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Togliatti Palmiro - 26 marzo 1959
Togliatti Replies to Pannella

ABSTRACT: In reply to Pannella on the question of creating a democratic alternative to Christian Democratic power, Togliatti reviews rigorously the historical facts that Pannella alluded to and then announces a change in position of an entire part of the anti-fascist coalition (exactly that part which intends to form the alternative power group) during the first years of the reconstruction in the sense that these groups decidedly direct themselves towards sustaining a firm Christian Democratic political monopoly.

(Notizie Radicali n.51, March 11, 1988)

Dear Editor,

Allow me to take part in the debate that your newspaper is publishing on the positions of the political parties. It is not possible to omit replying to some of the arguments presented by Marco Pannella in the attempt to establish the difficulty, if not the outright impossibility, of an understanding with the Communists which he nevertheless sees as necessary today. In particular all reasoning that try to base themselves on the fate of the democratic left and the Social Democrats in those countries where we Communists have been in power for quite a few years must, I believe, be considered in a very critical and sceptical spirit and, hence, rejected. The subject is a vast one and Pannella, it seems to me, extends it even more by bringing up facts and situations that are not entirely pertinent to his purpose. The Communists were not in power in France in 1939. On the contrary, the Communist Party was outlawed at the time and subjected to hard persecution by that political coalition that, after having capitu

lated to Hitler and Mussolini at Munich, had to prove its true reactionary and anti-national nature by giving birth, a year later, to the Pétain regime. As far as Spain is concerned, I can assure you that if it is true that in the first year of the war many Anarchists fell in armed combat with the Communists, as many or more Communists fell in armed combat with the Anarchists. Nevertheless, once that confused and bloody phase was overcome by mutual efforts, the Communists, Socialists, Anarchists and Republicans managed to establish an alliance and maintain it to the end. Indeed, even the labour unions during the last phase of the war established an agreement among the opposing organisations.

More to the point is what happened in the Soviet Union and then in the popular democracies. But what did actually happen? It happened that the Communists found themselves alone, or almost alone, in their desire and commitment to begin and conclude with all their strength the economic, political and social transformation that was not only demanded by history, but which had also been the subject of communal projects and agreements. In Russia the intermediate and ostensibly "leftist" parties were all to be found at the end in the camp of the czarist generals and then of the foreign invaders. The first Soviet governments were, however, coalition governments of those groups that accepted the program of the Soviets which included three points: peace, land for the peasants and control in the hands of the workers. Who broke up the coalition? Not the Communists but the others. And they broke it by taking up arms, by attempting an insurrection. What was to be done in such a situation, in the situation of a countr

y that had to be saved from catastrophe at all costs, of a government that had to be defended at all costs if one wanted to move ahead

as, in fact, happened? But even more evident, because more recent, is the example of the popular democracies. Why does one refer to the events in Prague in 1948 without even bothering to come close to knowledge of the facts? And yet the documents today are publicly known and cannot be denied. There was a coalition government that had taken on the job of realising a certain program (the Kosico program: nationalisation, agrarian reform, etc.). One branch of the government refused to continue along the established route; it resigned and requested the establishment of a "working government" as a first step for overturning the

situation, excluding the Communists and bringing about the same turn of events that had taken place in France and in Italy. But the Communists had a relative majority by themselves, and reached a clear majority along with the Social Democrats and the democrats who rejected the reactionary manoeuvre. What was there to do but to continue with the pre-established common program, along the road that was followed and that the opponents themselves had imposed with their conduct? And just that is what happened, more or less, in the other popular democracies.

In remembering these things, I do not at all forget that the exasperation that followed upon the ruptures occurring between

1947-49, also caused some Communists who remained in power to make mistakes, even serious ones, that then had to be paid for and corrected. But the substance of the matter does not lie in these mistakes. It lies in the fact that a sizeable group of those who had been aligned with the Communists withdrew at a certain point, went over to the camp of the adversaries and opposed the realisation of the projects for the deep and revolutionary transformations which would have finally given Europe a truly democratic and progressive face if they had been brought about on the entire continent.

Something of the same kind also took place in Italy, in fact, far though we were from wielding power. We too saw a switching of camps on the part of most of those who had been in agreement with us in considering necessary and in demanding a new development in our democratic institutions according to the direction laid down in the Constitution. Not to omit touching on a subject that seems particularly dear to Pannella's heart, we see many of those throw article 7 up to us with disdain who for years and years worked to create the conditions for the Christian Democratic power monopoly and the degeneration of the state into clericalism. This change in position of a whole sector of those who once were traditionally in the ranks for the fight against Fascism, the ranks of the democratic groups, worked to draw us new groups of citizens to us; it did not discourage us, but, above all, it did not make us change our positions. Neither in regard to our basic programs, nor in our fidelity to democratic institutions,

and not even with regard to that which is subsumed in our declaration that democratic and social renewal cannot be the work of one party only but requires reciprocal understanding, agreement and collaboration among diverse political groups that need not only belong to the lay democrats but also to Catholic organisations.

Hence we today are not "reinitiating" anything. We are persevering in a coherent line of conduct that extends from the struggle of thee workers to agrarian reform, that is against the massacre of workers and the "swindle law" and in favour of the application of the Constitution and economic renewal. We do not contest anyone's right to present themselves as the pivot point of future constellations as long as that does not damage the completion of the most urgent tasks. In order to know who will be at the center and who at the edges, we too are awaiting the future and in the meantime we work. The past, however, teaches us that this is not the debate that is needed today, but rather that which leads to a confrontation of positions on the ground of specific programs for democratic progress and economic renewal, and thus to the working out of the broad lines of a new political orientation. Once we have arrived at this point, the convergence of diverse groups to reach the common objective will be necessary - and

above all of groups that carry the same weight as we do. Clearly we will not call those who reject this stupid, but we will note that they act in a de facto manner to prevent reaching the objective and are content to stand aside and contemplate ideological arabesques and, in this way, to objectively serve the forces of conservatism. It seems necessary to me to underline this now, and I thank the editor for the space he has allowed me in order to underline it once again.

(By Palmiro Togliatti in Paese Sera, March 26, 1959)

 
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