ABSTRACT: The Radical Party's action to obtain the release of Judge Giovanni D'Urso, kidnapped by the "Red Brigades" on 12 December 1980, and to oppose that group of political and press officials who advocate his death to justify the imposition in Italy of an "emergency" government composed of "technicians". On 15 February 1981, Judge D'Urso was released: "The camp that advocates inflexibility was organizing and is still organizing a coup d'état: for this fascism as for the fascism of 1921, it needs victims, but this time, unlike what happened with Moro, it has been temporarily defeated. For once, the Red Brigades have not served the purpose. The campaign conducted by Radio Radicale successfully interrupts the blackout on information ordered by the press.

("The life of Judge D'Urso", Who needed it, who sold it, how it was saved - edited by Lino Jannuzzi, Ennio Capelcelatro, Franco Roccella, Valter Vecellio - Supplement to Radical News n.3 - March 1981)

(part three - continuation of text n.1769)

The reasons for the news blackout

In the meanwhile, the newspapers try to outdo each other in maintaining a strict news blackout and by giving ample space to the advocates of the "hard-line". It is important to understand the motivations given by the editors to justify this blackout. "Apart from the many discussions on the dangers of amplifying the blackmailing power and the propaganda of the terrorists through the media", states Di Bella, the editor of "Il Corriere della Sera", "the Red Brigades' last moves unambiguously proves that their objective is precisely that of gaining space in the medias to recover the ground lost with arrests and desertions". More or less the same stance is held by Indro Montanelli, the editor of "Il Giornale Nuovo". "The statement of the Red Brigades, whereby they dictate the terms to release Judge D'Urso after having sentenced him to death, offers us insight into the real objective pursued by the terrorists: to use the media to emphasize their exploits".

The readers of this and of the other newspapers who adhere to the blackout are told that the statements and the messages of the Red Brigades are "pure delirium", that they are "hallucinations" (and they undoubtedly are, considering the motivations with which they extol murder and violence), but at the same time they are not given the chance to realize this firsthand, because they are deprived of the access to those texts, in the fear that the Red Brigades will gain space and, in other words, sound too convincing. And no one seems to realize that if this were true, if the simple publication of two of the terrorists' documents implied the involvement of the population, then all would be lost, and the only possible conclusion would be that democracy is dead even in its primary source, that is, collective conscience; or conclude that, apart from the violence they use, the terrorists would need to be given some credit as the protagonists os the protest, albeit as murderers.

In both hypotheses, that is, in the event that the essence of those messages is pure delirium, or in the event that it has some capacity of persuasion, there are no valid reasons to deny the population access to those messages; people have the right to confirm one or the other judgement, denying any "value" to those documents if they recognize their deadly emptiness, or acknowledging that they contain elements for reflexion. Both cases would be beneficial to the battle against terrorism, which would either benefit of the refusal on the part of the collective conscience of that absurd violence, or would rediscover precious elements of reflexion as regards democratic force to oppose to terrorist violence.

Nor is the precaution valid of preventing the young from approaching a potentially dangerous fascination. If this fascination should encounter any interest on the part of the young, whom we know to be exacerbated by the passivity of a political society and an administration of authority that do not correspond to their needs for space and freedom, or that, even worse, respond to their needs with injustice, corruption and systematic mystification, then the publication of those texts is a necessary risk for a democracy that wants to challenge itself starting with the only credible and convincing starting point: truth, and the analysis of the responsibilities. Nor is it legitimate to assume that people of any age or social class will reduce their horror faced to violence and their conscience of its tragical uselessness, in the presence of a political society which respects and cherishes its human and civil conscience, risking its own existance by relying on the values of nonviolence, of truth, of moral, intellec

tual and political honesty. The concern, of saving D'Urso's life, of saving the life of a man, of refusing his sacrifice, would have been a sign of this authenticity and of this confidence in democratic values; a sign of force. The publication of these texts would have been a sign of the promptness of democracy to face not the Red Brigades, but itself, and the conscience of itself as a democracy.

There are no doubts that terrorism poses an urgent and pressing question to civil and political society: which State, which democracy? Terrorism, in other words, forces us to face an unavoidable choice: to choose which State and which democracy, which values, institutions and behaviours we intend to oppose to the unacceptable violence of murder and kidnapping, if by victory over terrorism we mean a reassertion of democratic civilization and a victory of values over the negation of values. Clearly, the speech pronounced by the Prime Minister Forlani during a ceremony at the Carabinieri Academy in Rome on the occasion or the inauguration of a course for captains of the Carabinieri, shows he is extremely removed from such beliefs. The speech is preceded by an introduction delivered by General Cappuzzo, who remarks, with much clear-sightedness, that in the battle against terrorism, repression alone is not enough, that such battle "calls for a global strategic approach", that it is necessary to "recover the conse

nt of that part of the young which represents the primary recruitment source for the terrorists", and clearly recovering it by means of a clear strategy. The words of General Cappuzzo are all the more significant because they contradict the statements of Forlani, who seems to want to attribute the responsibilities of the country's administration entirely to the Carabinieri.

In the meanwhile, a tragical event intervenes to denounce the decisions, taken coherently with the Reale law (whereby the police are given licence to shoot) by the majority in favour of the "hard-line"; the fact is not new in everyday life, nonetheless it assumes the meaning of a tragical confirmation. A young woman of 28, Laura Rendina, is shot at a police block because she did not respect the order to stop, as she was afraid of the police's intimidation. The victims of similar "accidents" are now a total of 85. "If someone has made a mistake" - guaranties the Minister of the Interior with reference to the accident - "that person will have to pay for it". But the guaranty rings far from convincing, because it is nothing but the dull repetition of a promise that is pronounced every time "accidents" of this kind happen.

And yet, now more than ever, the "hard-liners" urge the state of war against the Red Brigades (but Almirante coherently advocates its effective proclamation) in the aftermath of a sentence pronounced by the Prime Minister before the kidnapping of D'Urso, and reiterated by the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies in Parliament, which places the phenomenon of the Red Brigades, thus emphasized, at the centre of the country's life.

"It is in the name of this war" - comments Marco Pannella on 6 January in an interview published by "Il Messaggero" - "that governments and majority are done and undone, that achievements and failures are judged, that words and pictures are made to enter into Italian homes through television and the media. It is in the name of this war and of its alleged requirements that laws are done and undone, that choices that have to do with our juridical civilization are made and then contradicted". And he adds: "in a world in which a dozen million children are agonizing because of lack of food, three hours away from Rome, in a country in which thousands have been killed by an earthquake and then by the lack of aid three hours away from Rome, in this world, the murderers of less than 40 people in 1980 are placed at the centre of the Republic's life. On the basis of which aberration?". Urged by the interviewer, Pannella replies: "The deep cause is that the dominant culture, a mixture of Catholicism and communism, "anti

fascism" and fascism, believes that a political or a religious assassination is more "natural" or in any case "nobler" than an occasional or common assassination. But the most immediate, albeit structural cause, lies in the fact that there is literally no "government force" in ideologies or in dominant interests: the only thing that is managed and mismanaged is that which already exists, which is thus consumed. Whereas the immense realities that are taking shape, the political, economic, technological and ideal choices that will influence our life and the life of future generations (granted there will be any future generations) for decades are ignored, removed and censored by the institutions. It is in this political void that the media thrive on death and destruction...The answer to all this is: enough! First of all, we want to rule in such a way that the place for those who murder one hundred people will be prison, and not the institutions and the government, and the same applies for those who murder thous

ands or millions of people. We want to rule this country in such a way that crime news will have a marginal space compared to the news made by the institutions and by the 57 million citizens who do not commit murders...Nothing can be achieved unless we solve this problem. If we lack the capacity, the strength, or the concern to place the major problems of our time (which are neither Curcio nor Moretti) on our country's and our government's agenda, then nothing can be done. In any case, we should realize that the Red Brigades and the terrorists are left to threaten and thrive thanks to the fact that the State's injustices and betrayals provide alibis to despair and fanaticism, to the negation of any law other than the law of the jungle. If a prison reform were carried out, in conformity with the Constitution and with humanity and common sense, if this reform were carried out instead of denied and destroyed, if a reform of prison guards and of the police were carried out, that is, the reform of that State whic

h was born during fascism and which was kept alive for 35 years by official "antifascism", Moro would not have written his beautiful, tragical and vain letters invoking Cesare Beccaria against Francesco Cossiga and Ugo Pecchioli". From the group of warmongers, the Republicans have taken the lead, guiding the formation toward their common objective. "In a single day" - states Pannella - "after the cryptofascist ravings of Forlani (a hint to the speech delivered by the Prime Minister to the Carabinieri) we have heard the ravings of the heirs of Crispi, the so-called Republicans. The latter ask, in practice, life imprisonment without a trial, the invasion of the police in the responsibility of the administration of justice, and hint at the creation of special courts. There is little imagination in all this. Exactly like the old Republican Party, which on other occasions has been noble and faithful to its glorious Risorgimento battles, gave a precious contribution to the formation of the fascist party and fascis

t regime, the new Republican Party is trying to find a similar role to play to ensure its survival. Elected senator to life owing to prehistoric and pseudomilitary merits, Senator Valiani, having become the maitre ŕ penser of the journalistic group which depends on Sindona and on the P2, now draws new energy from his roots, D'Annunzio and Stalin, with even greater success".

In the meantime, as the visit of the Radical delegation to the prison of Trani comes to an end, press sources allegedly report that the founding father of the Red Brigades detained in Palmi is in favour of releasing D'Urso. According to the press dispatch, the prisoners of the Curcio group state: "we are not interested in the judge's fate more than we are interested in our situation as prisoners detained in special prisons. The assassination of D'Urso, who cooperated with us, is "politically non-relevant". He could be sent back home to his family.

It is the 8th of January, the last day of the visit of the radical delegation composed by the parliamentarians De Cataldo, Pinto, Teodori and Senators Spadaccia and Stanzani. The Radical parliamentarians have scrupulously kept faith to the mandate given to them by the Group, which met on an emergency basis in the premises of Radio Radical immediately after Daniela's call which denounced the violences on the prisoners. A release of the Group of 7 January states: "The radical parliamentarians believe it is not superfluous to remind the press and the public opinion that the objective of the visit to the prison of Trani (and subsequently to the prison of Palmi) already scheduled before the publication of the red Brigades' first statement, is to ascertain the situation in the prison, using all the instruments allowed by the law to gather information in this sense. Thus, it is obvious that listening to the various voices, those of the prisoners and of the staff, and possibly (and to the extent to which it deems it

possible), also of the Magistracy, is an essential part of the visit".

The Radical parliamentarians also point out that the Radical Party and the Radical Group had jointly announced the intention of using the communication means they dispose of to divulge the information which the prisoners in the two prisons of Trani and Palmi want to give the public opinion, at the terms the radicals judge fair and within the acceptable limits, as Judge D'Urso himself advocated in his letter to his direct superior at the Ministry of Justice". As we could gather from the fragmentary and incomplete story told by Daniela, the abuses, the violences and the beatings were really committed, and in a savage way. Following is an account of the first summarized report made by Massimo teodori during a press conference held by the radical delegation at the Hotel Holiday of Trani on the afternoon of 8 January: "we were bale to ascertain with our own eyes that there are still traces of wounds or dressings on a great number of prisoners of the whole section; we questioned the prisoners and the prison staff

on the subject. In the 24 hours following the blitz, as from approximately 5 p.m., 41 prisoners officially asked to be visited; of these 41 prisoners, there are official records witnessing the passage of the prisoners through the infirmary, or the so-called immediate first aid. According to such documents, all of these 41 prisoners suffered from hematomas, ecchymoses, lacerated and contused wounds (which I will avoid describing in detail), all duly put on the records. 2 prisoners were also treated for fractures, for the most part in the fingers, phalanges or articulations. One prisoner was also wounded by a firearm: prisoner Piras, who is still hospitalized outside of the prison. Moreover, we have evidence that 5 prisoners were sent to hospitals in the region, because they needed treatments that could not be ensured inside the prison; we also have evidence that according to thei statements or the statements of the medical officer, the same 5 prisoners were sent back to prison almost immediately, after 12 to

48 hours".

After having described the situation in the different sections of the prisons, where the delegation noticed destroyed hygienic equipment and material, and having denounced that the prisoners are at present gathered into groups of 8 or 14 people per room, with insufficient hygienic services, Teodori reports testimonies concerning the dynamic of the violences. First of all, the hygienic equipment and services were not destroyed by the prisoners; on the contrary, the latter allegedly heard noises coming from the top floor as they were all gathered on the ground floor. Moreover, the beatings reportedly lasted three hours starting from 5 p.m., and the authors were the police forces first and then the prison staff. Lastly, the prisoners were allegedly forced to sleep outside during the night.

A statement of the Radical Group and the Radical Party from Rome simultaneously announces the decision to divulge a document of the "fighting committee" of the prisoners of Trani, that is, the prisoners belonging to the Red Brigades, at 5 p.m. of the same day. "We deem it useless and impossible to give any answer to this document", adds the statement. "We deal with politics and human and civil rights. We are not interested in the tragic mechanism of war: unfortunately, this mechanism concerns those (unfortunately increasingly numerous and prestigious) who believe in it and proclaim it in prisons, in the country and in the institutions. Once again, we ask the Red Brigades: release D'Urso, without terms! We repeat: no negotiation can be carried out with people who blackmail in the most infamous way, by pointing a gun at the head of a person, ready to shoot. It is a refusal that must be opposed to those who think they are strong because they can be murderers or have already murdered, offering them the possibili

ty to correct their tragic mistake. We repeat: it is a reason of honour not to negotiate, not having negotiated, not tolerating negotiations neither on the part of the State nor of anyone else. The Red Brigades know this better than anyone else: no matter what the press - the faithful arm of the corrupt and corrupting authority - can write, we have never negotiated for the release of D'Urso. Moreover, we can say that the persons we talked to, who can be said to be representatives of the Red Brigades, have held a similar behaviour with us. They have neither negotiated not attempted to negotiate. This is why we repeat that dialogue alone is not only possible, necessary and feasible, but even that perhaps it is on the verge of being opened and is maybe already open. If this is so, we must thank our comrades assassins, who are too strongly attracted to the fascination of death...".

"We shall publish the text of document at our expenses on the newspapers, as a due act, and as an act that corresponds to the act done by the prisoners of Palmi: if we are well informed, these prisoners have gone well past our expectations in the direction of dialogue and life, whatever the reason they did it for". "We shall continue operating for democracy, for human and civil rights, for the reform of the laws, of the codes, of the prisons, of the penalties; and we shall do so as democrats, as parliamentarians, as nonviolents, once again denouncing the infamy of an authority, of parliamentary majorities and "oppositions" that prevented Parliament and the country from carrying out those constitutional duties which they must to some degree recognize as such when violence, which is their rule, could backfire and damage them".

In the afternoon, at the scheduled time, the document of the prisoners of Trani is forwarded to the press and broadcast by Radio Radicale.

On the 10th of January, the Radical Party and Group divulge the document of the prisoners of Palmi, It is the document of the Curcio group, that "assents" to the release of D'Urso: "Because the force of the revolutionary movement is such as to enable acts of magnanimity, we assent to the decision taken by the Red Brigades to release D'Urso, provided that this statement, as the statement of the comrades of the prison of Trani - the expression of the broader movement of proletarian prisoners organized in the different Mass Revolutionary Organs - are divulged through the channels of social communication". The ultimate decision on the fate of D'Urso, therefore, "belongs to the torturer's friends: either we are given the things we have a right to historically, and which we shall take in any case, that is, space on the channels of social communication, or there will be a State funeral, which it would be more appropriate, under the present circumstances, to call a funeral of the State".

The diffusion of the documents clarifies a misunderstanding created by the lawyer Di Giovanni on the previous day. The latter, after visiting the prison of Palmi, had talked about an unconditioned assent on the part of Curcio to D'Urso's release. But in fact, the terrorists had posed some terms for the release.

Marco Pannella and Franco De Cataldo, having visited the prison of Palmi, as deliberated by the Radical Group which had also decided that the visit to the prison of Trani was to be conducted in parallel with the visit to Palmi, were able to view the document and ascertain the state of the affairs, even if the prisoners had not mentioned the document at all.

According to that document ("...on the channels of social communication"), that condition could perhaps be considered already fulfilled by the diffusion which Radio Radicale and Teleroma 56 had decided autonomously and unilaterally even before knowing of the document: it was an ample diffusion, following the Radical station's request to hook up to a number of other private stations. "By publishing the following statement - warn the radical parliamentary group and party on 10 January - and by divulging it in a great part of Italy to hundreds of listeners of the network of Radio Radicale and of the several other private stations that are connected, we are performing the last act we owe you on the basis of the unilateral commitment taken with the public opinion. If the Red Brigades also intend to maintain the commitments taken, then the release of Giovanni D'Urso should be certain, and a matter of hours. With the statements we are divulging at present, written by the "unitary committee of Campo" of Palmo, we be

lieve that the terms under which the Red Brigades announced they could suspend the death sentence of Judge D'Urso have been fulfilled".

We immediately said that the "suspension" of the sentence, as announced by the Red Brigades, could very well mean nothing at all. First of all, how long a suspension? And does it mean he will be released or that the sentence will be changed? We gave our answer at once, firmly and clearly, continuing in our attempt to start a dialogue which we proposed instead of a negotiation or instead of a hard-line.

The Committee of Palmi replies that the "suspension of the penalty" means "the decision taken by the Red Brigades to release the torturer D'Urso". We realize that this is an extremely important answer...Had we not ascertained the inaccuracy of the information published by all major newspapers, according to which "Curcio has ordered the release of D'Urso", had we given up in our rigorous, responsible initiative, we can be certain that the terms dictated by the Red Brigades and then by the prisoners' committee of Campo would not be unfulfilled, with the obvious consequences for the "suspension of the death sentence" and for the release of Giovanni D'Urso"....

"We wish to add that Marco Pannella informed Curcio directly and personally that the statement of the prisoners of Trani had been divulged in the afternoon, and that Curcio, for his part, twice told Pannella that he had "no comment to make"; the same attitude was held by Delli Veneri, whom Pannella talked to in another cell. A further demonstration that the statement should have been taken into consideration verbatim".

"Thus, according to the logic and the statements of the Red Brigades, there are no doubts that this is the eve of the end of this infamous affair. We are in no conditions to forecast what the end will be like; but we do have the right to proclaim that at this point, the Red Brigades cannot avoid releasing Giovanni D'Urso and giving him back safely to his family and his world, unless they contradict their words, their promises and their commitments".

"We wish to repeat that everything we did and thought was done publicly, in a perspective of dialogue with everyone and as a public initiative. Completely opposite to our way of handling the affair is the cynical, passive way of operating of the "hard-line", which the Communist Party especially seems to support".

"If D'Urso survives this affair, if he can come out of an affair of hallucinating violence and aberration, Italian democracy will have acquired the strength to obtain constitutional and administrative fulfilments, acts of justice, and it will be the demonstration that the methods used at the time of the Moro kidnapping by the two "parties", the one that advocated secret negotiations and the one advocating a block in the State's initiative, both failed, and lead only to death; our method instead can lead to hope and to life. Once more, we ask the Red Brigades, as we asked them immediately after the kidnapping "release D'Urso now, unconditionally!".

A third document comes out a few days later. It is divulged on January 13 by the Radical parliamentarians Pinto, Spadaccia, Stanzani and Teodori. The text is signed by the "political" prisoners Giorgio Baumgartner, Luciano Ferrari-Bravo, Cipriano Falcone, Paolo Lapponi, Gianni Lucarelli, Antonio Negri, Luciano Nieri, Palmiro Span, Emilio Vesce. The prisoners state they have nothing to do with the "planning, development and execution of the revolt in the prison of Trani" or with the "political project" it is meant to be part of. The signers also specify that they do not consider themselves part of "any political movement organized in prison"; however, they underline their intention to fight against this "prison system" with the means and methods suggested by the imprisoned proletarians, means capable of involving the entire communist movement and the social forces that express a yearning for change".

"The magistracy", warns Teodori, "was informed about the document which is now being divulges".

The broadcasting of the two documents, drafted by the prisoners of Trani and Palmi, marks the beginning of the count-down for D'Urso's fate. The situation is the following. If he is to be saved, we must do all that is humanly possible, without accepting compromises or negotiations, and without involving the Government, whether with our without the "hard-line".

At the Chamber of Deputies, the debate is resumed in a tense, nervous atmosphere; the Government is called to answer a huge amount of parliamentary interpellations. Franco Roccella delivers a speech in which he criticizes the "hard-line", which, in its substance, is macabre and terroristic. "In the name of the "hard-line" and in the name of war, unacceptable behaviours have been authorized, the most infamous of which is th promulgation of the

Reale Law (to get a picture of the law's effects, read this morning's issue of "Il Messaggero"; 24 dead and 52 accidentally injured in 1980 alone). In the name of the "hard-line" and of the state of war, all those who made a sincere effort to understand the deep nature and causes of terrorism have been criminalized; terrorism is not the result of some demonic practice, it is a political phenomenon, which is physiologically part of this type of administration of the State, of this type of authority, of thus type of political and civil society".

Roccella then asks two fundamental questions, which no one has so far answered. "How can we not wonder where a State such as this one, whose administration is based on injustice, on dishonesty, on mystification, on privilege, on impunity, on corporativism, on lobbyism, can draw the democratic energy to oppose phenomenons such as terrorism?". And, addressing himself to the exponents of the Left, "how can we expect any antagonist democratic force, colleagues of the Left, if democratic loyalty is replaced by the logic of coalition and compromise, and the reforms are sacrificed to this logic, carried out subordinately to the interests of such agreements and compromises, which are all part of a substantially unanimous complicity?"

A subsequent speech delivered by Boato illustrates the Government's regression from 16 December on, from the moment in which the Minister of the Interior Rognoni firmly stated at the Chamber that this time, the Government would have left no stone unturned to save D'Urso's life, because the defence of life was a priority. Now we can see that certain attitudes, which are not attitudes of compliance toward terrorism, but toward a political initiative as regards the phenomenon of terrorism, whereby the hard-line corresponds to a total passivity of the institutions, toward a legal and legitimate political, institutional and constitutional initiative of the Government, is completely suffocated by the events of these last days.

The atmosphere is frenzy. The debate at the Chamber of Deputies continues nervously, marked by a series of accidents. The most sensational of such accidents is the slap given by the Communist Maria Ciai Trivelli to the radical Cicciomessere. Cicciomessere had called Pajetta an arteriosclerotic after the latter had gratuitously insulted him, calling him a Nazi on the basis of his physical appearance. The newspapers are unanimous in boasting about the fact that they will not publish the documents of the prisoners which the Radicals had distributed to their reporters. They also launch gratuitous accusations and go so far as expressing equally gratuitous suspicions against the Radicals, accusing them of conducting secret negotiations with the Red Brigades for the release of D'Urso, with the tacit complicity of exponents of the Government. During a press conference in Rome, parallel to the other press conference held in Trani, the Radicals explicitly state that they are in no way negotiating, because this is cont

rary to their line of thought and their political orientation. Pannella repeats the Radials' point of view, "release D'Urso unconditionally! We cannot negotiate with people who carry out the most horrible of blackmails, pointing a gun at someone's head. We shall not negotiate"; no attention is given to these statements. The main concern seems to be putting out fire with gasoline.

Nonetheless, there are some who disagree with the infamous behaviour of the regime. In addition to "Il Messaggero", "L'Avanti!" and "La Nazione", who continue working, there is also the case of "Il Lavoro", a paper of Genua. Its editor, Giuliano Zincone, had resigned following the publisher's decision to force the blackout on the paper's staff. Asked by a reporter whether he would publish to terrorists' statements, Zincone answers "I believe the terrorists belonging to the Red Brigades represent a serious threat for everyone, a national plague. However, I refuse to believe that they are the country's greatest plague, the only major threat for the Italian population. Therefore I cannot understand this major mobilization, the emergency decisions, the extraordinary measures which are urged for this group alone, even if its dangerous. If all this is going on, it can only mean that the political requests of this band are being taken into consideration. Their greatest achievement would be to prevent those who rule

this country from tackling all the other serious problems which affect it to fight against the terrorists alone. I think the press's duty is to inform the people of what's going on, even if this includes the criminals' deeds as well. Journalists can give up this duty only as a personal, free choice. If the State, the institutions, the parties believe that they should impose a single valid and legal behaviour on everyone, then they should assume the explicit responsibility of ordering press censorship".

It is a concise yet accurate evaluation, one which grasps the government's refusal to assume precise responsibilities in one direction or the other. And in fact, in this whole affair, but especially in these last crucial days, the government's behaviour is so ambiguous that people cannot understand whether it is endorsing the initiative for D'Urso's release or the "hard-line". But amid all the polemics, another important fact represents a hard "blow" for the hard-liners who advocate the passage of more packages of infamous laws. Four Attorney's Offices (Milan, Bologna, Florence and Livorno) release on bail the leader of Azione Rivoluzionaria, Gianfranco Faina, as the prisoners had requested. Professor Faina had already been sentenced to 19 years and three months of imprisonment, but he was scheduled to face more trials for terrorist offences. The "hard-liners" are unanimous in criticizing the decision to release Faina, ignoring the fact that Faina was released on bail because he was ailing from a serious for

m of lung cancer with diffused bone metastases: The physicians have estimated that he has 20 possibilities out of 100 of surviving for a maximum of six more months. But according to the hard-liners, Faina should have been kept into prison, whether suffering from cancer or not. And in fact, he does remain in prison, because when he is released he is no longer in the conditions to be transported. He dies a month later. On this unfortunate occasion, the Minister of Justice decides to join the front of the hard-liners, reprimanding the judges who are guilty of "surrendering". With a perfect timing, the general attorney of Rome, Pietro Pascalino, proposes a series of urgent measures in defence of the hard-line. With the full authority of his position, Pascalino submits a "package" of proposals that can thus be summarized: reform of the Constitution, establishment of special courts, new, stricter laws, the proclamation of the state of war. Following is a "compendium" of Pascalino's doctrine, in his own words. "The

battle against subversion is being fought with absolutely inadequate means"; "The Constitution is not the Gospel, and if the circumstances call for it, it should be modified"; "The country is far from being divided, and I believe it would be able to endure the consequences of an emergency policy just as it is enduring the sacrifice of so much innocent blood with extraordinary patience. Or is the only blood to be wept upon the terrorists' blood?"; "I advocate the institution of a single office, on a national scale, dealing with investigation on terrorism".

Nevertheless, Pascalino deceives his necrophilic friends on one point, and it has to do precisely with the Faina case. Asked whether he shares the same resent for Faina's release on bail as Minister Sarti, Pascalino firmly replies that "the decision was an appropriate decision, because Faina is in terrible physical conditions, with lung cancer, and the judges may allow him to leave the prison on the basis of specific norms and humanitarian reasons. The same was done with similar cases".

To wipe away any doubts, in an address at the Chamber, Sarti guaranties that "the government has in no way committed acts that justify the irresponsible statements of those who believe that the institutions of our country can deal with terrorist organizations". Moreover, he emphatically deplores "the fact that the Radicals have used their visit to Trani to take the terrorists' documents out of the prison". He also says he indignantly rejects "the insinuation that the decision of the judges of Florence, who granted release on bail to Professor Faina, was the result of pressures on the part of the ministry or its holder, which allegedly granted such release to launch or gather favourable signs of a negotiation".

Events are coming to a head. Everything is very confused, there is no time to check the sense of the information which is given or its truthfulness. The members of the staff of "L'Espresso", arrested with charges of aiding and abetting, reveal the name of the person with whom they had contacts to obtain the Red Brigades' material which was then published; the person is Professor Giovanni Senzani, an expert in criminology, a man who is above suspicion; Professor Senzani was even given a Lit. 50 million grant from the National Research Council, and the faculty to gain access to all prison institutions in order to conduct his researches. His only link with terrorism, as far as the authorities know, is represented by his brother-in-law, Enrico Fenzi (his wife's brother). The latter was arrested in Genua with charges of "participation in an armed band", and was later acquitted because the "fact does not subsist". After this incident, Professor Fenzi allegedly becomes an absconder. According to the reporters of "

L'Espresso", Senzani is the terrorist who organized the kidnapping of D'Urso, and almost certainly the person who conducted the judge's questioning. Arrest warrants are issued simultaneously against Curcio, Negri and 83 other prisoners of Trani, for the kidnapping of D'Urso. The judge who issued them, contradicting a common praxis according to which it is useless to issue arrest warrants against someone who is already in prison, reveals his deliberate intention of influencing the course of the D'Urso affair (these prisoners know that if D'Urso is killed, they will be tried), regardless of the reaction of the Red Brigadesm who might be brought to dictate other, more burdensome and unacceptable terms for the survival of D'Urso. Radio Radicale is the vehicle which voices the opinions of many jurists, who are unanimous in saying that the decision contradicts the common praxis; if the judge had waited a few days, the judicial procedure would in no way have been damaged, considering that the prisoners are already

in prison and as such, an arrest warrant is useless. At the same time, the decision can actually jeopardize all hopes for D'Urso's release. If the Red Brigades asked to revoke the provision to release their prisoner, this term could not be fulfilled.

So what is the meaning of the judge's decision? Is it a contribution to the "hard-line", which coherently supersedes any concern for D'Urso's survival and urges an open clash and trial of force, or is it simply the outburst of a judge who endorses the hard-line and is exasperated by the wave of "surrenders" which a large part of the magistracy seem to support? Or is it an awkward attempt to contribute to the judge's survival by introducing a threat, a "blackmail" with the intention of influencing the Red Brigades?

But if that is the case, would the very doubt of damaging D'Urso not be enough to prevent that intervention?

Statement n. 9 of the Red Brigades comes as a sort of ultimatum. The terrorists state that it is "inappropriate to prolong the judge's imprisonment more than it is necessary", because if the major Italian newspapers do not publish the statements "issued by the mass movement of Trani and Palmi" "within 48 hours", the "death sentence will be carried out".

The life of D'Urso depends on the newspapers. A few inches of printed matter can save his life or kill him.

Do the Red Brigades intend to set more terms for the judge's release? The answer is simple. The statement makes it clear what the terrorists mean by the expression "the channels of social information". The statement prompts a series of doubts and fears. When do the 48 hours expire? Which and how many are the major newspapers? Shall the Red Brigades procrastinate the sentence when the deadline expires if some of the terms, but not all of them, have been fulfilled?

Mrs D'Urso desperately asks the newspapers to publish those few inches of text that can mean the life of her husband. She launches appeals, she appeals to all the editorial staffs of the most important Roman newspapers. But everywhere she receives courteous, respectful and contrite refusals. She refuses to give up, she insists, implores. Finally she explodes and accuses the "newspapers of death...". She has implored and beseeched in all the Roman offices of the major Italian newspapers. But she has obtained nothing, and often her prayers have been preceded by refusals even before her visit. "Il Corriere della Sera" says no, amd so do "La Stampa", "Il Giornale Nuovo", "Il Resto del Carlino", "Il Mattino". Only "Il Messaggero", "Il Secolo XIX", "La Nazione" and "Il Giorno" give her a slight possibility. Only the Socialist Party's press organ, "L'Avanti!", has published parts of the statements of the prisoners of Trani and Palmi a few days before the debate at the Chamber of Deputies. Craxi, who is immediately

attacked by all the party newspapers, which advocate "a firm line", replies that "L'Avanti!" is a newspaper, not the Socialist Party; even Spadolini, who is among the allies of the Government, has been forced to swallow the bitter pill. There is the threat of a government crisis and the possibility of anticipated elections. The "PSI-Avanti! case" is discussed at the Chamber of Deputies, and is enormously emphasized by the Communist Party and by the MSI. With harsh tone, the two parties ask to know which line of action the government intends to pursue, whether the line of "L'Avanti!", or the hard-line, supported by the Republican Party. In other words, for the radicals, the line of D'Urso's survival and of the recovery of democratic force, or the one of his assassination, the "gladiatory" line. The Republican Party maintains that to the extent in which it determines the compulsive nature and the urgency of an answer, terrorism poses a pressing question to the political and civil society; which State and which

democracy. The choice cannot be eluded, the political and civil society owes it to itself more than to terrorism. During the debate at the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister justifies the government's conduct stating that a unanimity within the government would be a negative fact, because it is typical of totalitarian regimes.

Clearly, this is a fragile thesis, because the absence of unanimity in the majority, which formed a government on the basis of primary choices, cannot repeat the democratic dialectic between majority and opposition, and if dissent breaks up the coalition, the only feasible rule and safeguard, in a democracy, is that of forming new majorities and oppositions. According to a physiological law, on the other hand, a majority cannot avoid to choose its decisions and its line of action. Albeit ambiguous, the choice has emerged during that debate owing to the remission of polemic of one part, the Republican Party, and to a lesser degree (because the dissent had been less evident) of the extremist faction of the Christian Democrat Party. It is a temporary fact, but a fact which is immediately grasped by the Radical parliamentarians. Franco Roccella questions the government's ambiguity, but at the same time, he underlines the margins of a "sound ambiguity".

Now, as the deadline set by the Red Brigades is coming close to its expiry, the very little time that it left goes by at an incredible speed, while the tension of the polemic and the emotion reach their peak. From a quantitative point of view, that is, measured on the scales of the political and journalistic coalitions, the part which refuses any act aimed at saving D'Urso's life is overwhelming and completely exposed. The Socialists have taken a low profile, and have kept it to this moment. They feel the constraint of governmental coalitions, the commitment in the sense of "governability", and the threat of a crisis that would in all likelihood lead to anticipated elections. Within the majority, the Republic Party especially, and the part of the DC headed by Zaccagnini, adding to the external pressure of the PCI and the MSI, urge the Socialists to take a clear stance. The Social Democrats keep at a distance, they avoid confronting the PSi and even try to cover it, while not hiding its preference for a "firm

" decision, in the sense of a clear choice in terms of operative laws, provisions and methods.

Owing to this situation, the government is in a difficult positions, and during the 48 hours that will lead to D'Urso's death of life, insistent voices speak about the government's fate. Thus, the possibility that the judge be assassinated becomes less dramatic and becomes the occasion for a deep and far-reaching political manoeuvre.

It is obvious that the Radicals, who are isolated, are the recipients of the violence of an unprecedented polemic. "Il Corriere della Sera", possibly for the first time in its history, goes so far as publishing an article on the front page against the Radicals. It is the equivalent of a parliamentary interpellation. Following is the text. "Who authorized the Radicals to visit the prisons of Trani and Palmi so frequently? Were the provisions of article 67 of the prison regulations fully respected? For what reason did the Minister of Justice not intervene to prevent the visit, as he could have done according to article 90 of the same regulations?

The accusations become increasingly explicit, and corroborated by sour tones; they are not restrained by concerns of plausibility, civility and reserve. The Radicals, the accusers say, want the State to surrender, they are accomplices of the Red Brigades, their mouthpiece. The accusers do not hesitate in expressing patent speculations and obvious lies, covered by an unprecedented protection on the part of the newspapers who support the "hard-line". The latter give ample space to such accusations and deny any space the Radicals or to anyone else who may seem to defy them directly or indirectly. The objective is all too clear; because they cannot mortify their credibility, the hard-liners want shut the Radicals into a ghetto, criminalize them, disarming them with violence, preventing their voice from being listened.Disquieting voices circulate in the corridors of the Chamber of Deputies. They say that if D'Urso is murdered, arrest warrants for complicity and assassination shall be issued against the components

of the Radical delegation which visited the prisons of Trani and Palmi as well as against all those who divulged the Red Brigades' documents and held non-stop "call-in shows" at Radio Radicale. These are but voices, of course, and they are not necessarily true, but they reflect a blackmailing and persecutory intention by threatening an improbable and absurd judicial as well as political criminalization. The persecutory accusations, which slowed down when D'Urso was released, resume shortly after, and are faced by the Radicals with the stubborn coherence of their political action and with explicit replies which are systematically ignored by the press. Following are two statements by Marco Pannella which, though issued after the release of D'Urso, give a good synthesis of the reasons for the Radical counteroffensive during the whole affair.

Referring to the Communist Party, Pannella states that "the sordid, insane insinuations with which the Communist newspapers are trying to rid themselves of the Radical-terrorists today as of the Radical-fascists yesterday, trying to save themselves by barbarizing the political life, force me to acknowledge that the party which for over thirty years extoled and justified the most infamous events of the century - the communist and Nazi crimes, the exterminations, the trials, the invasions, the tortures, the criminalization of entire parties and ideologies - is the same one today, and is desperately trying to keep the political debate into ignorance and falsehood.

"It is by no chance that the editor of "Il Corriere della Sera" (and what an editor!) advocates that the Minister of Interior and all offices relating to the enforcement of the law, be held by Communists such as Pajetta and Pecchioli. The historical compromise with the catholic and clerical world, advocated by the Stalinists and by Togliatti, has prevented the birth of the first Republic in Italy. What these insane epigones are trying to do together with the "capital" (supporting Calvi, Gelli, Agnelli, the masonic-Republican finance and the clerical-mafia one, and even trying to exploit the Red Brigades' deeds to further destabilize governments and Parliament, to establish the so-called Visentini government) is to build over the ruins of the Republic and of democracy. Such group of people, often united in a subversive association, work as Prussians, for the King of Prussia, that is, for a Turkish type of intervention".

Referring to the Republic Party, Pannella says that the Republican press release, which accuses the Radical Party "of having already practiced an alliance with the Red Brigades and of pursuing an alliance for the future as well", and which urges the magistracy to treat the Radical behaviour with penal means, is ridiculous as well as grotesque. If the Republican Party is found responsible of penally relevant facts - a very likely possibility for its national and local leaders given their behaviour in all these decades - they should have been prosecuted long ago, with charges of criminal conspiracy. Only a situation of regime has managed to save the Republican Party from such a conviction. The party has been involved in a multitude of scandals (the oil scandal), in criminal association with exponents of the mafia in Sicily and elsewhere, and its leaders have been saved by the Inquiring Committee only.

"One thing is certain. the accusations against the Radicals of being allies of the Red Brigades and of seeking an alliance with them, are worthy of idiots, who rave against the State on the pages of newspapers which are financed by Sindona and other exponents of the mafia. As to the accusation against the authors if such press release, of being thieves, peculators and corrupt, I consider it true and therefore wish to repeat it".

The anti-radical polemic knows no hesitation and no obstacles. On the evening of 12 May, Lorena D'Urso, armed with the fear and anguish alone, appears on television during a party political broadcast on the second channel of the State TV. Such space had been granted to the Radicals, who offered it to the D'Urso family. It is the ultimate attempt on the part of the judge's family to convince the Red Brigades to release the judge and to convince the press to publish the two documents which the judge's fate depends on. Radio Radicale has already broadcast the appeals of Mrs D'Urso and of her brother-in-law, the brother of Giovanni. This is the first and the only time that the D'Urso family is able to benefit of the State TV.

Lorena divides her speech into three parts. She addresses herself to the editors of the national newspapers, "on which, as well as on the Red Brigades, the life of my father depends on". She launches an appeal to the terrorists, asking them to give back her father. "If you don't", she says, "the responsibility will be entirely yours and of those who, for incomprehensible or terrible reasons, first decided the news blackout". Lastly, she reads a sentence taken from one of the terrorists' pamphlets, in which her father is called a "torturer".

Without a scruple, the newspapers accuse Pannella of having "forced" the judge's daughter to "call her father a torturer". "Il Corriere della Sera", who leads this anti-radical campaign, publishes a bold type article just under the title of the front page. "We have reached the point that, taking advantage of the tragedy of a family, of the weakness of a government, of the divisions within the majority and of the passivity of the State TV, a young woman, the daughter of the kidnapped judge, is taken in front of the cameras and forced to read, in front of millions of Italians, the Red Brigades' document in which her father is called a "torturer", and the editors of the newspapers who refuse to surrender to the terrorists' blackmail are accused of being assassins. This is the point we have come to, that the painful decision of the major Italian newspapers to reject the terrorists' blackmail (with the purpose of saving the country and other people from further kidnappings and blackmails) is called an assassinati

on by people who put an unconditioned proclamation of surrender to the criminals on the innocent lips of a victim".

The insinuation expressed by "Il Corriere della Sera" is totally false. It was the family of the judge who decided how to use the space on TV, which the Radical Party offered it, and if they advised Lorena to read that specific passage, they did it with the purpose of saving the judge's life at all costs, fulfilling the terrorists' requests. The latter had linked the televised diffusion of that text to D'Urso's release.

It is insane to think that the members of the family could give more importance to touchiness or to a refusal to suffer or the concern for their image than to the safety of their relative. Lorena's subjection is painfully human, totally understandable and incredibly rich in her human mortification.

These are the only elements on which to judge the episode. But the arrogance and the persecutory intentions are such as to lead to the infamous exploitation of that terrible moment. In addition to the grief of that moment, Lorena must also endure the grief of being misunderstood and penalized, albeit indirectly, through a third party. Clearly, "Il Corriere della Sera" and the whole coalition supporting the "hard-line" - which it is more appropriate to call the coalition of death and cynicism - are lying. The facts are extremely different. After having offered the D'Urso family the short TV space, which the Radicals could have chosen to use to answer accusations which they never confuted on the press or on TV, Pannella met the family in the studio only a few minuted before the program was aired. He is informed that Lorena will appear on screen and he listens to the way she intends to deliver the speech. He has doubts on the decision of reading the Red Brigades' document. He considers it a waste, because the R

ed Briagdes had asked for the unabridged publication of the two documents, and Lorena would need a full half hour to read them. But the time granted amounts to four minutes only.

Leonardo Sciascia, who has a direct knowledge of the facts, delivers an interview to "La Repubblica". "I must admit that in these last days the atmosphere has become particularly incandescent; ancient intolerances have been rekindled. For example, I was particularly shocked by the fact that the newspapers accuse Pannella of having forced Lorena D'Urso to read the Red Brigades' document. I can say that Pannella has nothing to do with that decision, and that it was taken by the judge's family. The Radical Party simply offered the TV space at its disposal, and the family decided that Lorena would be the speaker. As far as I am concerned, I believe the millions of spectators who saw that girl reading the statement which called her father a "torturer" felt a sense of rebellion against the Red Brigades. The newspapers on the other hand interpreted the fact as an accusation against them, which could have been true to a certain extent, but the objective was another one, not raising a polemic. Now, faced to these acc

usations against Pannella, I think I can even justify some of his answers".

Lorena D'Urso immediately rectifies that Pannella and the Radicals had nothing to do with the decision. The decision of reading that passage, Lorena says, was mine and my family's. But it proves to be useless. The newspapers deliberately ignore the statement. The have taken advantage of the occasion, and now use omission to assert their license to lie and slander as they wish.

The 48 hour deadline decided by the terrorists is about to expire, perhaps they have already expired. The last minutes elapse, while in the newspapers, the staff keeps an eye on the phone, hoping to receive the announcement, whatever it is. Only D'Urso's family, and few others like Leonardo Sciascia refuse to give up and use the last moments. They continue divulging messages to the newspapers, urging them to publish the terrorists' documents if they are still in time. At the same time they launch appeals to the Red Brigades, asking them not to commit another crime, which would be a political mistake as well as a crime. Sciascia's last appeal is of the 14th of January, and is broadcast by Radio Radicale. The latter has broadcast messages for the Red Brigades non-stop. It has also broadcast messages for the press, but always live, to avoid the blackout after D'Urso has been sentenced to death, to stir pity in the people and urge the political forces to behave rationally. Sciascia's appeals have had the merit o

f obtaining important adhesions, such as those of Eleonora Moro, Stella Tobagi, Andrea Casalegno. Moreover, a great number of exponents of the cultural and juridical milieu have answered his appeals, sharing the hope for D'Urso's survival and joining the appeal to all men of good will.

Sciascia's appeals have no doubt influences part of the press, and have in any case contributed to tearing down that wall of silence and the blackmailing determination of the "hard-liners".

Now Sciascia launches a direct appeal to the Red Brigades, addressing himself "not to the members of the Red Brigades, but to this monstrous abstraction which is called the Red Brigades. I am not addressing myself to them, Sciascia adds, in the name of values which they have trampled on for years, nor in the name of theur future possible repentance. I am addressing myself to them by asking them this simple question, and letting them have an insight into its solution, to their momentary advantage.

"You have disdainfully denied being the "blind means of of other people's sharp-eyed manoeuvre". But are you not touched by the doubt that you are in fact such means by killing judge D'Urso at this point? Look around, ask your comrades, think, if you can. Your cause, the cause which you say you struggle for, has failed long ago. Would it not be a tragic joke to realize tomorrow that you have ruthlessly operated for interests which you will be the first victims of?".

Something unexpected and at the same time expected has occurred on the previous day. The editor of "L'Avanti!" has received a personal letter from Giovanni D'Urso. The news leaks, the text of the letter is divulged. Following are the important parts of the letter. "Dear editor...if I am writing to you it is because I believe it my duty to provide further elements to all those who, at the current state of affairs, may not agree on the line you have followed, and in order for them to ponder such elements. It is by now a well known fact that the trial I have been submitted to ended with a death sentence; such sentence will no doubt be carried out, unless the major newspapers publish the documents written by the prisoners of Trani and Palmi. the merely humanitarian value of such initiative is obvious, considering the circumstances of emergency. Its nature is such as to involve none other but the press organs which decide to carry it out. It would be inappropriate for me to explain the details of the problem of p

ublishing the documents or not. I presume such matter is already the object of fiery discussions. Nonetheless, allow me to remark...that a sense of humanity should prevail. Lastly, I have a request. Should I not see my wife again, I would like you to be the one to express my gratitude to her for all that she has done, and tell her that the only thing I counted on was her love for me".

At the same time, Mrs D'Urso has asked the four newspapers that refuse to comply with the terrorists' request or that adhered at first (e.g. "Il Giorno") and then reconsidered their decision as a resukt of pressure on the part of the staff or because they have been faced to the possibility of saving the judge through their decision ("Il Messaggero", "Il Secolo XIX", "La Nazione", "Il Giorno) to use paying advertisements to publish the two documents.

The request is difficult to refuse, especially for those newspapers which granted advertisement space to the families of other victims of terrorism. At the Rome-based daily "Il Messaggero", which, together with "Il Secolo XIX" based in Genua, is more incline than others to contributing to the judge's survival, Mrs D'Urso's letter is given to Franco Roccella, amd personally given to the Vice Editor, La Rocca, while the assembly og reporters meets to reach a decision on the matter. The editor of "Il Messaggero" is faced to a compulsory situation, so to say. This is exactly what he wants. Giovanni D'Urso's letter to Intini is the signal he had hoped for. It is now clear that the publication of the two documents can really serve the purpose of saving the judge's life. Mrs D'Urso's request, which cannot be refused because of the concessions made by the same newspaper to the families of other victims of terrorism, places it in the situation of having to "witness" the publication of the two documents in any case. T

he decision is reached. "Il Messaggero" shall publish the documents on the following day's issue. Moreover, the decision triggers the same decision on the part of the editor of "Il Secolo XIX", who is in contacts with his colleague from "Il Messaggero". The two editors have given a common evaluation of the affair and have taken the same operational decisions. The blackout is interrupted. Other newspapers publish the two documents, "Il Lavoro Nuovo", "La Sicilia", "Il Quotidiano", and with very few exceptions, the chain of the "Diari". "Il Giorno pledges to publish them once the judge is release, and keeps its promise.

It is the 14th of January. Forlani is expected to give an account of the situation at the Chamber of Deputies, and the speech could mean his end. But the majority seems to be resisting, even if from a merely formal point of view, and with the constant threat of an anticipated dissolution of the Chambers. Thus, it prepares to face the parliamentary verification without explicit threats of breaking up.

Yet, beneath the facade, there are conflicts which are barely kept under control, and that are not subdues by the use of caution outside of the Chamber. The tension is high beneath the surface. The threat of a split within the majority is still there. Unless....At 13:30, the Red Brigades' tenth message is divulged. It states "We are giving you back the torturer D'Urso...we have nothing to ask or to barter". It's over at last. "We have spared a life" - Pannella states at once - "this is a merry day for everyone". We have not won, we have convinced. The State has not negotiated, the law has not been broken. No one has given in. The intellectual honesty of a few newspapers, namely "Il Corriere della Sera" and "Il Secolo XIX" has saved the image of a press which has shown to be dominated by hard-liners, Bourbons, Jacobins and international meddlers".

"A legal coup d'état has been attempted. Appeals have been launched even to the President of the Republic, hoping for a victim to be sacrificed". "With D'Urso alive, the Stalinist and fascist rage is unveiled. The enemy has taken shape, but we shall defeat it in the institutions, and in the country. And now, back to the regime and its scandals. This time however, the Red Brigades have not served the purpose. We shall at once start collecting signatures to convict Gioia and suspend General Lo Prete and accuse him of high treason. The Radicals are happy to underline that dialogue has prevailed over negotiation and inflexibility. Some have asked to know what we mean by dialogue. What we mean is an act of humanity instead of a murder".

The hard-liners are obviously dumbfounded. To try to wipe away this effect, "La Repubblica" paradoxically and awkwardly claims merit for the hard-line, which has contributed to the judge's release. And it asked this merit to be recognized, although it does give a negative judgement on those who "surrendered". The arrogance of such judgement, and the obvious need to subdue the blatant failure of the hard-line, has its practical effects in Parliament, where the Republicans, supported by the Communists, unsuccessfully ask for "an acknowledgement of merit" for the newspapers that adhered to the blackout.

"La Repubblica", states Franco Roccella, underlining its contradictions and paradoxes", wants to be thanked publicly for having supported the positions that would have lead to the assassination of D'Urso. The ones to be thanked are those editors who conceded what it was fair to concede not to murderour violence but to life and democracy, rejecting, for this very reason, the terrorists' blackmail, avoiding to commit the acts of barbarization urged bu the terrorist strategy. Their behaviour is all the more significant because they are not part of the pact between a parasitical capitalism - in its versions, the fraudulent capitalism of Sindona and Rizzoli and the sophisticated capitalism of Agnelli - and the hard-line, which is equivalent of the pact signed between the agrarian pseudo-capitalism and the newly born industrial capitalism on the one side and Benito Mussolini on the other.

Pannella's hint to the involvement of the President of the Republic calls for a brief additional account. The attention of the President of the Republic had been urged by that array of newspapers lead by Scalfari's newspaper and by "Il Corriere della Sera". Pertini's support had been invoked often, in terms of an authoritative confirmation of requests advanced by a large deployment which included the MSI, the PCI, the left wing of the DC, and, though more cautiously, the PSDI. Such extended party had always referred to a sentence in which Pertini spoke about "war" referring to terrorism. During the D'Urso affair, the President had had an "outburst", in which, hypothesizing his own kidnap, had reduced the confrontation with the terrorists to a personal challenge between him and "them". But what could have been a profession or moral strength in Pertini, supported by his anti-fascist record, became a sort of seal of authenticity to be used as a confirmation of a policy of "inflexibility" which unburied the fasc

ist laws on public order, provisional arrest. amd the police's power of prevention, discretionary interrogations, the authorization to carry out roundups, preventive imprisonment, special laws and courts, death penalty, the abrogation of any areas of dissent in the name of a state of emergency which Almirante far more coherently called the "proclamation of the state of war". Many were aware of the uselessness of this policy as regards the battle against terrorism, and so were many of its advocates, who appealed to the necessity to give an answer to the population's exasperation. The awareness of its perverse and probably irreversible effects on our democratic and juridical system, in patent violation of the constitutional principles, was equally shared by the most sensible parts of society. Such awareness was not new, considering that the forces of the Left and of the lay democracy and a prestigious part of the Catholic front itself had prevented similar attempts to this moment with extreme firmness.

After all, such policy used the anti-terrorist motivation to pursue other objectives. That Pertini meant to authorize this type of policy is far but proven; the improbability of a hypothesis of this kind as well as the coherent personal record of the President is proved by his constant and inflexible refusal to cover the mismanagement of the society and of the country which were the first cause of the advent of terrorism and of the institutions' weakness faced to the phenomenon as faced to a natural disaster and the attempt to seek refuge in an all-out defence of the State and in the requirements of governability.

The patent manoeuvre, of using the authority of the President of the Republic and his personal prestige for this purpose, urging his intervention on the eve of the solution of the D'Urso case and on the presence of favourable signs pointing to his release, is immediately unveiled by Marco Pannella, who underlines its extremely dangerous nature.

The radical leader strongly objects to this appeal by "La Repubblica" and generally speaking to this use of the President of the Republic, attacking all those (Almirante, Valiani, Scalfari, Berlinguer) who aim at recreating the atmosphere of 1921. "Such party, like fascism in the past, needs victims to legitimate the new "fascism".

"For this reason, the murderers of no more than 30 people a year are placed at the centre of the country's political activity, of the life of the State. This is why some have explicitly said and written that D'Urso is needed as a victim and a martyr, and that the common duty is to leave him to his fate. This is why Rizzoli first of all, faced to the life or death of D'Urso, patently contradicted his previous praxis".

"Communists and fascists, a certain international financial and capitalist milieu, exponents of the P2, forces connected to the mafia, all aim at the creation of a second Republic, with a coup d'état which they are already carrying out, with explicit appeals to the President of the Republic. Our hope is that this is but the folly of a moment, and that it will not last as long as the folly of the national unities that caused the State to be impotent faced to terrorism and ruin".

After D'Urso is released, the conflict continues, and Pannella once again must face the "shameless and incoherent reaction" that follow the release of the judge and that "prove far more than what we had sensed and feared". "D'Urso", Pannella says, "was needed dead. The incessant appeals to the President of the Republic of two editorial groups (the one connected to Sindona and the one that went so far as publishing the Red Brigades' self interview and the records of the terrorists' trials), which urged the President to intervene on an extraordinary basis in the life of the institutions, for once could not count on the infamy of the assassins. And they have lost.

"Scalfari and Valiani are eloquent today. The senator for life, plunges into the life of the institutions out of a mistake that could prove fatal, imperiously asks for the constitution, in Italy, of the Special Court, similar to the French Security Court which all French democratic forces denounce as an intolerable offence to justice and to the Republic. Scalfari, who seems to have almost lost his mind, proves that the government he wanted to establish was meant to have extraordinary and dictatorial powers against the radical opposition".

"My opinion can be thus summarized. The hard-line was organizing and is attempting to carry out a coup d'état. But to establish this fascism, as the fascism of the past, it needs victims. But this time, unlike what happened for Moro, it has been temporarily defeated. For once, the Red Brigades have not served the purpose". It is now the morning of 15 January, a day marked by intense emotion and expectations, because the Red Brigades have announced that they shall release D'Urso, but the release is procrastinated.

At the Chamber, a discussion on terrorism is under way. In this tense atmosphere, a dispatch divulged by the ANSA agency is made public in the afternoon. According to such dispatch, President Pertini is following the debate under way at the Chamber "with extreme interest", and hopes that new indications will emerge for the battle against terrorism. The questions this note prompts are obvious. What are the conditions that this interest and expectation, which contradict the praxis, aim at? And what is the note's source, Pertini or generally the Quirinale, or both? In any case, it surely cannot be the expression of the President's temporary frame of mind, accidentally reported by the press. Everyone knows that the ANSA agency is extremely scrupulous as to the authenticity of the source, and especially of that source. Ig the source is really the Quirinale, to what extent the orientations of the Presidency correspond to those of Pertini? And in any case, what is the ultimate sense of that dispatch?

The Radicals ask to check the notes' sources first of all. On 16 January the ANSA agency asnwers. Pannella delivers a series of statements, specifying the terms of the problem. "The ANSA agency maintains that institutionally authorized sources were the basis of the dispatch divulged yesterday afternoon at 14:32. At 18:30, that is, four hours later, no one had denied this version. Therefore it took the press office of the Quirinale two more hours to intervene, confirming something that everyone knew, that is, that the dispatch was neither an "unofficial note" of the Presidency nor a statement. I must repeat the question I asked yesterday: who gave the ANSA that information yesterday, which the ANSA confirms, and why? Why did someone consider it necessary and appropriate to inform us that the President was following the debate at the Chamber "with extreme interest?", prompting unanimous albeit not univocal political interpretations which have, to some extent, influenced the debate itself? What does the express

ion "that new hopes will emerge ar regards the battle against terrorism" mean exactly? Does the "source" of the Presidency not realize that it has committed an indiscretion toward the President, and authorized people to believe that this was this was the answer to the open attempts to involve the President in a biased political campaign. to legitimate this campaign and its dubious objectives? We need to know more on the whole matter. For example, was the "source" specifically authorized for the occasion? Is the silence on the matter an assent? We refuse to believe it".

But in contrast with the praxis followed by the ANSA, Pannella's statements are released neither by this nor by the other major press agency, "Italia". Only the less important "Adn-Kronos" releases excerpts of them. The censorship is evident, and it is abnormal and unjustified considering the importance of the matter. "At this point", Pannella says, "it is difficult to believe that it is not legitimate to believe that someone in the Quirinale is trying to prevent the President from knowing the facts and ascertaining the responsibilities. The response of the two agencies is alarming...If the Presidency of the Republic knows nothing of this last part of the affair, then obviously the censorship worked in all respects. But the questions I asked call for an answer, or we will have to ask the public opinion to ask for it, informing it through the free and democratic media".

On the following day, Pannella insists and openly specifies his accusations. "The is more than a double agent at the Quirinale who works for the creation of the Second Republic against the Republic Pertini was trying to create, against the constitutional and antifascist Republic...The alarming thing is that "La Repubblica" is let free to give information as if it were the President's semi-official mouthpiece. Soon it might publish real or false statements of the President. Let us hope that President Pertini will not be forced to realize one day, as when he was President of the Chamber, that he is surrounded by dangerous and intolerable people and methods".

This alarming chapter of the D'Urso affair ends on 16 January. Pertini writes a letter to Forlani. "Dear Forlani, at the conclusion of the parliamentary debate which ended with a vote of confidence to the Government you are presiding, I must acknowledge that while the terrorists are trying to demolish democracy in our country, the democratic political forces and the population prove to want to uphold our liberties with extreme firmness. I wish to express my full support to the members of the police forces, who face terrorism with courage, risking their lives. The Italian population should be grateful to these men, who are faithful to their oath of loyalty to democracy to the point of sacrificing their lives. I wish to express my gratitude also to the judges who uphold our democratic regulations every day against the attack of terrorism, with intelligence, courage and perseverance, and with full respect of our juridical institutions. Reconfirming my confidence and my support to you, yours sincerely Pertini".

"The letter of the President of the Republic to the Prime Minister", Pannella says, "once again represents an example of immense sensitivity and righteousness. The people who tried to involve President Pertini in dubious manoeuvres have had what they wanted. Perhaps the 15th of January 1981, adds the Radical leader, represents an armistice, to use the expression of the hard-liners. But an armistice for them, not for the Republic. On 18 January the Radical Party and Group ask the President of the Republic to be received (and they are received shortly after), "to express their beliefs and feeling of complete and deep confidence, to thank the President for what he has done and continues to do for the Republic and for all its citizens, for the firmness with which he respects and embodies the Constitution, and lastly to give him an exhaustive documentation on the facts the Radicals and the citizens they represent are concerned about, of which the President is perhaps not informed".

But back to the announcement of D'Urso's release and to the expectations the announcement prompts. The judge is in fact released on the following morning, the 15th of January. The morning of 14 January goes by in an atmosphere of tension. The announcement that the "prisoner" has been found in Via di Valle Aurelia turns out to be fake, it is a misunderstanding. The man found is not D'Urso. It is a worker who fell from a scaffolding and injured himself. But the misunderstanding is not explained at once, and the time spent to carry out an easy identification and well as the silence on the matter are unexplainable. At D'Urso's house, the family is groping in the dark; and this is also hard to explain. The sources that are informed take time and give vague information. The authorities that ought to be informed are not, and are incapable of acquiring correct information. The absurdity of a situation of this kind causes rising anxiety and prompts diffidence and suspicion. It is normal.

The afternoon of 14 January is still and empty. This emptiness is perceived almost as a bad omen. At the Chamber of Deputies, the common opinion is that the Red Brigades' announcement is nothing but a joke, a ghastly joke. But the tone of those belonging to the hard-line who support this hypothesis is neither gloomy nor sad. They are not glad, but relieved. The question is, where is D'Urso? Has he been assassinated by the Red Brigades? This would be the first time that the terrorists break their word. Or is it a diversionary operation, carried out by the terrorists in order to move about freely during the release? It is possible. Or has the judge already been released? And why is the fact kept secret?

The atmosphere of suspicion is fueled by the ambiguous and unexplainable silence of those who know, having direct operative responsibilities. People are alarmed by the behaviour of Bettino Craxi and of the Minister of Defence Lagorio, who pace uo and down in Parliament with a gloomy look, totally ignoring what is going on, and by the refusal to speak of the Minister of the Interior Rognoni. It is in this kind of atmosphere that Pannella expresses a rising concern. "In these hours of anguish, because nothing seems to be entrusted into our hands, into our possibility of action, I have noticed how weak the hope is in each of us, that the State will be the State we know it should be, the State we fought for, against all those who want it to be violent and putrid. Now I see that I fear death in all its forms. It is a horrible thought, which I confess laically in order to overcome it, to defeat that amount of despair toward the regime which such a thought reveals. If others are unscathed by it, I am glad for them

and for once I envy them".

On the following morning, the release is confirmed, and the judge is finally found, without doubts. This is confirmed by the judge who orders D'Urso's questioning, and it is confirmed by his family and by some reporters who have seen him. Giovanni D'Urso is alive and free. Our question is: would his kidnapping have ended this way, without the action carried out by the Radical Party? Would he have survived, without the stubborn initiative of those who placed the life of a man above any risk, any advantage, any instrumentalization? Would D'Urso be back now, had the Radicals lacked the presumption of revealing the open calculation, had they not given a pitiless interpretation of the strategies and of the manoeuvres, of the responsibilities, of the dubious aims? Would the conclusion have been the same, had a group of "weirdos", of demagogues", of "accomplices" not invested their qualities and their defects in their political action? The Radicals recognize their defects and their difference, which are "incomprehe

nsible" for those who reject all that they foreshadow, that is, alternative of choices, of contents, of methods, of culture.

The conflict of positions has no doubt contributed to determining the violence of the anti-Radical polemic, in a case such as D'Urso which set the terms of the choice in a radical way.

But there is an aftermath of the affair. The polemic epilogue involving the radical De Cataldo and the Minister of Justice Sarti is an obvious symptom of this, except that Sarti's behaviour was characterized by a mediocre prudence and an obvious indifference for the values at stake.

The facts are the following. In an address at the Chamber, the Minister of Justice threatened to take legal steps against the Radicals who visited the prisons of Trani and Palmi, and condemned their behaviour during that visit. De Cataldo immediately explained that the attitude of the Minister was contradictory, because the latter had encouraged the visit, unsolicited by the Radicals. In a press release of 19 January, the Minister's press office states that "Minister Sarti firmly rejects De Cataldo's insinuation, and he acknowledges De Cataldo no right to question the correctness of the his political and personal behaviour. As anyone can easily imagine, over the last few weeks the Minister had met several people at his place, which happens to be close to De Cataldo's home, or at the Ministry. He also met De Cataldo. However, the Minister never supported positions other than those illustrated in parliament, neither with De Cataldo nor with anyone else. His positions can be summarized as: the defence of the p

reventive arrest and the firm refusal to have sort of relation with the terrorists. As De Cataldo himself recognizes, Minister Sarti, in his responsibility as a minister of the Republic, invited De Cataldo not to publish the terrorists' documents. De Cataldo's statements can only represent an instrumentalization, which the Minister firmly rejects. The Minister then confirms his negative evaluation of the radicals' behaviour in the prisons of Trani and Palmi. Such behaviour should be judged by Parliament above all, as well as by the competent organs, considering that parliamentarians have free access to prisons, on the basis of article 67 of the prison regulations.

De Cataldo's reply is prompt. "On 23 December 1980, at 17:45, I had a personal meeting with Minister Sarti on his specific invitation. Such meeting, despite the unusual hour, took place at the Minister's private home. On such occasion, the Minister informed me that on the following day he would have ordered a first evacuation of the prison of L'Asinara, and asked for our advice. I repeated that the question was not that of "negotiating" or "surrendering", but fulfilling a duty of the government, and - from a political point of view - establishing a "dialogue", that is, promoting a political and propagandist initiative with the Red Brigades.

"The Minister said he hopes the commitment taken would be fulfilled".

"On 28 December, informed of the revolt in the prison of Trani, I called the Minister. I talked to him over the phone in the late morning, while he was at the Chamber, and announced our intention of meeting to discuss a possible visit to the prison of Trani, despite the Christmas holidays. Sarti said this initiative might expose us to dangers, considering the gravity of the situation.

"On 6 January, while I was visiting the prison of Trani together with my colleagues Teodori, Pinto, Spadaccia and Stanzani, I was informed that the Minister wanted to talk to me. I was in the prison, in the infirmary. I called him several times at the number he had given, until - at the presence of the director of the prison - I was able to get through. He wanted to be updated on the situation, and I expressed my point of view, with reference to the situation of the prisoners. We agreed on meeting on the following day in Rome".

"During the visit to the prison of Trani, a prisoner gave me a sheet of paper at the presence of the director of the prison and of other people (prison guards); I did not read it at once". "It was the statement. As soon as I managed to have a look at it with my colleagues, I told the director that I meant to inform the Minister personally on the following day, leaving a photocopy of it in a sealed envelope to the director".

On 8 January, at 9:45, at the Minister's house, and on his request, I met with him once more. I showed him the 'statement', and told him that in the meanwhile the Radical Group had decided to publish it under its own responsibility. The Minister smiled and told me that as a minister it was his duty to ask me to abstain from publishing it. I repeated our decision (which we carried out only several hours later), and he did not insist or explain the reasons for which he advised me not to publish the document. I informed him that we would have started te procedure at once to carry out the visit to Palmi, where I went at the end of the week with Pannella".

"These are the facts, or rather, some of the facts which, being completely legal and dutiful, and alien to any negotiation or surrender neither on the part of the State or anyone else, represented, for us, that responsible and democratic unity which cannot but unite opposition and government in vital matters concerning the law and life".

"Minister Sarti now wants to tell those who are trying to lynch the radical Party, which contributed more than anyone else to D'Urso's survival and - as far as possible - to the dignity of the State, that our behaviour was neither legal nor loyal".

"Faced to this squalid lack of decency and of loyalty to the State and civil and personal dignity, we have no fear of submitting the facts on which it is necessary to shed light to the judgement of the public opinion and to the political judgement of Parliament".

"Minister Sarti is left with the difficult task of proving the things he is saying and prove that we are lying, and if he fails, resigning".

"Minister Sarti", Pannella adds on the same day, "rejects a fact which disturbs him. This is comprehensible, but also pathetic and ridiculous. The facts he confirms are the following: 1) that he invited De Cataldo at his place; 2) that he informed him (and not Parliament or the government or other groups) that on the following day he would have - finally? - evacuated some prisoners from L'Asinara, thus proving to be sensitive to the Red brigades' requests as much as he had been indifferent to the requests advanced by the Radicals and by Parliament; 3) the he followed the Radicals' visit to Trani, which was totally legitimate and legal, not only in the beginning, but during its entire course; 4) that he had all the time and possibility to alert the judicial authority of the existance of a document that could have been seized before it was divulged; 5) that he benefited of an unconditional confidence on the part of the Radical party, relative to his loyalty both toward the State and toward the Radicals, and of

De Cataldo's courtesy to accept to meet him at his home instead of at his office; 6) the Minister also confirms his attempt to jeopardize the ministerial investigation on the activity of the Radical parliamentarians in Trani, which the minister followed personally and encouraged until his cowardice induced him to deny it".

Let us put a full stop here, but the D'Urso case is far from concluded.

One thing that is certainly concluded is the story of the judge and the political events that accompanied it. But the kidnapping and the survival of D'Urso have given an ultimate value, in our country, to a conflict of civilizations and cultures, and therefore to a political conflict that is bound to last.