Neil Steedman comments in response to:
> SATYAGRAHA FOR THE FREEDOM FOR TIBET
> By Olivier Dupuis
(Posted on TSG-L on 5th June 1997)
>One thing is sure: the nonviolent struggle for freedom for Tibet is not yet
>started...
Is this meant as a "rallying cry" rather than as a statement of fact (because it's not true)?
>...Without doubt during the last 40 years the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan
>government in exile and the Tibetans have fought without a single violent
>act...
As far as "the Tibetans" are concerned, this is not true either.
>...This leads to a first question that we should ask ourselves: "do we want to
>move from a pacifist to a nonviolent struggle? In other words, do we all -
>Tibetans and non Tibetans - want to organize and translate into action this
>nonviolence in a worldly Satyagraha for freedom for occupied Tibet?...
An assumption seems to be made here that all Tibetans and all non-Tibetans should all adopt the same strategy. I do not think such a goal is either wise or realistic.
>...The main goal is, for most of us, Tibetans and non, freedom for Tibet.
>Freedom that can be defined with the words of the Dalai Lama: reaching a
>wide autonomy which will exclude foreign and defense issues...
Jumping from "freedom" to a specific definition of "wide autonomy excluding foreign and defense issues" is a big jump!! Such a definition (even though voiced by His Holiness) may not be "the main goal for most Tibetans and non-Tibetans" and even the referendum (if it happens) won't tell us. The main goal for most Tibetans could equally well be "freedom" defined as "full independence for Tibet (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo)". There may also be a difference between what most Tibetans regard as their "main goal" and what they would be prepared to agree to arising out of negotiations without preconditions between Tibet and China.
As outlined in my 28th October 1996 contribution to the "TSG Strategy Debate" on TSG-L (a debate which died a fairly quick death due to lack of interest and/or participation by list members!), I believe that the best strategy for the non-Tibetan TSG Movement is to argue on the basis of international law, to press the international community to recognise the Tibetans' right to self-determination and to adopt policies aimed at bringing the Tibetan and Chinese Governments into dialogue leading to negotiations without preconditions. We cannot call for Tibetans' right to self-determination to be respected and at the same time demand or promote a particular solution, be that independence or autonomy (however they are defined) or any other solution. To do so would be illogical, not to say colonialist. (Tibetans have every right to demand such particular
solutions, of course, and as individual non-Tibetans we should support their right to do so, but as the TSG movement we should stay focused on self-determination and negotiations without preconditions - as was determined by the Bonn Conference.)
>As regards the "institutional" level - the beginning of a negotiation
>without prejudices under the auspices of the United Nations between the
>Chinese government and the Tibetan government in exile - things are more
>complicated. There is, without doubt, a large consensus regarding the
>dialogue; less clear appears the way in which these negotiations should be
>carried on. "Under the auspices of the United Nations" it is not a neutral
>statement, because it implies a formal recognition by the international
>community of the whole process, Making it become a sort of guarantor of the
>negotiations. It is obvious that other negotiations are possible, the most
>dangerous remains the secret one between the two parts.
Last October during the Strategy Debate, Carole Samdup posted Resolutions passed by the Assembly of Tibetan Peoples Deputies on 21/1/92, including:
"2. The Tibetan administration will however leave the door open to negotiations mediated by a third country or an appropriate individual, or proposed from the Chinese side, and will examine any such initiative through open discussion." I responded: "This raises an important strategic issue which we might discuss later, namely which individual, country or international body might the TSG movement "target" and "recommend" as an effective mediator?" As far as I am aware, the TSG movement has undertaken no such discussion, but Olivier now proposes "the United Nations". Is it significant that the ATPD Resolution refers only to "a third country or an appropriate individual" and not to "an international body"? Shouldn't we consider the options? Or is it "too sensitive" for on-List discussion?
