ABSTRACT: The action of the government parties is concentrating on the struggle against terrorism and crime, playing on the feelings of collective insecurity. Once the phenomenon is rooted in society, the time requirements are long. The more terrorism becomes the actor of the political scene, the more the collective repression increases. In the strategy between terrorists and supporters of a strong State, other political forces enter the scene. The radicals have the task of devising nonviolent means to unblock the situation, particularly in the cities, as this type of violence is urban. Possible interventions: for example, the struggle against firearms.

(RADICAL SUBJECTS, POLITICAL BI-MONTHLY FOR THE ALTERNATIVE, December '77 - January '78, No. 5)

"'It is relatively simple to make a theoretic diagnosis of the conditions and of the causes of political violence. It is much harder to know how to avoid the "divine judgments" which still afflict society (...) for the purposes of a practical political action. Much more time and attention has been devoted to studying the way in which social processes start and expand than on analysing the ways in which they end'".

H. L. Nieburg

The consistent rise in political violence, recorded over the past months, the emergence - as a stable protagonist - on the Italian political scene of terrorism, have rapidly changed many of the main "equations" that defined the political action and created the traditional equilibriums.

As we write (December '77), everything seems to point to the fact that a leveling process is under way, started by the terrorism-repression spiral, as was pointed out during a recent meeting of jurists of the Left (Cf. "La questione criminale", No. 2, 1977), of politics "tout court" into "politics of public order". The tendency of the six-party agreement to consider itself not at the service of a general government policy, but in a prevalent if not exclusive function of "struggle against terrorism and crime", has emerged with ever greater evidence over the past months.

The effects are under everyone's eyes: a spiral of repressive laws which has already struck or is about to strike the country (ranging from the laws that worsen the Reale Law to the projects of a reform of the codes).

A complex mechanism of actions and reactions has started, according to which the terrorist action is amplified by all political forces and by the media with the purpose of a "politics of social alarm" - as it was aptly called during the above mentioned meeting - creating a generalized state of "collective insecurity" and placing citizens in the forced conditions of advocating a "strong State". At the end of the tunnel, the spectre of a "germanization", of the destruction in a short period of time of the chief constitutional guaranties with the endorsement and the active participation of the parties of the "constitutional range" (on the current situation in Germany, refer to the brief but clear analysis by C. von Braunmühl, "Civil rights and repression in Western Germany", Il Mulino, XXVI, 1977).

The "policy of social alarm" - it is necessary to say so - is an effective policy, generally successful. It traditionally plays on the rational, but more often irrational, fears of the petty bourgeoisie and on what Pietro Ingrao (2) called the "repressive illusion", which is extremely popular among the lower classes (Cf. "La questione criminale", III, 1975, P. 508): the lower classes tend to an ambivalent attitude when confronted with the various forms of "deviancy". On the one hand, as a heritage of the pauperist culture, they tend to sympathize with the deviant (the thief or the terrorist), because transgression is perceived by them as an insult or an attack on the dominating classes and on "their" laws - many of the workers Giampaolo Pansa interviewed for "La Repubblica" (18/11/7) after the terrorist attempt against Casalegno expressed this sort of attitude.

On the other hand, however, political or common crime trigger the fear of being considered similar to the deviant by the dominating classes, and ultimately the fear that repression will implicate the lower classes as well: hence the "repressive illusion", the tendency, which is contradictory compared to the first, to anticipate the leading class by advocating "more repression".

The existence of a majority in favour of the death penalty, as revealed by recent opinion polls, can probably be explained according to these mechanisms. In this new course, the (fewer and fewer) forces that still struggle stubbornly for an expansion of the areas of freedom, should probably revise a couple of things: it is necessary to ask ourselves whether, in these conditions, a policy which is purely aimed at the defence of civil rights, a purely defensive policy, has any chance of being successful; whether it is not necessary, along with the defence of the remaining spaces of freedom, to add new political initiatives capable of opposing the policy of social alarm by changing a policy which could become obsolete and destined to be overwhelmed by the events and at the most to turn out into a moral testimony.

The terrorism-repression spiral

Today, as we can easily ascertained by simply reading the papers, there are many interpretations of the terrorist phenomenon, and more generally of political violence. However, it does not seem possible to avoid the unpleasant impression that even the most intelligent remarks, even the analyses of the best journalists and experts, have reached a dead point, and are incapable of grasping the most relevant aspects of the phenomenon. We have access to a great variety of diagnoses on the birth, therefore on the "reasons", of political violence, that range from the structural theories, which all refer to Marxism and the socio-psychological interpretations which the models of "relative deprivation" or of "frustration-aggression" propose (a wide choice is available in R. Moscati, "Violenza politica e giovani", "Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia", III, 1977) to the political analyses which explain violence as the fruit of the political system's incapacity to act as an accumulator of tensions, so that the smaller the i

nter-party conflict, the more probable the explosion of violence (a thesis Giorgio Galli has been a long-time supporter of).

All these interpretations can help us, to varying degrees, to understand the political and economic conditions, or rather, the type of combination of political, economic, cultural factors that cause or can cause the explosion of the phenomenon. However, while they can explain the genesis of violence, they explain little or nothing on the subsequent stage, when violence is rooted in society and starts to have effects "on a stable basis" on the political system, on the relations between the parties, and between the parties and the public opinion.

Obviously, we don't mean to say that these analyses and interpretations are useless. On the contrary: a good diagnosis is always the essential condition for an adequate therapy. Except that therapies, especially the ones that have effects on the structural pattern of a society (for example, the reconstruction of the link between labour market and educational institutions) call for at least two things: suitable political conditions and rather long time requirements.

As regards the "political conditions": it is possible, at least in theory, for a left-wing alternative government to devise a (complex) series of measures on the basis of a good diagnosis, capable of eliminating the phenomenon by removing the structural and psychological conditions of violence. For example, it is possible to re-establish a physiological relation between political system and society such that if the level of the inter-party conflict rises, tensions start to channel themselves in the political system, and the latter can once again act as a means for a peaceful solution of social conflicts.

However, an "imperfect" Great Coalition such as the current one (or a perfect one tomorrow, with the PCI's (3) participation in the government) is in itself a political condition which makes it difficult if not entirely improbable to adopt adequate therapies in good time.

As regards the "time requirements": it seems clear that, once violence has rooted in a society, even the adoption of adequate therapies - provided the political conditions make it possible - in no way guarantees an "immediate" cessation of the phenomenon. In any case, a certain period of time must elapse between the moment in which the decisions are made and the moment in which they start to have "visible" effects on society and on the "perceptions" of the various social groups. In other words: if, for instance, the intellectual unemployment and the state of decay of Southern Italy were the two chief socio-economic causes for violence, even the best government could not remove them from one day to another; moreover, provided that after a certain period and a certain number of efforts it succeeds in the task, this will not necessarily have immediate effects on the attitude and behaviour of the social groups which embrace the armed struggle out of despair. In the meanwhile, the "escalation" spiral continues to

produce its effects according to a (circular) pattern of this kind: violence --> increase of collective insecurity --> social alarm policy --> general increase in repression --> probable further increase in violence.

As in the "escalation" processes between two States which, at a certain point, engage in an arms race which ends with war (overcoming even the will of the protagonists), this type of "escalation" can lead, as a natural outlet, to an authoritarian State. Unless, obviously, measures are not introduced "in the short range" enabling a "de-scalation", i.e. a reversed trend, a new and progressive reduction of the levels of social tension and violence.

The limits of a system based on the safeguard of constitutional guaranties

Let us set aside the pessimistic thesis according to which the late capitalist society, because of its own functioning and of the contradictions it contributes to accumulating, calls for the relingquishement of the democratic State, no longer adequate to suit its new structure, unlike in the times of liberal capitalism, and the adoption of ever more authoritarian forms of administration of the power (this is the thesis suggested by the School of Frankfurt, of which Federico Stame is the most convinced supporter in Italy). Such thesis should be carefully analyzed, however it seems to leave space to nothing but new forms of a state based on the safeguard of constitutional guaranties, which are clearly indispensable (and anyone but the radicals would want to deny the importance of such a system!) but which could lead to a probable defeat if the on-going social process has been correctly pin-pointed. Also because precisely the popular left-wing parties, which should be the champions of this system, in fact suppo

rt far different positions: together with the DC they co-administer the social alarm policy and do not oppose the introduction of repressive measures.

When terrorism (whatever the complicities which trigger it and which contribute to sustaining it) takes root itself in a society, i.e. when it finds favourable conditions to expand and reproduce itself, from that moment on it will be necessary to analyse the complex political pattern which develops, the processes of action and reaction which are set off: the terrorist group or groups become stable actors who participate in the political pattern with their own "strategies" which intertwine, clash and converge with the strategies of other political actors.

In an acute stage of de-legitimation of the political power, which can engender the level of internal consent, the trend is toward an increase in overall repression. To this moment, societies have always been based on a combination of consent and repression: when consent drops, the political authority will increase repression, whenever it can. And in an acute stage of delegitimation of the political power, a typical mechanism it resorts to is that of "finding a scapegoat", the "external" enemy (war) or the "internal" one, on which and against which it will channel the tensions, and thus consolidate a wavering general consent. The scapegoat mechanism, among others, is much more used in politics, for important or trivial matters, than we normally think: the "enemy" is constantly created both by the leading classes in societies and, for example, by the leading groups inside the parties to overcome any difficulties by shifting the attention and postponing the unpleasant solution of given problems. The objective

is always the same: consolidating the consent around the establishment through a more or less convenient diversion.

Political actors, tactics, strategies

All this means that terrorism is instrumental, in the political game, to the strategy of given actors: it serves the purpose of shifting the attention from the problems relative to the management of power in society, enables to reconstruct at least a part of the lost consent, and to further sustain the political power through an increase in the level of repression.

But things are not that simple, because the terrorists also have their own strategy, they too aim to an increase in repression (right-wing terrorists, because they obviously want an authoritarian state, left-wing terrorists, because they consider it the "condition sine qua non" to urge the masses to rebellion and to revolution). Thus, there is an objective "strategic convergence" between terrorists and supporters of the authoritarian State: both want the same thing, to perfect the authoritarian State. The former, the terrorists, want it as a "tactic" objective (the authoritarian State as the prelude to revolution), and the latter, obviously, as a "strategic" objective (supported in this also by the violence of the neo-fascist right wing).

But the mechanism is even more complex, because many other actors participate in it apart from the terrorists and the supporters of the authoritarian State, with different strategies, and because the same actor can modify his strategy when the situation changes.

The case of Italy is emblematic: for example, given that all the parties of the constitution, some actively and other reluctantly, contribute to the "social alarm policy", it would be simplistic and wrong to say that they all want the same thing. In fact, they are different actors, whose partial convergence masks consistent strategic differences. Thus, certain Christian Democratic groups that oppose the historical compromise hope that the reduction of politics to "public order politics" will serve the purpose of wearing the positions and the credibility of the PCI in order to relegate it, according to more favourable relations of force, to the opposition. Other parties that favour the PCI's participation in the government operate in order for this to occur in terms of a social stabilization guarantied by high levels of repression and by the relingquishement of any reformative intention. Other still, like the PSI (4), that oppose the historical compromise but are incapable of advancing alternative proposals,

follow the initiatives of the two greater parties according to the short-sighted estimation that by showing themselves recalcitrant, they can appear in the eyes of the public opinion like the party that has "struggled" to the bitter end to prevent the introduction of repressive measures. Also, inside the PCI itself, there are several lines: those who want to participate in the government "by hook or by crook", and paying any political price, and those who try to react against a policy which they consider suicidal.

And, obviously, no one holds just one trump card, and there are strategies for a change. In the face of the evolution of the situation, even the sectors that currently oppose the PCI's participation in the government could accept this solution as the lesser evil, if the Left showed more willing to pay the price of even more repressive measures (and provided in the meanwhile an electoral reflux of some entity doesn't take place in the Right).

If we accept the interpretation which is proposed, the point to hold on to is that the spiral terrorism-collective insecurity-repression is either defused somehow, or it tends to produce a refinement of the authoritarian State (in Italy's case, "with" or "against" the PCI). If the "escalation" process described above corresponds to the truth, the comments of the democratic journalists and intellectuals (as well as of many officials of parties of the Left who are sincerely against the continuation of the repressive spiral) could turn out to be no more than the impotent testimony of a process which no one can stop.

A challenge for nonviolence

If the situation described is only reasonably plausible, the radicals are faced to a hard task, all the harder because at least under certain aspects it is undeniable that in the new situation they are not fully prepared. The radicals have always confided in the maturity of society, and have built their entire political action on the idea of an inadequacy and incapacity of the Italian political system, because of its functioning and of the characteristics of the political actors, to express this maturity politically. In The battle for divorce, it is worth recalling, only the radicals, inside the pro-divorce front, were convinced that a referendum was necessary, and that the referendum would have been won because the Italian society was far more mature and "modern" than the leaders of the other parties of the Left, the PCI above all, were willing to believe.

Even the battle for abortion and today the one for the eight referendums, are the consequence of this "challenge": that it was necessary to give more importance to society, rich as it is with progressivist impulses, before an ultra-conservative system of parties, based on mismanagement, could destroy its possibilities of expression. This challenge remains valid, just like the fundamental hypothesis on which the radical strategy bases itself each time.

Nonetheless, we have to admit that there can be situations which are partly brought about by the parties that want to prevent a "non-mediated" expression of civil society in order to continue to keep their "representation monopoly" (electoral postponements, attempts to block the referendums, etc.) in which an unfavorable "situation" jeopardizes society's possibility/capacity to express and develop the progressivist forces which it contains: a "social alarm policy" which combines itself with a terrorist strategy can engender a similar situation.

It is necessary to wonder, first of all, whether it is convenient to devise other instruments along with the traditional methods of action. For example, the radical nonviolence has always been conceived as an effective means which society or parts of it could oppose to the "violence of the State". But in the face of a violence which comes also from sectors of society, is the nonviolent strategy still effective against this violence? Probably so, but in this case it is necessary to literally "invent" new methods of application of this strategy (because what is valid vis-à-vis the State cannot be valid, in the same terms, vis-à-vis society). This is a theoretic (but not just theoretic) problem, which the radicals must confront.

More generally: in the face of a generalized situation of collective insecurity, it is necessary to immediately devise the suitable means in order for this "state" of the public opinion not to turn out according to the expectations of those who contribute to fostering it. The great force of the "social alarm policy" lies precisely in the fact that, forced inside a situation of fear, citizens will ask for "more repression" in the total absence of alternatives. In such situation, it becomes necessary to start an offensive, and not simply "play passively" (as occurs usually when one simply protests for the "closing of the hide-outs", etc). It becomes indispensable to offer at least a hope for a different outlet to collective insecurity, enacting all those initiatives enabling to loosen the tension and to reduce the spaces open to violence.

Once again, it is necessary to concentrate, as always when struggling for an expansion of the areas of freedom, on an intense "mobilization" of citizens on specific political struggles; which is very different from the PCI's appeals to "vigilance" against terrorism, which can trigger counter-productive processes, increasing rather than diminishing collective insecurity, fostering a witch-hunting atmosphere (once again, there is the spectre of the German model) and of collective spying.

A mobilization against collective insecurity

The radicals, obviously, have already acted for the mobilization of citizens, collecting signatures first, and defending the nine referendums now; an action which is the essential means, the indispensable condition to enact many other intervention projects. In these conditions, resorting to the will of the citizens is, per se, a powerful means which, by channeling directly social dissent and/or consent "in a peaceful shape", can contribute to the "de-scalation" of processes such as the one described above.

If the available forces make it possible, it is nonetheless necessary for the Radical Party to carry out its action also in other fields, in parallel. Political violence is prevalently, if not exclusively, "urban violence". The reason for this is obvious: just like banditry is a form of (organized) violence typical of a rural society, the urban one is a the form of violence typical of the industrial society, because it is in the city and through the city that its fundamental processes take place. It is therefore necessary to devise a strategy to intervene on the city and on its contradictions: the more "counter-powers" we stimulate in the city, the more we can limit the space of violence. And the counter-powers can be aggregated on a variety of subjects which range from the defence of consumers' rights to the struggles for housing (requisition of non-rented houses), closing of the historical centres to private traffic, struggle for welfare services for children and the old, and many other subjects on which v

arious radical associations are working on in various areas and with tremendous difficulties (and without sufficient co-ordination). The question, therefore, is concentrating on the reconstruction of the urban fabric, in cooperation with union forces and other political formations of the Left, through a constant political mobilization. And the peaceful mobilization of the citizens exploiting all possible extra-party and extra-institutional channels appears all the more necessary today than the institutional fields of "protected and subordinated" participation are wearing out and losing credibility (see the evolution of the recent school elections).

A few indications for an intervention

Along with all these initiatives, it is necessary to carry out all the traditional battles of the Radical party for the democratization, the demilitarization and the unionization of the police Corps (on this problem, refer to Ernesto Bettinelli's analysis; Cf. "Radical subjects", No. 2, pages 122-138) and for the most complete and immediate information to all citizens on the charges against the persons arrested for political offences (since information is the indispensable requirement for a real democratic control).

In order to re-establish the urban fabric, it is possible, in the context of a struggle for a true democratization of the police, to advance proposals aimed at reinstating conditions of security and democratic order (which is something very different from the so-called "public order"). For example, we could think of institutions which have given good results in Anglo-Saxon countries, such the "neighbourhood policeman", stably assigned to patrol a restricted area of the city and therefore "known" by the inhabitants of an area, who can thus rapidly resort to him in all cases of need.

In this context, it is necessary to evaluate the possibility of having a major campaign, at conditions to be decided (popular bills, or referendums): against firearms - withdrawal of the licence to carry firearms, reconversion of the arms factories, struggle against the complicities that favour clandestine traffic, etc - without thinking, obviously, of stopping the violence in this way, but rather seeking alternative outlets (to the demand for repression) to collective insecurity. And counting on the psychological effects of this or of other types of campaigns.

A campaign against firearms can encounter the resistance of certain social strata - for instance, certain categories of shopkeepers - but it could also be accepted favourably by large sectors of the population and - under other aspects - can express and even relaunch pacifism and radical nonviolence on the field of the "internal policy".

In the famous report of the "Trilateral" on "The crisis of democracy", Samuel Huntington and the other authors of the report conclude by deciding in favour of a recreation of the models of authority which have declined everywhere in Europe over the past years. The fundamental thesis, which found a tremendous echo in the most recent political events in Europe and in the climate of restoration it is experiencing, is that "too much" democracy is dangerous for the good functioning of the democratic system itself. The radicals have always based their action on the contrary hypothesis: that democracy can be upheld and consolidated by expanding, instead of restricting, the existing spaces of democracy and freedom. Also for this reason, in connection with other sectors of the human and political society (for example, certain union forces), the radicals can now contribute, by mobilizing their political imagination and their capacities, to imposing a battle in this country against the on-going authoritarian tendencies

which is not necessarily a lost battle.

Translator's notes

(1) PANEBIANCO ANGELO. (1948). Structuralist political analyst, studied with Professor Sartori in the United States. Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. Co-author of "I nuovo radicali". Editorialist for "Il Corriere della Sera". Former member of the Radical Party.

(2) INGRAO PIETRO. (Lenola 1915). For many years chief exponent of the Italian Communist Party. After militating in the fascist university organizations, leader of the party's "Left", open to the so-called "dialogue with the Catholics" and to a grass roots conception of politics, perceived as struggle of the "masses" against capitalist exploitation on a world scale. President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1976 to 1979, at the time of the "compromesso storico" and of "national unity".

(3) PCI: Italian Communist Party, now Democratic Party of the Left.

(4) PSI: Italian Socialist Party