CHAPTER I

FIRST STEPS

ABSTRACT: The chapter is in turn divided into paragraphs.

1. Decline of the first radical party: there follows the history of the first radical party established in 1955, with particular attention to the "Piccardi case" which was used to disband the party, and to the national Council of 20 January 1962; 2. Young pioneers: a survey of the activity of the radicals issuing from the university experience where they had come to develop extremely different beliefs and methods with respect to the rest of the radical leadership; it then analyses Pannella's proposal of a "unity of the parties of the left", outlined in an article on "Paese Sera" of March 1959; it outlines the positions of the left-wing group at the national Council of 19-20 November 1960 and the second Congress (May 1961); it describes the birth of the periodical "Sinistra Radicale". 3. New party, new politics: the "new" party born in March 1963, with the first initiatives (elections of April 1963, "Agenzia Radicale", Thirring Project, Committee for Nuclear and conventional disarmament of the European area,

Committee for the Unity of the Italian Left, etc.), Pannella's articles on "Nuova Repubblica" and "Corrispdenza Socialista". 4. First groups in view of the creation of a "non-party party": there followed attempts to gather radical groups in various cities. 5. Towards the refounding congress: the events of the preparatory commission of the 3rd Congress; the Convention of Faenza of 29-30 October 1966. 6. The third Congress and the Statute. For a lay alternative: analyses the findings of the Congress, namely the characteristics of the new Statute thereby approved. There follow exhaustive and useful Notes and bibliography.

(Lorenza Ponzone, THE RADICAL PARTY IN ITALIAN POLITICS, 1962-1989, Schena, January 1962).

1. Decline of the first radical party

The crisis of the first radical party may be dated between the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. The party had been founded barely six months previously, in 1955, by the left-wing current which had broken away from the liberal party.

The factor that unleashed the crisis was the controversy arisen on disclosures of the allegations of anti-semitism brought against Leopoldo Piccardi. At the time Piccardi was co-secretary of the party (the other two secretaries were Arrigo Olivetti and Francesco Libonati). The allegations against Piccardi were based on the news contained in the "History of Italian Jews under fascism" by Renzo De Felice, published in 1961. The book revealed Piccardi's participation as relator on the theme "race and law" at the second convention organized by the "committee of Italian-German juridical cooperation" held in Vienna in March 1939 (1).

Piccardi's contribution to the two conventions is in truth controversial. It has never been proved, for instance, whether or not he endorsed the Costamagna report on the subject of race. At any rate, Piccardi had voluntarily submitted himself to a committee of purge in 1946 which had cleared him from any suspicion of cooperation with the fascist regime (2).

The Piccardi "affair" had been opened by one of the two groups that formed the majority which ruled the radical party. The two fronts hinged respectively on the weekly publication "Il Mondo", whose editor was Mario Pannunzio (among the other members: Niccolò Caprandini, Leone Cattani, Francesco Libonati) and the second was formed by Piccardi, Bruno Villabruna and Eugenio Scalfari.

The two groups were in constant and irreconcilable conflict. The controversy soon turned into personal hatred. Ernesto Rossi, one of the most authoritative collaborators of "Il Mondo" and a long-time antifascist, sided unconditionally with Piccardi, whom he considered to be unjustly accused. In sign of protest he discontinued his more than decade-long cooperation with Pannunzio's weekly (3). The whirl of accusations and counter-accusations had lethal effects on the radical party. The party experienced an earthquake in a few months' time. Between January and October 1962, many of the founders of the radical party broke away. In January, Mario Pannunzio and Arrigo Benedetti, the editor of "L'Espresso" were followed in March by Eugenio Scalfari and all the friends from "il Mondo". Lastly, in October the largest remaining group, i.e. Piccardi's supporters and Ernesto Rossi, also left the party (4). The motivations for this generalized diaspora were not based, in truth, on a mere personal case. The affair was the

pretext to sink a party which had lost reason for existing in that shape and in that period. Deep and irreconcilable differences had arisen within the party on the political stance towards the newly-born centre-left. The uncertainties focused more clearly on the type of relationship to be held with the socialist party. "It was impossible for intellectuals who were proud of their condition and content with the ensuing independence to get along well", wrote Arrigo Benedetti on "L'Espresso" in March 1962 (5). The remark was plausible enough, considering that the radical party had been founded by men of different culture and origin, and kept together by the somewhat utopian project of creating an ill-defined "third force" to occupy a position at an equal distance between the dominating Catholic party and the hegemonic communist party at the left. They fantasized about a different Italy, less bigot and free from the dogmas of the "churches" both of the right and of the left, alien from any system of lobbyism and

shadow potentates (6).

While the radical party drifted towards its decline, the general political scene was changing. The protagonist of the new phase was the socialist party. After the congress of Turin in 1955, the latter had revised its relation with the communist party. It was willing to govern with the Catholics, relinquishing any Marxist and class-conscious extremism, supported by the belief that once the PSI had managed to have access to what Nenni called "the control room", the lines of development of the state and of society would have been more progressivist. And that in any case this was the only viable solution.

This new socialist strategy contributed to challenge the internal relations in the parties of the centre-left, while at the same time exasperating and in practice rendering irreversible the latent divisions on a party which was still "in progress" in terms of organization and ideology, such as the radical party of the late fifties.

It is appropriate to recall that the various parts of the radical party were formed by ex members of the Partito d'Azione, such as Leo Valiani and Guido Calogero, ex members of Unità Popolare, intellectuals from "Il Mondo" and "L'Espresso", and a slightly more isolated group headed by Ernesto Rossi (7). The young university students coming from the UGI (Italian University Students Union) whose major exponents were Paolo Ungari, Giovanni Ferrara, Stefano Rodotà, Marco Pannella, Franco Roccella, Massimo Teodori, Fabio Fabbri, Giuliano Rendi and Gianfranco Spadaccia, were a group apart. Two conflicting tendencies were at work in the university group. One opposed the project of a government coalition of the socialists with the D.C. ((Pannella, Roccella, Teodori, Spadaccia, Rendi and others), and a pro-Republican one (Ferrara, Rodotà, Ungari) in line with La Malfa and in favour of the centre-left (8).

In correspondence with the new socialist course, most of the radical party had shifted from the initial project of an intransigent alternative to the D.C. to a critical acceptance of the centre-left. Nonetheless, in the majority there remained a contrast on the role which the party could have within the new coalition. In fact, two opposite theses emerged during the meeting of the central direction held in November 1961 (9), which focused in particular on analysing possible alliances in the political elections of 1963. According to Leopoldo Piccardi, who supported a more open position, the electoral accord with the socialist party was an inevitable step for the radicals. The other thesis which tended to affirm the radicals' independence, and whose most important advocate was Leone Cattani, confirmed the long-term prospect of an alliance of all the forces of the democratic left. As a consequence, the radical party was to avoid any permanent alliances that might tie it down to the policy of centre-left. The con

trast extended to foreign policy. The party was divided between Ernesto Rossi's neutralism, the adhesion to the pro-socialist theses of Piccardi, who accepted the Atlantic Pact as a means of détente of the blocs, and the pro-American position of "Il Mondo". In December Piccardi resigned as secretary of the party owing to the controversies concerning him. This resignation caused an irreconcilable disagreement in the central committee, whose members were divided into two fronts, one in favour and the other against Piccardi's breakaway. An agreement was impossible to reach, and thus the direction and the secretariat resigned tout court. At that point the various components decided to set aside the "Piccardi case" momentarily and to call a national council on 20 January to deal with the crisis of the leadership in relation to the debate on the role of the party in the emerging centre-left (10). That was one of the last meetings of the national council. The clash between the various components was extremely harsh

. In order to rescue the party from a complete dismemberment, Eugenio Scalfari offered to act as mediator between the two opposite lines, that of the "friends of Il Mondo" and that of Piccardi and Rossi (who did not attend the debate) (11). Scalfari's proposal aimed to a renewal of the national direction, which was to exclude the men who had been more deeply involved in the contrast. First and foremost, Scalfari affirmed the objective of an alliance - initially purely electoral - with the socialist party. But the

group of Il Mondo refused the mediation. They sided with the

young "right-wing" group of Il Mondo (Ferrara, Rodotà, Jannuzzi) and endorsed a common motion which asked to set aside the "Piccardi affair" and call an extraordinary congress by June (12). The strategy of the latter group had the purpose of maintaining the radical party's autonomy and refusing any federation with the socialists. It supported, rather, an alliance with the small lay parties, which the radical party was to be the centre of under the aegis of the "republican front" (13). The unified resolution, promoted by the friends of Il Mondo, obtained a majority thanks to the abstention of the party's left-wing group. The abstention of this juvenile group was tactical: the radical left did not agree on the pro-centre-left policy pursued by the two conflicting components. On the other hand it supported the group of Il Mondo with the sole purpose of obtaining the summons of the extraordinary congress, during which it could have attempted to tilt the dominating lines in the party in favour of an alliance betw

een the D.C. and the P.S.I.

Leone Cattani was elected secretary of the party by the council of January 20, 1962. Cattani was backed by the group hinging on the friends of Il Mondo. The supporters of Piccardi were excluded from the direction. This did not, however, have the effect of stifling the controversy on the Piccardi case. As a consequence, the newly-elected secretary Cattani called the national council for 24 and 25 March 1962 with the precise purpose of putting an end to the diatribe which had been poisoning the atmosphere within the party. Eugenio Scalfari broke away at once, because he did not agree on the political line of the majority. It became immediately clear that the Piccardi affair was a politico-moral issue and not just a personal case for the secretary of the party and the group of Il Mondo. In his report delivered at the opening of the council, the secretary posed an ultimatum: the presence of Leopoldo Piccardi was incompatible with the ideals and the history of the radical party, and Piccardi was therefore to leav

e (14). After such statements, the schism between the group of Il Mondo and those who supported Piccardi (namely Ernesto Rossi) became inevitable. The secretary's report was followed by a rather sharp self-defense by Piccardi himself, who opened the debate.

A motion of no-confidence was passed against the secretary Leone Cattani, who announced before the voting that he would leave the party, followed by the councillors belonging to the group of Il Mondo (15). The council, while halved, elected a new national direction, which in turn appointed Bruno Villabruna secetary of the party.

The following October, after the sharp defeat suffered at the administrative elections, even the largest group, headed by Piccardi, Rossi and Villabruna, left the party, inviting the members to continue the radical battle from within the socialist party.

The radical party continued to exist, nonetheless, thanks to a small group of the left, former UGI and UNURI militants: Pannella, Teodori, Rendi, Spadaccia, Roccella and Stanzani (16). This group proposed to collect the legacy of the first radical party and basing itself on the spirit and methods which had characterized the many university battles carried out with determination in the fifties, wanted to carry out a political activity outside of the traditional guidelines.

2. The young pioneers

We need to take a step back to tell the political and ideal history of the small left-wing group that refounded the party. The young radicals meant to detach themselves from the abstraction and the distinctions of the founders of the party. Twenty years after these events, Marco Pannella commented on that period: "The mistake of Il Mondo and of the radical party of that time was an involuntary self-satisfaction originating from the choice of a communication within a community of no more than forty-fifty thousand readers...the mistake of an élitist, aristocratic culture of the radical party of that period." Pannella considers the friends of Il Mondo as intellectuals devoted against their will to politics, who "did not realize that what they were experiencing as a political commitment to reinstate something of the prefascist past was, instead, the persistence of an utopia which the history of our country had never developed - the utopia of a fairer, more humane and lay society" (17). The young people who had c

arried out battles in the universities wanted to free the decaying party from that intellectualism which had been the initial defect of this group of heterogeneous ideological origin. The young left challenged the party's élitist aspect as conceived by Pannunzio, Benedetti and Carandini, i.e. the party as a sort of political workshop for large parties which they would leave the task of intervening materially in politics and which would never have had any influence on the reality of the country. This way of conceiving the party did, in fact, represent a sort of renunciation, and in any case a way of delegating the accomplishment of one's own ideas to others. The university militancy on the other hand had accustomed the young radical left to a not purely ideological clash, but to the concreteness of the problems to be debated and tackled day by day, to a clash with other realities, a way of conducting politics which was totally different from that of the intellectuals who "gathered in Via Veneto in the evening

s". The idea of the young left was based on the autonomy of associationism with respect to any ideological and party origin. They theorized a type of organization among people who unite to work together on the solution of immediate and precise problems, regardless of any preconceived confessionalism. They had by then overcome any prejudice towards the parties of opposite ideological origin, such as the communist party, which the intellectuals followers of Croce present among the first founders of the radical party regarded with prejudice. Franco Roccella, then president of the U.G.I., summarized the new conceptions in the formula, "not unity of lay forces, but lay unity of forces as the basis of democracy" (18). One example in this direction is provided by the convergence of the socialist and communist organizations in the U.G.I. (19).

The radical left at that point struggled to extend the political method successfully experimented in the U.G.I. to the rest of the country. This gave rise to a political project on which the action of the new radicals hinged. Such project was clearly exposed by Marco Pannella in an article published on the communist daily "il Paese" in March 1959.

The central point of Pannella's thesis lay in an invitation to the entire democratic and communist left to unite in order to represent that alternative to the DC which would otherwise have been impossible. Pannella wrote, "proposing a co-responsibility of the PCI in this work (of preparation to the alternative): operating without hypocrisies and fears in this direction, the serious task of the democratic left, aware of its irrenouncable independence no less than of its right to present itself as a force that aspired to power. If a new majority is needed in the country and in Parliament to create a modern democratic state at least insofar as it is provided by the Constitution, Pannella writes, why not explore, among others, the possibility of a common action of the democratic left with part of the Catholics and of the communists?" (20).

What Pannella meant was not reproposing a purely frontist policy - which would have meant a regression and the inevitable subordination of the lay forces to the P.C.I., but an accord based on a constant political confrontation with the communists with the ultimate purpose of achieving a democratic state. According to Pannella it was necessary to tie the P.C.I. down to a democratic platform, far different from the compromise with the reactionaries of 1943-46 against the lay and democratic left.

Pannella's article on "Il Paese" had a loud echo and caused the furious reactions of the radicals of Il Mondo. On the other hand, it was not appreciated by the communists either. These reactions are usually explained by the fact that precisely in that year, 1959, the radical party's leadership was attempting to establish a dialogue with the Catholic left, and therefore accepted to endorse the emerging centre-left, relinquishing its initial intransigence towards the Christian Democratic Party (21).

In this same period, Aldo Moro, the then head of the current of the "Dorotei" and the successor of Fanfani as secretary of the D.C., marked a change with respect to his predecessor not by maintaining a position of openness towards the socialists, but by the gradualness and need to create a single party.

Thus, the political hypothesis outlined by Pannella was destined to be dropped. Apart from anything else, the radicals of "Il Mondo" had always been hard-shell anticommunists, and even opposed any shortcut which could lead to an accord with Togliatti's party.

Pannunzio's weekly answered Pannella by rejecting point-blank any political prospect involving the communists (22). The direction of the radical party also hastily specified that "the positions recently taken by radical exponents who are convinced of the possibility and convenience, at the present time, of a dialogue between the forces of the democratic left and the communists, are not shared by the majority of the party" (23).

Lastly, the receivers themselves of the new policy advocated by Pannella, the communists, replied with a letter by Palmiro Togliatti to "Il Paese", where the secretary of the PCI declared, among others, that "the democratic social renewal of our country cannot be the result of the efforts of a single party, but calls for agreements and forms of cooperation among different political forces which should not belong only to the field of lay democracy but also to the field of organized Catholics" (24). In other words, Togliatti reaffirmed the age-old line of the PCI which was based on the agreement not with groups of left-wing Catholics, but with the organized expression of the Catholic world, i.e. the D.C.

Thus, Togliatti suggested a policy that opposed any cooperation with the single lay forces which were generally anticlerical. The general refusal of the political forces concerned and that coming from within the radical party itself did not, however, stop the radical left.

During the National Council of the party on November 19-20, 1960, Marco Pannella and Giuliano Rendi presented "four plans of declaration" where they explained the theses they had long been exposing (25) and that in their view did nothing but exacerbate the party's initial goals.

The first thesis outlined the radicals' position on the problem of state-Church relations. The second dealt with the party's position in the emerging centre-left, with particular reference to the relation with the socialist party. The last two theses focused on foreign policy.

The first touched on the most delicate and controversial issue both for the radical party and for the Italian left at large from the very founding of the unitarian state--State-Church relations. Pannella and Rendi based themselves on the assumption that the Italian left had always abdicated the function of ruling the country, delegating it to the Catholics and thus hindering any progress. The left had chosen a line of compromise, a sort of consociation with the antagonist which revealed its inferiority complex with respect to the conservative party. That is why, the two contended, it had until then been content with the scraps of power.

Precisely this policy of renunciation (this was Pannella's thesis) lead to the approval of art. 7 of the Constitution, which, by promoting the Lateran Pact to the rank of constitutional norms, had legitimated the clerical and classist takeover. According to the two exponents of the radical left, the Catholic party was a single "right" which masked itself behind a populist appearance. A conservative party, therefore, which was part of the capitalist and reactionary class and which, as a consequence, could not aim at a democratic renewal of the institutions. That was the mistake, or the illusion, of the parties of the left: thinking that they could alter the course of Italian politics by reaching an agreement with sections which necessarily pursued opposite goals. The anticlerical struggles were thus set aside in view of a compromise with a Catholic party, renouncing the laicism which constituted the key element of any real left.

The criticism was addressed in particular at the socialist party, which was preparing to side with the D.C. convinced that "a leading class capable of achieving a serious swing to the left could arise and prevail in the Catholic world" (26). The reality was that owing to the above considerations, the D.C. could only conceive the agreement with the socialists as a strategic move with the purpose of consolidating its power to the detriment of the popular masses. As a consequence, Pannella maintained, the socialist position, while presenting itself as political realism, was abstract and inaccurate because it neglected the "ideal" aspect of political struggles. According to the radicals, the alliances which in those years were referred to as "orgies" obstruct the functioning of our system and clash against the Anglo-Saxon liberal conception of the radical tradition. A liberal regards conflict as a natural and sound fact: on the one hand are those who rule, on the other those who oppose, with the exclusion of any

confusion or agreement, not even strategic, between the two fronts.

All this is concretely manifested by the different position of the benches in the parliaments of Britain and Italy. In Italy the benches form a circle, ideally representing a sort of constant continuity. In Britain the benches of the opposition are opposite those of the government, to signify a clear-cut separation. The only democratically viable solution for the radicals is the parliamentary one, provided it is an uncompromising conflict between a large right and a large left.

The socialist realism, the "policy of things" as Nenni put it, broke the ideal continuity of socialism in that it overlooked those major institutional reforms to achieve which it would have been worthwhile to cooperate with the Catholics. The radicals' position on the other hand was totally uncompromising. The radicals postulated a vast aggregation of the components of the left, without excluding any force (such as the P.C.I.) to constitute a progressivist alternative, finally setting aside any perplexity or the fear of winning and running for the political leadership of the country. The creative instrument which the radicals identified for the accomplishment of the operations was the immediate constitution of a Unitarian National Committee for the repeal of art.7 of the Constitution. Ultimately the goal was creating a coalition where all lay forces would converge, ready for a conflict at whatever costs, with those groups that prevented the modernization of the country. The radical left, nonetheless, with it

s lay furor, overlooked the complexity of the Catholic-oriented forces, against which it was tactically and strategically wrong to wage in an all-out battle. That is why such stances were not shared by the parties of the left, which contained among others Catholics (communist Catholics, socialist Catholics, etc). The second "plan of declaration" presented by the radical left concerned the shape of the relations between radicals and socialists after the two parties had been allies at the administrative elections of 6 November 1960. The radical party's leadership had regarded this alliance as the convergence of the intellectual and bourgeois forces with the democratic and popular ones; in other words, the radicals were to assume the role of inspiring philosophers and a guide for the democratic and socialist popular masses. The spirit of such interpretation was rejected by Pannella and Rendi, who believed instead that the radical party's roots were popular ones. The somewhat misplaced appeal to a popular origin

of the radical party was obviously a pretext: it was a polemic position towards the majority of the founders of the party, who conceived it as a gathering of political philosophers, thus placing a golden, if marginal, aura around the radical party. In Pannella's opinion the convergence between the intellectual bourgeoisie and the popular masses could only be achieved through top-level agreements which constituted a remainder of the corporativist conception of political representation. The party of the intellectuals on the one hand, and the party of the workers on the other, as sole bearers each of the interests of their own class.

At that same Council, the radical party had also addressed topical international issues. The third scheme recalls the insurrection of the Hungarian people in October-November 1956 to sound a warning to the democrats of the world not to forget the aspirations to freedom of individuals and peoples.

The fourth and last thesis put forward a different idea of foreign policy, which was summarized by the intention of struggling not for a power policy, but for a new type of pacifist internationalism. Thus the strengthening of the UN, the creation of a European federation by means of direct elections, the conventional as well as atomic disarmament of the entire European continental area; peace with the two Germanies and the consequent denunciation of the NATO and WEU military pacts; the recognition of the right to conscientious objection, the federation of all socialist and libertarian movements with the purpose of establishing a full-fledged democracy in Western Europe (27).

The four resolutions introduced by Pannella and Rendi stepped up the split of the party's juvenile group, which divided itself into a left-wing current (Pannella, Rendi, Spadaccia, Stanzani, Roccella, Mellini, Bandinelli, Teodori, S. Pergameno and L. Strik-Lievers) and a right-wing one (Ferrara, Rodotà, Jannuzzi) which aimed to a rapprochement between the radical party and the republicans and the social democrats.

During the second congress of the party (May 1961), the radical left further enhanced the breakaway from the line of the secretary of the party, which had by then adopted the single political strategy which seemed viable to the radical leaders for the near future - the accord between the DC and the socialists, with the hope of imposing a policy of liberal-oriented reforms on the party with the relative majority. Pannella suggested instead a line of clear-cut and rigid alternative towards the conservative and clerical right, insisting on the importance of the alliance of the lay parties with the communist party, essential, according to Pannella, to break the conservative equilibrium and for the success of the lay requests expressed by the radicals, such as the repeal of the Concordat and the introduction of divorce. It was a line which was clearly incompatible with the declared aims of the radical party's leadership to reduce the massive communist presence through the centre-left. The theses of the juvenile l

eft were dimissed as a sign of impatience and avant-gardism typical of a dreamful and angry youth. Commenting on the congress, Nicolò Carandini wrote on Il Mondo that "the only relevant shift has been limited to a minority of the juvenile group, stirred by a violent if moving restlessness, but also one of impatience and belated search for elusive truths and adventurous novelties which are alien to the party's clear-cut line and which the juvenile exponents of every other party are not immune from" (28).

The consequences of the dissent were far more material for the left than a paternalistic and ironic rebuke: the majority group channeled part of its votes into the right-wing juvenile group, so that the left managed to elect only three of its exponents in the National Council (Roccella, Teodori, Gardi), notwithstanding its superior effective force (29).

The result of the second radical congress thus sacrificed the left on the altar of an apparent party unity. But the unity was not held, because a controversy broke out in the secretariat immediately after the congress (July 1961) on the subject of the decision of Piccardi and Scalfari (then vice secretary), who advocated an ever closer alliance between the radicals and the socialists, to make the party adhere to the league of democratic commons, considered by the rest of the majority to be a "frontist" organization (30).

The left kept out of the controversies and began to organize itself. In October 1961 it published the first issue of a monthly newsletter called "Sinistra Radicale" (radical left, translator's note) which was published for about a year thereafter, until October 1962. After that date the destiny of the left-wing current merges with that of the entire party, since the party's existence is entrusted to it alone.

The newsletter was edited by Giuliano Rendi and most of the articles were by Gianfranco Spadaccia, Massimo Teodori and Angiolo Bandinelli (31).

"Sinistra Radicale" became the only vehicle to circulate the positions of the radical left, namely the opposition to the centre-left. In an editorial published in the first issue of the newsletter under the significant title "A policy of abdication", Marco Pannella maintained that the centre-left would have placed "technical objectives with a forced solution at the centre of the political life, to bury the political ones that the radicals had the merit of showing the country; means that can serve opposite ideas and aims are taken as aims" (32).

Economic planning, which the socialists regarded as the main means to transform society, a sort of myth of the sixties embraced by the technocrats of the left, was judged incongruous by Pannella because it was self-motivated. Postponing the supremacy of politics would have been dangerous because the solutions offered by the technicians, i.e. the fundamental choices in the field of economics, were to come only after a clear political choice. Therefore, with the direction of the country ever firmly in the hands of the D.C., nothing would have changed even with the strictest planning since it would have been used to serve the purposes of those in power. Without a substantial political change, even the most innovative program would have failed (33).

To achieve such change, the radical left hypothesized a critical unity with the communist party. Ultimately, the search for practical forms of convergence with the P.C.I. on specific problems while maintaining the independence of the democratic left towards the communists.

The choices of the radical left translated into a daily, concrete commitment in the field of antimilitarism. It was a limited field, but the only possible one for a minority current formed by very few militants (34).

The initiatives of the young radicals developed along two directions, the same which later on characterized the activity of the reborn radical party: direct actions and the constitution of associations and committees on circumscribed projects on which to achieve that lay unity of forces which the radicals had already experimented in the U.G.I. The participation in the first march for peace organized in Italy (Perugia-Assisi, September 1961) and in the subsequent pacifist march, the so-called "march of 100 commons" (Camucia-Cortona, March 1962) fall into the first method (35).

As far as associationism is concerned, the radical left with the communist movement for peace and the Catholic-minded Non Violent group headed by Aldo Capitini, gave birth to the Italian Commission for Peace.

However, the radicals broke away from the latter organization in 1964 on grounds that, being influenced by the communist representation, it would have carried out a merely propagandist action, aligned on pro-Soviet positions. The radicals then promoted the Committee for the nuclear and conventional disarmament of the European area, which endorsed in 1963 the constitution of the International Confederation for peace and disarmament (Oxford) (36).

While the left promoted these initiatives, the old radical party was about to conclude its existence with the progressive diaspora of the leadership among controversies, some of which personal. While the leading group was engaged in accusing one another, the left reached the majority in the constituencies of Rome and Milan (37).

Thus, at the local elections in Rome on 10 June 1962, the left presented a list formed entirely by its exponents, obtaining slightly more than one thousand votes and no seats (38).

In October 1962, after Ernesto Rossi and Leopoldo Piccardi and the whole of their group had resigned, the left assumed the entire responsibility of the party's survival.

3. New party, new policy

The first demonstration of the new radical party was that of 9-10 March 1963, when the groups that had survived the dismemberment of the old party met in Bologna in a sort of enlarged National Council summoned to decide the new political contents and the attitude to be held at the imminent political elections (39). The line devised in the political resolution approved by the National Council was the same assumed by the left-wing current within the crisis-affected party. The motion confirmed the clear-cut and intransigent opposition to the centre-left, motivating it with an analysis of the antidemocratic aspects which characterized the Italian state dating to the fascist period, but which persisted by direct responsibility of the Christian Democratic Party or of centres of power which depended in one way or other other from it: the Concordat between State and Church, the repressive attitude of the police forces, the subordination of the public administration to specific interests, the crisis of the public sch

ool system, the non-implementation of the regions (40). The task undertaken by the new radicals, in conflict with the dominating positions among the parties of the non-Marxist left, was to create a vast unitarian coalition to constitute a governing alternative to the D.C., a coalition that was not to be hegemonized by the communist party, albeit with its necessary participation. This position, which had barely been underlined, could have isolated the radical party both from the democratic left, which had by then come to favour a cooperation with the D.C., and by the communist party which continued, since the end of the war, to seek a convergence, from a fundamentally leftist position, with the Catholic masses; and it upset the plans of the parties of the left (41). The unity of the left was conceived as the national expression of a more general European policy: in the face of the authoritarian coalition which the radical witnessed abroad as in Italy (42), it was necessary to join forces with the European lef

tist forces which distanced themselves both from social democracy and from communism. This analysis also affected the Soviet bloc, where the bureaucratic-militarist structures unquestionably represented the main pillar of a totalitarian power, whereas a true socialist society was to be, according to the radicals, without an army.

The party was immediately forced to address the problem of how to manage the imminent political elections of 28 April 1963 - the first after the creation of the centre-left. It was decided to present no list, considering the party's shaky position: the electorate was simply invited to support with its vote the four parties of the left (P.R.I., P.S.D.I., P.S.I., P.C.I.). It was a suggestion which should not be considered as a simple second choice, because it fits in perfectly with the radicals' long-term political project: the unity of the left in view of its candidacy for the government of the country. The Rome section of the radical party, the most active of all, further explained the decision of the National Council inviting the Roman electors to choose within the four parties those candidates who would lead their party towards a unitarian policy, against the D.C. For example, for the socialist party, the electors were invited to back the leftist current headed by Tullio Vecchietti (43).

The radicals were extremely active in the electoral campaign, circulating a booklet titled "the radical vote" which contained the declarations of vote of well-known exponents of the Italian culture such as Pasolini, Risi, Eco and Sciascia. These intellectuals had accepted the invitation to vote for the four parties of the left, qualifying their choice as a radical vote even if it was given to another symbol. The open aim was driving the leading groups of those parties towards the unitarian policy proposed by the radicals.

Consistently with this strategy, the radical party refused the P.C.I.'s offer to candidate radical exponents in the communist lists, with the guarantee of electing at least three of them at the Chamber; likewise it refused Pajetta's proposal to create groups to support the candidacy of left-wing independents in the communist lists (44).

After the electoral mobilization, the radical party found itself isolated, with a makeshift organizational structure and a scant membership due also to the difficulties in reaching the public with its messages. To overcome this deadlock, the party's leading group, after the meeting of the national council of 8 and 9 June 1963, gave life to a daily press agency, "Agenzia Radicale" (radical agency, transl.) which was to handle the relations with the media as well as act as a centre for the party's militants as we will see later on (45). The main press campaigns carried out by Agenzia Radicale were those addressed against ENI and the one on public welfare. The first, which was started in '63 and continued until '66, was addressed both against the state conglomerate's economic policy and, above all, with documented allegations, against the corruption policy practised by ENI towards the press and the political establishment. This campaign drove the Roman magistracy to open an investigation. The second campaign, s

tarted in '65, denounced the connivances between the management of public welfare and the political establishment, with particular reference to OMNI (Opera Nazionale Maternità Infanzia, National Organization for Motherhood and Infancy, trans.). According to the radicals, the latter acted as an electoral machine for the D.C. Following these allegations, the mayor of Rome, Amerigo Petrucci, was arrested (46). The party's first real initiative was promoted in 1964, to support the plan presented by the Austrian social democratic senator Hans Thirring, which provided for the unilateral disarmament and the demilitarization of an area of central Europe (47). The radical party, through the C.D.A.C.A.E. (Committee for the atomic and conventional disarmament of the European area, transl.), founded by the radical left in 1962, circulated an appeal to invite citizens to endorse the plan. Despite the party's meagre size, the initiative was successful. Some 400 town councils endorsed the plan with official resolutions, fo

r the most part town councils administered by parties of the left. On that occasion, thousands of signatures of citizens of all political and social orientation were collected and forwarded to the radical party (48). However, this movement proved a soap bubble. No left-wing newspaper covered the initiative. What's more, it proved impossible to find an institutional channel to make it operative. The appeal circulated by the radicals, moreover, expressed a conception of pacifism which the Italian left and the communist party in particular did not accept. It did not agree on the aspiration to abolish armies, perceived as authoritarian structures, the pillar of power that escapes any normal democratic control, both in the communist countries and in parliamentary democracies.

The communists who pursued at the time a stubbornly pro-Soviet policy, considered this position sectarian. They sided with the Eastern bloc while covering themselves behind an apparent yet single-way neutralism, i.e. against the military system of the West. This also explains the controversy on the issues of disarmament, in relation to the radicals' condemnation of the nuclear rearmament of the socialist countries.

The radicals then took to criticizing the methods adopted by the P.C.I. within the "assembly of peace", addressed by the communists in a strictly pacifist sense for reasons of pure propaganda. It was precisely for this reason that the radicals ultimately withdrew from the assembly in 1964 (49).

The creation of a "promoting committee of the national union of public schools" in 1964 (50) is part of this same radical project of causing the birth of collective movements (with the ultimate purpose of favouring the much-pursued unity of the left). The committee was promoted by some 200 communist, socialist and independent teachers with the participation of several students at the initiative of the radical party. The school body gathered a few hundred adhesions on the national scale.

The question was not, for the radicals, an isolated and temporary event, but rather the continuation of old lay campaigns, dating to the fifties, when "Il Mondo" upheld the impartiality of the public school's educational function and the freedom of teaching (51). The sterility of the past results had nonetheless convinced the radical leading group that the winning idea was that of gathering the lay and democratic components of the school and, in a wider perspective, of the country, into a grass-roots movement, rather than into a bureaucratic offspring of union and party leaderships.

However, even this initiative of the committee for schooling was not completed, because the risk was an irreparable split with the C.G.I.L. and the left-wing parties, a prospect which was contrary to the purpose the radicals were pursuing.

In 1964 the party had to face an important event: the partial administrative elections of November. The leadership of the radical party addressed an appeal to the electors through "Agenzia Radicale" on September 16, 1964. It invited them to vote for the lists of the P.S.I.U.P and stressed that "the fundamental objective of the radicals was renewing the Italian left and recreating its unity to create a clear-cut alternative to the D.C." (52).

In that same period, the radicals could benefit from

a confirmation of their prospects and of their political realism with the election of Giuseppe Saragat as president of the Republic, thanks to the votes of communists, socialists, social democrats, and Christian democrats which, because of internal conflicts, chose the lay candidate. Imposing a left-wing candidate on the D.C., an example for the leaders of the radical party of the concrete possibility of a union of the left at least on limited objectives, but which could have evolved into a permanent agreement on progressivist issues (53).

On the other hand, the radicals' insistence on the unity of the left corresponded to similar impulses both in the P.C.I., theoretically, and in the P.S.I., which prepared to make a first concrete move with the upcoming unification with the P.S.D.I. However, it should be taken into account that the radicals advocated a unity of the left in a completely different way compared to the two larger parties, laically, as a grass-roots mobilization on a number of issues. "Agenzia Radicale" accepted Giorgio Amendola's proposal on "Rinascita" (October 1964) to merge the two historical wings of socialism into a "labour party". Nonetheless, the radicals remained mistrustful because the communist exponent's invitation could have lead to a summit agreement, i.e, a contradiction with that "original creative capacity for mobilization" necessary, according to the radical conception, to lay the premises for a true swing to the left (54). The creation of the C.U.S.I. (Committee for the Unity of the Italian Left, transl.) and th

erefore of a popular movement in August 1965, was the reply of the radicals to these ferments in the left (55). The committee's promoters were radicals and single communist, socialist, republican and independent exponents. The purpose of the radicals was using the body as a cross-party pressure group, especially to urge the debate at the level of rank-and-file. The C.U.S.I. was not sufficiently appreciated by the official forces it was addressed at. According to the Radical party, the initiative was boycotted by all means, particularly with a media black out (56).

The party's national direction, which met in Rome on 22 September 1965, approved a resolution which criticized both the unification between the P.S.D.I. and the P.S.I. and the communists' proposal for a unification with the P.S.I.U.P. and the left-wing minorities of the P.S.I. (57). The weak spot in all this movement of the left was identified by the radicals in the type of organization of the parties concerned: bureaucratic-type of structures which as such aimed only at perpetuating themselves, instrumental in the established political relations. According to the radicals such organization could not, by their very nature, promote revolutionary or even progressivist changes in the social political system. This analysis lead to the conclusion that a prejudicial question to be tackled was that of proceeding with the renewal of the structures, in order for the organized political representations to express a real desire for a grass-roots democratic struggle. Therefore, the accusation to the parties of the left

to have set aside its initial purposes and of aiming to a consociational and therefore static administration of the government, hiding itself behind a pseudo-opposition. The radical party's recipe against similar dubious operations was that of making a clear and explicit choice on all that which a real left-wing force should aim at as such. In other words, the alternative to the parties of the right--in the Italian case, to the D.C. The clarification was to occur within the parties, in the sense of providing for the transformation or the abolition of the apparatus.

The founding of the C.U.S.I. responded to this perspective of reform of the structures. Placed in these terms, however, the radical proposal met with the clear-cut rejection of the left.

On the other hand, the communist party's long-time scheme, first with Togliatti and then with Longo and Berlinguer, had been that of achieving a cooperation between communists and Catholics in the belief that without such agreement the realization of a progressivist democracy in Italy would have been impossible. Obviously this strategy implied a policy of "appeasement" towards the D.C. and the Church and the dismissal of any matter that could raise conflicts, and of a clear-cut opposition (58). The communists were unable, therefore, to accept and carry out the declaration of "revolutionary will" requested by the radical party. Nor could they, in all likelihood, cooperate with a party that considered its independence as irrenouncable and that precisely in '65/'66 embraced the campaign for the introduction of divorce--a subject which the P.C.I. would have gladly avoided. The socialist party was instead active in those years in the controversial centre-left cabinets and in the conditions of cooperation with the

D.C. and the other parties of the centre. Also, in 1965 the process of unification with the P.S.D.I. which had been in the air since 1965, was about to be achieved. Its purpose was not so much aggregating forces of a possible alternative, but rather enhancing the negotiating weight of the socialists within the centre-left coalition. In 1966 the radical party voiced its opinion on the choices of the two major parties of the left through two highly controversial articles by Pannella.

The first provocation came from an interview granted in August 1966 to Pacciardi's newspaper "Nuova Repubblica" (59). The object of the discussion was the communist party and the policy followed by the latter ever since the end of World War I.

According to Pannella, the P.C.I., while professing the most inflexible opposition with words, followed in practice a cooperation with the conservative forces in the phase of the so-called reconstruction, progressively acquiring positions of power in civil society, especially thanks to a co-management of the corporate structures of State capitalism--one of the legacies of the fascist period. With respect to this, Pannella resumes the position assumed by the old radical party and by "Il Mondo", voiced in particular by Ernesto Rossi, whom the radicals increasingly indicated as the mastermind of their party.

The importance of the interview with the weekly magazine directed by Pacciardi was the radical leader's outline of the party's future strategy: placing the P.C.I. in front of its responsibilities as a revolutionary and leftist party, denouncing the ambiguity of some of its choices and the complicities with the party of relative majority (60) in order to force the communists who, in the face of their electorate and of the public opinion, could not afford open conservative connivances, to openly embrace leftist positions. The radicals' attempt, therefore, was that of forcing the contradictions inherent in the P.C.I. guidelines, trying to break the stalemate which had arisen in Italy since the end of the war, and which prevented the parties of the left from coming into power.

Pannella grasped the essential problem of the "communist issue", a party which was unable to become a true force of parliamentary opposition, with concrete possibilities of entering a government coalition, because it shunned a clear-cut theoretical and political choice that could break it away from the Soviet bloc. In this way, the P.C.I. on the one hand played the democratic-parliamentary game, behaving as a social democratic party, on the other hand it did not break away from its historical origin, which had generated that ambiguity in the policy of Togliatti's party ever since the "turnabout of Salerno" and which Pannella hoped could be overcome in order to pave the way of a leftist alternative.

The communists of course dismissed Pannella's criticism at once, with a sharp article published on "L'Unità" of August 24, 1966 (61). On the other hand, it was unrealistic to ask the communists to carry out public self-criticism, imprisoned as they still were on a tactical and ideological level.

On that occasion, the secretary of the radical party was accused of anti-communism. It was an unfair accusation, considering that Pannella had always tried to establish a bond between the radical party and the P.C.I. believing that the left would have been unable to rule the country because of its inner divisions, and therefore that it was impossible to do without the communists. Apart from anything else, Pannella's position was in open contrast with the ideas of the intellectuals of "Il Mondo", who were more anti-communists than they were anti-Christian democrats. Notwithstanding the attacks, at the administrative elections of the following November (1966) the radical party presented common lists with the communist party in Ravenna, and managed to have two radical town councillors elected (62).

As far as the socialists are concerned, in December 1966 a long article by Pannella was published on "Corrispondenza Socialista", which reflected the deliberations of the direction of the radical party on the problem of the occurred P.S.I.-P.S.D.I. unification (63). Pannella explained the reason of the radicals' refusal to adhere to the new unified party.

First of all he questioned the method followed in the unification process, whose effect was that of further enhancing the bureaucracy with the immobility of the cadres. As we will see further on, the problem of the structure of the parties remained the most important one for the radicals. According to Pannella, the unified socialist party had failed and would have failed in the future also in the unitarian realization of those reforms which the European social democracies had already long since carried out: the reform of the health system, the solution to the problem of housing, a modern family law - all sectors where Italy was far behind the civilized Europe. The new party's possibilities did not go much beyond that of acquiring more negotiating power of subgovernment from the D.C.

The radicals' invitation, in brief, was relinquishing the ruinous policy of things which did not even lead to limited results and finally carry out ideal and programmatic choices. The radicals thought it was necessary to carry out an in-depth debate to decide which type of clearly outlined society the socialists wanted to achieve once they had come into power. The lack of a program would have seriously impaired the result of the vote.

The questions to be solved were the following: which economic structure to build, trying to overcome the consumerist society - unacceptable in a socialist vision - and State capitalism which had revealed incapable of guaranteeing the inclusion of the popular masses in the administration of the economic power. The problem of the armies, a pillar common both to the capitalist and communist societies, which could not be reduced, according to the radicals, to a mere question of pacifism, but which had consequences on the structure of society; the problem of the lay character of the State, on which the socialists were reticent. It is with respect to these questions, the radicals suggested, that a unity of the parties of the left was to be formed, with the inclusion of the communists; only with such a program could there have been an immediate possibility of coming into power. The task which the radical party, alone, proposed, was that of "freeing" the P.S.I. from the formula of centre-left, pinpointing the possib

le points of a rupture of the governmental balance to urge the socialists to shift it more to their advantage and possibly break away from it.

The radicals' pressure on the parties of the left did not obtain encouraging results in the short-term: the communists, the socialists and the social democrats remained almost indifferent if not hostile to Pannella's proposals. Pannella's intuition proved instead successful, once it was applied to civil rights: the campaign for the introduction of divorce had barely started, albeit almost in silence, and the parties of the left had started to give their consent.

A "cartel" policy, aimed at seeking adhesions on single political campaigns more than on theoretical platforms, was the radical party's successful approach.

4. First groups for a "non-party party"

After the disbanding of the former radical party, the radicals concerned themselves with finding an organization which would not commit the mistake of institutionalizing itself to the point of causing that which is called the replacement of the aims: the main goal becomes, for the structure, maintaining itself, replacing the party's ideal aim.

The first organizational documents of the new radical party date to February 1963. They are internal communications, signed, for the central secretariat, by Marco Pannella and Massimo Teodori, which concerned the reorganization of the position of the members (probably less than 100) and a sort of census of sympathizers and friends. From these circulars there emerges that the party was kept in place only by the Roman group formed by Pannella, Teodori, Spadaccia, Bandinelli, Stanzani and others; a small Milanese group had remained, headed by Mario and Luca Boneschi and Umberto Emiliani. The "officially non-resigned" town councillors Balestrieri in Genua, Salsa and Donadei in Piemonte, Fedi in Pistoia, Ponci in Como, the councillors of L'Aquila, Pescara, Varese, Civitavecchia and other minor centres (64).

At the end of 1962, a temporary national secretariat had been elected, formed by Marco Pannella (Rome), Luca Boneschi (Milan) and Vincenzo Luppi (Bologna) (65).

The first and most pressing problem which the "constituent" leadership had to tackle was the reorganization of the small rank-and-file of the party, which had committed suicide by the will of its founders, seeking nonetheless a model of aggregation more functional to its purposes. It was a turnabout: with a circular letter of March 12, 1963, the sympathizers were asked to "start all over again".

It should also be said that the old party itself had always had a rather fragile, quasi non-existent organizational structure. It was formed by sections which had arisen in a disorderly way, since none of the most representative men of the party had dedicated much energy to the matter, almost disdaining the problems of organizational technique, while they privileged the journalistic and intellectual activity (66). The new radicals, therefore, inherited very little from the old organization and felt instead the need for innovative structures in order to be directly present in politics in a diffused and non-élitist way. The new and different position of this emerging radical party in the political and social framework in which it moved its first steps, was not parochial and was ahead of its time. It was not parochial because the (civil) individual rights which the radical party professed to support, towards which the mass parties were largely indifferent, were manifesting themselves in the society of the weste

rn democracies. Thus, in order to meet the new needs, the structures of the new party were to be open, agile, non-bureaucratic. The radicals endeavoured to immediately put into practice their idea of party. The first proposition, included in the political resolution approved by the National Council in March 1963, was that of reorganizing on federate bases, relying on the autonomy of the local groups. It was a federalism conceived as a way of putting together the independence of the single members with the necessary unity of the party (67). At any rate, more than laying down a precise structural form, the party decided for the moment to rely on the experimentation of every single group, resolutely rejecting any hierarchic model.

The party's leading organs were partly reorganized with the appointment of Elio Vittorini as president, and the confirmation of Marco Pannella, Luca Boneschi and Vincenzo Luppi as co-secretaries; these appointments were made during the same session of the National Council.

At this point, considering the refusal to mingle with the other similarly inspired political forces, and the desire to remain a "peculiarity" on the Italian political scene, the radicals were nonetheless forced to find a solution that would enable them to remain present in the country despite the small size of the initial group.

A National Council was therefore called for 8 and 9 June 1963 with the purpose of deciding on the alternative, "growth of the party or disbandment" (68). Having decided to carry on, it was decided to pursue a different structure; suspending all the activities of the central organs, and inviting the sections and local groups to develop their own initiatives autonomously in order to carry out a restructuring of the party from the base. The local groups, by joining it on a federate basis, were to give origin to the party's central organ, which was to be conceived simply as a moment of coordination of independent local associations.

The internal communications among the local groups were entrusted to "Agenzia Radicale" (July 1961). The agency was the first subsidiary structure of the future organization of the party. Its task would have been that of coordinating the activities of the Roman central group with the peripheral groups (69). Moreover, its function was also that of connecting the party with the media and therefore with the country, as we saw previously. The Roman group chose such an instrument of communication also because it was the most suitable for people who did not want to lose time in theoretical debates but rather intervene effectively in the political debate day by day.

The Agency represented not only a workshop of ideas, but also a way of carrying out an active and militant political activity: the denunciations, the proposals, the press campaigns on topical problems originated and were emphasized by this daily publication.

However, the fiery press campaigns promoted by the Roman group through Agenzia did not have the effect of increasing the number of members of the party, who were no more than one hundred in the years '64/'66. The small size of the organizational structures can also be deduced from the balance data of 1965, which totaled no more than eight million lire (70). The party was active in practice only in Rome, with occasional presences in other cities. Only a small group based in Milan, guided by Carlo Oliva and Lorenzo Strik-Lievers, coming from the students rank-and-file, centred on the newspaper "Libera critica" (Free criticism, transl.) and on the "Centro Salvemini". The Milanese group, however, conceived the party in a different way from the Roman one. It advocated the constitution of a party that was to be a lay and libertarian avant garde of the new left, in the same way as the P.S.I.U.P. was for the socialist party (71).

The rapprochement of the Milanese group did not, however, bring any benefits because the culture, the history, the personal biographies of the new group were not homogeneous with those of the party's central group centres on Pannella's "Agenzia Radicale". The party's survival, in fact, despite the objective difficulties and misunderstandings, was caused by the uttermost cultural homogeneity and by the strong ideal bonds between the members of the Roman group. Such bonds had arisen from the participation in common struggles at the time of the U.G.I. This gave the Roman group full cohesion, but at a later stage it also estranged a number of sympathetic forces which held traditional views on the party which the Roman group regarded as obsolete. The latter mobilized to structure the new party imagined throughout the university period along a general line that aimed to the renewal of the leftist political organizations in Italy, failing to integrate itself in the top positions of the national political class, but

experimenting on their own a new organizational model whose ultimate purpose was that of encouraging the unity of the left. Such model would have assumed the function of a container of all the components that supported progressivist positions, with a flexible structure allowing it to include groups of various origin but with common objectives.

So much so that Pannella (interim secretary of the party) disclosed during an interview to the weekly "Astrolabio" in May 1967 (72) the day after the refounding congress that the national secretariat had decided to suspend memberships from 1963 onwards, despite criticism coming from sympathizers from various Italian cities, who saw the national secretariat's decision to refuse to accept enrolments as the impossibility of creating local groups.

The radical choice, not to organize the party on a territorial basis, had been originated by a strictly political reason: Pannella thought it was vital to reach the congress with a party in which the typical member of all parties would have little weight, and whose contribution would be limited to the simple purchase of the membership card and a passive participation in political activities. The radical leaders had preferred to aggregate those who had participated or participated in the numerous and demanding radical campaigns (divorce, antimilitarist initiatives, committees for the unity of the left, national union of public schools, and others). In other words, the "militants" were available and strongly motivated on the subjects of the party.

The strategy adopted by the radicals obtained one result: they managed to gather thousands of people on a number of specific and well-defined campaigns, but not to increase the number of members, when they decided to reopen enrolments. Between '67 and '72, after the first campaign, the Radical Party counted between 150,000 and 200,000 members (73) - a number which is not much greater that the one achieved in the previous years, when it decided to refuse any further enrolments.

Regarding the reorganization of the party, a note of "Agenzia Radicale" of 10 January 1964 read that "organizing one's presence as a grass-roots presence, without any claims to globality and organizational ubiquity, and operating with an experimental method of pilot areas and test zones" (74). This idea was translated into the birth of grass-roots associations and other organizations based on spontaneous aggregation. Among them, the C.D.A.C.A.E. for antimilitarism, the C.U.S.I. for the unity of the left, or the promoting committee of the national union of public schools.

The first few years of the radical party's activity already indicate the guidelines of the structural organization and the draft statute adopted by the congress in 1967.

As we saw, the radical party is a party that exists, originates and shapes itself on specific themes and campaigns: its adherents are not gathered into a political body because they were united by a common ideology. Rather they gathered on a common objective. As a consequence, the internal mechanisms change in the radical party with respect to the traditional parties: there are no currents, or internal oppositions on a given exponent or a tactic to follow, movements that can place a secretariat in a position of minority and form a different majority. The secretary resigns if he has not managed to fulfil the task decided by the congress. We believe that the lack of internal dialectics, in the sense explained above, is also due to the fact that the number of militants has been (and will be in the continuation of the radical party's history) so small (no more than twenty people who work for the party full-time) which, in practice, the leadership and the base identified with the same people. These were, for the

most part, strongly homogeneous for the common cultural and ideal origins and for the experiences.

Pannella's leadership becomes clear already in these first few years, within the party but especially in the external manifestations, since the relations with the media (interviews, declarations, articles) and the most sensational initiatives (the first hunger strikes) which no doubt helped the small radical party come out of its isolation, were promoted by him. In the most difficult moments, when the party seemed paralysed, he knew how to "invent" the successful solution.

The decisions, the attitude, the relations with the various parties and institutions, the media assumed during the first three years will reflect themselves throughout the party's subsequent life. A "strong" and final organization had been ruled out from the beginning. The party was to develop "by diffusion", i.e. merge with local administrations which would gradually associate themselves on a federal basis in order to give life to a national formation. Agenzia Radicale, which we described above, was established with the purpose of linking the various associations. It is the only central structure and means of exchange and reunion at all levels. Nonetheless, the group of Roman radicals, which was strongly homogeneous, obviously assumed a central role and was to represent, in the following years, the continuity of the initial political scheme.

5. Towards the refounding congress

The party's refounding and the constitution of the Italian League for the introduction of divorce, seemed to go hand in hand, and the two process intertwine and overlap. The League was founded in January 1964 by Marco Pannella and Mauro Mellini, who were the real masterminds of the secretariat the former and of the presidency the latter. In the League's directive council, of the local trustees at least one third were radical militants, so that in practice the party had merged with the league (75). The reorganization of the radical party was of course influenced by the techniques of pressure and demonstration such as hunger strikes and direct actions (dispatch of telegrams and postcards to parliamentarians) experimented in the league. However, this confusion of roles, though it served the purpose of drawing the attention of the media on the party, hindered its development and the organizing of the central and peripheral structures.

It may be hypothesized that the reason why the national congress scheduled for November 1965 was not held were the efforts to launch the league. All energies were devoted to such initiative, considered to be vital and of preminent importance for the civil modernization of the country.

During the National Council of 6 July '66, the secretariat resigned, since it was not possible to hold the congress. Marco Pannella was re-elected, but only to take care of the ordinary administration; a committee was appointed for the political functions that was to prepare the third national congress /76) and draft a new statute.

The committee was chaired by Sergio Stanzani and formed by Nina Fiore, Angiolo Bandinelli, Luigi Del Gatto, Roberto Pieraccini, Carlo Oliva, Piero Pozzoli, Claudio Lelli, Andrea Torelli, Gianfranco Spadaccia; it published a newsletter, "Information for the radical party's third congress" which was used as a platform for the internal debate on the situation of the party and on its future shape (77).

To prepare the congress, the appointed committee divided the work into four sections: civil rights, institutions of the state, international society, the modern party. The first three topics outline the itinerary of the party and define the contents of the action it would carry out in the years to come. These theses, taken separately, contain the compendium of the initial ideology: civil rights as a means to achieve essential freedoms for individual happiness; a reprise, therefore, of the nineteenth-century radical philosophy in a contemporary interpretation. The proposals on the reform of the justice system, on schooling, on divorce, on family, on women, on conscientious objection, all converge towards the aim of ensuring autonomy for the citizens.

As for the second subject, the relations between citizens and institutions, the radicals underlined the importance of the emerging needs of the individual in the institutional framework.

The third subject, international society, repeats all the antimilitarist theses, the radicals' long-time prime battle. The purpose was overcoming both right-wing and left-wing nationalism by associating with the left-wing oppositions that operated everywhere in western Europe. Agenzia Radicale, to explain the proposals on international politics, wrote (25 February 1966) that "internationalism is above all a position of internal struggle of national politics, or it is nothing but a comfortable and artificial cosmopolitan plaything;...

internationalism cannot but also be struggle against the national state also and because of the necessary shapes it assumes...common to western and eastern countries...army, police, non-independent justice...arms industry, are the shapes historically assumed both by socialist and bourgeois states" (78).

The fourth point, the modern party, was perhaps the most important and newest. In the conviction that the typical model of the left-wing party was at this point obsolete and inadequate with respect to the problems of democracy in a post-industrial society, and that organization in particular influences a party both in the inner relations with its members and in the external one with the electors, the radicals suggested to seek a totally new associative formula compared to the tradition. The new radicals, well ahead of their time, realized the crisis of representation of large parties in the face of the new demands coming from civil society, whose drive towards a greater participation could not find an outlet.

It was precisely to discuss the statute of the new party, a major problem for the radical leaders with respect to the definition of the contents, that a meeting was organized in Faenza on 29-30 October 1966 (79). Some forty people participated in the meeting, including communists, socialists, republicans, exponents of the autonomous socialist movements, dissenting Catholics, antimilitarists. The number of participants gives an idea of the scantiness of the forces deployed by the radical party about four years after its refounding.

The set of speeches delivered at the meeting of Faenza gave birth to the formula of the new party and more generally the conception of participatory democracy developed by the radicals. The point of departure of the radical reflection was the belief that to move from an individualist and unrealistic phase of revolt to more effective ways of influencing the political reality it was necessary to form a real party; a party that was to differ, however, from the existing ones, in the sense that it was to become the means through which each citizen could participate in the political life. A party conceived not as a transmission chain, but as a means of direct participation, allowing each militant to struggle individually and assume all the responsibilities and risks involved.

The concept of militancy was far from bureaucratic: no to a party-church, to a structure with general competences on any problem, both in "the respect of the existentiality of human life and of citizens" and for practical reasons. It was far better for the party to hold together its militants on two or three subjects on which there was general agreement rather than receive an abstract ideological and global consent. That is why an internal organization on a federate basis was proposed, meant as federation of independent local associations within the line established by the congress. The so-called "federative moment", strongly underlined by the radicals, consisted in a convergence on the party of movements, groups, leagues, with agreements especially at the level of local associations. The flow of ideas and initiatives was to go from the associations towards the party and not vice versa: in fact, these spontaneous groups were not meant to be collateral, but independent sources of aggregations on themes origin

ated by their own needs.

In addition to the organizational choices, the meeting of Faenza stressed pacifism, laicism, anticlericalism and European federalism as the irrenouncable values of the new party.

6. The third congress and the Statute. For a lay alternative.

The third congress was summoned for 12-13-14 May 1967 (80) in Bologna. It task was mainly that of making a final draft of the party's new statute. The document of summons (81) clearly indicated that position which the commission and therefore the Roman leading group wanted to give: the congress, the document reads, is open to the participation of militants from all parties of the left, not as simple observers, but as real congresspeople. This open position originated from the belief that the problems to be tackled to modernize the country at that precise historical moment, were common to all progressivist parties. Hence the radical party's ambition to present itself as a point of gathering and propelling centre of a left-wing, grass-roots political aggregation. On the other hand, the double membership card will remain in the years to come an important factor of organization of the party.

Some two hundred and fifty people attended the third congress, half of which under thirty and less than 10% over fifty (82). Only a third had participated in the previous congresses. Among the participants, the most substantial group was represented by those who were part of the left-wing current of the former radical party. Others came from the pro-divorce movement, others yet from the movements for population control, against militarism and exponents of religious minorities. The actual militants of the Radical party were only about a hundred, of whom only a few dozen full-fledged members.

In his report, the outgoing secretary Marco Pannella (83) recalls that the "refounders" of the Radical Party had found a party "without headquarters and without even the right to archives", but that they were legitimated to continue, also juridically, its existence. Continuity, Pannella argued, was provided by an indication which the radicals of the time did not have the strength and perhaps the intention to conclude, and which can be summarized in the slogan, "a new party for new politics" - a party that declares itself consciously and stubbornly anti-clerical, in the sense of a unifying element of the whole of the left. The other aspect, a sort of recovery of the old libertarian ideals, was to be based on the great libertarian traditions of Italian socialism and laicism. Hence the appeal to create free internal democratic and non-bureaucratic structures, based on the principles of participatory democracy. Pannella also underscores the party's antimilitarist characteristic, though not in a neutralist sense.

He wonders what to do with the army and the military structures, in a socialist perspective. The congresses, another of the party's typical elements, were to focus on themes on the construction of which all members were to participate. That way they would not be the expression of the party's leaders. After the debate, the majority of congress participants sided with the new type of politics outlined by Pannella (84). The political resolution approved by the congress summarized the objectives and indicated the tools prepared by the party leadership in the months prior to the congress (85). It also confirmed the radicals' commitment towards "achieving in its organization the libertarian aspirations of the citizens and workers who intend to participate actively in the political and social struggle" by passing the federal type of statute which had been discussed at the meeting of the previous October.

The party embraced a global alternative to the Christian Democratic party without any possible compromises, and declared that the party's ultimate goal was the unity and renewal of the Italian left on a number of themes: anticlericalism, antimilitarism, struggle for civil rights, internationalism. The congress elected Gianfranco Spadaccia secretary and Andrea Torelli treasurer. Mauro Mellini, Giuseppe Loteta, Marcello Baraghini, Domenico Baroncelli, Aloisio Rendi, Lorenzo Strik-Lievers, Giuseppe Bombaci and Angiolo Bandinelli were also part of the national directed elected by the third congress. This, at least, can be argued from the interview with Pannella quoted by Luigi Ghersi, in the absence of any precise congress data (86). At this point, it is necessary to analyse the general lines of the stature approved by Congress, to explain which party the new radicals had theorized (87).

The statute's formal characteristic is its flexibility, in the sense that no qualified majorities are required to modify it. It is not, therefore, a primary source of fundamental rules, since a hierarchically higher position of the stature with respect to other normative sources was not provided for, such as congress resolutions, for example, and which can if necessary amend it.

The first paragraph reads: "The party is a political body formed by the members of the party, the members of the non-radical associations adhering on a regional level, the regional radical parties, the associations or groups adhering non a regional level, the associations or groups adhering on a federal level. The bodies of the federal party are the congress, the federative council, the secretary and the committee, the treasurer, the board of auditors".

As far as the members are concerned, therefore, anyone can join the radical party, including non-Italian citizens. This was a peculiar rule compared to the statutes of the other Italian political parties: even if it was not specified, it was clearly implied, as announced, that anyone could join the radical party, even if already a member of another party. An age limit of 16 was established. The radicals refuse those collateral organizations through which the young must normally pass before being able to join a party. Even this low age limit was abolished almost immediately. The only "conditions" for membership are the commitment to create associations, pay the enrolment fees and accept the statute. Enrolment is valid one year.

The radical associations that are formed to pursue the aims of those who join in, must have a territorial reference, in the sense that they should keep in as close touch as possible with the local realities. This does not mean, however, that they have exclusive rights in such territorial area (more than one radical association can exist in the same city, for example). The associations are completely independent, in the respect of the binding decisions of the National Congress and of the regional party they are federated to.

Apart from the duties originating from the elections and the congress motion, therefore, the associations are free and have no territorial limits for their initiatives. In fact, it is precisely from such bodies that, according to the original project of the radical leaders, valid ideas should depart and proposals for the entire party.

The radical associations are expected to federate to then create the regional party, formed also by the non-radical associations and groups that adhere to it. It is defined as a "political body that pursues autonomously established and financed aims" with its own organs on the model of the federal party.

The statute also establishes - and this is perhaps the most important innovation - that non-radical associations and groups that pursue their own political, cultural or labour goals can contribute to the formation of the federal party from the outside. They may adhere to the party with agreements at the federal and regional level without such decision implying that their members must join the radical party. Both at the federal and regional level the radical groups would have had the right to appoint their own representatives in the regional and federal federative councils and send their delegates to the regional congress.

The congress is the party's deliberative body. it is called by statute every year in the first week of November. It is formed by the delegates of the radical associations and non-radical groups adhering to the regional parties. Only the deliberations adopted with the majority of 3/4 of the participants are binding for the radical associations and the regional radical parties. If adopted with a simple majority, they are equally binding if the federative council expressed itself on the same with a 2/3 majority.

The federative council is formed by the secretaries of the regional parties, by the delegates of the adhering non-radical groups and by a number of members elected directly by congress. The national secretary and the treasurer participate in the council without the right to vote. The competences of the Federative Council are complex, and refer to the decisions on the congress deliberations, the coordination of the policy of the federal party with that of the regional parties, the electoral matter, the federation of non-radical groups, the summons of the congress, the circulation of information within the party.

The secretary is in charge of applying the policy of the federal party, according to the directives established by the congress and the decisions of the Federative Council. It has a vast, presidential-like power that expresses itself also in the possibility of calling extraordinary congresses. It is elected directly by the congress, and si liable to it only.

The treasurer, elected by the congress which it depends on, has the duty to administer the party's funds and activate sources of self-administration.

The funds to the party come from the individual membership fees of the members and of the associations or by spontaneous contributions in relation to specific activities and initiatives. A party, therefore, which is totally self-financed by precise ideological choice. Paid positions are prohibited in order to avoid the formation of professional bureaucracies. The organization relies on volunteers. The third congress then passed an organizational resolution that contained transitional rules to regulate the composition of the Federative Council while waiting to create the regional parties. It was simply established that "until the regional parties have been formed, their tasks are fulfilled by the federal party, and the tasks of the Federative Council will be fulfilled by the Direction until the Council itself is formed".

The motion also laid down that "the Federative Council of the federal party is formed with the presence of at least 10 secretaries of regional parties". But as we will see below, the regional parties are formed at a late stage and only in certain regions, and were soon to be abolished de facto and recently also de jure.

During the first few years of the party's existence, the federative council was replaced by other organs, with the same competences but formed by members elected directly by the congress, contrary to the indications of the statute.

The federative council was first formed in November 1974 (XIV congress) assisted by a national direction with tasks of coordination. In the following years the Council had a varied composition due to the impossibility of integrating it with all the regional secretaries because of the non-aggregation of the regional parties.

During the 23rd congress (Nov. 1981), it was decided to attribute the competences of the Federative Council to a "Federal Council" formed entirely by elected representatives of the congress on the basis of an open list.

By replacing the Federative Council, which never existed in the way that had been originally established by the statute, the radicals acknowledged the failure of federalism as inner organization of the party. The federal party would have had marginal tasks, bearing on the coordination of the regional autonomies, which in turn were subsidiary structures for the local associations. The few regional parties that were formed proved inventions devised by the federal executive, and were suppressed, also formally, by the 34th congress.

The praxis and usage was not, as we shall see, always consistent with the dictates of the statute. One of the most important usages was that according to which the members, and not the delegates of the associations, as provided by art. 4.1.1., 2 of the statute, always participated in the federal congresses. The non-implementation of that article of the statute raised controversies and ill-feeling at the base of the party, which thus saw the representativity of the congress manipulated and altered. The members of all over Italy, deprived of the opportunity to be represented by delegates, and unable for practical reasons (travel expenses, work, etc.) to participate directly in the congress, were thus excluded by the debate and by the congress decisions.

NOTES

(1) Cf. RENZO DE FELICE, »Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo , Einaudi, 1961, p. 411

(2) Cf. MASSIMO TEODORI, »Storia del partito radicale , in AA. VV., "I nuovi radicali. Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico", Mondadori, Mi, 1977, p. 41.

(3) »Annuario politico Italiano-1962 , edited by C.l.R.D., Milano 1963, pp. 704-706.

(4) Ibidem.

(5) ARRIGO BENEDETTI, "L'Espresso", March 1962.

(6) PAOLO BONETTI, »"Il Mondo" 1949/66, Ragione e illusione borghese , Laterza, 1975. MANLIO DEL BOSCO »I radicali e Il Mondo , E.R.I., Torino, 1980.

(7) MASSIMO TEODORI, »Storia del Partito Radicale . in AA.VV., "I nuovi radicali. Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico", Mondadori, Milano 1977 p. 13 and following.

(8) »Annuario Politico Italiano edited by C.I.R.D., Milano, Comunità, 1963 pp. 704-706 e MANLIO DEL BOSCO, op. cit. pp. 117-150.

(9) »Annuario Politico Italiano , cit., pp. 704-706.

(10) »Annuario Politico Italiano , 1963, cit.

(11) Cf. EUGENIO SCALFARI, »La sera andavamo in Via Veneto , Mondadori, 1986, pp. 150-161.

(12) Cf. FAUSTO DE LUCA, »I radicali e la sinistra , "Il Punto", March 1962.

(13) Cf. MANLIO DEL BOSCO, op. cit., p. 130

(14) »Annuario Politico Italiano , cit.

(15) ARRIGO BENEDETTI, »I radicali , "L'Espresso", March 1962

(16) Marco Pannella was president of the UNURI, Gianfranco Spadaccia president of the UGR Roma and vice president of the ORUR, Massimo Teodori councillor of the UGI goliardia, Franco Roccella president of the UGI, Sergio Stanzani president of the UNURI. Giuliano Rendi, Giuseppe Ramadori, Giuseppe Picca, Andrea Torelli, Giuseppe Loteta had all had experiences of university politics. Information taken from Massimo TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , op. cit., p. 342.

(17) MARCO PANNELLA, »Superare la "paura" d'essere radicali , in "L'antagonista radicale", Rome 1978, p. 202.

(18) Cf. MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il PR: organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP Padua, 1982, p. 18.

(19) MASSIMO TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit. pp. 28-31.

(20) MARCO PANNELLA, »La "sinistra democratica" e il P.C I. , "Il Paese", 22 March 1959

(21) MANLIO DEL BOSCO, op. cit p. 121.

(22) Anonymous, »L'alleanza dei cretini , "Il Mondo", 7 April 1959.

(23) Cf. »Comunicato della Direzione del Partito Radicale , quoted by FABIO MORABITO in »La sfida radicale , SugarCo, 1977, p. 42.

(24) Cf. »Lettera di Palmiro Togliatti , "Il Paese", 25 March 1959.

(25) The resolutions were published by the magazine "Quaderni Radicali", n. 5/6, January/June 1979, pp. 235-245.

(26) Cf. »Schema di dichiarazione sui rapporti con il mondo cattolico e per l'abolizione dell'art. 7 , "Quaderni radicali" cit., p. 239.

(27) Cf. »Schema di dichiarazione sulla politica estera, sul disarmo atomico e convenzionale, sulla politica per la pace , "Quaderni radicali", cit., p. 245.

(28) NICOLO' CARANDINI, »La polemica Radicale , "Il Mondo".

(29) The congress closed with the passage of a majority resolution which obtained 75 votes versus the 21 of the right and the 35 of the left. As far as the election of the National Council is concerned, the sources are inaccurate: the result was taken from the book by MANLIO DEL BOSCO, »I radicali e il Mondo , whose source are the private notes of the author who took part in the Congress. According to Del Bosco, 75 exponents of the majoruty were elected, 22 of the right and 3 of the left.

(30) »Annuario Politico Italiano , 1963, cit.

(31) MASSIMO TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit. p. 35.

(32) MARCO PANNELLA, »Una politica di abdicazione , "Sinistra Radicale n. 1, October 1961, citato da MASSIMO TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , op. cit., p. 43.

(33) The newsletter of the radical left devoted several articles also to the new French left, which the radicals felt similar to, also because Marco Pannella was in that period (1959-1962) vice correspondent from Paris of "Il Giorno", and thus there were greater opportunities to have information and connections.

(34) GIULIANO RENDI, »Per il disarmo europeo, eliminare gli eserciti , "S.R.", n. 6, March 1962, quoted by TEODORI in »I nuovi radicali , op cit., p. 36.

(35) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Antimilitaristi: Cronache di 25 anni , "La Prova Radicale", n. 1, Autumn 1971, pages 125-162. The Camucia-Cortona march was elected "march of the 100 commons" because it was characterized by the adhesion of the representations of 100 town councils.

(36) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, last article quoted, p. 136.

(37) The list that obtained the majority in Rome was formed by Mauro Mellini, Roberto Mazzucco, Giuseppe Ramadori, Massimo Teodori, Gianfranco Spadaccia, Franco Roccella, Giuseppe Loteta, Angiolo Bandinelli. In Milan Luca Boneschi and Mario Cattaneo were elected in the direction of the Milanese section to represent the left. Information taken from MASSIMO TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit., p. 44.

(38) Cf., TEODORI, ibidem.

(39) TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit. pag. 47; GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, »Voce P.R. in »Annuario Politico Italiano , CIRD, Milano 1964, pp. 605-609.

(40) GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, op. cit., ibidem, p. 606.

(41) » the union of the parties of the left with the D.C. would have had no favourable effects because the power of the D.C. was in itself a factor of corruption; therefore the left would have been unable to affect the power system, and would instead have been absorbed from within - LORENZO STRlK-LIEVERS, in a conversation held in 1976 at the Milanese radical association, quoted in AGHINA, IACCARINO, »Storia del Partito Radicale , Gammalibri, 1977, p. 18.

(42) They refer to De Gaulle's veto on the entry of Great Britain in the EEC, the Paris-Bonn axis; the agreemnts of military cooperation of France and Germany with Spain and Portugal, the close bond between the Italian and the French, German and Spanish military forces, Cf. »Annuario Politico Italiano , 1964, cit. p. 606.

(43) The appeal of the Roman section of the radical party in »Libro bianco sul Partito Radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra , edited by BANDINELLI, PERGAMENO, TEODORI, Rome, 1967, p. 78.

(44) Cf. ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Dalle elezioni corporative all'alternativa , "La prova radicale", n. 3, spring 1972, p. 41.

(45) Cf. pp. 43-44.

(46) Cf. »Libro bianco sul P.R. , op. cit.

(47) The proposal provided for: 1) the consent of the four victorious countries signatories of the treaty of peace in Paris in 1947; 2) The guarantee of the United Nations, whose officials were to control the country's borders (Austria), placed under the aegis of the Security Council 3) The agreement with the six neighbouring countries with Austria binding them to withdraw their troops at a given distance from the borders of the Austrian Republic. »Libro bianco sul P.R. , cit.

(48) Cf. »Libro bianco , cit. p. 43; A. BANDINELLI, »Progetto Thirring e `nuova sinistra' , "Alternativa non violenta", supplemento a Notizie radicali, n. 207, 1977, p. 12.

(49) Cf. p. 30.

(50) »Libro bianco , cit. pp. 4719.

(51) Cf. PAOLO BONETTI, »Il Mondo 1949/66. Ragione ed illusione borghese , Laterza, Bari, 1975.

(52) The appeal of the radical party's direction was signed by Pannella (national secretariat), L. Balestrieri (direction), G. Spadaccia (direction), M. Teodori (direction), G. Rendi (direction), A. Bandinelli (office for foreign affairs), A. Rendi (press office), A. Sabatini (school office) and Mancuso (union office). TEODORI op. cit. p. 76.

(53) »Libro bianco , op. cit, p. 86.

(54) »Annuario Politico Italiano , 1965, cit.

(55) »Libro bianco cit. pp. 51-52.

(56) »Libro bianco , ibidem.

(57) "Risoluzione della direzione nazionale del P.R.", Rome, 22 September 1965, in »Libro bianco sul P.R. , pp. 65-66.

(58) At the conclusion of the XI congress of the P.C.I. in Rome from 25 to 31 January 1966, a resolution was passed where Catholics were urged to seek points of agreement where the independence of the Church was recognized and state atheism was condemened.

(59) »Il P.C.I. elemento del sistema , interview with Marco Pannella edited by GIANO ACCAME, "Nuova Repubblica", n. 20, 31 July 1966.

(60) According to Pannella it was enough to recall the svolta di Salerno, the amnesties of the justice minister Togliatti towards the ex-fascists, the remissive attitude towards the Church, from art. 7 unto the refusal to engage in moralization campaigns involving power centres close to the Vatican. The very bureaucratic organization of the PCI was typical of a social democratic party which was paradoxically forces into the Stalinist bloc.

(61) »Un Pannella demistificato , "L'unità", 24 August 1966.

(62) »Libro bianco sul P.R. , cit., p. 76.

(63) M. PANNELLA, »I problemi della sinistra italiana , "Corrispondenza Socialista", anno VII, n. 10 October 1966 pp. 505-512.

(64) TEODORI in »I nuovi radicali , Mondadori 1977, pp. 46 and foll.

(65) It is held that this election took place during the National Council of 11 October '62, during which Piccardi, Rossi, Villabruna left the party (see: »Annuario Politico Italiano , cit. 1963, CIRD, »Voce Partito Radicale ).

(66) Cf. M. DEL BOSCO, who accuses the young left to waste time in assemblary technicisms, MANLIO DEL BOSCO, »I radicali e Il mondo , Turin 1980, p. 120.

(67) »Annuario Politico Italiano , 1964, cit. P. 605.

(68) TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , op. cit., pag. 49.

(69) Ibidem, p. 49.

(70) TEODORI, cit., p. 153.

(71) TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit., Ibidem.

(72) LUIGI GHERSI, »Intervista a M. Pannella , "L'Astrolabio", n. 21, 21 May 1967 Year V.

(73) TEODORI, op. cit., p. 123.

(74) »Annuario Politico Italiano , entry P.R., written by GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, (C.I.R.D.), Mi 1965.

(75) Testimony of Massimo Teodori in »I nuovi radicali , op. cit., p. 93.

(76) The information on the changes of secretariat in these years have been taken by MASSIMO TEODORI »Storia del Partito Radicale, in AA.VV., "I nuovi radicali", Mondadori, MI, 1977. Teodori maintains that in 1964 Marco Pannella was elected interim secretary of the party. He then states that "...a single secretary subsequently replaced a collegial secretariat in July 1966..." (p. 71 op. cit.). The contradiction is obvious, which in the light of the documents we have we have been unable to solve fully. What appears to be certain is the presence of Marco Pannella in the secretariat from the end of'62 to the refounding congress (May 1967). In that period, the relevance of such charge was more external that internal: it wad formed and ruled, as the radicals often repeat, by ten perhaps twenty people, so that the party's rank-and-file and leaders ultimately coincide.

(77) TEODORI, op. cit., p. 72.

(78) Quoted by ANGIOLO BANDINELLI in »L'antagonista radicale , Paper printed by the federative council of the radical party of the meeting held in Rome on 5/7 May 1978, on "La teoria e la pratica del partito socialista e libertario", p. 121.

(79) Papers published in part in "Quaderni radicali" n. 7 Oct.-Dec. 1979 pp. 151-172 (for the day of 29 October 1960) and Q.R. n. 8/9 January/June 1980 pp. 390-406 (for the day of 30 Oct. 1966).

(80) The numbering of the old radical party continued.

(81) Document of summons of the III Congress of the R.P., quoted by FABIO MORABITO, »La sfida radicale , SugarCo, Milano, 1977, p. 131.

(82) An interview with Marco Pannella by Luigi Ghersi, cit.

(83) M. Pannella's report at the III Congress, our transcript from a tape owned by Radio Radicale.

(84) FABIO MORABITO, cit. p. 132.

(85) Cf. Political resolution passed by the III congress, in »Le lotte, le conquiste, le proposte radicali , edited by the Radical Party, Rome, 1985, p. 5.

(86) Cf. Marco Pannella, in the abive mentioned interview by Luigi Ghersi.

(87) See Statute 1967, Appendix p. 209 and foll.