ABSTRACT: Some exponents of the Communist Party judge the American presence in the Persian Gulf in a negative way. But in fact, the United States "deserve to be thanked, and not scolded" for having protected the interests of the entire international community. Nor should we forget the participation of Italian firms to the attempts to build the Iraqi atomic bomb, the L. 160 billion bribe paid for the supply of the Italian fleet to Iraq, the role of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (1) in the financing granted to the countries of the Gulf engaged in war. This is not the time to wash our hands of all this. The tragedy calls for a new planning of the North-South cooperation, the diversification of the supplies and the economy and rationalization of energy on the part of Italy.

(L'Unità, 21 August 1990)

Allow me a direct and rather brutal question: how come the Soviet Union judges the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf in a more positive way than many authoritative exponents of the Italian Communist Party? The assistant foreign officer of the Pcus, Gorbachev's envoy in the Middle East, Karen Butenz, stated in an interview published by this paper (17 August) that "the problem lies not in the presence or not of U.S. soldiers in the region; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia had a right pose the question of its own defence. The problem is the United Nations' initiative and the quest, until the very last moment, for a political solution of the crisis". A group of personalities who opposed the intervention in the Gulf has repeated that the U.S. "assume the function of policeman for the international community", and that they are "gearing for a violent solution". I can understand that the flood of superficial statements by De Michelis (2) can prompt bewilderment, that the patriotic role held by certain minor forces o

f the government in the military intervention can cause irritation. But the Italian political scene seems to be once again prey to the syndrome of Pilat, with a supplement of Left-wing anti-Americanism which I consider the most serious symptom of a die-hard ideology. This is why the policy based on "howevers" ("Saddam committed an unacceptable action, however...") is absurd. The reasons are that 1) it is difficult to maintain that the West and the U.S. particularly, after having totally misjudged Saddam Hussein's actual inclination toward the annexation of Kuwait, should have also ignored the dislocation of dozens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers at the borders with Saudi Arabia; 2) a multilateral armed presence under the flag of the United Nations represents an operation of enormous political as well as operative complexity, whose timing was manifestly incompatible with the need to prevent further facts committed in the Gulf and to ensure the effective respect of the embargo (a correspondent from Peking under

lined yesterday the great difficulty and reticence among Asian countries to enforce the embargo and accept the envoy of the UN multinational force); 3) a direct pressure was obviously necessary, because the use of the over 10.000 Westerners in Baghdad and Kuwait as hostages in Saddam's blackmailing game was clear from the first moment.

The United States therefore deserve to be thanked and not scolded, for having protected, in this circumstance, not only the major political and economic national interests, but also the general interests of the entire international community (including Italy). On the basis of such premises, we can formulate a couple of "howevers". The first is of a retrospective nature, given that the assumption of today's responsibility cannot cancel the precise

responsibilities of yesterday. I remember ten years ago I denounced the participation of Italian firms in attempts to build the Iraqi atomic bomb (on that occasion, the Israeli bombed the "Osirak" reactor in 1981 and the relative Italian-built "hot cells"). I remember the political and judicial action undertaken by the Radical Roberto Cicciomessere on the matter of the L. 160 billion bribe paid to arms and drug traffickers for the supply of the Italian fleet to Iraq; I remember I didn't succeed in taking a vote on a parliamentary motion whereby the government was asked to activate the UN procedures provided to condemn Iraq for the use of chemical weapons; I remember the initiative of the Green deputy Sergio Andrei concerning the role of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in the financing granted to the countries of the Gulf engaged in wars. Such episodes are not the demonstration of a "minority coherence", they are the demonstration of the incapacity of governments and ministers which have made wrong totally cho

ices in their attitude and behaviour vis-à-vis the Baghdad tyrant.

And if it is legitimate to clinically defend the protection given to Saddam Hussein during the war against Iran as a guaranty of the "stalemate" between the two contenders (with the advantage of the profitable business of those years and the small defect of one million victims, which we contributed to), no one can maintain that there was no evidence of the delirium of Saddam Hussein, the frenzy searcher of the atomic bomb and the criminal user of chemical weapons. Another limit should be set to the Italian initiative, to link it to two priorities: the prejudicial European cooperation (the release of the citizens of the European Community and the kidnapping of citizens belonging to other member countries is a major defeat for De Michelis), the operativeness in the UN context (accelerating the ascertainment of a multilateral military presence enabling the implementation of the embargo and a greater direct pressure in the Gulf, replacing the U.S. "block").

The absence of these conditions can in no case be the occasion for washing one's hands, even if it will be necessary to clearly define the characteristics of an Italian naval presence (which is purely decorative from a military point of view, compared to the eight ships already on the spot) and of the decisional responsibilities in the area of the conflict, in parallel with an enhancement of the dialogue with the Arab countries which are in a very difficult situation (whom Israel should offer a possibility of dialogue on the Palestinian issue). The tragedy of these days forces us to plan two fundamental aspects of Italian politics all over again and straight away: the North-South cooperation (so vital in this historical stage as marred by corruption and confusion), the diversification of the supplies and the economy and rationalization of energy.

Translator's notes

(1) Banca Nazionale del Lavoro: Major Italian public bank. Its Atlanta branch was involved in a scandal after it was discovered that it had granted consistent financing to Saddam Hussein.

(2) Gianni De Michelis (1940): Exponent of the Socialist Party. Currently Foreign Minister.