ITALY - Physician, author of many books on the pharmacological and social aspects of narcotic substances.

ABSTRACT: Drug policies are mainly regulated by international organizations attached to the United Nations. The public at large misinterprets his international character as a guarantee of objectivity and democracy. On the contrary, the drug policy adopted by U.N. mirrors the ideologies of the reigning political parties, more particulary those of the most powerful states. Moreover, a centralization of the policies to such a higt degree generates inertia and a lack of adaptation to reality.

("THE COST OF PROHIBITION ON DRUGS", Papers of the International

Anti-prohibitionism Forum, Brussels 28th september - 1st october 1988; Ed. Radical Party)

Various institutions, both national and international, have been created to deal with the drug problem.

Many of those institutions are part of the United Nations, the supreme decisionmaking organ of which is the General Assembly (the Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC).

The agencies belonging to ECOSOC are:

- the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is responsible for legislative decisions and policy;

- the International Control Board, which is responsible for implementing controls of the Single Convention.

Other United Nations agencies concerned with this problem are: - the World Heath Organization (OMS) which, with its Expert Committee on Narcotic Drugs - including the Pharmacological and Toxicological Division - provides expert consultation;

- the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) - created in the early 1970s to finance programmes aimed at finding solutions to the problems of drug abuse.

The "Pompidou Group" operates within the European Community. Due to their super-national status, which is generally interpreted as being non-partisan, all international organizations, and particularly those belonging to the United Nations, enjoy considerable prestige and an image of impartiality.

However, as regards the drug problem (and others as well), the simultaneous presence of representatives from more than one State does not of itself necessarily ensure that variety of opinion which alone can guarantee objective discussion, if the criteria themselves applied in making up the components of those agencies have not thus been explicitly defined.

Representatives to the United Nations agencies are chosen either by national governments or local bureaucracies, and thus are destined for the most part to reflect the tendencies and interests of the groups in power.

On the other hand, operations and policy choices within the United Nations agencies inevitably reflect international power balances and imbalances, those existing between the various States.

An observation of the stands taken by the United Nations agencies will more than confirm the accuracy of those statements.

A significant - albeit practically unknown - fact is that official United Nations documents, the Single Convention to begin with, adopt a series of key-words to justify international control; "abuse", "non-medical use", "narcotic", "psychotropic substance", "drugs". And not one of these terms is defined without ambiguity, either in the text of the Single Convention (which includes a detailed "Glossary"), or in any other document of the United Nations or the World Health Organization.

However, the most revealing example of the 'subjectivity' of United Nations drug policy is the choice of substances placed under control.

As the purpose of any similar control is presumably the safeguarding of public health, any complete discourse on drugs and their control should logically include also the more popular psychoactive substances in the industrialized world - alcohol and tobacco. The Single Convention is, however, exclusively concerned with substances such as opium derivatives, cannabis and cocaine - the recreational intoxicants traditionally used in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The obvious conclusion here would be that a similar choice would have to have been dictated by the balance of power between the industrialized and the developing countries. That conclusion is also justified by the reason given for making the use of cannabis a crime; i.e. that it is used in the non-industrialized countries.

The balance of power has caused not only the North-South conflict, but has also determined United States hegemony over the other Western countries. That hegemony has been amply documented (cfr. Hulsman, 1984, p. 58; Inglis, l975, p. 198; Latimer, l981, pp. 165-174; Solomon, 1969, p. 80, and others). One example of the type of policy promoted by the United States is its choice of representatives on the international scene - e.g. Harry Anslinger, Director of the Narcotics Bureau who was instrumental in the criminalization of cannabis in the USA in 1937 through his propaganda campaign which had no basis whatsoever in reality (cfr. Becker, 1966, pp. 140-142; Brecher, 1972, p. 416; Grinspoon, 1971, pp. 24-26; Musto in Mikuriya, 1973, pp. 419-444; Kaplan J., 1971, pp. 92-97 and 101; National Commission, 1972, p. 16). He was also nominated in 1961 as U. S. Representative to both the Society of Nations and the Single Convention (CFR. Inglis, 1975, p. 198).

To what extent the United Nations agencies can be considered scientifically credible is illustrated by the fact that they insist, even today, in equating cannabis with heroin, including them both in Table IV of the Single Convention of substances subject to maximum control, explicitly referring to their "particularly dangerous properties" (Art. 2, Paragraph 5a), as distinguished from those substances included in Table I (opiates and morphine), or those in Table II (codeine and its derivatives), or Table III (preparations containing opiates or codeine). Those agencies thus demonstrate total ignorance of any of the material published documenting the enormous difference in the elements of risk involved in the use of cannabis and heroin - which is by now public knowledge, even in the most underdeveloped sectors of world public opinion. But what is even more incredible, is that the United Nations does not even seem to be aware of the fact that the legislation of some nations (Italy and Great Britain, for exampl

e) have actually disregarded the Single Convention classification and ascribe differentiated control for cannabis and heroin. The insistence on making a conceptual distinction between illegal and legal drugs has resulted in the most singular behaviour of the World Health Organization as regards tobacco addiction.

The World Health organization did not recognize the habitforming properties of tobacco (only too well-known to the millions who have tried to stop smoking) until 1973, excluding it until that date from the category of "special dependence" which had been created in 1965, which included, among other things, substances (such as the hallucinogens) which are not habit-forming, and substances (such as cannabis), the habit-forming nature of which is still subject to discussion. A separate classification was created for tobacco; "non-habit-forming abuse" (cfr. Jaffe, 1977, p. 210). Even more recently, the distinction between legal and illegal drugs has on occasion been reconfirmed. At a convention in Amelia in September of 1987, the Director of UNFDAC stated: "...strictly speaking, unless it is used excessively, alcohol is no more a drug than pasta is." (Corriere della Sera, September 19, 1987).

The "structural" difference between legal and illegal drugs was defined by eminent U. N. scientific consultant Gabriel Nahas, according to whom the addiction potential of cannabis is seven times greater than that of alcohol. That estimation was based on a comparison of the cases of alcoholism (that is, alcohol addiction) in the Western countries and the daily use (which is not necessarily addiction) of cannabis in Jamaica (cfr. "Bulletin on Narcotics", Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 3-4, 1986).

The increase in alcohol consumption in the Third World countries has been denounced repeatedly by their governments (cfr. Inglis, p. 223 and Whitaker, 1987, p. 134). Decisive action on the part of the United Nations or the World Health Organization, however, has not been forthcoming. To the contrary, in 1984, the Secretary of the Council on Alcohol Policy (USA) denounced World Health Organization censorship of a document ("Alcoholic Drinks: Proportions of Corporate Power"), analyzing the effects on public health of the sale of alcohol in the Third World. Professor Griffith Edwards of the University of London (who had written the Preface) expressed his "fear that the report would be shelved by World Health Organization bureaucracy, after one of the organization's officials suggested that it not be published since the health aspects of the problem had not yet been sufficiently evaluated" (ASPE, 1984, No. 84.0058).

United Nations policy, it would appear, is guided by the principle of immutability. The French delegate during the 1973 session of the International Commission on Narcotic Drugs stated:

"The question of the relative harmfulness of the different variants of cannabis - of taking the drug in larger or smaller doses, and so on - is undoubtedly of theoretical and clinical interest and the World Health Organization should certainly continue investigations along those lines. However, such investigations should not be allowed in any way whatsoever to influence international control measures." (cit. Whitaker, 1987, p. 220).

And there we have a perfect example of the complete divorce between scientific objectivity and drug policy.

However, that separation also involves the more banal aspects of the phenomenon. According to the 1982 INCB Report, even the occasional use of cannabis will cause headache, dizziness, diarrhea, vomiting, stomach-ache, and a wide array of ear, nose and throat disturbances" (from Il Manifesto, February 9, 1982).

Clearly, before a similar statement, it is licit to wonder whether the "experts" in question have indeed ever seen or spoken to even one of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who have actually used that substance.

The maintenance of the status quo was vigorously supported by the Single Convention, and the relative regulations were structured in such a way as to facilitate any eventual additions to the list of controlled substances, but made the removal of substances already included practically impossible:

The possibility of changing those treaties in the foreseeable future is practically nil. This became evident when the Netherlands and the United States - separately - attempted to do so, as regards cannabis. Although, formally, changes are possible, the procedures necessary to implement them are so complicated, and so dependent on the cooperation of the majority of the members of the Narcotic Commission, that the chances for success are practically non-existent, (Hylsman, 1984, p. 61).

In fact, up to now no substance has ever been removed from the Single Convention list, and - even worse - it would appear that the most convincing reason for those substances remaining on it is that they always have been there.

This attitude is also justified by the apparently humanitarian assumption that eliminating drugs - "one of the major social ills threatening humanity" - is of vital importance.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the United Nations agencies tend to emphasize the dangers implicit in the phenomenon.

The 1985 INCB Report state that "drugs constitute the greatest threat to mankind" (La Stampa, January 18, 1985), thus implying that in comparison the existence of nuclear and conventional arms, the disastrous state of the world's ecological balance, hunger and famine in the Third World (not to mention the problems caused by legal drugs such as tobacco and alcohol which claim more victims than illegal drugs) are insignificant. And the newspapers take such statements at face value; La Stampa's headlines on that particular occasion read, "Drugs Worse than the Atom Bomb". They do not seem to realize that it is in the interests of those agencies to demonstrate the vital importance of their function to humanity - as well as the subsequent importance of adequate economic and political supports.

The public's concept of the United Nations agencies is a somewhat noble one, as the image is one of the defenders of highly idealistic causes.

That "idealism", in reality, is merely "ideology"; that is, conceptual structures based on principles. They are ideologies more interested in "combatting" drugs than in resolving the real problems of the individual using those drugs.

Ideological approach and bureaucracy converge in the rejection of pragmatism, in the reluctance to focus on concrete problems, the former in the name of upholding principles and the latter in the name of established norms.

The history of the United Nations and the documents produced by that organization provide many instances of the distortion of pragmatism and scientific objectivity by ideology and bureaucracy.

A recent document is a good example of this. It reads: ...several terms have been commonly used in discussions of drug abuse which, whether in good faith or bad, foster misconceptions and hinder understanding of the nature of drug-related problems. The United Nations discourages the use of all the following terms and concepts; "recreational use' of drugs, "responsible use" of drugs, "decriminalization", and the definition of drugs as "hard" or "soft". (U. N., 1987, p. 49.)

In other words, the United Nations presumes to omit from all debate certain phenomena or theory through the censorship of words, and even of "concepts" (that is, of thought), demonstrating an attitude reminiscent of formulas of exorcism from religious texts.

Institution-related problems were touched on in the l973 U.S. Government Report, in one paragraph entitled, "Perpetuating the Problem". ( The reference is to the American situation, but it could obviously be applied to any national or super-national situation.) That paragraph reads:

Because of the strong public concern and emotionalism connected with the subject of drugs, all levels of government have been pressured to take action with little time for planning. The political pressures (...) have resulted in a concentration of public energy on the most immediate aspects of drug use, and a line of action of least political resistance. The result has been the creation of ever larger bureaucracies, ever increasing financial expenditures, and extensive publicity, to inform the public that "something" is being done.

Perhaps the major result of this ad hoc policy planning has been the creation, at federal, state and community levels, of a vested interest, among those dispensing and receiving funds, in perpetuating the problem. (...) During the past several years, drug programmes have come to represent a multi-billion-dollar industry, administering to its own needs as well as those of its drug-using clientele. Somewhere along the line, with wellintentioned efforts to do something (...) our society may have inadvertently institutionalized the problem as a never-ending project. (Nat. Comm., 1973, p. 27.)

The Commission is concerned that the underlying assumptions about the problem and the organizational response to the "drug abuse industrial complex" may, instead of resolving or making the issue less emotional, tend to perpetuate it. (op. cit., p. 3). According to various AA, it was that same tendency to perpetuate its activities which motivated the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to unleash its violent anti-marihuana campaign in the 1930s, which resulted in the federal prohibition of that substance.

Anslinger in 1936 was faced with a situation where the Bureau's budgetary approporiation had been decreased by almost 26% in four years. The Bureau's response was to attempt to appear more necessary, or in short, to widen its scope of operations...Now it argued that it was necessary to control marihuana on a federal level. The result was the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, At that point, the Bureau's arrests, convictions and seizures statistics, which had been declining, soared - in 1938, one out of every four Federal narcotics convictions was for marihuana violation (Young, 1971, P. 103).

One more thing should be remembered as regards international agencies in general.

The phenomena of the use and abuse of drugs is not associated exclusively to the substance, but is also largely influenced by the circumstances of its use, the personalities of those using it, as well as the cultural and social context of that use.

Before so complex a problem, placed against such varying cultural and geographical backgrounds, the policy of United Nations agencies has unfailingly demonstrated total disinterest in local factors. That attitude has been manifest since the prohibition of those drugs traditionally used in the Third World, favoring (or in any case accelerating) the introduction there of Western drugs, such as alcohol, tobacco and psychotropic substances. And that attitude survives, for, as a solution to stopping the massive increase in illegal drugs presently in progress, United Nation agencies propose - in addition to intensifying repressive measures - a uniformity of measures for all nations. That has included ignoring the results of experiments which, at least at the local level, have provided positive results.

In this context, the attitude of the Dutch government which is - to say the least - laudable, was criticized in the 1983 INCB Report for its "permissive" approach, which threatens the consensus which is the basis of international control systems and the "principle" obliging all nations to reduce the drug offer (cfr. Kaplan, C., 1984, p. 1). In other words, Dutch policy was not being criticized so much on the basis of results obtained, as for its putting in question a matter of principle.

The 1987 International Conference of United Nations Ministers in Vienna once again reprimanded "certain governments" for their "excessive permissiveness", or their falling short in applying the laws, and proposed a new international convention to further unify national policies (cfr. Engelsman, 1987, p. 8).

In that way, the super-national agencies appropriated the right to strongly influence peripheral cultures, presaging worldwide agreement on the choice of recreational intoxicants. The repercussions of this on democratic processes were stated by Hulsman as follows:

Another aspect of this kind of international drug legislation is that the manner of its introduction was not compatible with the requisites of democracy. At the time the Single Convention (and the treaties preceding it) was accepted by the European states, the use of the substances prohibited in those treaties was practically non-existent in Europe. That acceptance was not preceded by any public debate; the whole issue was seen as a technical matter which touched upon the colonial territories, but which would not have any impact on the "mother countries" (Hulsman, 1984, pp. 60-61).

That centralization, however, also implies difficulty in functional capacity.

Another interesting analysis of Hulsman's defines four levels of action, as regards the use of illegal drugs:

Level 1, which has direct contact with the phenomenon, includes the police, the social services, medical and social workers;

Level 2, includes the local administrators of the policy - magistrates and local officials;

Level 3, includes those administering the policy at the national level - Ministers of Justice, Ministers of Health, the Foreign Office, etc.; and

Level 4, including those administering the policy internationally - United Nations agencies, INTERPOL, etc.

This level can - subject to prior consultation with third-level agencies - impose regulations for operation at the first two levels.

However, still according to Hulsman :

It is clear that responsiveness to the signals from the different environments, which is essential if policy is to be suitably implemented, is more likely at the first and second levels. As we have seen (...), an 'element of smallness' is a necessary condition for a participatory structure, and a participatory structure is a necessary condition for policy flexibility in this area. This implies that the first and second levels of the drug policy structure must have a considerable degree of freedom, as compared to policy at third and fourth levels. (...) The fourth level has, in the context of flexibility, special importance. At present, this level receives incomplete and more or less unreliable data on policy success. Information on unwanted side-effects of policy are not forthcoming. The organization at this level would not be capable of processing such information. Even if that organization should be up-graded to the point of being able to process that information, prevailing procedure would not be adequa

te to act on it. The tendency towards petrification at the fourth level affects (...) counteracting any policy adaption which might be developed at the first three levels. Thus, concentration on that (fourth) level would mean immobility of drug policy (Hulsman, 1984, p. 69).

Bibliography

Becker, Howard, Outsiders, New York, The Free Press, 1966.

Brecher, Edward B., (ed.), Licit and Illicit Drugs, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1972

Engelsman, Eddie, "Moralistic versus Pragmatic Drug Control Policies", Seminar on Drug Policy, London, 1987.

Grinspoon, Lester, Marihuana Reconsidered, New York, Bantam Books, 1971.

Hulsman, Louk, "Drug Policy as A Source of Drug Problems and A Vehicle of Colonization and Repression", EWODOR Workshop, Rotterdam, 1984.

Inglis, Brian, The Forbidden Game, Seven Oaks, Coronet, 1975. Jaffe, Jerome, "Tobacco Use as a Mental Disorder", in NIDA,Research on Smoking Behavior, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

Kaplan Charles, "The Uneasy Consensus: Prohibitionist and Experimentalist Expectancies behind The International Narcotic Control System", in Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 1984.

Latimer, D. and J. Goldberg, Fiori nel sangue : storia americana dell'oppio, Rome, Ciapanna (ed.), 1981.

Mikuriya, Tod (ed.), Marijuana : Medical Papers, Oakland, Medi-Comp, 1973.

National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, "Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding", New York, The New American Library, 1972.

Idem : "Drug Use in America : Problem in Perspective", Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Solomon, David (ed.), Marihuana Papers, London, Panther Books, 1969.

United Nations, "The U. N. and Drug Abuse COntrol", NYC, U.N., 1987.

Whitaker, Ben, "The Global Connection - The Crisis of Drug Addiction, London, Jonathan Cape, 1987.

Young, Jock, The Drugtakers, London, Paladin, 197l.