Gianfranco

PROPOSED NEW ICG POLICY ON KOSOVO

27 October 1998

A. Introduction

Since the outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo in late February 1998, ICG has consistently stressed the need to use all available means to exert pressure on Slobodan Milosevic to halt his military campaign in Kosovo and enter into serious and unconditional negotiations on the future status of the province.

Until recently, the basic thrust of our policy has been to urge Western governments to impose stiffer diplomatic and financial sanctions in an effort to isolate the Milosevic regime and restrict its access to much-needed foreign capital. As the level of violence rose, and the international community failed to exert sufficient pressure on Milosevic, ICG urged diplomatic and financial sanctions to be accompanied by the credible threat of military action against Serbia.

With the announcement of a deal between U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke and President Milosevic and the subsequent pull-back, (at the present time still incomplete), of Serbian forces in the province, the crisis has entered a new phase. While the level of violence appears to have subsided, we believe the risk remains ever present that the conflict, which for now seems to have subsided, will re-ignite, probably in the new year, perhaps sooner. It is crucial that the parties themselves and the international community capitalise on the current lull to initiate genuine all-party talks on the future status of Kosovo and push towards a political solution before the violence restarts in earnest.

This paper summarises where we see the crisis headed and outlines a series of recommendations we believe need to be articulated. The recommendations we propose differ markedly from those previously pursued by ICG, most notably on the issue of independence for Kosovo. For this reason we would like to put them to you in draft form for your consideration before taking

our case to Western governments.

B. The Milosevic-Holbrooke Deal

The accord reached between Richard Holbrooke and President Milosevic on 13 October 1998 is still, two weeks later, shrouded in mystery. One part, concerning the role of the OSCE, has been made public. The rest, however, has not been formally released, though details have been leaked. Under the published terms of the accord, it seems that Milosevic has agreed to scale down the number of Serbian soldiers and special police in Kosovo to pre-March 1998 levels and to let 2,000 unarmed foreign observers or "verifiers" enter Kosovo to monitor the situation on the ground. He has also committed himself to political talks that would restore greater self-rule to the province. Despite the obvious stake Kosovo's ethnic Albanians had in the Milosevic-Holbrooke talks, they were not represented and are not party to the accord. This is clearly problematic. Whereas OSCE verifiers may attempt to hold Serbian troops to the letter of the accord Milosevic has signed, ethnic Albanian fighters in the Kosovo Liberation Army (K

LA) have not agreed to anything. Moreover, despite recent reverses, they have at times during the past eight months achieved military successes. Indeed, at one point early in the summer they claimed to control some 40 per cent of Kosovo. Having already sensed that liberation was within their grasp, many

fighters are determined to continue the armed struggle, irrespective of peace agreements or the wishes of the mainstream ethnic Albanian leadership in Pristina.

Perhaps the most that can be said for the recent agreement between U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke and President Milosevic is that it may, if respected, contribute to a temporary lull in fighting over the winter. It is, in essence, a stop-gap measure. It does not provide a basis for a

lasting political settlement because it does not tackle any of the political issues that lie at the root of the conflict. Logistically, the deal also appears fraught with difficulties. Given that, despite a leisurely lead time, the OSCE failed to recruit some 300 staff for its Croatian mission, and that it has had recurring staffing problems in Bosnia during the past three years, assembling 2,000 qualified verifiers at short notice is a massive undertaking. Moreover, these unarmed observers may in practice end up as little more than potential hostages if fighting re-starts. Critically, despite the threats, it is unclear how NATO would respond in the event the verifiers report that Serbian troops were refusing to withdraw.

C. All-Party Talks on the Future Constitutional Status of Kosovo

If the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement is to achieve anything more than a short pause in the fighting and an opportunity for humanitarian relief agencies to distribute much-needed assistance, the international community will need move quickly to establish genuine, all-party negotiations on the future constitutional status of Kosovo. To kick-start the negotiating process, the international community should immediately appoint a mediator and lay down a strict timetable for talks. All parties to the conflict should be included in the process, including, from the Albanian side, the UCK.

If negotiations are to be successful, we believe two crucial elements, currently absent, need to be supplied. The first is increased pressure on the Milosevic regime to make the kind of concessions necessary for an agreement to emerge that satisfies the legitimate demands of the Albanian community in Kosovo. The second is an international guarantee that whatever agreement emerges from the negotiations it will include, as a minimum, the prospect of a binding referendum, to be held on a fixed date, on the option of independence for Kosovo. Only with such a guarantee are the Kosovo Albanians, in particular the UCK, likely to step back from pursuing independence by military means.

Pressure on Milosevic

Having seemingly averted the threat of air strikes and additional sanctions, Milosevic is unlikelyto make the kind of concessions necessary for the peace process to move forward unless he is subjected to enormous external pressure to do so. To this end, we believe that NATO should maintain its threat to launch air strikes and that Western governments should step up diplomatic and financial pressure on the Yugoslav regime until such time as a viable agreement emerges from the negotiating process.

Independence - the "unthinkable option"?

Up to now, Western governments have been reluctant to admit discussion of independence for Kosovo as a policy option for fear that such discussion might open a "Pandora's Box" of problems by encouraging other minority populations in the region to press for independence. Indeed, the West has effectively ruled out independence, making it clear that it will not support such an outcome under any circumstances.

Of particular concern is the prospect of Macedonia's ethnic Albanians - who make up almost a quarter of that country's population - launching a bid for sovereignty based on the precedent of an independent Kosovo. Pessimists predict an ensuing nightmare scenario in which a new wave of disintegration takes hold, sparking new local wars and threatening the fragile peace in Bosnia where Bosnian Serb leaders might be tempted to abandon the Dayton Agreement and announce the secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia.

While fears of the possible consequences of independence for Kosovo are understandable, we believe that by ruling out independence, Western governments have created more problems than they have solved. They have strengthened the Milosevic's hand vis-a-vis the Kosovo Albanians. They have undermined the moderate and peaceful political leadership of the Kosovo Albanians and unwittingly helped fuel the spread of support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).

Building the possibility of independence into the peace process .By any measure, the Kosovo Albanians are overwhelmingly committed to independence. That commitment has only been strengthened by eight months of Serbian military attacks on Albanian villages. By refusing to discuss independence, the West has, in effect, sent a signal to the Kosovo Albanians that they will never achieve their objective of an independent Kosovo by means of peaceful and patient negotiation. The natural consequence has been to boost support for an armed struggle to achieve

independence by violent means. Based on our experience of Kosovo over the past nine months, we believe that, in the long-term, no peace agreement will hold in Kosovo unless it offers at least the prospect of a binding referendum among the people of Kosovo on the question of independent statehood. Anything less is unlikely to satisfy the appetite of Kosovo Albanians for independence and will almost certainly be met with renewed determination by Kosovo Albanian separatists to fight on.

A legal perspective

At no point has anyone subjected the problem to a thorough legal analysis

Accordingly, ICG will publish next week a paper, prepared by a team of specialists in international law, that demonstrates substantive differences between the Kosovo Albanians' claim toindependence and those of other minority groups in the region. The arguments contained in the paper are potentially highly significant. They provide a sound legal explanation of the difference between the position of the Kosovo Albanians and that of the Macedonian Albanians or the Bosnian Serbs or the Sandzak Muslims. By reference to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia, recognised principles of international law and legal precedent expressed in decisions of the International Court of Justice and various international treaties, the authors argue that

independence for Kosovo would not necessarily create a dangerous precedent for the rest of the region.

D. The Humanitarian Crisis

While finding a long-term solution to the crisis is essential, in the short-term another pressing problem requires urgent attention. The humanitarian situation on the ground continues to worsen. TheHolbrooke-Milosevic agreement will, it is hoped, encourage people to come down from the hills where they fled following Serbian shelling attacks earlier in the autumn and permit aid agencies greater access to vulnerable populations. However, early indications suggest that refugees remain reluctant to return to their homes because they believe the fighting is not yet over. Moreover, many of the displaced have nothing to return home to Their villages have been burnt, their homes destroyed, their food stolen, the crops dead, their livestock gone. A massive relief operation will be needed in the short term and through the winter if these people are to be saved from misery and possible death by a combination of disease, starvation and exposure. The scale and logistical complexity of the effort required seems hard

ly to have dawned on Western leaders.

E. Recommendations

We propose that ICG concentrate on the following key policy recommendations in the weeks ahead:

1. That the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement be made public at once.

2. That NATO maintain its threat to launch air strikes against Serbian military facilities and infrastructure in the event that the Milosevic regime in the event of Serbian non-compliance.

3. That the countries of the Contact Group and the EU proceed with a programme of tight, targeted diplomatic and financial sanctions, to be lifted only once all-part talks between the Serbs and the Albanians have produced an agreement on the future constitutional status of Kosovo.

4. That an international mediator be immediately appointed to convene all-party negotiations on the future constitutional status of Kosovo.

5. That the international community drop its hostility towards the prospect of independence and insist that any agreement on the future status of Kosovo should include provision for a referendum on the question of independence to be held on a fixed date, (the timeframe to be determined by

the parties). Provision for such a referendum should be a non-negotiable element of any peace agreement to emerge from the negotiating process.

6. That urgent action be taken to relieve the suffering of vulnerable civilian populations in Kosovo. Humanitarian relief organisations on the ground in Kosovo must be given complete and unhindered access to all populations in danger and Western governments should provide thenecessary financial and logistical support to enable relief organisations operate effectively.

Charles Radcliffe

Alain Destexhe

27 October 1998