è un

settore chiuso di agorà. Chiedo scusa ai frequentatori della

conferenza segreteria se ripeto ancora che questo documento non

puo' e non deve essere utilizzato in alcun modo se non per

conoscere nei dettagli politici la missione di Emma Bonino.

(maurizio turco)

******

Brussels, 29 May 1995

Political notes en marge of Commissioner Bonino's visit to Cuba,

Haiti, New York (UN) and Washington.

The following is a thematic report of the most significantissues

addressed during this intense transatlantic trip.The visits to Cuba

and Haiti were essentially intended tomonitor and evaluate ECHO's

operations on the spot; meetingsat UN Headquarters and in

Washington focused on fosteringcloser cooperation with UN and USG

representatives in thehumanitarian field. Fisheries and general

political issuessurfaced, as appropriate, throughout the trip.

I.CUBA

1.The implementation of ECHO's programmes in Cuba,focusing on

nutrition support for targeted vulnerablegroups (children,

handicapped, pregnant women, etc),as well as on basic medical

assistance, is undoubtedlya success story. Member States

Ambassadors, EuropeanNGO's and all qualified observers, including

thosemost exposed in their criticism of the regime (such asthe

Cardinal) concurred that the continuation ofhumanitarian aid was

both useful and necessary. Eventhough the extent of Cuba's

predicament is, generallyspeaking, hardly comparable to that of

major disasterareas such as Rwanda, it can be assumed that EU

(andUS) humanitarian interventions have been instrumentalin

preventing the explosion of massive social unrest,on the scale of

the "balseros" crisis of August 1994.

2.Fidel Castro unexpectedly took part in the dinner ofEU resident

Ambassadors organised in the honour of MrsBonino, on 17 May. He

appeared in good health and ingood spirit; and surprisingly

well-prepared to handlean in-depth discussion with the Commissioner

on Cuba'sstance in the recent Canada/NAFO dispute (which

lastedthroughout the dinner).

At the toast, Castro stood up and, ostensibly keepinghis glass

firmly raised for more than 15 minutes,thanked the Union

extensively for the aid given to theCuban people; and expressed the

hope that the economicreforms underway in the country (which he

qualifiedof "difficult but irreversible steps") would pave the12way

for new and closer links between Cuba and the EUand its member

States. There was little or noreference in his speech to the US

(with the exceptionof some caustic remarks on the "surprising"

ability ofthe Americans to make some good wine in

California);whereas references to "cooperation" with the EU

wereably dropped here and there in a non-casual manner.

In reply, Mrs Bonino stressed that her very presencein Havana

symbolized the EU's interest in thepredicament of the people of

Cuba. There was anopportunity for Cuba to grasp in the

currentinternational context: but the government had todeliver in

terms of economic, political and humanrights reforms. Otherwise,

European public opinioncould hardly accept any significant

"rapprochement".The economic reforms undertaken went in the

rightdirection: but they were neither broad, nor speedyenough to

bring about the needed internationalisationof Cuba's economy.

There was'nt much time left, forCuba to keep pace with a fast -

changing world: theEU remained attentive and ready to respond

positivelyto tangible progress in Cuba itself.

Mrs Bonino's intervention went down rather well withthe "lider

maximo", who nodded attentively; and wasmuch appreciated by member

States Ambassadors.

3.The situation in Cuba was also repeatedly raisedduring Mrs

Bonino's meetings in Washington.

With a spectacular and controversial turn-around, theUS

Administration's policy has now come to mirror to alarge extent the

Union's own. Alperin (NSC) andTarnoff (State) appear to be the

masterminds of thisnew orientation, which foresees:

13-an expansion of humanitarian aid, authorized underthe so-called

"second track" of the Torricelli Act(reportedly, aid worth 65 M$

has been channeledthrough NGOs, Churches and other institutions in

thelast 2 years);

-a "roadmap" of gradual responses to any positiveopenings by the

Cuban regime;

-firm opposition to the "Helms-Burton" bill,currently discussed in

Congress - possibly leadingto a Presidential veto.

Both the US Representative in Cuba (Sullivan) and P.Tarnoff in

Washington confirmed to Mrs Bonino that thecooperative policy

inaugurated with the bilateralagreement on the influx of refugees

(negotiated byTarnoff himself) should continue in the

foreseeablefuture.

But the Republican majority in Congress, as well asthe very vocal

(and financially influential) communityof the Miami exiles (which

is the driving force behindthe Helms proposals) will strongly

resist this newpolicy orientations.

This was confirmed in a meeting with three Congressrepresentatives

- Men ndez (D-N.J.); D az-Balart(R-Fla); Ros-Liehtinen (R-Fla),

ranking among the moststrenuous supporters of the Helms bill -

whoexpressely requested to see the Commissioner, toexchange views

on Cuba. Speaking Spanish, and barelycontrolling their emotions at

times, they took stockof the EU fundamental objections to the

Helmslegislation, and hinted that the bill could be"improved" in

the Congress mark-up, possibly bydropping the "sugar" provisions

(clearly13WTO-illegal) and even those affecting aid to Russia.The

bulk of the embargo provisions, however, includingtheir

extraterritorial impact, would stay.

4.Cuba and the US have a long story of being obsessedwith each

other, and the Helms bill debate is only themost recent episode of

this mutual obsession. Itcomes, however, at a very critical

juncture in Cuba'sevolution:

-a younger generation of Ministers under theleadership of Carlos

Lage (vice-premier) is gettingready to prepare the inevitable

transition to thepost - Castro era, inter alia through hesitant

butcoherent measures of economic liberalisation. Theyall talk

about following the "Chinese model" (i.e.of politically-controlled

opening) but the onlyperceptible "China-type" evolution relates to

thenumber of bicycles on the roads, due to the shortageof gasoline.

There is anyway little doubt that, inspite of Castro's resistance,

the emergence of adollar economy will over time sweep away

theresiduary socialist fences;

-Canada and Mexico, but also most EU member States,are already

responding to this measuredliberalisation, increasing their trade

andinvestment links. This process is bound to continuein the

coming months;

-most reasonable politicians in the US are alsocoming to terms with

this new reality, and Clintonappears ready to solve once and for

all the "Cubanissue": without condoning, however, the lack

ofdemocracy and human rights. Freeing the politicalprisoners and

launching (even with a long itinerary)a democratic process would

probably suffice tonormalise US/Cuba relations.

The Miami exiles, and the Helms bill, have thepotential to disrupt

this process. It is a matter ofchoice: recovering economic

activities and propertiesnationalised, rather than restoring

democracy, seem totop the exiles agenda. It is understandable,

underthe circumstances, that a gradual and managedtransition is

anathema for the Miami hardliners, whowill continue to push for

isolation and a suddendemise of the Havana regime.

The EU has a critical role to play in this context, interms of

promoting and thereafter assisting thetransition to a new order.

The US Administration,whose proactive stance faces strong

opposition inCongress, will also rely increasingly upon

thismoderating role.

II.HAITI

1.In sharp contrast with Cuba, where the remarkablelevel of

literacy, higher education and basicinfrastructure could bring the

country out of itscrisis in a few years, the first impression one

getsin Haiti is one of despair. It will take a long timebefore the

country gets on to the path of an orderlydevelopment, starting from

the present (disastrous)state of the economy and infrastructures.

Humanitarian programmes, carried out by 20-oddEuropean NGOs on the

spot, seem to worksatisfactorily. But the country needs

structurallong-term interventions, rather than emergencyassistance,

to underpin the democratic process.

2.Member States representatives, Haitian Ministers andUS envoys

alike, carried the message that disbursementof development aid

pledges (amounting to 1 bn USD) isproceeding too slowly, and that

failure to "deliver"in the coming months may13fragilise the new

democracy. We should bear in mindthat the Union and the member

States are committed tointervene (for whatever reasons) for roughly

40% ofthis overall financial burden.

This was also the essence of the message delivered byPresident

Aristide to Mrs Bonino. The Presidentlooked otherwise rather

distracted and depressed, andfailed to convey an impression of

charismaticleadership (we were later told in Washington that heis

indeed rather moody).

3.The democratic process, which humanitarian assistanceis also

intended to facilitate by reducing the scopefor social discontent

in the poorest areas, shouldresume its course with the political

electionsscheduled for 23 June/end July (2nd round).Presidential

elections should follow in December, and,according to the

constitutional clause imposed by theUS, Aristide should not be up

for re-election.

The President did, in fact, confirm to Mrs Bonino hisintention to

"hand over power in February 1996"; butspeculations are growing

that a massive victory in theforthcoming parliamentary elections

could bring abouta strong "temptation" to push for a

("Menem-type")constitutional revision, allowing for his

possiblere-election.

The US remain however, vigilant on the whole process,and wary about

any attempts of constitutional"entorses".

III.RWANDA AND THE GREAT LAKES CRISIS

1.The account of the meeting between Mrs Bonino andBoutros Ghali

provided in D. Koenig's report (New YorkTelno n& 91 of 24 May)

gives a remarkably freshperception of the outspoken and

matter-of-factattitude of the SG on the Rwanda crisis. One

couldnot help considering that, should these views be madepublic,

Boutros Ghali would loose his UN Africanconstituency (for

re-election) overnight. P. Hansen(DHA) told us later that he (and

most of the UNhierarchy) did not share some of the

opinionsexpressed during that meeting, especially with regardto

conditionality applied to humanitarian aid.

Most worrysome for the EU is Boutros Ghali'sbottom-line in terms of

prospects for eventualsolutions: the UN are already over-stretched;

it is upto the EU to find a negotiated solution, through aidand

re-settlement of the Hutu refugees in Tanzania andZaire, away from

the Rwanda borders. Incidentally,the SG appeared to have lost hope

and confidence inthe usefulness of a regional conference on

securityand peace.

While stressing that the current level of aid wasalready imposing

on the EU an extreme (and unfair)financial burden, Mrs Bonino took

great care not tostep into the dynamic suggested by the SG.

Sheundertook, however, to report back to the Commissionand to

consult (as appropriate) the Council.

2.In Washington, there seem to be at least three schoolsof thought

on the Rwandan crisis:

-G. Moose (State, Ass. Secretary for Africa) soundedvery much like

Boutros-Ghali (resettlementstrategy), even though more hopeful that

a regionalconference could produce some results;

-T. Wirth (State, Global Affairs) could not agreewith this

strategy: creating a permanent Hutusettlement away from the borders

would furtherincite the Kigali government to force the

remainingHutus out of Rwanda, thus achieving their silentplan to

create a "Tutsiland";

-R. Clarke (NSC) admitted that there was no agreed USposition at

this stage. Some dislocation ofrefugees (especially military

elements) wasauspicable; but there was no solution without

aregional initiative. He was unaware of "new"thinking at the UN on

this point.

3.Unless a major political initiative is launched, thehumanitarian

crisis of the Great Lakes will get worsebefore it gets any better,

as donor's fatigue (anddespair) will inevitably grow. The EU

should be waryof assuming, on top of the burden of sustaining

2,2million refugees, the effort of indemnisation ofTanzania and

Zaire for a permanent re-settlement,whose political (and security)

implications remain forthe time being rather dubious.

IV.US AND FOREIGN AID

1.An intensive working session took place on 25 May withB. Atwood

and USAID staff, to pursue new avenues forcooperation on the field

(joint evaluation) and atheadquarters (exchange of staff, etc).

Due to the Budget debate underway in Congress (theSenate bill

foresaw the outright suppression of theAgency!) the mood in USAID

was rather sombre; but theAdministrator, confident that Clinton

would veto anysubstantial limitation of his ability to

conductforeign policy, put a brave face to it.

2.On substance, any budget compromise in Congress willhave to pay

tribute to the isolationist pressures ofthe Republican majority:

this will certainly mean a substantial decrease of funds available

for developmentaid, for contributions to UN agencies and (to a

lesserextent) for humanitarian aid.

It is therefore not surprising that the Administrationshould turn

increasingly to the EU for back-to-backcooperation in areas where

limited budget funds willforce the US to scale down their

(political) presence.This trend - incidentally - is likely to

affect in thecoming months the whole spectrum of US Foreign policy.

There is an opportunity for the EU to grasp, in termsof truly

putting the bilateral relations on an equalfooting, and of giving

more profile and assertiveness(f.i. in terms of UN representation)

to Europeaninterests. Provided, of course, that the Union

stopbeing shy and incoherent (e.g.: UNICEF saga) about it.

V.VARIOUS

1.Mrs Bonino met in New York the new UNICEF ExecutiveDirector, Mrs

Bellamy, on 23 May. This was the verylast of a series of contacts

with the leaders of themain humanitarian agencies (the Red Cross,

UNHCR, DHA,WFP). UNICEF had13decided to sign the Framework

Partnership Agreementwith ECHO, and Mrs Bellamy intended to come

toBrussels for this purpose at the end of June.

2.On the Commissioner's meeting with the First Lady,Hillary

Clinton, a separate report will be circulated.

3.Humanitarian aid to Former Yugoslavia: the"topmanagement" at

State (Hollbroke, Fraser) was inemergency meeting over NATO raids

by the time of thevisit in Washington. Mrs Bonino met briefly

Amb.Thomas for a fruitless (due to the moving militarysituation)

exchange of views on the humanitariansituation.