SUBJECT: HOW TO HANDLE WITH THE NOMINATION OF MR. JOVANOVIC AS NEW FRY REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK
HOMS DISCUSSED VERY INTENSIVELY HOW TO HANDLE WITH THE FUTURE NOMINATION OF MR. JOVANOVIC AS NEW FRY REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK THE TWO EXTREME POSITION WERE PRESENTED BY ITALY AND GREECE ON THE ONE HAND AND BY GERMIANY ON THE OTHER.
ITALY CALLED FOR A PRAGMATICC APPROACH, SETTING, ON THE ENORMOUS
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF MR JOVANOVIC. THE UE SHOULD MAKE USE OF IT. THERE WOULD BE A POLITICAL NEED TO KEEP THIS CHANNEL OPEN. ITALY AGREED THAT THE FRY REPRESENTATIVE HAD 19 TIMES SINCE NOVEMBER 1992 PARTECIPATED IN MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAD 11 TIMES TAKEN THE FLOOR. THIS WAS A REALITY TO BE RECOGNISED. THE EU SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AGAINST THE NOMINATION OF MR JOVANOVIC. IT WOULD BE THE TASK OF THE UN LEGAL ADVISER TO DO SOMETHING IF HE THINKS IT IS NECESSARY.ITALY WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY GREECE. SHE SAID THAT A MODERATE DIPLOMAT COULD ONLY BE HELPFUL. THIS POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD PRVAIL OVER LEGAL ONES, IF THERE WERE ANY.
GERMANY SAID THEY WERE NOT AT ALL PLEASED WITH THE NOMINATION OF MR JOVANOVIC AS PERMANENT REPRESENRATIVE OF FRY. SHE FORWARDED LEGAL AND POLITICAL REASONS:
LEGAL REASONS:
- ACCORDING TO GA RESOLUTION 47/1 FRY HAD TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP ANDWERE NOT ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GA.
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF GA RESOLUTION 47/1 FORMER UK AMBASSADOR
SIRDAVID HANNEY HAD STATED AS PRESIDENT OF THE SC THAT THE CLAIM OF FRYTHAT HER PRESENCE IN THE SC WOULD REPRESENT HER CONTINUITY WERE COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED.
- RESULT OF BADINTER COMMISSION
- ART. 4 OF THE UN CHARTER
- ACCORDING TO SC RESOLUTION 777(1992) THE FORMER SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA HAD CEASED TO EXIST AND FRY HAD NOT YET APPLIED FOP MEMBERSHIP.
POLITICAL REASONS:
AT THIS MOMENT POLITICAL EFFORTS WERE UNDERTAKEN FOR THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLICS. AN ADMISSION OF MR JOVANOVIC AS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRY WOULD PREEMPT THE NEGOCIATION GOAL AND TAKE AWAY WHAT THE EU AND UN HAD TO OFFER. THE EU SHOULD THEREFORE NOT HAMPER THE ONGOING POLITICAL NEGOCIATIONS.
- SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT MR JOVANOVIC TO COME TO NEW YORK, IT WOULD AT LEAST BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE NOT TO APPOINT HIM AS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.
GERMANY MADE TWO PROPOSALS..
1)EU MEMBERS HAVING BETTER RELATIONS WITH MR MILOSEVIC SHOULD ADVISE HIM NOT TO APPOINT MR JOVANOVIC AS PR BUT AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.2)IN ANY CASE, THE MOMENT MR JOVANOVIC TAKES UP HIS FUNCTION IN NEW YORK, THE EU SHOULD MAKE A COMMON STATEMENT THAT HIS APPOINTMENT AS PR OR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE STATUS OF YUGOSLAVIA.
THE OTHER DELEGATIONS TOOK THE FOLLOWING VIEW:
THE UK SAID ONE SHOULD NOT SEE THE SITUATION MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN IT IS. SHE SUPPORTED THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF GERMANY AND WAS IN FAVOUR OF THE 1ST GERMAN PROPOSAL (MAKE IT CLEAR IN BELGRAD THAT MR JOVANOVIC SHOULD BE ONLY A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND NOT A PR). BUT THAT THE EU SHOULD FIRST WAIT HOW BELGRAD HANDLES THE AFFAIR. IF IT WERE NOT HANDLED IN THE RIGHT SENSE, THE EU SHOULD RATHER WRITE A LETTER TO THE SG THAN MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT'.
F, NL, DEN, AND B, SUPPORTED THE UK COMPROMISE. NO DELEGATION SUPPORTED THE VIEW OF ITALY AND GREECE. SWEDEN URGED TO ELABORATE IN ANY CASE A EU COMMON POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT.
THE PRESIDENCY CONCLUDED IN THE SENSE OF THE UK INTERVENTION, SAYING THAT EVERY COUNTRY IS FREE TO MAKE A BILATERAL DEMARCHE TO MILOSEVIC.