ABSTRACT: The Radical Party's action to obtain the liberation of Judge Giovanni D'Urso, kidnapped by the "Red Brigades" on December 12 1980, and to oppose that group of political and press officials who advocate his death to justify the imposition in Italy of an "emergency" government composed of "technicians". On February 15 1981, Judge D'Urso was freed: "The camp that advocates inflexibility was organizing and is still organizing a coup d'état: for this as for the 1921 fascism, it needs victims, but this time, unlike what happened with Moro, it has been temporarily defeated: for once, the Red Brigades have not served the purpose. The campaign conducted by Radio Radicale successfully interrupts the blackout on information ordered by the press.

("The life of Judge D'Urso", Who needed it, who sold it, how it was saved - edited by Lino Jannuzzi, Ennio Capelcelatro, Franco Roccella, Valter Vecellio - Supplement to Radical News n.3 - March 1981)

Leonardo Sciascia's letter on Lotta Continua (December 23)

In the period in which Aldo Moro was still alive, in the so-called "people's prison", I was not among those who signed the appeal of "Lotta Continua" to the State, urging it to negotiate and save his life. For many reasons, not least the need to make a distinction between negotiating and giving it - despite this is both legitimate and possible for a strong and democratic State - it would have proved disastrous considering the conditions of weakness, inefficiency and confusion of the Italian State: but it seemed to me that these same conditions - weakness, inefficiency, confusion - should have advised the authorities to undertake a negotiation: to back Moro's game, answer it, gain time.

Moro's destiny

I was convinced that Moro's destiny had been decided already when he was kidnapped, and that giving in would have been useless. The evidence of this is that when the hypothesis to give in started taking shape, it was cut short by the terrorists' decision to carry out the "sentence" rapidly (and consider the shrewd use of this gerund, "executing", which Government and press officials used at the time, in a tragicomic manner, so as to subtly enable the positions of inflexibility of Government and the parties to consolidate themselves).

Moro, in other words, could have been saved by the police only: hence the advantage that a flexible approach to a negotiation could have ensured, that is, gaining time. It must be said that if the State had declared its willingness to negotiate, this might have accelerated his killing; but in such event, the Red Brigades would have immediately given up the alibi of being forced to kill the hostage because of the refusal, on the part of Government and of the other parties to have dealings. An alibi which they strongly needed, for reasons concerning not only the relations they allegedly had with the masses, but also their internal consistence, their structure (which is to be considered formally democratic in the same proportions as the fascist council was: where votes were taken perhaps only once, to decide that fascism was over).

Nothing is more fair than negotiating

As for the D'Urso case, it seems we are faced to a repetition. But this is not so. The camp advocating inflexibility is not that inflexible; and the camp in favour of a negotiation is much more cautious. But even if it less inflexible, the camp advocating inflexibility is by far more dangerous; in the same way as negotiations were not undertaken for Moro in the name of the reason of the State, for D'Urso letting Moro be killed may represent a precedent, or rather is a precedent. No one, of those advocating inflexibility, will explicitly say that if the State took a firm stance for Moro the same must be done for D'Urso; but this intent will act secretly. Moro in the name of the reason of the State. D'Urso in the name of Moro. With all possible mental reservations, including that of not giving in. But it is necessary to negotiate. Bearing in mind, however, that the surest safety for D'Urso lies with the intelligence of those who direct the investigations and in the shrewdness, in the prudence mixed with coura

ge, of those who carry them out. I believe reading Poe's "purloined letter" would be beneficial to the Head of the Rome police administration.

"Leonardo Sciascia"