ABSTRACT: The Radical Party's action to obtain the liberation of Judge Giovanni D'Urso, kidnapped by the "Red Brigades" on 12 December 1980, and to oppose that group of political and press officials who advocate his death to justify the imposition in Italy of an "emergency" government composed of "technicians". On 15 February 1981, Judge D'Urso was released: "The camp that advocates inflexibility was organizing and is still organizing a coup d'état: for this as for the 1921 fascism, it needs victims, but this time, unlike what happened with Moro, it has been temporarily defeated: for once, the Red Brigades have not served the purpose. The campaign conducted by Radio Radicale successfully interrupts the blackout on information ordered by the press.

("The life of Judge D'Urso", Who needed it, who sold it, how it was saved - edited by Lino Jannuzzi, Ennio Capelcelatro, Franco Roccella, Valter Vecellio - Supplement to Radical News n.3 - March 1981)

The 33 days

by Ennio Capelcelatro and Franco Roccella

"We deem it monstrous for a political class which detains power, as part of the Government or of the opposition, administering it in such a way as to jeopardize the State and civil society to such an extent, to try to recover its force and redeem its incapacity through the life of one man. Well, do not rely on us for such deed: we will do all we can to save the life of D'Urso: we will do all that is rightful and proper".

Franco Roccella, Radical member of Parliament

(Chamber address of 9 January 1981)

The kidnapping

It is a few minutes after 10 p.m. of 12 December 1980. At that hour, the morning papers are packed, and the first edition is already being delivered to the peripheral offices. Only reporters are still at work. In the other sectors, most of the staff has gone home; the few journalists who linger on for an updating of the final edition or for any emergencies often while away the time by playing a game or two of poker. After all, one never knows, suddenly and quite unexpectedly one might come up with a scoop to "splash across the front page".

In the offices of the Rome-based daily "Il Messaggero", as in all other Roman newspapers, the day has gone by as usual. The list of events is long, but it's basically routine work; the main course remains the scandal of the oil frauds and the tragedy of the earthquake which shattered Southern Italy, with side dishes such as the threats of toughening up fiscal regulations, increasing the prices of oil products and the rise of inflation rates. It is true that they are disquieting events, announced with terrorist tones, but nothing new in the Italian political scene. The new fact is represented by the request of a life sentence for Valpreda and Merlino for the massacre of Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969. It is new from the point of view of the circumstance, not from the point of view of the structure; as a matter of fact, it follows a worn out pattern which closely resembles the pattern of the scandals. In conclusion, wherever you look in the information scene, you are overwhelmed by the same stinking atmosphe

re.

The relatively sleepy atmosphere of the offices of "Il Messaggero" is abruptly shaken at exactly 22:15. The switchboard operator notifies that an unidentified person wants to speak with a member of the editorial staff. The call is taken by Mario Spetia, a senior editor. Speaking on the other end of the phone is a young man, the tone of his voice is quick and agitated. Amid the flow of often incomprehensible words, Spetia clearly picks up this message: "Red Brigades speaking. We have kidnapped Judge Giovanni D'Urso. We ask for the suppression of the penitentiary of L'Asinara. A dispatch will follow".

It is not rare for jerks to call the offices of newspapers announcing sensational news. But this time, Spetia senses that this is no joke, that the man calling is not the usual mythomaniac. His suspicions are fueled especially by the name of D'Urso, a name which rarely appears on the press and is practically unknown to the public opinion; a person wanting to play a stupid joke would have probably chosen the name of a well-known person. Spetia tells the editor in chief, Pino Geraci, about the call, and together they agree to ascertain the truthfulness of the message by calling the Digos and the Carabinieri. Neither the Digos nor the Carabinieri know anything about a kidnapping carried out by the Red Brigades. Nonetheless, as they know Giovanni D'Urso's position, they realize that it is possible that he has been kidnapped. At this point, there follows a frenzy series of telephone calls. The Digos and the Carabinieri call the D'Urso family; the judge's elder daughter informs them that her father isn't home yet

at 10:30 p.m., despite the fact that he had informed the family that he would have returned home no later than 8:30 p.m. At the Ministry of Justice, the personnel guaranties that the judge left his office to go home just before 8 p.m. At this point, there are no doubts: the judge has really been kidnapped. The police confirm the news to "Il Messaggero", which immediately publishes the announcement of the kidnapping on the front page. But not all the other newspapers give the news the same importance, and some place the news toward the centre or the bottom of the page.

So-called security measures are activated at once. The Assistant Public Prosecutor, Domenico Sica, immediately goes to the police headquarters to coordinate the investigations. Roadblocks are immediately established along the main arteries, especially those leading to the city; but after about three hours, during which the kidnappers were free to move around with the uttermost calm, the hopes to find the terrorist commando are practically nonexistent. At 10:30 p.m. the terrorists have no doubt already reached the hideout prepared to receive the prisoner.

Giovanni D'Urso, 47 years of age, comes from Catania and has been living in Rome for five years, in via Ludovico Micara 34, in the Aurelio area. He is a ranking official of the General Direction of the Prisons of the Ministry of Justice. The shifting and assignment of the prisoners in the country's different prisons depends largely on him, and he is the one to decide the transfer of this or that prisoner to maximum-security sections.

D'Urso entered the magistracy on 10 April 1959, was appointed councillor of the Court of Cassation in 1979, after a career of barely 20 years. His rapid advancement was favoured by a law passed in 1978, which abrogated a previous law according to which the three years he spent as a judicial deputy would not have been valid for his promotion. Without this law of 1978, D'Urso would have had to wait until 1982 to be appointed councillor of the Supreme Court, the necessary condition to assume directive functions in the judicial administration, especially in a field in which he would control the life conditions of captured terrorists or alleged terrorists.

The first investigations are fruitless. The frenzy mobilization of the investigative instruments is nothing but a ritualization of an efficiency ambition which has to this moment been a complete failure; moreover it follows a pattern which has already caused a rebuttal in the potential spectators. In conformity with the general expectations of a failure of the police operations, the first night of the kidnapping goes by without even a fragment of information on the identity of the authors of the kidnapping, and especially on the whereabouts of the so-called "people's prison" from emerging. On the basis of the first hypotheses expressed by the investigatory authorities, it seems that Giovanni D'Urso had been spied during several months, exactly as Aldo Moro had been years before.

D'Urso himself had reported that on an evening of February 1980 he had noticed two cars, a Fiat 500 and a Renault, with suspicious looking individuals aboard. On the basis of such vague elements, the inquiring judges trace a first outline of the possible kidnapping "commando", which, in their opinion, consists of the usual, elusive Mario Moretti and Barbara Balzerani, who, rather like God himself, are anywhere there is a massacre, a kidnapping or a terrorist attack. In addition to these two terrorists, the inquiring judges presume that the "commando" is made also of Nadia Ponti, Vincenzo Guagliardi, Antonio Savasta and Emilio Libera.

The truth is that in the meanwhile, the authorities are groping in the dark. It takes 24 hours before they start understanding the dynamics of the operation. The first hypothesis which is considered is that D'urso was blocked in via Arenula or in the surroundings immediately after having left the Ministry at about 8:00 p.m. But the hypothesis soon turns out to be fragile: in an hour of such intense traffic, the terrorists could not have possibly carried out the operation undisturbed.

Only later do the investigating authorities realize that the kidnapping occurred near the judge's home, probably in via Pio IV, a road that runs perpendicular to via Leone XIII, where the Fiat 124 with which the official returned home is parked.

At a distance of about thirty metres from the car, the investigators find a pair of broken lenses and tyre marks on the asphalt; the judge probably reacted to the aggression, perhaps even vigorously, but succumbed and was loaded on board a car which left immediately after.

It is not enough to pick up weapons

It appears very clear from the beginning that the D'Urso kidnapping calls into question the Government's whole antiterrorist strategy, culminating in the action of General Dalla Chiesa, who is the mastermind more than the executor of such strategy; thus, it would be more correct to talk about a Dalla Chiesa strategy rather than a Government strategy. The event sparks a psychological repercussion which reopens the disquieting questions advanced after the Moro kidnapping. The carelessness with which the operation was carried out insinuates the suspicion that the operative capacity of the Red Brigades is far from declining, as the press organs want to convince the public opinion of by playing on the massive arrests of terrorist groups that are under way in the country.

Despite the fact that the terrorist organizations have never remained inactive from the Moro kidnapping to 12 December 1980, and have on the contrary carried out sensational (from their point of view) attacks, such as the assassination of the journalist Walter Tobagi, of the Vice President of the Supreme Magistracy Council, Professor Giovanni Bachelet, and more recently of Dr. Giuseppe Furci, a physician working at the Roman prison of Regina Coeli, the general slogan was that they were being destroyed. According to Dalla Chiesa, organizations such as "Prima Linea", "Nap" and other minor terrorist organizations have been wiped away; there remain the Red Brigades alone, who are however being decimated by arrests, desertions and afterthoughts, and are torn by internal contrasts between hawks and doves, that is, between the "Walter Alasia commando" and the group headed by the founders, which; according to the authorities, such conflicts have greatly reduced their offensive capacity. Two days before the D'Urso ki

dnapping, two components of the "Walter Alasia commando", Roberto Serafini and Walter Pezzoli, are killed by the carabinieri of Milan in the Certosa area.

There are also those who warn against any "excessive optimism". The judges of Turin warn that if the armed party is experiencing a crisis, it must nonetheless be fought against with all forces, because if it reorganized itself, this would represent a terrible threat for everyone; but even statements such as these continue to take it for granted that the armed party is declining, nor do they take into account fascist terrorism, which, through striking occasionally and erratically, selects masses of people as their target, as last summer at the station of Bologna (84 victims and hundreds of injured). The attack followed a technique which had already been used in Milan and was used also in the massacres on the Italicus train and in Brescia. Were it not for the trial in Catanzaro, which is unrolling rather like a "flashback", perhaps no one would even remember fascist terrorism. Nor does the recent massacre in Bologna, despite the terrifying executive ferocity, seem to have relaunched the serious concerns as reg

ards the involvement of organs of the State of the early seventies; such concerns turned out to be fully justified, and were neutralized through clean-up operations in the State organs that were most glaringly involved.

The D'Urso kidnapping automatically reminded of the more sensational kidnapping of the President of the Christian Democrat Party, Aldo Moro, even if the course of the D'Urso kidnapping never was so sensational, and did not involve the massacre of five members of the escort. According to the statements delivered by his wife, D'Urso had voluntarily waived both the armoured car and the escort, not out of fatalism, or because he did not fear being the possible target of an attack, but because he considered such measures both useless and dangerous: in his opinion, a determined commando acts suddenly and unexpectedly, and the first thing it does is to eliminate the members of the escort, without even giving them the time to react.

However, precisely the simplicity with which the kidnapping was carried out reveals a tactical renewal which focuses directly on the target, eliminating wide-range operations which inevitably produce fundamentally superficial damages and which are perhaps even politically counterproductive. However, there is an even greater difference between the two kidnappings, a fracture which, while not proving an ideological discontinuity, is nonetheless a symptom of a strategic and possibly even a political innovation.

It is quite obvious that with both operations the terrorists want to deal a blow against the "heart of the State". But while in the Moro case the strategy points to a general destabilization, in the D'Urso case, despite the fundamental objective, the action is specifically aimed at the suppression of the prison system, which can be restricted, in the near future, to closing the penitentiary of L'Asinara and the maximum-security sections of the other prisons. The final objective is always the destruction of the imperialist State, but the terrorists now seem to have relinquished the subversive strategy in favour of a strategy linked to the pursuance of immediate objectives, based on an "escalation" which passes through the suppression of the State's supporting structures, starting with its repressive structures.

This time, which in fact does not represent a novelty, it is stated quite clearly by the terrorists themselves. Coherently with the announcement made to "Il Messaggero", in the early afternoon of 13 December the kidnappers deposit the first dispatch in a rubbish bin in front of the cinema Ambassade, in via Accademia degli Agiati, then informing the newspapers to see that it is picked up. Attached to the despatch is a photograph which portrays the hostage on the background of a panel with the words "Red Brigades" in large letters and with the five-pointed star; a sentence reads: "close L'Asinara immediately". The pattern is the same as the one used for Judge Mario Sossi, for Judge Giuseppe di Gennaro and for Aldo Moro.

The despatch opens with these words: "On Friday 12 November, an armed nucleus of the Red Brigades abducted and shut into a people's prison Giovanni D'Urso, magistrate of the Court of Cassation, director of the Ministry of Justice's 3rd Office of the General Direction of Prisons. D'Urso is called a "bastard, the torturer of thousands of proletarians...the highest responsible for the treatment of all proletarian prisoners both in normal and in special prisons...He is responsible for the general and particular treatment of the prisoners, the differentiation among the different prisons, the transfers, the torture practices and the political, mental and physical annihilation of the prisoners". "Now", the dispatch continues, "he is in a people's prison, and will be submitted to the judgment of the proletariat, which this swine thought he could massacre without being punished".

As to the probable outcome of the trial, for the moment the terrorists do not reveal much, but from the crudity of the language it can be gathered that his survival is seriously endangered. They provide no concrete anticipations, but they do foreshadow a disquieting severity. "Our trial", they state, "has nothing to do with the rites and codes of bourgeois justice...We will follow the criteria of proletarian justice, which never fails to manifest itself with punctual and inexorable inflexibility".

However, and this is something new, the trial against the magistrate appears to be a purpose in itself, or the culminating moment of the attack against the prison system, which must conclude itself, for the terrorists, at least with the suppression of L'Asinara, the neutralization of maximum-security prisons and the abrogation of the so-called differentiation circuit. "To try this slave to the authority, in charge of administering the most infamous instrument of annihilation used by imperialism" - state the terrorists - "means to try the whole imperialist bourgeoisie, and to struggle so that the relations of force in prisons will change in favour of the proletarians". The objective is even better specified where they say that the highest point of the clash are the FIAT company and the prisons. Nonetheless, according to a strategy based on "escalation", priority is given to the problem of the prisons, in that they are habitual dwelling places for "outlawed proletarians, that is, that social class which suffer

s the cost of the crisis and the burden of the productive reorganization". Prisons thus become "the decisive battlefield of the clash between revolution and counter-revolution", and "the battle of 2 October at L'Asinara, the battle of Volterra, of Fossombrone, of Florence, the destruction of the camp of Nuoro and the execution of the spies and double agents" should all be seen in this same perspective. Therefore, for the moment the priority is to "organize the release of proletarian prisoners, dismantle the differentiation circuit, create and consolidate struggle committees ("inside the prisons"), and immediately close L'Asinara".

These statements clearly reveal the strategic renewal of the armed party, the refusal, in practice, of an indiscriminate resort to weapons without a rationally selected objective. But there are also more direct references which are in practice critical of the strategy of the hawks, in other words of the "Walter Alasia commando", which is explicitly accused of acting indiscriminately. "We must accept war and strike at the heart of the State" - the terrorists state in their dispatch - "maintaining the elements of destruction and disorganization within a general guideline that blends the immediate programs with the general program for the transition to communism".

The characteristics of this new strategy are clear, even if from this point on the tone becomes openly accusing: "Those who refrain from doing this today are opportunists, because they do not link the party's action to the immediate programs of the different class sections, do not construct the armed proletarian power, but avoid the historical duty which belongs to the communist fighting organizations. Those who believe that the problem is to shoot or eliminate a few enemies of the people are mislead. We already said it and we will repeat it forever: it is not enough to pick up weapons! Those who do nothing but this prove they have not understood the progress made by armed struggle, and its future".

The "hard-liners" to the offensive

On 15 December another dispatch is diffused, this time it is prevalently informative. "The prisoner Giovanni D'Urso is in good conditions - it states - and the examination he is submitted to is being conducted with his complete cooperation, and is highlighting his direct responsibilities...The role he has played to this moment in special prisons leaves no doubts; all the proletarian prisoners known him to be a bastard". It is premature to establish the moment of the verdict, the terrorists say, but the declared acquisition of the evidence of D'Urso's "guilt" in practice foreshadows a verdict of guilty. The only thing to see is how this will be carried out, even if, after the Moro affair, there should be no illusions as the extent and the quality of the punishment. Clearly, there are also the positive precedents of Sossi and Di Gennaro, cases which concluded themselves with the prisoner's release, but the historical conditions have deeply changed, and the objectives pursued were less clearly specified at the

time.

As far as the investigations are concerned, no relevant progress is being made. Practically speaking, the situation is stagnant, and the investigators are getting absolutely nowhere, despite the effort to display efficiency. Massive police operations are carried out in different areas, according to a ceremonial which has revealed itself a complete failure on all other occasions. The only element acquired is the identikit of one of the kidnappers, drawn with a pencil on the basis of the indications of some witnesses. The result is the portrait of a young man, aged 25-30, with the following features: straight black hair neatly combed and thick at the sides towards the sideburns, fine, straight nose, oval face, thin lips, black almond-shaped eyes.

This improbable character, according to the testimonies that enabled the reconstruction of his aspect, was allegedly part of the commando that carried out the kidnapping, and served as a lookout during the operation. His participation in the aggression, and the role he presumably played in the operation, were deduced by the fact that an unidentified person saw him in the surroundings of the magistrate's home at about 3 p.m. of the day of the kidnapping.

A vaguer identikit would be impossible to outline, but this, together with a leak according to which a top-secret "detailed plan", developed at the time of the Moro kidnapping, is being implemented to locate the terrorist' hideout should reassure the public opinion on the fact that the investigations are fruitfully continuing. The hypothesis of the "detailed plan" is corroborated by the fact that its development follows and does not precede the Moro case: it therefore takes into account the mistakes made at the time when developing a highly perfectioned operative plan.

However, it is from a political point of view that the problem soon becomes burning. The first to ignite the polemic, immediately after the kidnapping, is Senator for life Leo Valiani, somewhat of an institution as an editorialist of "Il Corriere della Sera", an advocate of the hard line without who does not even pretend to support a repressive generalization. "We must respond to the D'Urso kidnapping" - he writes on "Il Corriere della Sera" - "with the same inflexibility that was used at the time of the Moro kidnapping". A statement which is the equivalent of telling the Red Brigades: "hurry up and send us a corpse, and that's the end of it". Then Valiani rejoices at the decision to prolong provisional arrests, advocating a "vigorous use of it".

Unfortunately, Valiani's repressive mysticism is not an isolated phenomenon, nor is it proposed by the MSI alone out of an ideological vocation. The Republican Mammì is equally strongly impregnated by it, and in fact he is always an enthusiastic advocate when it comes to issuing special laws, provisional arrests or regulations that are in any case restrictive of individual liberties. In relation to the kidnapping of Judge D'Urso, Mammì promptly intervenes with an apparently problematic statement, which would, at a first impression, formally place him above those who advocate negotiating and those who oppose it, but which in fact represents a biased refusal of any act or move that could contribute, at least in theory, to save the life of the hostage.

"The question is not to divide ourselves in hard-liners and soft-liners"; Mammì says, "the question is to ask ourselves if a kidnapping would not follow another kidnapping if the State carried out negotiations with an armed party which desperately needs to reconstruct areas of support and solidarity, presenting itself as an effective counter-authority". The same sort of position had been expressed by Ugo Pecchioli, responsible for the PCI's section which deals with State problems, on the previous day, a few hours after the kidnapping; the article had been published on the front page of "L'Unità" (a detail which highlights the official character of the statement, involving the responsibility of the entire party): "Any surrender to blackmail is unacceptable. Apart from anything else, if the State capitulated, this would give back force and influence to terrorism, and would help it overcome the crisis it is experiencing".

In fact, statements such as these intend to be on the safe side. At the moment, there is no terrorist blackmail, and no request addressed to the State or the Government. The dispatches diffused simply states the objectives and the strategy of the armed party.

The request to suppress the penitentiary of L'Asinara is advanced as a peremptory order: either it is fulfilled by those who have the authority to, or it shall be conquered by means of a struggle; it is never advanced as a possible condition for the release of the prisoner or as an exchangeable good. There is no offer of a negotiation; there is not a single passage, in the dispatches divulged to this moment, that points to a compromise agreement, a "do ut des". This fact is underlined by the liberal Bozzi: "to discuss the problem of surrendering or not before the terrorists have advanced any requests, has the sole purpose of dividing the political forces even more".

The Republicans' premature refusal to negotiate (a negotiation which has apart from anything else not even been requested), is in fact a signal sent to the socialists as well as to Forlani, an attempt to exert pressure on the Prime Minister and prepare him to use all his influence on the other forces of the majority who might have any humanitarian temptations. For the moment, Forlani has had informal contacts over the phone with Piccoli, Craxi, Spadolini and Longo only, but prepares to summon a meeting in order to decide a unitary line of action. Craxi has already expressed a point of view which considerably differs from the Republican one, being it based not on "inflexibility", but on the humanitarian issue. In his opinion, "a firm battle against terrorism calls for us to defend and save human lives that are in danger, and the life to be saved at present is that of Giovanni D'Urso"; the Social-Democrats, who would certainly not benefit of an open contrast with the Socialists, declare, through statements exp

ressed by Saragat and Longo, that "it is necessary to do everything that is possible to save the life of Judge D'Urso, realizing that such objective must be pursued in such a way as to give back force and credibility to the institutions".

According to the Radicals, the problem of negotiating or not is a pure pretext. If the State must assert its inflexibility, it cannot do so omitting the democratic fulfilments it is bound to out of democratic faithfulness; in other words, it cannot use the alibi of a "blackmail" to justify and legitimate its lack of democratic solidity. To close an institution of violence such as the lager of L'Asinara, which the political class and the Government are already carrying out - objects Massimo Teodori to the "hard-liners" - would be, if ever, "a sign of force on the part of the State, and not a sign of weakness"; "independently of any request advanced by the terrorists - adds Franco de Cataldo - "L'Asinara must be closed because it is unworthy of any civil society". An intransigent refusal to negotiate could backfire, because in practice the terrorists have advanced no "blackmail"; such attitude cannot be interpreted other than an attack against measures that are being carried out and that would have been implem

ented in any case. Because L'Asinara was about to be closed, and its suppression had already been decided and scheduled, and was being carried out long before the Red Brigades divulged their dispatch N.1, a suspension of the operation could have caused the terrorists' blackmail and the consequence of accepting it, insofar as the State, in order to avoid accepting it, would have relinquished its own autonomous evaluations in favour of evaluations based on justice and civility. This is somehow confirmed by the Liberal Raffaele Costa, under-secretary of Justice in the previous Cossiga government: The progression of the chronological timing would have lead to closing L'Asinara as well ("after Favignana"), not out of respect for the founders of the Red Brigades, but out of respect for a decision which had already been planned and which needed only to be gradually implemented in relation to the possibility of shifting the prisoners elsewhere".

According to Costa, Italy's prison system is absolutely obsolete and inadequate, and there is a persisting negative situation in prisons which aggravates and which extends the reasons for the protest, and in certain respects legitimates it. Prisons are being attacked because they are a weak spot in the country's administration; and the Red Brigades' intention, according to Costa, "is certainly not that of improving them. On the contrary, they want them to remain in the current conditions", because otherwise they would lose one the strongest bases of the subversive strategy. Even if Costa does not explicitly say so, there ensues that to speed up the suppression of prisons such as L'Asinara and to adopt measures to make a prison reform feasible (a reform which is extremely vague) would mean to cut the grass under the Red Brigades' feet, and would truly be a demonstration of coherence and of enlightened inflexibility.

At least as far as the suppression of the maximum-security section of the prison of L'Asinara is concerned, there is a quasi-unanimity. The differences arise as regards the timing of the operation: the "hard-liners", headed by the Republicans, would prefer to postpone it, so as not to accept the blackmail of the terrorists, despite the fact that the life of a man is at stake. The logic at the base of such attitude reduces the confrontation with terrorism to a gladiatorial conflict, and totally neglects to consider the implications for D'Urso's survival. For the moment, the Government keeps at a safe distance, waiting for the situation to clear up among the forces of the majority. In the meanwhile, the DC can play safe, displaying a neutral equidistance.

First debate at the Chamber

A more tangible demonstration of such ambiguity, which is very little promising for Mrs D'Urso, who in the meanwhile visits the Head of the State to advocate the safety of her husband, is given by the debate at Montecitorio, on the morning of 16 December. The numerous interrogations and parliamentary questions presented can be divided into two groups: those concerned chiefly about the future of the hostage, and the others that aim at urging a "determination" which overshadows the problem of the magistrate's survival.

Only the interrogations presented by the Radicals belong to the first group, aimed at "knowing the intentions of the Government in relation to the kidnapping of Giovanni D'Urso", or at "knowing which initiatives the Government has taken to obtain the release of the judge"; all the other interrogations belong to the second group, from the ones presented by the Christian Democrats to the ones presented by the MSI, aimed at "knowing the circumstances of the kidnapping" (DC), or at knowing "the state of the investigations to release Judge D'Urso and to discover his kidnappers and have them judged by the law" (PCI). There should be no misunderstandings as to the contents of the questions. The Communists are not asking for direct political initiatives aimed at favouring the judge's release, but an action aimed at punishing the kidnappers, which is to be above all a trial of force, and only secondarily a contribution to the prisoner's release. The request is pure wishful thinking, because no one has the slightest i

dea as to the whereabouts of the "prison". The PSI's interrogation is ambiguous, in that it aims at understanding "which relation this episode can and must have with the general situation of terrorism in Italy".

The Minister of the Interior Rognoni is extremely vague in his answers. As far as the dynamics of the kidnapping is concerned, he reveals nothing more than what has already been divulged by the press. The same can be said as regards the investigation under way, which, he guarantees, is assuming "clearer features", but on this point he believes he must respect a reserve which Parliament should "understand and appreciate". As for the protective measures for those who are subject to terrorist attacks, Rognoni deems that those adopted are appropriate (armoured cars for judges); if ever, the problem is how to "induce those who do not consider them necessary and appropriate (as the kidnapped judge) to adopt the uttermost precaution".

For that which concerns the Government's attitudes and initiatives, Rognoni runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds. "The firmest determination and precaution can by no means be loosened against terrorism", he says. The Government, while confirming its willingness to hold a debate on prison policies and on the current situation in prisons, preannounced by the Minister of Justice last Thursday at the Chamber Justice Committee, ensures it is equally ready to hold a debate on the themes of security, from which it believes it can gather elements destined to reinforce the commitment in defence of a just and peaceful civil coexistence".

After this rather acrobatic survey of security problems, Rognoni concludes his address with a pro-negotiation statement: "The Government will leave no stone unturned, within the limits of its possibilities, to achieve the primary objective of the restitution of Judge D'Urso to his family...In such perspective, the Government will do all that is possible and will neglect no opportunity that can lead to a positive outcome of this affair, which objectively concerns the deepest values of the "private" sphere and at the same time belongs to the more complex and articulated context of the national community".

The Radical Franco De Cataldo, while acknowledging the Government's willingness to debate the problems of security, objects to the Minister that the Government's action is a failure from every point of view, and the last initiative, taken on the occasion of the kidnapping of the magistrate, to prolong provisional arrests by sixty days, serves the sole purpose of "exacerbating the spiral of violence". Any attempt, De Cataldo adds, "in the respect of the law and of the Constitution", must be made to save the magistrate's life. Any attempt. A State is strong not because it is objectively strong, but because it displays its force when it is also capable of creating the conditions whereby a member of society is not ruthlessly and barbarically murdered. In any case, regardless of the requests advanced by the Red Brigades, the occasion is the right one to "reach the prompt decision to close the prison of L'Asinara...I believe the decision cannot be delayed. And we should not deny that the State is acting under the

pressure of the terrorists: it would not be true, it would be a fake justification, because if it is necessary to act, it is necessary to act now. And if this can even partly solve the problem of the life and freedom of D'Urso, all the better: we will have the satisfaction of having carried out two important actions, from an ethical and social point of view".

Marco Boato, Radical, goes further back into the past, and accuses the Government of serious omissions which place it in the conditions of being blackmailed, and which prepared the ground for the judge's kidnapping. "Have you done your duty every day?", he asks the representatives of the Government present in Parliament. "Have you foreseen, on the basis of the events of these last months, that this was about to happen? Clearly, not that the terrorists would have kidnapped D'Urso: no one knew this, or so I hope. But have you understood the facts that were occurring? Have you read the documents of the Red Brigades, concerning a single, obsessive, paranoid objective: close L'Asinara, close L'Asinara, close L'Asinara! This was the only, paranoid thing that they repeated. Then how could you not know that they would have done this? The revolt of Nuoro, the revolt of Florence, had but a single aim: to close L'Asinara".

Boato recalls that a few days previously, when D'Urso hadn't been kidnapped, he had concluded his address at the Chamber Justice Committee with these words: "I ask you not to reach the point of having to accept the terrorists' blackmail on the prison of L'Asinara". "In any case", he adds, "to close L'Asinara and to re-examine the whole regime of special prisons, of maximum-security prisons in our country, is a fully justified claim which we, democratic political forces, whether of the majority or of the opposition, must propose autonomously and vigorously, for reasons that have to do with justice, legal tradition and democracy in our country".

The only feasible solution is that of a democratic action, which must include such fulfilments and all the other ones inherent to the prison system, and certainly should not include special laws and provisional arrests, which even the Minister of Justice Bonifacio (DC), Boato says, considers "an obstacle for the return to a institutional pattern other than that to which terrorism has forced our country in these years". Therefore, he concludes, "if we want to continue with old solutions, and maybe even repeat them wearily, this will be a tragedy not only for D'Urso and his family, but a tragedy also for the democracy of our country. You will apparently solve this case by burying a corpse and saying "we did not surrender", but you will be faced to an endemic phenomenon, which you will have been incapable of defeating because incapable of understanding".

The addresses of the Christian Democrats and of the Socialists are ambiguous: Gerardo Bianco, of the DC, does nothing more than endorsing Rognoni's promise, that is, that no stone will be left unturned for the release of D'Urso, nonetheless recalling that the laws of this State, which is a legal state, must always be respected; and Labriola, on behalf of the PSI, is concerned chiefly about urging a debate on the state of security in Europe, omitting any direct reference to initiatives aimed at D'Urso safety. The member of the MSI Pazzaglia is in an isolated position, advocating the suppression of L'Asinara but at the same time asking for the creation of a constellation of special, maximum-security prisons; the Communist Fracchia is the only one to be sincere as regards the attitude which the Government should adopt toward terrorism and the specific case of the kidnapping. According to Fracchia there can be no doubts: the attitude must be one of "determination, inflexibility, rigour and coherence", as on the

occasion of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro.

Red Brigades: "where is the secret plan?"

With the debate of 16 December at Montecitorio, the D'Urso affair becomes veiled. There follows a climate of suspense, which is not the result of a moment of reflexion, but a suspence which often hides a total lack of initiatives. The investigation continues at a quick pace, according to the official version, but without any progress: the hope to acquire useful information is subordinated to the possibility that the "repentants" will provide some new elements, enabling the police forces to follow more precise tracks. The Carabinieri and the Digos reply to the press which incessantly asks for information to the magistracy, guaranteeing that they are moving on precise tracks, but that they cannot provide any information. At the same time, a number of marginal circumstances are ascertained: the first one is that the judges have been given only 330 armoured cars instead of the 1200 which had been promised, and this contradicts the image of efficiency boasted by Rognoni at the Chamber; the second is that on the

day of the kidnapping D'Urso went to his office to replace a colleague who had asked him to: if the Red Brigades spied him and captured him on that day, this could only mean that they had been promptly informed about the change from someone inside the ministry (in other words, the usual hypothesis of a double agent in the public administration). The climate of suspence is enhanced by the uncertainty on the Government's intentions and orientations. The summit between Forlani and the four secretaries of the parties of the majority takes place all the same, on the day of the debate at Montecitorio, but it is not clear whether it is decisive or colloquial. At its conclusion, a press release states that "the Prime Minister met the secretaries of the four parties of the Governmental majority. The secretaries of the four parties guarantied their support to the Government in tackling emergency problems such as the struggle against terrorism, the reconstruction of the areas destroyed by the earthquake, the commitment

s concerning economic planning".

This is all. On the basis of the events occurred in the previous days, some hypothesize that perhaps an agreement for the immediate closing of L'Asinara has been reached; however, precisely as the summit is under way, Mammì specifies that the Republican Party "is in favour of special prisons, in the sense of places to keep criminals that are part of organized crime who could, for this reason, escape much more easily in other prisons". Most probably this position was maintained during the meeting of secretaries with Forlani. Clearly, it is not peremptory, in other words, the hypothesis of closing L'Asinara remains valid, but represents an obstacle which the Government must overcome by all means to avoid major contrasts within the majority. On the other hand, the match is not between a neutral Forlani and an inflexible Republican Party on the so-called hard line; all four parties of the majority must be accounted for, and among them the DC, the party Forlani belongs to, which seems to share the views of the Re

publican Party. On the basis of leaks, it seems that Piccoli has agreed with Spadolini on the need to adopt the uttermost inflexibility faced to any request advanced by the terrorists, because the value at stake is "the State's credibility", which would be jeopardized by the "slightest capitulation".

The communists in the meanwhile intensify the initiatives to make the line of inflexibility prevail, opposing it to a non-existent pro-negotiation policy. On 19 December "L'Unità" publishes a long and detailed interview with Judge Pietro Calogero, the author of the "Negri theorem", in which the judge maintains that now more than ever, more than at the time of Moro, it is necessary to reject any hypothesis of a negotiation or surrender, precisely in consideration of the minor and more easily attainable political objective which is being pursued with the current kidnapping. "By choosing a less important political objective", Calogero states, "and implicitly requesting the State to negotiate at less costly conditions, the Red Brigades probably aim at breaking that front of inflexibility which in 1978 was the cause of their defeat. I believe that the refusal to negotiate is indispensable this time too, not out of an abstract reason of principle, or an anti-historic reason of State, but because only that refusal

will prevent the Red Brigades from reaching an objective which is instrumental to the achievement of a subversive strategy. The D'Urso kidnapping is, in my opinion, the first step, albeit improved and modified as compared to '78, of a gradual and inexorable planning that aims at upsetting the State, and plunging the country in the spiral of a civilian war".

In the interview, Calogero takes the authority of the State for granted, stressing it in terms of force, and rejects the concern of giving back to the State force in terms of democratic tension, which is the means to obtain a real efficiency. He shows the same obstinacy in considering negotiation as a necessary alternative to inflexibility; Calogero labels any effort to find feasible ways for the State to preserve its dignity as a democratic State (all the more democratic and authoritative in that it does not need to prove its force through the human sacrifice of D'Urso) as an execrable negotiation. That same obstination was the most evident symptom of a logical and moral violence, almost to say that the political class had no responsibility concerning the phenomenon of terrorism, as if it were not involved and concerned by the hypothesis of death which threatens a man, faced to which it could give no other reply but the obstination not to challenge itself, its duties and values, but to project a gladiatoria

l image of its "victory", in a match against the Red Brigades. Altogether, Calogero and anyone who relied on that logic find it absolutely natural to sacrifice a human being on the altar of the State's inadequacy and omissions.

The suppression of L'Asinara had long since been acknowledged autonomously by the Government and by the political forces as a just act in the name of democracy; nonetheless, the State had not implemented this decision; and now someone wanted an innocent man to pay for this guilty sluggishness with his life; everyone found it natural for the State, the Government, the parties and the political society to offload their own responsibilities on D'Urso's life.

Calogero's statements were in complete harmony with the PCI's alarmist carelessness, which, timed on the apocalyptic statements of the terrorists' dispatches, took the hypothesis of a negotiation for granted, a hypothesis which had never been advanced, and which enabled to ignore the political importance of the confrontation between democracy and terrorism. Consistent parts of the magistracy on the other had started to realize this, disagreing with Calogero's theses.

According to Neppi Modona, in the documents of the Red Brigades "there are signs of force, but fortunately also many symptoms of weakness and insoluble political contradictions; it is from the analysis of such weak points and contradictions that we must operate to give the Red Brigades an answer capable of saving a human life and politically defeating the new strategy of terrorism"; and this is possible only by "overcoming the sterile juxtaposition between the advocates of a negotiation and the advocates of inflexibility".

It is at this point of the polemic that the Red Brigades release a third dispatch, left in three copies in a rubbish bin in via Merulana, near the cinema Brancaccio. "Il Messaggero" is the first newspaper to be informed, with a telephone call made by a woman. The text is a cyclostyled copy of one page and ten lines, divided into three numbered chapters.

Once again, the terrorists advance no request, and even less propose negotiations. The chief motivation is always the same: "close L'Asinara", but this time it is enounced as a peremptory order, or an irremissible request which the armed party will not give up.

The formulation and tone are, if ever, those of someone who expects an unconditioned surrender of the counterpart, with no negotiation. It is not by chance that the polemics concerning the previous days and the perspectives of really closing the prison are surrounded by irony and contempt; the terrorists increase their accusations: "After the capture of D'Urso" - the dispatch states - "we are discovering that no one likes L'Asinara. We cannot understand why this prison was a favourite one until Friday 12 December. It always operated at full rhythm, to such a point that the most sadistic guards were concentrated there, and the director was a sort of beast called Massida, who acquired an experience as a torturer at Nuoro. The ridiculous show put up by the fake democrats at the service of the DC regime does not concern us; we have nothing to repeat but this: the movement of Proletarian Prisoners ("the capitals are put in the text to underline a judgement of value as opposed to the judgement given to the democra

ts and the torturers, who are mentioned with small letters") has been asking this for years and years in its battle: close L'Asinara immediately and forever".

As for D'Urso, the dispatch says that he is "a macabre and efficient executor of the imperialist philosophy". This "good father was the first of the infamous torturers who carry out the genocide of the hundreds of thousands of proletarians who are sentenced by this regime to the only system of life it can offer: prison...Those who ask for the release of the head of the torturers D'Urso had better know that we will never cease supporting the program of the proletarian prisoners".

Sarcastic tones are lastly devoted to the inquiries conducted by the different police forces and by the magistracy to discover "the people's prison" and the kidnappers. The terrorists' opinion is that the inquiries are pointless, and that the authorities hope to gather information by questioning detained terrorists, especially the so-called "repentants". State the terrorists: "The press keeps propagandizing a secret, efficient plan which the Carabinieri are supposedly preparing. It also has a name: the torture of communist prisoners. The torturers of the special departments are organizing the implementation of the measures which they experimented on many comrades during this last year...But we will respond with retaliations to all attempts toward a criminal provocation and to torture".

Sensational news from Paris:

Marco Donat Cattin arrested

After this third dispatch of the Red Brigades, which presents no fundamental news compared to the previous ones, a relative silence follows in relation to the specific D'Urso case.

On the other hand, the are no signs of a political initiative, even if it seems that top-secret talks between the Prime Minister and the four secretaries of the majority are under way, nor is the polemic rekindled by new clues, nor do the investigations mark any progress, as they have made no progress after the few revelations of the first day: as a consequence, the press publishes the usual stale news, pretending to refresh it by renewing the emphasis on the single details every day.

A series of secondary events which have do to with the phenomenon of terrorism intervenes to break the monotony.

The sensational news comes from Paris on the night of 19 December. At 22:00, press releases state, Marco Donat Cattin, the son of former Christian Democrat Minister Carlo, is arrested outside a brasserie in Paris on the "Champs Elysées"; Donat Cattin was the object of several arrest warrants for five murders, at least as many kidnappings, and a vast series of minor offences. He had been absconding for three years, when all attempts to locate him and arrest him had turned out to be vain. The press said he was in London, then in Paris, on the Cote D'Azur, in the United States, while most probably he was hiding in his home town of Turin, where many people testify to having seen him. According to the press releases, he was arrested by agents of the French counter-espionage and by Italian Carabinieri of the anti-terrorist task force. The young leader of "Prima Linea" was with a girl, and as soon as he was blocked by the police he showed a false passport. But this move was useless, as the Carabinieri recognized h

im without any doubts. Conducted to the "Sureté", and given that his identity had by now been ascertained, Donat Cattin preannounced sensational revelations by means of material which he promised to give the authorities.

Even if there are no clues as to the whereabouts of D'Urso, the arrest of Marco Donat Cattin is the right occasion to recover part of the credibility lost in a week of useless inquiries on the kidnapping of the judge. The press releases divulged by the official press organs deliberately stress the role of the Carabinieri in the whole operation, and above all give credibility to the circumstance according to which the action is the conclusion of a series of investigations developed and implemented by the Italian authorities. According to the official version, after the numerous arrests carried out previously, the remaining members of "Prima Linea" are Marco Donat Cattin and Maurice Bignami. The former had chosen to abscond abroad, while the latter allegedly joined the Red Brigades. Therefore, the son of the Christian Democrat leader could well be the last representative of the Northern component of "Prima Linea": his capture therefore allegedly marks the destruction of the dangerous terrorist formation.

It is possible that things effectively went as the inquirers said; even if France denied the participation of our police forces in the capture. But the conditions of the arrest, which are of an exemplary simplicity, also authorize the suspicion that the terrorist knew he would be arrested, or even that he himself favoured his arrest, choosing Paris deliberately to confirm the hypothesis that the family ignored his condition of absconder. Of all the political forces, only the Radicals develop an action which, coherently with objectives that have always represented the main part of their program, can presumably have positive effects on the D'Urso affair as well. Franco De Cataldo, Adelaide Aglietta and Marco Boato send a letter to the Minister of Justice to remind him that politicians, sociologists, judges and specialists in the field of law have long since agreed on the need to close the special section of L'Asinara. "The painful circumstance of Judge D'Urso" - the letter states - "should not lead to attitude

s which are against the law as well as against morals, but should on the contrary lead to follow the solution of the correct implementation of the laws and of the regulations. No one will ever interpret the continuation of an action which contributed to making society more mature and the State more civil as a sign of weakness".

A few days previously (15 December), Franco de Cataldo had written a letter to the Socialist Felisetti, President of the Chamber Justice Committee, which the Radical is part of, to ask for the immediate summons of the Committee so as to avoid the silence of Parliament from covering the D'Urso affair, as occurred on the occasion of the Moro kidnapping. Felisetti's reply (19 December) is negative, while the further telegraphic request by De Cataldo (26 December) to summon at least a meeting of the office of the Presidency of the Committee receives no answer at all. At a first analysis, Felisetti's reply seems to be in contradiction with the actions of the Socialists, who urge to close L'Asinara and are not indifferent to D'Urso's fate. But his response is less contradictory if we realize that the Socialists' action, as already in the Moro case, tends to limit itself to the narrow field of the relations within the governmental majority, while the Radicals' initiative tends to bring everything out in the light,

where each act implies a consequent, explicit responsability, without exclusions or tricks, totally exposed to the judgement of the public opinion.

A fake dispatch

However, there are some who surreptitiously do all they can to discredit the radical initiatives, and this despite the fact that their identity is extremely obvious. Parallel to the radicals' letter to the Minister of Justice, a dispatch by the Red Brigades is divulged, which involves the radicals, but which the inquirers of the Digos immediately judge to be fake. The message, left in the usual rubbish bin in Piazza Armellini, in front of the Academy of the Revenue Guard Corps, is collected by a journalist of the daily "Vita", who had been directed there by a young man who talked without dialectical inflections. The message's style and language, as well as the material used and the instruments used to package it, are absolutely improper: "To organize the release of the fellow prisoners ("the imprisoned proletariat", a definition which is a 'must' for the Red Brigades, is forgotten). To dismantle the differentiation circuit, to build and enhance struggle committees, to close the State "lagers". To create the

premises for debates concerning special prisons with the active and correct participation of organs of the Radical Party; moreover, to dismantle the theses of infamy attributed to the comrade Jannelli (Judge D'Urso is cooperating and participating in our examination). Jannelli is a communist comrade who should not be considered a collaborator. All those will use concepts of arbitrary legality will be held responsible. Freedom for all comrades who died while fighting". These are the contents of the fake dispatch.

Even if the press knows the dispatch is fake, it uses the dispatch, "honestly" expressing the hypothesis of its fakeness, but letting the public understand that the request for a radical mediation could be quite natural, especially on the part of the most politicized wing of the Red Brigades. Comments De Cataldo: "apart from the fact that we have serious doubts as to the authenticity of the message, our attitude does not change. We did not need this request to become concerned about life conditions in prisons", An investigation would nonetheless be timely, in addition to the one conducted to ascertain the authenticity of the dispatch, to try to understand who could benefit of the diffusion of a similar text, which appeared openly aimed at weakening the radicals' action and preventing the closing of L'Asinara. It is an interesting symptom, that this pseudo-dispatch is divulged when voices circulate that L'Asinara will be closed; the communists are stubbornly against such hypothesis, and so are the republicans

and the parties of the right, and at alsmost the same time there is the summons, on the part of Forlani, of a meeting for that same afternoon, of the Inter-departmental Committee for Security (CIS).

Along with the radicals' initiative, which expressed itself in a letter to the Minister of Justice, there is a lengthy statement by Bettino Craxi with a direct reference both at the D'Urso affair and at the roots and especially at the possible international connections of terrorism, a re-emerging theme, but always in vague terms: "I have on other occasions recalled", states Craxi in an interview with "Il Corriere della Sera" of 21 December, "the sentence of the German Supreme Court on the Schleyer case, especially when it states that the peculiar conditions of the defence against terrorist blackmails that threaten human life is marked by the fact that the due measures cannot but correspond to the variety of peculiar situations, while it remains clear that human life represents a "supreme value", and that the State has the duty to safeguard it. I believe everything reasonable should be done to release Judge D'Urso".

With reference to the existence of foreign centrals which could somehow monitor terrorism in Italy, Craxi says he thinks "not so much at the existence of a real foreign control, but rather at a complex of connivances, international complicities and probably also protections, of which part of the Italian terrorism has benefited of in different periods of its growth and of its organizational ramification. By continuing the reconstruction of the history of these years, possibly on the basis of factual evidence and not of fantasy, by continuing to probe and investigate scrupulously, all the aspects which have been covered by shade for various reasons will no doubt emerge".

Buonoconto commits suicide

The tense stalemate for the D'Urso affair is nonetheless interrupted by highly dramatic events, which draw the attention on life conditions in prisons. On the afternoon of 20 december, Alberto Buonoconto, considered one of the founding fathers of the armed proletarian nucleuses, hangs himself in his home in Naples in via Nennella Di Massimo, in the Vomero area. Taking advantage of the absence of his elderly parents and of his sister Paola, he ties a sheet around his neck, ties the end to the knob of a door and lets himself dangle. The psychiatrist Professor Manacorda, who visited the young man periodically, and the lawyer Enzo Siniscalchi, who was his lawyer, have no doubts: "this suicide", they state, "is the consequence of the long periods of detention in special prisons, which Buonoconto was submitted to. The psychic trouble he ailed from is the result of a serious organic decay, which lead him to a bone paralysis".

Alberto Buonoconto, which had been sentenced to eight years of imprisonment during the super-trial against the NAPs of Naples, was already in poor health conditions when he was captured. Despite this fact he was sent to special prisons, where his conditions inevitably became worse. The diagnosis issued by the physicians talked about "anxious-depressive syndrome of a reactive nature, in a subject who was neurologically disturbed and had behaviour problems". This is why his release was taken into consideration in exchange for the restitution of Aldo Moro, who was then a prisoner of the Red Brigades. On 9 May 1978, Moro's body was found, riddled with bullets. Buonoconto, who was to be released in any case owing to his terrible health conditions, was sent to the prison of Poggioreale, where, according to the physicians themselves, his conditions got worse and worse every day.

The numerous requests to release him were answered with meetings and postponements, until the reiterated requests of a committee established for his release induced the Attorney General to grant it.

Having reached a temporary improvement of his health conditions, Buonoconto moved to Rome, where he was arrested twice; once because he was found sleeping in a car, and the second time because he was found in a state of mental confusion while carrying a knife. He was sent to the prison of Regina Coeli, was submitted to neurological examinations, but because of the progression of an apparently irreversible deterioration, he was sent home on November 20, where he unfortunately committed suicide a month later.

Most newspapers however tend to subdue the news of Buonoconto's suicide, as it sheds a sinister light on the prison system. The news item concerning the event is mostly confined to less important sections; the main titles in the front page are devoted to the arrests of alleged exponents of armed formations, which are carried out in a rapid succession between the 20th and 22nd of December. After a shooting in Naples, Digos agents disguised as garbage collectors and vendors capture Marco Fagiano, considered to be the other leader of "Prima Linea" and Federica Meroni, while four other terrorists manage to escape. Almost at the same time, the police arrest Armando De Matteis and Maria Rosaria Frangipane in Caserta, and in Capua the worker Luigi Bucchierato, both considered to be collaborators; in Rome two students, Rita Iacomino and Antonella Pacchiarotti, both according to the inquirers somehow connected to the Roman group of the Red Brigades, are arrested in Rome. On the following day, Fagiano's parents are ar

rested, accused of complicity.

On 21 December the police carry out another sensational operation. In a snack-bar in Corso Brescia in Turin, they arrest Vincenzo Guagliardi and Nadia Ponti, strategic leaders of the Red Brigades. The former is allegedly Curcio's right-hand man, and the latter the responsible of seven murders. Their capture could enable the police to locate D'Urso's prison: "We have already questioned them", says one of the inquiring judges. "Clearly, our first concern is the kidnapping of our colleague D'Urso. We have asked them to cooperate...", but the judge does not add that this cooperation has been denied, as will later become evident.

In the meanwhile, D'Urso's family is experiencing a period of terrible anxiety. "We know nothing", says the brother of the kidnapped judge, "we live in grief, we await a sign of hope, a message, a phone call that can help us understand. Instead, we know nothing; after that photograph published on the newspapers, only silence". The investigations are at a stalemate, and as time goes by fruitlessly the judges enhance their usual reserve. On the afternoon of 22 December Forlani meets Rognoni at Palazzo Chigi. Nothing leaks of the secret meeting. A press release of the Minister of Interior ensures that it was only an updating of the situation.

Pannella to the red Brigades:

"comrades assassins, release D'Urso"

The fourth dispatch of the Red Brigades is divulged, at the same time as a message diffused by the two daughters of the kidnapped judge, in the hope that it will be forwarded to their father. "Father dear, this will be a sad Christmas without you, but we are close to your heart with all our love and out thoughts. We firmly believe that our love and our prayers will give you the strength to resist. We are doing all we can to save you".

Like the previous ones, the Red Brigades' fourth dispatch does not contain requests or proposals for a negotiation; amid all the threats, it is clear that the kidnapped judge's fate could change if something were done about maximum-security prisons. "Those who think that D'Urso can be released while the policy of annihilation of proletarian prisoners goes on has understood absolutely nothing of proletarian justice". As a consequence, "if the annihilation policy does not continue", D'Urso could be released.

But for the moment this alternative is simply a logical protection. The more specific and direct references to the magistrate are no reason for optimism. "We have no doubt that D'Urso is perfectly at ease where he is: in a people's prison. But we are against prisons; against prisons of any kind. We will not prolong his detention beyond the time necessary to estimate his responsibilities, which are in any case all too evident. Proletarian justice will follow its course, without hesitations". After this, the terrorists obsessively stress the fundamental point: the suppression of the prison of L'Asinara. "This weapon of blackmail and death must be wiped away once and for all and without discriminations for anyone. We consider the mystifying prattle that aims at changing the terms of the problem as useless provocations".

But a letter by Pannella to the Red Brigades published by the daily newspaper "Lotta Continua" on 24 December stimulates a political initiative, advances a proposal which goes beyond both the rigour of "inflexibility" and the ambiguity of negotiations. The letter hesitates between a bill of indictment and an invitation, and develops the logic of nonviolence to its full extent, replacing the logic of negotiation with the logic of dialogue. "Dialogue, dialogue, dialogue", says Pannella to the Red Brigades, which he calls "comrades assassins". No negotiation. There is no possible negotiation worthy of the respect of any of the opposed parts, if it is imposed by violence, fear and blackmail. No one should collaborate with those who commit violence: this is a precise duty. There are no war rules to be followed: fortunately, and out of the people's will, war is banned by the Constitution, which was dictated by antifascism and by the Resistance, and which todays' "antifascism" and the "neo-fascism" of the parliamen

tary parties have been incessantly betraying from 1947 to present times, with the sole exception of the Radical Party".

Coherently with this formulation, Pannella requests the unconditioned release of Judge D'Urso. Another victim would legitimate the violence of the authority, would offer the perfect pretext to pursue the betrayal of the Constitution and of the laws of the State, which are in force since 1947. After all, this is what everyone expects, that is why it is necessary to deny it. "Are you so sure, comrades, if such you consider yourselves, that it is not convenient to release Giovanni D'Urso now"?, Pannella asks the terrorists, inviting them to ponder this terrible truth: "in actual fact they don't expect it, they would not be happy of it; those who expect it and would be happy are people, people like us, like you". To kill D'Urso would be a tragical mistake also for this reason: "because the authority wants death, and it needs D'Urso as a martyr, not alive".

Clearly, there is the precedent of Moro, and not by chance the two kidnappings have several common elements. "But with a major difference, which no seems to have considered: on 16 March, to kidnap Moro, the men of his escort were killed, humble police officers who were doing their duty. Releasing Moro, the powerful, the enemy, after having killed the four police officers in Via Fani, would have represented a political, ideological and "human" difficulty, a dangerous contradiction".

Pannella penetrates the logic of the armed party to the point of no return, precisely to overturn its orientation. According to this logic, taken to its extreme limits of "humanity", it is possible "that the life, and not the death, of Giovanni D'Urso,the life that belongs to him, that it sacred at least as much as the life of those who kidnapped him and threaten to kill him, will become an occasion of victory and growth for everyone, for both sides, in the only direction in which there can be hope and growth, instead of despair and death. It is possible "to convince, to win together, today and always. Not to win against one another. Not even for those who kidnap D'Urso is this a fatality, a slavery, a necessity". "I hope that someone, in the Italian Parliament", Pannella writes, "apart from the radical comrades, will think about proposing a motion, a means for a debate for a new direction, rich in political contents, to answer the danger in which you are keeping D'Urso. The problem is not to destroy "you",

as these macabre and violent idiots maintain, but to destroy the elements in you that can engender a tragedy, another "victory of death", a despairing and suicidal victory, if it comes from those who calls themselves "comrades". The problem is to be able to "question, publicly, by means of television and newspapers, which for once should not censor parliamentary debates (and party debates), so that whatever the answer given, it may be given according to the norms laid down by the Constitution and by those who appeal to the respect of the Constitution",

Blackmail cannot favour this perspective. "Allow me to tell you that to suppress L'Asinara today is more difficult than it was before the D'Urso kidnapping. In the State, there dominate instincts and reflexes that are similar to yours, which you have perhaps inherited and which you share with such a large part of the regime class. This is not, I am sure, what you want to achieve. It is not this, it is not on the lives of the hundreds of comrades detained for terrorist acts that you want to build God knows what "tactical victory" or what "execution" as "executioners". (*).

(*) The unabridged text of Pannella's letter is quoted in the documents).

(More at text No.1769)