ABSTRACT: I will herewith try to elucidate the reasons for which I voted in favour of the use of the Italian military contingent in the Gulf to enforce resolution n.678, touching, while I'm at it, on a series of other problems.

1. Ten years of accusations against Iraq and the Italian government.

2. The Radicals' proposal to restore legality violated by Iraq.

3. The Radicals' vote after the beginning of the armed conflict.

4. Why I voted YES.

5. War or police action.

6. Non-violence and the conflict in the Gulf.

7. The Radical Party's Statute:...not to kill, not even out of legitimate defence.

(CONFERENCE RADICAL PARTY - Agorà - Text # 502)

1. Ten years of accusations against Iraq and the Italian government.

For ten years, we harassed the Italian governments with dozens of motions and interrogations, addresses in parliamentary debates which we provoked, press campaigns and lawsuits to warn it of the dangerous situation which was building up in Iraq, with the complicity and the short-sightedness of all the industrialized world. We were denouncing the Italian government, guilty of doing nothing to prevent Iraq's rearmament, to ban the exportation of arms, ammunition and technology for the production of chemical weapons toward the regime of Saddam Hussein, and this despite a specific embargo; we were denouncing the silence of the Italian government on the violation of the rights of the Iraqi and Kurdish populations; the latter has been literally exterminated precisely with the chemical technology provided by Italy. We had underlined the involvement of the Bank of Italy in the scandal of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in Atlanta. Barely two years ago, we pointed our finger once more at the complicity of the Italian

industries in the sale of "cluster" bombs to Iraq. During two legislatures, the Committee of Inquiry of the Italian Parliament discussed a denunciation I had presented against several ministers concerning bribes connected to the sale of an entire naval fleet to Iraq: L. 135 billion.

For years, ignored by all, we denounced the suicidal behaviour of the West, that considered it a bargain to trade the human rights of the Arabs, of the Somalians, of the Ethiopians, of the Kurds, for petrodollars or military orders.

When we denounced the millions of Arabs exterminated by the police forces or by the armies of Arab dictators, we were not supported by the mass demonstrations of the Communist Party, or by the protests of the pacifists. The "democrats" were too busy celebrating and supporting the Khomeini's revolution against the Shah.

Saddam Hussein, Siad Barre, Haile Marian Menghistu, Affez Assad, are all faithful pictures of the West in the Third World. For these dictators, who must first of all defend themselves from their own people, starving it, sending it to war, exterminating it, war is the prime condition to survive.

2. The Radicals' proposal to restore legality violated by Iraq.

The position of the members of Parliament and of the Senate of the European Federalist group on the Gulf crisis had been clearly stated in the two documents presented these days, quoted in texts n.3614 and 3634 of the RADICAL NEWS sector. The documents basically expressed the request to avoid using military force, despite the fact that this was a legitimate possibility according to international law (art.42 of the U.N. Statute), but to use non-military force to its maximum extent, namely to activate a major information offensive addressed to the Iraqi and Arab populations. The suggestion was not, therefore, simply that of prolonging the embargo, but to clearly aim at a rebellion on the part of the Iraqi population, of part of its leading class, against Saddam Hussein. Even if it had obtained important results as to the political and economic isolation of Iraq, the embargo could not have yielded this result, and the military presence of the U.S., which intervened on the request of the Arab countries to avoid

the operation started with the invasion of Iraq, could not last forever, in consideration also of religious occurrences.

Moreover, the documents requested government to announce the summons not of a peace conference on the Middle East, that is, dealing exclusively with the Palestinian problem, but of a "Conference on human rights and security in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East", that is, to tackle the real causes for the instability of this area, which is above all caused by a lack of democracy. The motions also requested precise commitments to reach an international treaty for the limitation and control of the arms trade.

Unfortunately, this was merely a proposal, the testimony of a position, because we still lack a transnational political means capable of transforming it into an option effectively present in the international political debate, organizing it through a struggle to be conducted in the squares and in the parliaments of the main countries of the world.

This was an entirely non-violent position, which meant to oppose the "pacifist" position, in that it unambiguously took sides against Saddam Hussein, in compliance with all the resolutions of the United Nations (n.678 requested to use all means to....and therefore not necessarily military force), and suggested to use force against this dictator. Force therefore, and not diplomatic means, as the "pacifists" were asking, means which proved completely ineffective. The diplomatic path, the "negotiation" which is being invoked in the streets today could have been pursued only at one condition: to give in on the question of the withdrawal from Kuwait, a hypothesis which Saddam Hussein would not even take into consideration, and therefore reward the dictator. I believe only the uninformed and those in bad faith can question this fact: all possible diplomatic means and even the attempts of "friends" of Saddam Hussein, like Arafat or King Hussein of Jordan, have been tried.

3. The Radicals' vote after the beginning of the armed conflict.

The central argument of our motion dropped altogether when the U.S., Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait decided to enforce resolution n. 678 of the United Nations Security Council with the use of military force. These countries, and especially the U.S., on the one hand judged that the embargo would not have had the desired effect, on the other hand considered that Hussein would not have engaged in a military conflict in which he would surely have lost. From a purely rational point of view I too believed, to the last moment, that in the end Saddam would have pulled out of Kuwait, avoiding a further tragedy for his people. But Saddam's values and mental responses are obviously different from mine.

Clearly, the Radical Party could not take a position on the vote through the address of its Secretary, but it certainly did so as far as the evaluation of the responsibilities of the West and of Iraq are concerned. The members of the Radical Party took different positions from the NO expressed by Bordon (PCI), Mattioli, Lanzinger and Andreani (Greens), Tessari, Corleone, Modugno (federalist groups of Parliament and Senate), from the abstention of Mellini and Strik Lievers (federalist groups) and the YES of Stanzani, Bonino, Zevi, Staller, Calderisi, Negri, Cicciomessere (federalist group).

The question raised by Roberto Giachetti concerning the statements of votes of dissent is extremely simple: because the regulations imposes a single statement per group, and given that this had been already used by Stanzani, it was necessary, in order to talk, to use the device of declaring oneself "in dissent with the group". This is what Emma Bonino did. But in fact, the group had not voted any position, leaving each member of Parliament (as usual) free to vote according to his own beliefs.

4. Why I voted YES.

If I had been a deputy of the U.S. Congress, I would have voted against the decision to use military force to enforce resolution n. 678. In that place and in that moment, it was possible, at least in theory, to impose the option of the use of non-military force through a vote. If the vote at the Italian Parliament had taken place before the beginning of the conflict, I would have voted the Radical motion and rejected the one presented by the majority. As a matter of fact, this was the orientation of the majority of Radical MPs on 16th January.

Unfortunately, when we were called to express our opinion, the decision to pass to the use of military force had already been taken. The question was to decide whether Italy should join the countries which were enforcing a resolution of the United Nations, in compliance with the international law, or if it was to break ranks.

I think it would have been very easy and "popular" toward the "radical" electorate to vote NO. My commitment, over four legislatures, against the military, political and economic support of Iraq on the part of the Italian government would have entitled me to tell the Italian government: "this is your own business", "you have sown the wind, now reap the whirlwind". In other words, I could have taken a snug, uncomprimising position, "neither adhering nor sabotaging". Unfortunately however, when there is a war one cannot be neutral. I believe history makes progresses only when people have the courage to take unpopular positions. Only then, on one side and on the other, are we forced to use intelligence, to overcome the laziness of commonplaces, to dismantle solid beliefs and take the paths of true dialogue.

In practice, I decided to vote in favour of the majority motion on the basis of a single question: what would I have done if I had had the entire responsibility of deciding Italy's position today, in this circumstance?

No doubt I would have necessarily chosen to take sides with those who use violence to uphold legality against those who use violence to violate legality. I would not have dismissed my responsibilities, given that Italy had approved, also with my consent, all the resolutions passed by the United Nations, from n.660 to 678.

I have taken upon myself the burden of governmental responsibility that belongs, in different proportions, both to the majority and to the opposition.

In other words, I would not have been in peace with myself if I had chosen to vote NO out of cowardice, opportunism and, even worse, out of electoral interest. This, on the other hand, is the feeling I detected in the eyes of so many communist MPs, who came out of Parliament without their usual self-assurance, their usual hostility toward all those who do not agree with them.

I am perfectly aware of the difficult contradictions between this vote and my non-violent beliefs, but as a lay person I don't believe the truth is necessarily the fruit of irremovable coherences and beliefs. In the same way, the Mahatma Gandhi was lay when, on the occasion of World War II, he experienced the tragedy of being non-violent and at the same time deeply convinced that he could not move a finger to prevent the Indians from fighting against Nazism.

And yet, he did not cease for this fact to profess or to practise non-violence.

Even if it is far removed from my intentions to compare myself to Gandhi, I will not cease professing and practising non-violence after the 17 January vote, to underline my anti-militarist positions, to state that war is always a crime against mankind, that the armies are all fascist, that the means must be adjusted to the goals, and that even the so-called "just wars" leave behind them not only the atrocity of innocent victims, but also the lethal conviction that war is a continuation of politics, that we will need to arm ourselves once more out of fear or with the alibi of other dictators like Saddam Hussein. But above all, I will not cease risking incoherence, if it is necessary, to win even a millimeter of hope to build a world in which no one will be forced to die to uphold justice.

5. War or police action.

In common language, the one that is being fought in the Gulf is war. But are we sure that this is the most suitable term, from a juridical point of view, to define today's events?

I understand It is hard to convince oneself that in compliance with the international law accepted by all the countries represented by the United Nations, including Iraq, the fact of unloading 18,000 tons of bombs each day should not be considered a war action but a police action. Even several radical companions, and first of all Mauro Mellini, seem to refuse this distinction, which may appear unacceptable at first sight. But things that seem obvious are always true.

One of the most important achievements of mankind has been that of transferring the legitimate use of weapons and the right to do justice to a superior power. The single individual is not allowed to use weapons against another person, to restore justice by himself, if not exceptionally out of self-defence. The right to self-defence has been entirely transferred to the State, to the police forces and the judicial bodies. From a juridical and semantic point of view, the consequences of this are obvious: if a citizens shoots and kills a burglar, he is committing homicide, and in people's opinion he is a murderer; if the police kill the burglar, this is not a crime, nor will anyone think the policeman is a murderer if he used weapons with extreme caution.

The second historical progress in this direction is that of transferring the typical prerogative of the national states, military defence, to a body of supranational and democratic law. The U.N.'s Statute explicitly provides for this, even if no State has to this moment delegated and transferred this prerogative of military self-defence entirely to the United Nations.

The Italian Constitution positively rules out the possibility of resorting to war, except in cases of self-defence, meaning by this a reaction to an armed aggression on its territory. In this case, the state of war must be declared by Parliament; in the same way Parliament must decide if Italy is compelled to intervene in an armed conflict on the basis of a military pact, NATO for example, to defend an allied country from a military aggression. If, on the other hand, the intervention is carried out following an order of the United Nations, under the banner of the United Nations, with national contingents assigned, according to article 45 of the United Nation's statute, to the Security Council, not only the declaration of the state of war is not compulsive, but not even a vote of authorization on the part of the Italian Parliament is requested. In the specific case of the Gulf, a deliberation on the part of Parliament was necessary (not the declaration of the state of war) both because there are still no Ital

ian contingents (and relative agreements) assigned to the United Nations, and because resolution n. 678 was optional and not binding.

In conclusion, when the United Nations undertake "any action necessary to maintain or restore peace and international security with air, naval and land forces", in compliance with art. 42 of its statute, the countries providing the military contingents are not acting on their own against another country, but are simply the armed arm of the United Nations. As it is obvious in this case, the United Nations are not conducting a war against another country, but are imposing the respect of the violated international law through military force.

Today, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, at least for that which concerns such a tragical conflict (I believe the only precedent is Korea), we are faced with the complete enforcement of art. 42 of the Statute. From a strictly formal point of view, the countries operating in the Gulf are doing in compliance with an order of the United Nations and as representatives of the latter. They are not, therefore, engaged in a war against Iraq.

By no means do these remarks mean to subdue the horror of the "war" under way. However, the aim of a non-violent person cannot just be that of discrediting and delegitimizing the United Nations because it uses the only means of force it knows, that is, military means, but of operating in such a way that these means may be replaced by other, more effective means of non-military force. The non-violent must therefore assume the burden of devising these means, and cannot mistake them with the common means of diplomatic initiative. Moreover, there are enormous problems concerning the incomplete democracy of the United Nations, the right to veto, the need for the political Europe to counterbalance the power of the U.S., but I don't think these aspects can change the fundamental issues at stake today. No more constructive are the remarks on the U.N.'s different behaviour toward past violations of legality. Those who use such arguments seem to forget that the cold war finished barely a year ago, and with it the patt

ern of crossed vetos of the two super-powers and the division of the world into areas of influence.

6. Non-violence and the conflict in the Gulf.

The aspiration of a democrat and a federalist, of a true pacifist, should be that of transferring all national prerogatives concerning defence and security to the United Nations, of enforcing the Statute in all its parts, of transforming the Security Council in a democratic sense, of abolishing war in other words, in the sense of a military conflict between national entities.

Is this the aspiration also of a non-violent?

Strictly speaking, political non-violence aims at replacing violence with legislative means. In an international context, the non-violent individual struggles so as to prevent the use of war and violence from becoming inevitable, including for the defence of legitimate interests such as national territory or democratic institutions. A non-violent's aim is not, therefore, peace at all costs. The aim of a non-violent person corresponds to the aims of a "democrat" (it is my conviction that a person cannot be democratic without also being non-violent!) for that which concerns the transfer of the powers of the use of weapons from the national state to a supranational body. The non-violent individual is aware of the fact that by abolishing the law of the jungle, the law of legitimate defence, replacing it with the right and the duty of the State to ensure the security of its citizens, the level of violence will drastically drop. Similarly, in the case of national security, he knows that if the United Nations were

really granted the full powers of an international police, strife among states would be considerably reduced. But the non-violent individual also struggles to reduce the need to resort to violence, especially in institutions. In other words, he wants to progressively convert the military weapons of the legitimate authority into non-violent weapons. Today, even if the first aim, that of transferring the prerogatives of defence and security of the State to a supranational body has been partially - but decisively, in that it represents a precedent - achieved, we still cannot say we see signs pointing to a conversion of war instruments.

My question is, however, what right we have to expect this conversion to be achieved, when political non-violence, expressed only by the Radical Party, is still widely ignored, at least on a international basis?

What can we possibly expect, when the only cultures represented by Western mass-media, with the images of war and of pacifist demonstrations, are on the one side the ones that charge the military power with the task of upholding the law, and on the other side the ones, doomed to failure, that would be willing to suppress legality, and the very life of millions of Iraqis and Arabs, exterminated for years by other Arabs, to safeguard their peace and wealth?

These questions are the very core of the Radical party's challenge: to organize a culture of non-violence - which is a culture of force, of intervention, not of weakness and resignation - in order to counter the only two cultures, the culture of the force of violence and the culture of the weakness of neutrality, which are depicted everyday by the televisions of the world, through the images of the tremendous military efficiency and of the protests, void of any concrete proposal, of the "pacifists".

7. The Radical Party's statute:...not to kill, not even out of self-defence.

I don't want to dodge the question, simply stating, as I did before, that to think that non-violence is a path void of contradictions, defeats and ambiguity is both wrong and deceptive. Those who claim an alleged coherence with their alleged non-violent dogmas give show of a catechistic furore which has nothing to do with the patient religion of dialogue, with the humble quest, even amid the horror of the war, for tiny signs that the hope for life and for legality are advancing, even if just by a millimeter.

Nor will I dodge the question recalling that we are talking about the premise to the statute, and not the statute itself; therefore the statement of a political resolve, of a political project, and not a discriminating condition to join the Radical Party.

It is unquestionable that non-violence, the Gandhian symbol, represent the characteristic feature of the Radical Party. Thus, no one can think that the military action in the Gulf, carried out in fulfilment of a U.N. mandate, even if it represents a legitimate expression of international law, can be praised as the expression and the achievement of non-violence. As I tried to state in the previous 6 points, the question is another. There is no need to quote the "premise" to realize this, to see the number of contradictions, hopefully fecund ones, that make up the life of a Radical, or of anyone venturing on the unknown paths of quest, of those who have left the snug and comforting certainties of ideologies, of those who, like me, have chosen the curse of war rather than accepting the defeat of resignation and complicity.

Those who really want to understand the Radical premise and not just use it to seek our contradictions (all laid out live!) must first of all set it in the concrete political conflict of our society and in the field of politics, and not mistake it for a revisitation of the fifth commandment.

The premise wants to underline that the Christian imperative that orders not to kill must become a political imperative, with no exceptions, not even when the reasons of legitimate defence are involved. Not even for legitimate defence must it be possible for a national state to use the instruments of war.

I have already stressed this point: even the principle of self-defensive war must be referred to a supranational right, and transferred, as an exclusive prerogative, to the United Nations.

The premise has a major and clear meaning: the Radicals that share the political goal and the method of political non-violence commit themselves to organizing themselves to uphold this principle. In how much time? We are talking about the times of political struggle and resolve, not about the times of imagination. No one, I hope, will think the Radicals are so conceited they believe the premise has become a law for the international community for the fact that it has been adopted in one of their congresses. After years of struggle to uphold it against mass extermination due to hunger, we have been forced to acknowledge that the organizational instrument, the Radical Party, is no longer sufficient. Nonetheless, we continued our struggle, and are trying to obtain a new, transnational political means, capable of engaging in the non-violent struggle in the greatest possible number of countries.

My question is: what has the premise of the Radical party's statute to do with the vote of 17th January? The aim of the premise was achieved neither during the night of 17th May nor when the first bombs hit Baghdad, nor the 2nd august, when Hussein thought he could invade Kuwait unpunished, nor when the international community ignored the request of the Nobel prizes, of the Radical party, for a priority commitment against world hunger, nor will it be achieved in the near future.

The path of political non-violence is neither easy nor short, and it cannot be imposed. It especially unsuitable for those who are in a hurry, who are looking for short cuts and especially for alibis to convince themselves that non-violence is doomed to failure.