ABSTRACT: Intervention during the founding congress of the International Antiprohibitionist League - Rome, 30th of March - 1st april 1989 - Journal of Drug Issues, 1990

There is an unintentional effect of drug-policy, which has scarcerly been analyzed until now: law enforcement, rather than undermining the illegal market, indirectly promotes its evolution.

We must start from two basic premises:

1) The use of psychoactive substances is a need for many, and perhaps for most of human beings (see: Canadian Government Commission of Inquiry into the non-medical Use of Drugs: "Interim Report" 1971, par.322). Therefore, if they are by any means discouraged from the use of one specific substance, they are likely to turn to another one.

2) The goal of the illegal drug trade, like any other economic enterprise, is the pursuit of the most favourable balance between risks and benefits.

Our point is that the risk-benefit balance varies according to the different substances. As an example, we will draw a comparison between the most popular illegal drugs: on one side marijuana, on the other side cocaine and heroin (which will be defined by the improper term "hard drugs"). We refer to the Italian situation, which is probably not very different from most other Western countries.

In Italy, heroin and cocaine have a retail price of about 250.000 lit. per gm., marijuana of about 5.000 lit. per gm.. This means that, for people in the trade, the economic benefits for weight unity are roughly 50 times higher for hard drugs than for marijuana. The 1 to 50 ratio has been reported also in the US context: according to Reuter, the profit for drug smugglers from Colombia to US is 50 times more for cocaine than for marijuana (see: Reuter P. "Can the borders be sealed?" RAND 1988,Santa Monica, p.63). A ratio 1 to 100 was reported in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (cit. by Whitaker, D.: "The Global connection", J.Cape, London 1987,p.187).

The main risks of drug trading are bound to law enforcement. Penalties related to trade are in most countries as severe for marijuana as for hard drugs. In fact, any legal distinction of marijuana control from that of heroin and cocaine is implicitely denied by the Single Convention (Art.2, 5). In Italy, the minimum sentence for selling of small amounts is one year jail for marijuana, two years for hard drugs; for producing and trading, two years for cannabis and four for hard drugs.

We can then assume that penalties for hard drugs are at most double those for marijuana. Yet, the risk-benefit balance cannot be assessed solely by the level of the penalty, but also by the likelihood of being caught by the law enforcement agencies.

We assume that the profit involved in marijuana trade is about 1 in 50 compared to hard drugs; therefore, in order to make the same profit, one must trade 50 times more the amount of the substance, thus risking 50 times more being caught. So, even when penalties are double for hard drugs trade, the actual vulnerability to law enforcement is much higher for marijuana trading.

This vulnerability is linked to another important variable: the physical properties of the substances.

Hard drugs are soluble powders, which have the following qualities:

a) they can be easily mixed with inexpensive additives: for heroin the adulteration can go up to 95%, for cocaine up to about 50%; thus, the profit can be further increased up two to 20 times;

b) they can be easily hidden or smuggled by various and quite effective techniques (e.g., by dissolving them in liquid compounds or in textiles);

c) in case of a police raid, they can be easily eliminated, e.g. throwing them down any water sink.

On theother side, marijuana is marketed in leaves, which are difficult to smuggle, to hide or to eliminate. Therefore, the risk-benefit balance becomes further favourable to hard drugs trade.

The practical outcomes of these dynamics have been displayed in the US, where the "war on drugs" strategy turned into an indiscriminate and harsh repression of any type of drug use and traffic, including marijuana, which during the Carter era was managed with a more tolerant approach.

In fact, the "war on drugs" has determined some important changes within the illegal market:

a) decreased availability and higher prices of marijuana;

b) increased availability at lower prices of cocaine;

c) stabilized availability and prices for heroin.

(see: NIDA: "Community Epidemiology Work Group - June 1988" USDHHS, p. 1-4)

It seems that the tightening up of the repression induced the market to discard the less profitable goods, achieving what in a legal context would be defined as a productive rationalization. This trend was reported in US by NIDA, referring to the fact that many marijuana dealers turned to the more profitable cocaine trade (see NIDA: "Community Epidemiology Work Group Proceedings", USDHHS 1986, p.I-12, II-86, II-99).

The tendency towards a productive rationalization has been shown also in other contexts. In Latin America, according to the latest UN Reports, cannabis eradication programs were successful in Brasil, Belize, Colombia, Panama (International Narcotic Control Board: "Report", Vienna 1988, parr. 112, 113, 120, 121, 127), but coca eradication has been a failure (cit., parr. 107, 108, 109, 110, 113). In Pakistan, "the trafficking of heroin to Europe was facilitated by [...]hashish smuggling organizations, a number of which switched to more lucrative drugs" (Whitaker, op.cit.,pp.322-323). In Belize, due to cannabis eradication programs, former cannabis traffickers "are using their established supply routes to trans-ship cocaine" (International Narcotic Control Board: op. cit., par. 120). In Colombia "cocaine replaced marijuana as the country's main illegal export late in the 1970s and has drawn a lot more money in the country" ("The Economist", April 4th 1988,p.59)

This phenomenon may be explained by different kinds of considerations.

One may be that many people in the marijuana trade choose to deal in marijuana instead of hard drugs, being aware that their trade does not pose a particular threat to the users' health. This "moral" approach is likely to be discouraged, when society reacts with indiscriminate harsh repression.

On the other hand, a higher level of repression is more likely to strike the less experienced traders rather than the ones who are better organized , thus indirectly stimulating higher levels of criminality within the trading system (see: Reuter, op. cit.,pp. 59-60, Dorn - South: "A Land fit for Heroin" , Mc Millan, Houndmills 1987,p. 162); therefore, the marijuana traders could be induced either to give up or to resort to substances (like heroin and cocaine) which are bound to higher level of professional criminality.

Thedevelopment of the illegal market is influenced also by another factor, bound to the current drug policy.

In most countries, the law-enforcement systems are inadeguate for the implementation of drug laws. In Italy, the prisons are overcrowded and the justice system is becoming more and more overloaded. In US, the situation is not different. According to Mr. Poklemba, Coordinator of Criminal Justice in NY City, the drug pushers are often let out of prison because there is no room left (cit. by "Il Giornale", Dec. 8th 1988). Considering that in US one third of all federal prisoners are drug offenders, and that 2 out of 3 criminal drug cases in federal courts involve marijuana charges (US Department of Justice, cit. by K. Zeese:"No more drug war", on "The Nation Law Journal", Jul. 7,1986), there is enough evidence that the repression of marijuana crimes involves an important share of law-enforcement resources, which could be employed against hard drugs' trade. Strangely enough, the most radical supporters of the "war on drugs" strategy seem to ignore a basic warfare rule: when the "enemies" are two, one bullet

more on the first one means one bullet less on the second one.

The effects of law enforcement on the risk-benefit balance also have implications for drug-users.

With respect to marijuana, the penalties for possession are generally equal to those for hard drugs. But other behaviours strictly bound to use are severely punished: in Italy, growing even one single plant of cannabis is a crime punishable with the same minimum penalty (two years jail) as selling heroin.

Moreover, the likelyhood of being arrested is higher for cannabis users because of the physical properties of the substance: as we have seen, hard drugs are easier to hide and to get rid of.

The biggest advantage for hard drugs users comes with the urine- test: heroin and cocaine are detectable up to three days after the last intake, whereas cannabis can be detected after one month or longer.

Therefore, in terms of vulnerability to law enforcement, cannabis use is altogether more risky than hard drugs' use.

In fact, the evolution of the market in US coincided with an analogous evolution in the drug use trend. Official data prove that during the 1980s there was

(a) an increase of IV drug use, in spite of the recent escalating HIV threat: 1,3 millions of IV users at the beginning of 1988, according to the President Commission on AIDS (see "US Journal of drug and alcohol dependence", March 1988)

(b) a decrease of cannabis use;

(c) a sharp increase of heroin and cocaine deaths: heroin related deaths rose from 492 in 1980 up to 1385 in 1987, cocaine related deaths from 166 in 1980 up to 1494 in 1987 in the Drug Abuse Warning Network (see: NIDA: "Statistical Series - Annual data 1987" "Statistical Series - DAWN 1976 -1985", "NIDA Capsules", August 1988)

The risk-benefit balance for use and trade of marijuana vs hard drugs is summarized in table 1

On the basis of these considerations, we can tentatively build up a scenario for the future evolution of the drug phenomenon.

In some way, the aforementioned productive rationalization is connected with a tendency of the illegal market to move towards more pharmacologically concentrated substances; a tendency which can be itself part of a more generalized trend away from natural towards synthetic drugs.

This trend has already been realized in some producing countries, where people traditionally took coca leaves or crude opium for centuries. In these countries the drug policy imposed by the Single Convention has brought about the disappearance of the natural products and the diffusion of their chemically refined derivatives (morphine, heroin, cocaine). According to Bruun et al, the replacement of opium by heroin use in several countries has been one of the historical failures of the drug control strategy (see: Bruun K., Pan L., Rexed I.:"The Gentlemen's Club - International Control of Drugs and Alcohol" - The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London, 1975, p.275).

In Pakistan heroin addiction was unknown until 1979, when opium was banned by the Zia Government; now it affects at least 300.000 and probably one million people (see: Whitaker, op.cit.,p.322 and Council of Europe, Parliamentary Hearings, Paris, Jan.11-12 1988). The same phenomenon was reported in Hong Kong after the opium ban in 1945 (see Whitaker, op.cit.,p.68), in Laos after the opium ban in 1971 (op.cit.,p.66), and in Thailand (see: International Narcotic Control Board: "Report", Vienna, 1987,par.45). More recently, escalation of heroin abuse was reported in India after the 1985 new law (see: International Narcotic Control Board: "Report", Vienna 1988,par.49)

The trend towards synthetic drugs appears to be proved by the recent data from International Narcotic Control Board.

According to the 1988 Report, methaqualone is now produced and abused in India and in Africa (see: op.cit.,parr.49 148), stimulants and depressant are trafficked from Europe to the Middle East (par.54), barbiturates are widespread in Pakistan, where they are also mixed with heroin (par.60), and in West Africa (par.149), and a large-scale amphetamine traffic is reported in Cote d'Ivoire (par. 150).

Most significantlly, the INCB reports that

"Large supplies and declining prices of illicitly manufactured amphetamines in the Federal Republic of Germany, the UK and the Scandinavian countries have contributed to the slower spread of cocaine abuse in those countries" (par.78).

A similar trend was reported in US by a NIDA research:

"Various indicator data and other sources suggest that abuse of metamphetamine from clandestine labs has been increasing during recent years. [...] Just as cocaine was introduced [...] in the 1970's before its expansion in the later half of that decade and in the 1980's, [...] metamphetamine looms as a potential national drug crisis for the 1990's"

(J.N.Hall, R.S.Uchman, R.Dominguez: "Trends and patterns of Metamphetamine Abuse in the US - September 1988" NIDA order No 88MO31054801D, p.1)