Preliminary Document for the Federal Council

Lorenzo Strik-Lievers

Olivier Dupuis

This document was drawn up on the basis of a debate in which Sandro Ottoni and Antonio Stango participated.

The specific character of the Radical Party: its concern with

the transnational aspects of problems.

Prerequisite to any analysis of the political prospectives of

the Radical Party in Central and Eastern Europe is a clear

structural distinction between what the Party's position as a

transnational party must be and those forces which, also the East,

struggle for democratic reform in a prevalently national context.

It would be totally unrealistic to imagine a Radical Party

operating alongside, and in some ways in competition with, the

various national political forces working for democratic reform in

Poland rather than Hungary : thus, anyone imagining a similar role

for the Radical Party must be prepared for disappointment and

defeat.

To the contrary, a transnational political force can have an

important role in the process of democratic reform in the Communist

world if it succeeds in remaining rigorously true its specific

vocation. In fact, it is not possible not to take into account

what is one of the central characteristics of the process of

democratic reform; that is, that it is not only a national process,

but in large measure transnational, because:

1. the connections of interdependence between democratic

developments in Hungary and Poland and those in the Soviet Union

are decisive, in a context determined by the fact that Central and

Eastern Europe are part of an empire, the capital of which is

Moscow;

2. considering the extent to which economic aspects affect

democratic reform, it is impossible to disregard the elementary

consideration that there are no margins for autonomously resolving

the economic problems of the single countries, and consequently the

solution must be found exclusively in the international context;

3. the importance of evaluating the extent to which the destiny of

democratic reform is inextricably bound to an increasing atmosphere

of tension and national or ethnic conflict in so many areas of the

Communist world, and consequently, to both European and world

security.

These generally are the problem areas which the various

national democratic forces--given their nature--are least able to

confront. And this constitutes one of the most obvious points of

weakness and some of the difficulties faced by the democratic

process as a whole. They are also precisely the areas which a

transnational democratic political force would handle well--we

might even say its raison d'etre. It is even more valid as regards

the Radical Party which, presenting itself as a transnational force

operating exclusively neither in the West nor in the East, and thus

intervening as a Federalist body in that decisive terrain which is

East-West interdependence in economic relations and security.

The Paris Summit. An Important Step towards Transnational

Policy.

It is precisely from this point of view that the Paris Summit

of the world's seven most industrialized countries modified

profoundly the terms in which the Radical action in East Europe is

presented.

Until now, most obvious were the specific national

characteristics of each process of democratic reform. In other

words, in Hungary and in Poland, that process was seen first of all

as an internal event. Thus, it was not always easy to communicate

the determinant and decisive transnational value. For many, and

perhaps even within the Radical Party itself, the urgency of

current events might have seemed otherwise, connected to the

various spheres of internal and national politics. Party actions,

however, cannot but be directed at encouraging and Western aid for

democratic reform, at democratic union of East and West in a

European Federalist context, and the support of transnational

coordination of the democratic struggles going on in the various

countries.

President Bush's voyage followed by the Paris Summit, changed

the situation. The international and transnational importance of

democratic reform in the East was brought suddenly to the attention

of public opinion in both the East and the West. In addition to

this, we must admit, it was thanks only to the actions of the

American President, that a role of coordinator was given the

European Community of international support for democratic reform.

This signifies, among other things, recognition of the Community

as an important political force.

It is obvious that this change in prospective is an enormously

important one. Until then, there had been no indication in the

West of any real awareness of just how much the success or failure

of democratic reform in the East depended on a series of actions,

on the West's involvement, or of what enormous importance one or

the other result could have for the West itself. American and

European actions were few and far between. European concern as to

democratic reform in the East, was negligible. Data, although

positive, on establishing relations between the EEC and COMECOM,

and between the EEC and Hungary and Poland, seemed in themselves

marginal, also due to the fact that there were extremely limited

as regards any substantial practical effects. There were a variety

of national, State and private actions which, however, due to their

overall dimension and fragmented character, did not lead to any

policy. not even constituting action which would be consonant with

the requirements and the responsibility of any significant Western

European presence. In this context. particularly relevant was the

position taken by West Germany, which advanced development not as

a European policy, but still in the German national context of the

traditional Ostpolitik, which is totally useless as am incentive

to democratic reform.

The importance of the Paris decisions is that they represent

a real assuming of political responsibility on the part of the West

as a whole, and consequently constitute an initiative of organic

political value, actually proposing to use of the "economic weapon"

to advance the cause of democracy. It is important that, in THIS

context, Europe must exist politically, and that the Commission in

Brussels assign European Community the task of coordinating Western

democratic initiatives. In terms of method, this is surely an

acquisition of great importance. In some ways, that approach can

be seen as a first step in the direction of a collective assuming

of responsibility in the context of "governing" the great

transnational questions. It is also a step towards overcoming at

the onset that conception of using non-interference as a cover-up

for complicity with any number of dictatorships.

We might add that eliminating the practice of non-intervention

was not done through any use of pressure which would violate or

compromise the independence of the nations concerned. Western

intervention was presented as support for decisions autonomously

assumed. And it was precisely for this reason that it ended up by

objectively determining--not with threat or blackmail--a strong

pressure in destabilizing the Eastern European regimes, and

completely extraneously to any instance of democratic reform.

Thus, if it is true that as regards North-South relationships

or macro-environmental matters, the Paris Summit was limited to

making to general affirmations, without translating them into

political commitment, it is also true that the definition of the

method adopted for democratic transition in the Communist

countries, is one which could make it possible to finally approach

the environmental issues and relations with the Third World in an

effectively, based on the principle of the priority of human

rights. However, it would also be impossible not to acknowledge

the great significance of Gorbaciov's letter to the Seven, which

revealed the USSR's total involvement in this common assuming of

responsibility.

A Radical "Triumph". Has the Radical Party been made Obsolete?

We could say--in a certain sense--then that we are witnessing

the "triumph" of those principles upon which the Radical Party has

for some time based its policy, such the duty to intervene, the

connection between economic relations and the protection of human

rights, and--of course--the necessity of responsible political

action at the transnational level. And we can also say that it

responds--even if in largely approximate terms--to the Radical

position, and the fact that Europe begins to exist in terms of

political initiative only as an active entity in an international

initiative aimed at supporting and promoting the spread of

democracy beyond the Community's borders.

These observations could result in two opposite

interpretations of the role today awaiting a force proposing the

objectives of the transnational Radical Party.

In fact, it might be said that very little space remains at

this point for a small movement like the Radical Party, since the

substance of its political proposals on relations with Eastern

Europe have been adopted by leading world forces, and since the

pace and dimensions of the reforms in proces in the Eastern

European countries would appear to have considerably supplant any

possibilities of action of the presence of an organization such as

the Radical Party.

However, the opposite conclusion is that precisely the

defining of the context drafted by the Paris Summit, creates the

necessity for developing an important and substantial transnational

political initiative in the interests of democracy and rights.

This beginning with the limits, obvious and considerable, imposed

by the decisions taken by the Seven, and the absolute necessity

that the positive aspects of those decisions be defended, sustained

and developed on a large scale, and not remain blocked on the level

of diplomatic-intergovernmental agreement.

It is in this area, and its capacity to meet these needs, that

the existence of the transnational Radical Party depends.

Obviously, if in this new situation, the Radical Party does

not succeed in going beyond merely affirming its own transnational

character, it will inevitably find itself relegated to the fringes

and swept away by events. The problem of the Radical party is that

of becoming--thanks to an adequate political position and relevant

proposals--the nucleus of promoting a new type of broad political

movement mobilizing and organizing public opinion in the various

countries. In fact, it is essential that a foundation of authentic

political force be given the positive innovations which have been

defined, but which--it would be well to keep in mind--are bound up

with a contingent situation and agreements between governments

which could be invalidated at any time. Thus, an instrument for

political action must be created capable of transforming the

acquisitions defined by the Summit agreements into institutions,

positive democratic transnational and sovranational law.

A Proposal: The Radical Party promotes a trans-parliamentary force

operating between East and West.

The passage which today could perhaps furnish the Radical

party with the key to action in this sense, is in our opinion the

attempt--which is within our capacity--to create within the Radical

Party, or as a result of its initiative, a structure in which

members of Eastern and Western parliaments, belonging to various

parliaments and parties, can meet and coordinate in order to

promote together, each in his national seat, common actions in

support of the process of democratic reform. A similar proposal

evolved from the observation that one of the new aspects of the

Soviet, Hungarian and Polish situations is the role which

parliamentary institutions have assumed in those countries (they

have become the seats where confrontations between the various

political forces are played out) and the awareness that, the

Radical Party, by being present in various Western parliaments--no

longer as a national party but as a transnational and transparty

party already having among its members, members of parliaments

belonging to various national parties and various nationalities--

is in a position to create a similar trans-European and trans-

parliamentary instrument, which could place the urgent matters of

mutual interest for democracy in both West and East Europe in the

order of the day of the parliaments, in "real time".

It is obvious what the value of a similar situation could be

for the objectives we mentioned above. It would provide a precious

instrument to feed a common determination, both democratic and

European, which went beyond the ancient borders of the blocks,

stimulating and controlling the carrying out of the measures set

down by the Summit of the Seven, as well as proposing and passing

others in an ordered and organized way.

Nor should we undervalue the value which a similar center for

coordination would assume in the East for members of the Hungarian,

Polish, Soviet and Yugoslav parliaments belonging both to the

independent movements as well as to the various Communist parties.

It would also provide a setting in which projects for transnational

actions of common interest could be realized, with the possibility

of corresponding with initiatives of the Western parliaments as

well.

On their part, Western members of parliament, imbued with the

Federalist spirit, would draw strength, arguments and credibility

from the stimulus reaching them from the parliaments of Central and

Eastern Europe, to launch once more a campaign for that

construction of a politically united Europe which is today

substantially far from the thoughts of the European political

classes. We might also mention that, in this context, a

considerably strong incentive would be derived from the results of

the Paris Summit. By assigning an important political role to the

Community's institutions, the Summit provided a very strong

argument in favour of the democratic reform of the institutions

themselves, consequently questioning the present set-up of the

Community.

On another level, it should be considered that if the Radical

Party should succeed in creating that political structure, the

result would be any number of opportunities for aggregation and

commitment of Radical activists in Central and Eastern Europe.

European Federalism changes Direction.

This action would also result in the Radical Party's becoming

more completely and organically that Federalist political body

which it intends to create and develop, because that action would

transform into political reality what is today the new image of

European Federalism.

In fact, we must be clearly aware that the deep changes taking

place in the Communist world, and consequently in the world in

general, have resulted in a radical change in the Federalist

prospective. Today, it is for the first time possible to salvage,

although in very new terms, an essential part of Federalism's

original message as it was proposed in the "Ventotene Manifesto"

of Spinelli and Rossi. The European Federation which it advocated

in 1943 was meant to include the entire continent and was conceived

primarily as an instrument for preventing forever the reappearance

of the spectre of war. Subsequently, once the iron curtain went

up, European Federalism was conceived--and it could not have been

otherwise-as existing only within the sphere of the Western Block.

Today, the new hope of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

permit, or rather oblige, a return to the Federalist plan which

included all of Europe, and not only Europe--as we Radicals have

for so long sustained.

It is in this context--and it becomes more and more evident

with the passing not of years but of months, even days--that the

Radical Party must develop in the direction indicated first by

Yugoslavia's and, more recently, by Hungary's joining the European

Community.

Ten years ago, when the Radical proposal was formulated for

the first time to admit Yugoslavia to the European Community, its

importance was prevalently the questioning of the illusion of non-

alignment as national independence. The extension, a year ago, of

the discourse to include Hungary resulted in the necessity of

Western Europe's taking a real position of support of that nation's

new democratic aspirations. Today, it is possible--and necessary-

-to place those same proposals, or any that might concern Poland,

in the context of a broader and more inclusive evaluation and

political programme.

Do not destabilize Moscow: Federalist Proposals in this Context.

The political design cannot but be that of the most effective

intervention in support of democratic developments throughout the

entire Soviet Empire. And all European Federalist proposals should

be based on the evaluation of this overall context. Since,

obviously, in this context, vastly different proposals are

possible, to the extent that the opposite result could be produced.

It is generally known that, in the long run, the most

important party and also the most difficult one, will be the one

within the Soviet Union. A day does not pass that we do not

receive news from that country confirming how difficult the

struggle is, and how dramatically uncertain its outcome. The

danger, which could sweep away all hope for democratic reform, is

to all appearances, that the accumulation of economic difficulties,

the incapacity to resolve them, and the flaring up of national and

ethnic conflict, could plunge the country into a state of chaos.

In that case, there would be the very strong temptation to restore

the old order, or in any case, an authoritarian regime, perhaps

with a direct or indirect assuming of power by the military.

And here, the paradox is that it is essential that the real

revolution last, that it completes its evolution, which must

inevitably include democratic reform. Consequently, it is

essential that the stability--albeit a "dynamic stability"--of the

present regime be preserved. One might say that that process,

although substantially revolutionary, can proceed only and as long

as it remains on a rigorously reformist and gradualist track.

In conclusion, the situation has totally been turned around

since Brezhnev's time when--rightly so--we Radicals sustained that

the first objective was that of destabilizing Soviet power through

non-violent action, utilizing the arm of information. That

fundamental observation must remain the basis of our approach to

the East. (This takes nothing away, naturally, from the validity

of destabilization as objective and method as regards the Communist

regimes which have remained insensitive to the process of

democratic reform, or which have fallen victim to the degeneration

of totalitarianism (for example, Romania), although using the new

terms and the new instruments indicated by the new situation in the

Communists world.

What must at all costs be avoided is advancing European

Federalists proposals to any of the Communist countries in such a

way as to constitute possible elements of destabilization for

Moscow. In this sense, proposals--such as those advanced by

certain sectors of the American Congress--attempting to change the

strategic balance between the two Blocks, with particular reference

to the area of security, are detrimental to the Soviet Union and

are to be considered negative. And, surely, that attitude is an

example of irresponsible gameplaying precisely because of its

seriously destabilizing effect on the Soviet Union.

However, the Summit of the Seven, appeared to be fully aware

of this problem, in assigning a role of "factor Europe" as regards

developments within the Communist Block.

Should the Federalist Proposal be addressed also to the USSR?

Considering this possibility obviously does not imply putting

aside or shelving the European Federalist proposals addressed to

Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. Rather, it is a question of

taking stock--also in defining the most effective ways to ensure

support for democratic reform in those countries--with considerable

factors of interdependence between the various democratic processes

in progress in the Communist world, which in some ways could be

referred to as different aspects of a single overall political-

social phenomenon undoubtedly having very different

characteristics, natures and origins. It could be debated, and it

often is, as to whether and in what measure, the choices decisive

for Poland and Hungary are determined also in Moscow, that is in

the capital of that empire of which those countries continue to be

a part. It might be true then that democratic reform in Budapest

and in Warsaw are thus advanced, and conversely the USSR is so

little able to take charge of the problems of the other countries-

-naturally, provided that those countries' membership in the Soviet

Block is not placed in question--that an eventual restoration in

the USSR would not result in the defeat of the democratic reforms

in Hungary and Poland. But the opposite is also possible; that is,

hypothetically, that a catastrophe in Moscow would necessarily

result in the suffocation of the democratic experiment also in

other areas of the Empire.

In any case, even if internal events in Poland and Hungary

could condition, either negative or positively, those in the Soviet

Union, it remains of vital interest, also for the defense of

democratic hopes in those two countries and eventually other

Eastern European countries, that the difficulties in the transition

to democracy in the USSR not be increase, but instead lessened.

Any Federalist initiative must be conceived taking into

account this overall view. Their value must be that of providing

opportunities and occasions for Eastern Europe to grow.

Thus, far from labelling the Federalist proposals addressed

to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, as anti-Soviet, it should be

made more clear the notion that the proposal is addressed to every

Communist European country which becomes democratic; that is, that

proposal is not in function of a concept of power blocks but of a

criteria of democracy and respect for the state of rights. It

should be said that this Federalist proposal cannot not be

addressed to a Soviet Union which, advancing radically along the

road it has taken, would truly and concretely be capable of

assuming for itself the image of a democratic State of rights.

The difficulties are evident simply evoking a similar

prospective. It is enough to consider the problems which

integration--even very limited--with a superpower would cause, for

the weak and rich Western European states; and with a superpower

which has historically been their adversary, having had history,

traditions and an economic and social system so removed and so

different than those of the Western countries. And that is not to

mention the overwhelming questions which could be posed as to

relations between Western Europe and the United States, relations

which--we must not forget it even for an instant--provided the

foundation upon which democracy in Western Europe was able to rise

again and develop after the Second World War and which represent

one of the vital supports for world equilibrium.

Certainly, the new directions--which also on this level

emerged from the Paris Summit--America's willingness to recognize

Europe's own role in a context which is however neither Europe

versus U.S.A. nor American withdrawal from Europe, are important

elements which should be analyzed. And what were the factors--also

related to internal politics or the difficulties being experienced

by the American economy--which led the United States to take this

position.

A New Way to Supercede the Power Blocks. Supporting Democratic

Reform as Security Policy.

One result of this position is the necessity--which the

Radical Party must meet--is a complete rethinking of the Atlantic

Treaty. And thus, we must go back and examine the original reasons

for western solidarity, and what was not by chance once called the

"free world": a solidarity which evolved not so much as "anti-

Russian", as hostility towards Russian power as such, but as a

result of anti-totalitarianism, in defense of the free and

democratic states against the threat of expanding of totalitarian

Communism. Certainly, from the beginning, to these reasons were

added those of the logic of the power of the United States of

America and its allies--which over the decades became widely

prevalent. However, the new world situation of today has made it

realistic as well as necessary to return to that original position.

And once more, the results of the Summit of the Seven seem to

indicate an openness, or at least less resistance, to making

significant steps in this direction

In this context, it is possible and necessary to propose in

drastically new terms the matter of replacing the power block

system. Those new terms are no longer those of a pacifism willing

to neglect and ignore the vital exigencies of defending liberty and

democracy, but begin precisely with those exigencies. Thus, one

might propose a progressive elimination of opposing military blocks

dependent upon the fall of totalitarianism and its threat, in real

terms, in such a way as to offer serious guarantees. Then, at the

same time, the construction on other foundations of a new

international order. And, we could even say that just having the

strength to propose a similar line of action constitutes a strong

element of pressure for stimulating and supporting of democratic

reform processes.

Clearly, it is a question of conceiving and defining a

different policy for security. However, how is it possible for

this not to imply--within the framework indicated here--that

supporting the processes of democratic reform in the East would

become an integral part of a policy of security for the West? In

this sense, it might be more to the point to measure the extent of

Western commitment in supporting those processes economically as

well in relation to that economic commitment which the West itself

makes to its own defense; and there is also a problem of financial

and economic compatibility between the willingness of the West and

the resources which it would be necessary to destine to the East.

The question might also be posed as to whether it is really a wise

or far-sighted--precisely in terms of security--to utilize to these

ends appropriations presently destined to the military budget. (It

is interesting to note that it is precisely in this area that the

West is called upon to meet the continued disarmament initiatives

of Gorbaciov.)

From this essential observation, it becomes evident that since

it is the economic sphere which will be decisive as to whether

democratic reform will succeed or fail, the real measure of the

quality and credibility of Western commitment in supporting

democratic reform in the Communist world, will be the quantity and

type of economic effort which will be the realization of the

promises until now generic of the Summit of the Seven, as well as

the capacity of the West to integrate it into a Federalist

prospective through a progressive construction of institutional

factors of sovranational law.

A Three-Level Europe: Rights and Freedom, Economic, and Political.

Based on the above, there are three distinct spheres of need,

which any Federalist proposal must satisfy. It must:

1. avoid causing strategic imbalances;

2. constitute a factor of real economic support;

3. function as an element of stimulus, consolidation and guarantee

for the democratic progress.

Thus, as such, simple proposals of membership in the European

Community can result inadequate, considering the nature of the EEC,

which is on the one hand merely an economic community and on the

other a structure within the Western block. It will probably be

necessary to begin a debate which would allow the definition of

multiple means of approaching and integration in order to adapt to

the various needs as well as provide a framework necessarily

articulated, both as to instruments as well as time, in which it would be possible to meet and resolve positively present

difficulties.

In this area, obviously, we can do no more than offer a few

observations.

If it is true that proposals for membership "tout-court" in

the EEC can raise the objections just mentioned--and it is only

with difficulty that we can today conceive of one being addressed

to the USSR--it is not the case as regards the idea of a European

Pact which would involve both the Western and the Eastern European

--even in limited numbers--having as its object not economic

matters, but the guaranteeing of citizens' rights and freedom and

eventually environmental questions; a Pact which would provide also

representative institutional organs with effective sovranational

powers of legislation and control, validity and effectiveness,

corresponding, in their various areas of competence, to those

attributed to the organs of the EEC.

On the other hand, there already exists an institutional seat,

which could be extended and reformed in order to make real progress

in this direction: the Council of Europe, an organization which,

we should remember, includes 23 countries, the most important

structure of which is the European Court of Human Rights. It is

most significant that the Council of Europe recently accepted as

"special guests" Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and even the USSR.

It is equally significant, in the context we have mentioned, that

Gorbaciov chose to address Western Europe there, indicating it as

a possible basis for the construction of what he called "the common

house of Europe". In another sense, a point of reference, an ideal

base upon which to create adequate sovranational institutional and

juridical institutions was offered by the Helsinki Agreements,

which as it is known, united, besides all the European countries

(with the exception of Albania), Canada and the United States of

America.

Obviously, alongside this new or renovated European

institution, the present EEC would remain, and the objectives for

its democratic reform remain valid. However, clearly, the

possibility is presently minimal for transforming the present EEC,

in its entirety, into a United States of Europe, with all the

renouncing of national sovereignty as to foreign, defense and

monetary policies that would imply. So, it is equally clear that

achieving that objective would be possible today only on the basis

of an agreement between one part only of the present member States.

In the same way, an ideal situation can be prefigured of the

simultaneous presence on the European stage of three different

levels of integration, each having a different range of

participation: economic (the present EEC); human rights and,

eventually, environment; and strictly political in the first

nucleus of the United States of Europe.

The existence of so organized a European framework, could in

itself result in eliminating some of the obstacles otherwise to be

expected in the present situation as regards the hypothesis of

membership in the EEC for the Eastern European countries. On the

one hand, in fact, its position as an organ within the West would

be lessened, and, on the other, beginning with the creation of a

"juridic Europe", a political dynamism would be created which would

remove from the process of European construction as a whole many

of its "block" aspects.

Conversely, a process of European integration with these

characteristics, would be open to the East and the USSR itself,

without implying in any way a breaking up of the solidarity between

the European and American democracies. In fact, precisely that

elasticity and variety on the institutional level would permit the

participation of either of them, the USA or other extra-European

democratic states. (Remember the meaning and the terms of the

Radical proposals on Israel's participation in the United States

of Europe, or think of the importance analogous proposals could

have in promoting democracy in Africa, or the significance they

could assume if addressed to the countries with democracies in

danger, such as Argentina.)

Thus, European construction could not go in the harmful

direction of the construction of a new national super-State (which,

on a different scale, happened in Germany during the last century),

but might instead be a first concrete step in the construction of

a new type of political-institutional atmosphere of democracy and

transnational and sovranational law.

The Radical Party as Interlocutor of the Soviet Communist Party.

To these themes and similar types of problems, it is difficult

for the Radical Party to avoid comparing its own political

challenges. And it must be said that a transnational Radical Party

which succeeded in becoming the porter of a Federalist policy--

naturally, beyond the validity of hypothesis of the solutions

mentioned here--could legitimately consider offering itself as

interlocutor, in the East, of the Communist Party in the USSR

itself which, through the voice of its first secretary, as we have

already mentioned, proposed the theme of the "common house of

Europe", and a juridical Europe.

In this sense, we could evaluate the hypothesis of the

secretary of the Radical party requesting permission to make an

official "party visit" to the USSR in order to establish relations-

-on the basis of this political prospective--with the Communist

Party of the USSR, in order to organize within the USSR a Radical

Party congress, or to request permission to promote in the USSR a

convention on the nationalities problem in the context of

democratic federalism. Alternatively, an initiative of this type

could be assumed by the trans-parliamentary structure described

above.

From this approach, in any case, the transnational party

derives a fundamental role of dialogue-meeting-debate with the

various forces operating in the Eastern countries, both within and

outside of the parties of the regimes. Equally, however, the

transnational party has an equally important position in the

political setup of Western Europe, within which it is indispensable

that a Federalist dynamic be created capable of meeting the

historical occasion which has opened in the East.

The German Question

On this question, it would be well to remember, a serious

obstacle which it would be impossible to avoid confronting is the

German question and the form which German politics tend to assume.

In fact, there is increasing evidence that in Germany there is

pressure to substantially change political priorities from a

European, or even Western, tendency to a specifically national one,

an increase in a nationalist point of view in the latest proposals

for the reunification of Germany, which has had its consequences,

in the role played by the Federal Republic in East Germany.

Certainly, it must still be decided whether the German assent to

the results of the Summit is a sign of the Federal Republic's

decision to assume leadership of positive European policy, or that

it is a cover-up for intentions of a very different sort. Thus, the

need is evident for obtaining a solid European (including Germany)

Federalist response to those renewed tendencies to search for

solutions on a national level.

The Tragedy of Ethnic and National Conflicts. The Danger of

Democracy's Failing.

This, on a broader scale, is one of the most dramatic aspects

of European life today. We are witnessing the return of the myriad

forms of ethnic and national priorities which--in an era when so

many ideologies seem to have failed--have been taken up again as

values in themselves. There has been a marked increase in

phenomena of a nationalist, racist, etc., tendency in the West;

but in the East--in the Soviet Empire and in Yugoslavia--there has

been a virtual explosion of national and ethnic conflicts.

It is generally agreed that this tendency can be mortally

dangerous, especially when combined with the results of the

terrible economic difficulties and, in the Soviet Union, could

swamp the process of democratic reform. And, as we know, there is

a similar situation in Yugoslavia. This danger becomes even more

acute when we consider that, for decades in the satellite countries

of the Soviet Union, the matter of national freedom had been

conceived of--and legitimately so--as being inextricably bound up

with liberation from totalitarianism.

It is inevitable and necessary that this problem be taken up

as a central theme by a transnational force such as the Radical

Party, which was destined to be the recipient of that

responsibility and burden if it intended to remain true to its

image and ideals. It must pit itself with all its available forces

to resolve this disastrous state of affairs, and attempt to provide

a solution in terms of democratic Federalism.

It is difficult in the present state to imagine how a force

like the Radical Party will manage to intervene effectively on that

terrain. However, a step in that direction might be made with the

organization of a congress on the subject of nationalities

mentioned above, during which solutions would have to be found

which went beyond the simple affirmation of the principle of the

state of rights. A preliminary reflection not without value could

be made on the substantial difference between the two types of

national and ethnic conflict. The first is characterized by the

opposition being conceived of as a state or imperial centralism and

a demand for autonomy or independence by an ethnically and

culturally compact population, and the second evolving from a

contraposition of different peoples cohabiting the same territory.

It would be absurd and presumptuous to propose solutions here.

What we could say, however, is that any study or reflection on the

subject would have to be in the direction of becoming aware of that

radical difference. And it is precisely at that point that the

first points of references can be represented on the one hand by

conclusions arrived at by Radicals on the structural inadequacy of

the dimensions of independence and national states, and on the

other, by the principle-guide which demands the achieving of two

different types of autonomy and Federal relation, one of a

regional-territorial type and the other based on the right of the

individual to have his own ethnic-linguistic-religious identity

protected, apart from territorial aspects.

Radical Nonviolence against the Roumanian Gulag.

What has been said up until now obviously does not diminish

the importance and urgency, for the transnational party of

democracy and right, of the challenge represented by the

persistence in Europe of Communist regimes which refuse any

democratic opening, or even worse, recent events in Bulgaria and

Roumania.

As we have already said, for these countries the road to

democratic reform must pass through the destabilization of existing

power balances. However, also in this context, the premise for any

reasoning must necessarily be an evaluation of the completely new

terms with which the question must be posed, resulting from the

general transformation in progress in the Communist world.

It is only too clear that the major factor of destabilization

in those countries is the progress of democratic reform in the

state of rights in the USSR, as well as in Poland and Hungary. And

the more success that democratic reform has on all levels, the more

it appears to be the key to remedying the backwardness in those

countries. In this context as well, the importance of an effective

Western support for democratic reform should be kept in mind: think

of the impact on Roumanian society, gripped as it is by poverty as

well as political oppression and literally dying of hunger, the

notion that this help is truly operative and effective would have.

In the Roumanian situation, which is tragically emblematic,

it is strikingly clear how important Radical nonviolent action

might be, due to its inherent utility, as well as the significant

connotations it might also have in the Communist countries already

experiencing democratic reform. The problem which must be solved

in attempting to conceive these processes in the most effective and

productive manner possible, is placing them in that context. In

other words, it is a question creating and conducting in such a way

as to create an instrument which, in East-West relations and

relations between different Communist countries, would help

destabilize the processes in progress in Roumanian society, or at

least render it politically even more costly, on the international

level, for the regime to maintain its present line of action.

July 17, 1989

PROPOSALS ON THE INITIATIVE OF THE RADICAL PARTY FOR EAST EUROPE

The proposals listed here with brief explanations have been made

by various colleagues (R. Cicciomessere, L. Strik-Lievers, A.

Stango, P. Pietrosanti, M. Lensi, M. Busdachin). It is possible-

-and we apologize for this--that in attempting to be brief

simplifications or inexact approximations were made. Corrections

and specifications, as well as other proposals are obviously

welcome. We might also say that these proposals should be read

keeping in mind another document (drawn up by Lorenzo Strik-Lievers

and Olivier Dupuis) in which an attempt was made to explain how the

transnational Radical Party could operate within the general

situation in East Europe.

The many problems discovered in that document have led us to come

to a single conclusion: every choice to act on the part of the

Radical Party in that sphere will require thorough reflection on

the theme. Reflection is obviously inseparable from an more

general analysis of the Party's situation (with particular

attention to the financial aspects).

Sandro Ottoni

Olivier Dupuis

Proposals

1. ROUMANIA

a--The launching in Italy, and other countries (after the

initiative was launched in recent months in Belgium and France by

the International League for Human Rights) of "Operation Village":

a campaign to "adopt", by means of a twinship unilaterally

proclaimed by cities throughout Europe, of Roumanian, Hungarian and

Saxon villages threatened with destruction by the Ceaucescu regime.

b--A campaign for the liberation of political prisoners, the

obtaining of information on the "desaparecidos" and human treatment

of prisoners.

c--A visit of Radical Party exponents, including some members of

Parliament, to Roumanian activists under house arrest. Colloquia

with them also on the possibility of developing a Radical Party in

Roumania.

d--The distribution in Roumania of material in the language of that

country on the violation of human rights and on the Radical Party.

e--The presentation in all the parliaments of the European

Community, as well as in the European Parliament, of motions on

Roumania.

f--Pressure on all the governments of the other 34 countries having

signed the Helsinki Agreement (N.A.T.O, the Warsaw Pact, neutral

countries) to condemn Roumania more explicitly officially following

the Congress of Helsinki and in bilateral relations. The

organizing of meetings of delegations of exponents of the Radical

Party, accompanied by Roumanians with diplomatic representatives.

g--Other nonviolent action, to be specified later.

2. THE IRON CURTAIN

A--March against the power block system. March along the Iron

Curtain for the elimination of the block system and the destruction

of the Wall.

3. RESTRUCTURING OF THE OLD CONTINENT

a--Information Campaign on Adhesion/Association/Integration of

Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland to the Community (to be modified

according to the general content of the campaign).

b--Manifesto/Appeal for the United States of Europe. To be signed

by a reasonable number (500?) of prominent Hungarians, Yugoslavs,

Soviets and Poles, and to be addressed to the European Parliament

and the various national parliaments. The content of the text will

obviously depend on the nature of the campaign itself.

c--Manifesto/Appeal for membership of Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Request the Hungarian and Yugoslav governments to make the first

steps towards gradual membership in the EEC, therein included the

denunciation for the postponement until after 1992 of the

consideration for membership. (In some ways referable to the

preceding).

d--Campaign to denounce the blocking of memberships on the part of

the EEC.

Procedure to be specified.

e--Mega-Congress on "The Democratic Reform of the East and the

Reconstruction of the Old Continent.

Congress of the same type as the Antiprohibitionist Congress in

Brussels, for conceiving a European strategy (Community or not) to

support the processes of democratic reform and proposals for

European integration. It should unite prominent figures and

experts (jurists, constitutionalists, economists)...) from the

various Eastern and Western European countries. The Congress

should be arranged in order to make it an occasion for all the

reformers of the different Easter countries to meet.

f--March from the Baltic to the Black Sea !!!

March for European integration, according to the "principle" of the

Party's East European Campaign. In any case, its "objective"

should be bringing about a taking of positions of the guest

countries.

g--EEC Amendment.

Lobbying in favour of the introduction of amendments to the

Constitution to define the new types of privileged relations

(status of "observer", "associated", "confederated" states,...)

with Western Europe and its various seats of integration.

h--Campaign against the Europe of 1992.

Clear denunciation of the EEC as it is developing at present and,

at the same time, a campaign for the creation of the Unites States

of Europe with the states in agreement.

i--Transparliamentary Association.

Creation of a Radical or "para-Radical" association including

members of Eastern and Western European parliaments to act as a

"Democratic European Federalist Lobby" within the various East and

West European parliaments.

j--European integration: institutional prospectives.

Analyze whether and in what way the existing European institutions

can be utilized (European Council, "Helsinki Agreements", European

Community,...), and in what way it is possible to create others,

in the interests of the integration of the entire continent.

4. THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES

a--Mega-Congress on the problem of nationalities.

Mega-Congress on the problem of nationalities, with prominent East

European figures (and in particular, representatives of the various

Soviet and Yugoslav republics) and the West.

It would perhaps be useful to include in the same congress the

themes, "Recomposition of the Continent", "European Integration"

and "Nationalities".

b--Emblematic Campaign.

Creation of a Radical Party campaign, based on a symbolic person

and a situation involving a particular grave violation of human

rights. In this context, obviously, it is possible to find

ourselves emersed in national events difficult to control.

c--Nonviolent Actions.

In Transylvania rather than in Armenia or Georgia. To be enlarged

upon.

3. ELECTIONS

Determine if and in what way our electoral presence can be favoured

in the Eastern countries (in particular, Slovenia and Hungary,

where the next elections will be this spring).

4. PARTY

Here it is also a matter of understanding how to bring about the

initiatives in the East, in terms of campaigns and memberships in

the West.

a--Series of Assemblies.

Organization of assemblies of Eastern colleagues in various

countries and cities in Eastern Europe. To be included in the

broader membership campaign.

b--Legal Status of a Transnational Organization.

Inclusion of the concept of transnational party in the legal order

of the Eastern countries (constitutions, laws...), by means of

contacts with official authorities, also in view of the

constitutional reforms foreseen in some of those countries.

c--Legalization of the Radical Party.

Legal Memorandum on the possibility of legalizing the transnational

Radical Party, the Radical associations and electoral lists.

d--Statute Expiry Terms.

Utilization of the statutory expiry terms or similar (Congress,

Federal Council, Secretariat, ...) in order to establish new

contacts or launch new initiatives (in Moscow rather than in

Budapest).

e--Meeting of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Radical

Party.

Attempt to establish a dialogue between the two parties on the

problems indicated above, also in the context of a possible

Congress.

f--Eastern European Assembly.

Series of assemblies to launch or relaunch various initiatives.

g--Seat in Budapest.

The opening of offices in Budapest for coordinating the various

initiatives. To be evaluated also and above all in relation to the general approach chosen.