by Roger LEWISGRAT BRITAIN - Visiting Professor and Researcher at the University of Calabria (Italy). Since 1983, he has worked with the Anti-Mafia Commission of the Italian Parliament, and in 1985 completed work on a book entitled, "The Big Deal - Policy of Illegal Drug Traffic".
ABSTRACT: The author discusses the different environments in which drug users, heroin and cocaine dealers envolve from an athnographical standpoint and presents the evolution and characteristic of the distribution networks of illegal drugs. He emphasizes the huge profits and the strength of the structures that result directly from repression.
("THE COST OF PROHIBITION ON DRUGS", Papers of the International
Anti-prohibitionism Forum, Brussels 28th september - 1st october 1988; Ed. Radical Party)
"In the field of drugs, Europe already has its unified market. It won't have to wait until 1992." -Spanish police officer (Time, August 1, 1988).
Since Preble Casey's landmark paper, "Taking Care of Business", was published in 1969, urban ethnography has attained a certain level of respectability in the field of illicit drug research. The domination of the medical and psychiatric establishment has given way to a multi-disciplinary approach that acknowledges that the data collected in treatment contexts with treatment priorities will not necessarily ensure an accurate picture of what is going on outside in the real world. The vast majority of cannabis and cocaine, if not heroin, users do not come into contact with treatment services or law enforcement agencies as a result of their drug use. Ethnography is one of the few effective ways that these populations can be reached and their experiences recorded.
Serious economic studies of illicit drug markets are also a relatively new development. For many years, the image of drug "addicts" was such that they were widely held to be incapable of making rational economic choices. Their craving was believed to be such that they would pay any price and commit any crime to obtain the drugs that they desired; hence, the absurd claims made in not so distant political campaigns that, if all drug addicts could be cured or jailed, most street crime would be eliminated at a stoke (see Epstein, Agency of Fear, 1976). In fact, heroin users will often seek alternative retail outlets, reduce or eliminate their consumption, substitute heroin with other drugs, or voluntarily enter treatment rather than pay unacceptably high prices.
As understanding of drug-use behaviour has grown, so has impatience with simplistic accounts of the way the market and supply systems operate. When seizures are reported, they are frequently overvalued by the press which multiplies hypothetical street purity x by hypothetical street price y to come up with total street value z. It may make the agency involved look good, but it tells us little or nothing about the actual situation. Similarly, control of the drug trade is often attributed to monolithic alien conspiracies controlled at various times by the warlord Khun Sa, the Bonanno Mafia family and the Medellin Cartel. This also makes exciting copy, but it's not the way things happen.
WHY THE INTEREST?
I entered this field in a fairly roundabout fashion. Working in a London "storefront" street agency that had grown out of the "alternative" drug sub-culture of the 1960s, I was constantly amazed by the disparity between accounts of drug-dealing, as described in the press and literature - as far as it existed - and the actual experience of clients and colleagues. Many lawyers and more thoughtful police officers with whom I came into contact seemed equally bewildered. To my surprise, by the end of the 1970s, I found myself attending court to give expert evidence in these matters. At the time, despite work by Silverman, Brown, Spruill, Moore and others in the United States, the study of illicit drug markets in Britain was regarded as an eccentric pursuit. (It was a bit like knowing about the "munchies", a phenomenon experienced and discussed by probably all regular cannabis smokers, yet barely recorded in the literature and subject to little scientific study).
When I took up the position of street ethnographer with a research body concerned with the epidemiology of problematic drug use in London in 1980, it was made very clear to me that any work on price, purity and availability was to be considered of secondary importance. It is a measure of how far things have changed that by 1986 the British Home Office was funding research into economic aspects of the illicit drug market and drug enforcement policies in the United Kingdom.
Five factors probably account for this recent interest :
1) concern about the social costs of problematic drug use;
2) the economic beliefs of British and American administrations since 1980;
3) recognition of the apparent financial strength and influence of trafficking groups, and their de-stabilizing influence on local areas and entire regions;
4) the involvement in academic research and government agencies of individuals with direct or personal experience, at some point in their lives, of illicit drug use and retail supply;
5) the development of the drug issue into a major political football.
Since 1980, I have studied illicit drug markets in London, Naples and Rome, and am currently involved in a multi-city study in central and northern Italy. The work stems from widespread Italian concern about the size of its heroin-using population (estimated at around 150,000), a spiralling overdose rate (242 drug-related mortalities in 1985, 292 in 1986, 516 in 1987), and the involvement of the Sicilian Mafia, the Calabrian 'ndrangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra networks in bulk supply. Mafia,'ndrangheta and Camorra are not used as general terms, but refer strictly to the geographical, cultural and criminal origins of such groups.
INFORMATION COLLECTION
Little quantitative information has been published about the functioning of illicit drug markets in Europe or on fluctuations in price and purity (heroin, cocaine, amphetamines) over time. Material collated by enforcement agencies tends to be neither systematically organized - although this is changing - nor generally available. Apart from privileged access to judicial and state records, our main source of market information has been through face-to-face interviews with users and dealers. From the outset, participant observation proved to be a productive method of research. The illicit nature of the activities under investigation meant that contacts were sometimes wary, appointments were not always kept, and acceptance could not be taken for granted. However, such difficulties did not occur as frequently as might have been anticipated and cooperation was generally good. Commentaries and opinions were recorded regarding the overall nature of the supply structure and the operation of the market, in addition
to individual, specific experiences.
On occasions, we have interviewed ton importers of cannabis and kilo purchasers of heroin, although, because of the security considerations of participants and the extent to which professional criminals dominated bulk delivery, this was a rare occurrence Most of our contacts have been drug consumers and dealers operating at or below the ounce level, in the case of heroin and cocaine, and at or below kilo level, in the case of cannabis. In London, as opposed to Italy, there were few reports of heroin dealers trading in amounts of less than one ounce who were not also users and, invariably, addicted. Ready access to cheap heroin is a constant temptation to the using, but as yet non-dependent, dealer.
VALUE FOR MONEY
Cocaine and heroin are sold in powder form which makes them easy to dilute with inert or psychoactive substances to add weight and increase profit margins. So far, we have not encountered "crack", although free-basing was evident in London by the early 1980s. Buyers at kilo, ounce and, in Britain, multi-gram level, normally demand precision-weighing of the product. Assessing purity is more difficult. A variety of amateur or professional tests may be implemented, usually depending upon the level within the distribution system at which the transaction takes place. Cocaine may be tried or "tasted" by prospective retail or wholesale customers to evaluate its effects. Cocaine suppliers often have a consumer's interest in the use value of their product. The unpredictability, erratic behaviour and abrupt termination of some cocaine networks have been attributed by a number of fieldwork contacts to an excessive indulgence in the drug itself.
Testing is unlikely to be permitted at street level where units are usually pre-wrapped, underweight and heavily "cut", and where rapidity of turnover is the supplier's main priority. Purchases are not made indiscriminately and customers, unhappy with a specific weight and/or quality, may not complete the transaction or refuse to make a repeat purchase. Individuals, who persist in unacceptable business practices, may be ostracized and, at bulk level, may be subject to retaliatory or punitive action.
Demand for cocaine and amphetamines tends to be far more elastic than demand for heroin. Cocaine and amphetamines do not induce a form of dependency that involves a physical withdrawal syndrome or, at least, are not perceived by users as provoking a withdrawal syndrome. The apparent absence of the kind of physical dependence associated with opiate drugs, like heroin, puts consumers in a stronger bargaining position and makes them more likely to insist on a high-grade product. This is partly reflected in the relatively higher purity of cocaine samples seized at retail level as compared to samples of heroin. There is less urgency in making a purchase, although the conspicuous consumption associated with much cocaine use means that high prices may be paid if the purchaser believes that the quality of the product enhances his status.
Heroin prices have held relatively steady in London over the past eight years with some minor fluctuations. Street purity has fallen from around 40%-50% in the early 1980s to around 30% in 1987. This is still remarkably high compared to Italy where current street purity is no more than 4%-6%. Costs in Italy tend to be passed on through dilution, although prices have also risen steadily.
HEROIN IN THE CITY
European experience suggests that full-blown drug markets tend to develop first in the great metropolises. Subsequently, other cities develop their own subsidiary or autonomous markets. However, diffusion of consumption is usually not uniform. Within the great cities themselves, a shift to the periphery often takes place in response to local demand and enforcement pressure. In the last decade, this has happened in London, Paris and Rome.
Heroin, hashish and cocaine are all imported into Europe. When drug markets are at an initial stage and poorly developed, import and supply usually stems from anti-trafficking, individual initiative and co-operative ventures organized by users themselves. As a market develops, criminal organizations, ethnic diasporas and petty villains tend to become involved at import and wholesale level, but not to the extent of excluding all other enterprises. The extent of involvement depends upon the country, the city, the type and origin of the product, and the opportunities for profit.
Depending upon the pharmacological properties of a particular illicit drug and where it circulates, some markets may involve restricted groups of consumers in informal systems of barter and exchange, while other markets may be profoundly impersonal in nature. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, most retail supply in Europe was relatively friendly and informal, and largely restricted to students, "bohemians" and private circles. These friendship networks and barter systems tend to break down over time. The more established a heroin market becomes, the greater the attempts at penetration by professional crime. Prices rise, quality declines, and the product is retailed in increasingly smaller units - dilution and short-weight being the most common forms of fraud.
However, we found that there was immense variation from nation to nation and city to city. Although European and American developments have been very different, the American literature has provided an invaluable touchstone with which to assess what is happening in Europe. In the early 1980s, the London market appeared to be neither as established nor as violent as that of New York. "Business" was conducted in a more amateurish fashion, although this was changing. There were indications early on in our London research that some free-lance entrepreneurs of violence were attempting to penetrate the distribution system at wholesale level in order to extort higher payments from customers and swindle foreign importers/distributors unfamiliar with its structure.
In Naples, we found heroin consumption was particularly established in the suburbs and the hinterland, possibly because the traditional culture of the "vicoli" (alleyways) discouraged use in the older part of the city. However, in a city where structural employment is a primary problem, there is no shortage of criminal labour for the distribution system. There is widespread heroin consumption by unemployed young people on the margins of society. Dealing is one way of earning a little cash and guaranteeing a personal supply of drugs. In both cities, consumption is deeply rooted in the slums of the periphery.
Retail networks supply specific districts. At wholesale level in both cities, the market is largely dominated by professional criminals. One of the principal differences between Rome and Naples is that the Roman underworld is so disorganized and divided that it is almost entirely dependent for its supplies on Southern Italian importers, manufacturers and distributors. Neapolitan groups are better organized and better capitalized, with generations of experience in contraband of all kinds. Along with Sicilian and Calabrian organizations, they dominate the medium and upper levels of the Roman heroin market.
Notwithstanding the role of Naples as a center of transit and distribution, street purity seemed to decline faster than it did in Rome. This may be because a greater number of individuals in Naples than in Rome attempt to become involved in distribution and survive on drug sales alone. It also seems likely that Third World importers in Rome boost levels of purity by selling high-quality heroin directly on a retail market, the workings of which they may not quite understand.
While organized crime groups may be said to dominate wholesale supply in Naples and Rome, a quite different situation prevails in "Pandoro" where attempts to penetrate distribution networks by Calabrian and Neapolitan groups have almost entirely failed. "Pandoro" is a warehousing and reception center for Southwest Asian traffickers, and a focal point for distribution to other parts of Italy. Over the years, local distributors have built up direct contacts with foreign producers and seem to have a reputation for efficiency, straightforwardness and reliability. Such a reputation is of immense value in an illicit business where there are no written contracts and good faith is of crucial importance. The province is wealthy and productive and there is little unemployment. Nevertheless, there is a large heroin-using population. Heroin appears to be half the price of that in Rome, with addicts operating at kilo level. While this appears to be rare in Italy, a recent paper about "Southdown", a southern English to
wn, also found that supply groups were composed of addicts, who bought and sold kilos of heroin.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We found that despite contractions, extenuations and parallel distribution systems, they did not differ fundamentally from Preble and Casey's pyramid model, although there were some notable exceptions. I hope that there will be the opportunity to elaborate during the discussion, as well devote some time to supply and demand and the role of "organized crime" in the Italian drug economy.
My final comment would be that problematic drug use is going to be with us for the foreseeable future. The supply systems that have developed are immensely profitable and enforcement can do little more than perform a holding operation. Indeed, it has been argued that repression actually provides a price support system for suppliers. The best features of the much-denigrated Dutch approach and the much-discussed and little understood British "system" may provide an answer. In a period where the dangers of substance abuse are being rapidly overshadowed by the reality of AIDS, harmreduction rather than a "war on drugs" is the only sensible option.