by Lorenza PonzoneCHAPTER III
FROM THE SQUARES TO PARLIAMENT (1967/1976)
ABSTRACT: The chapter is divided into six paragraphs.
1. Beginning of the long march: analyses the party's organizational and structural characteristics until the Congress of November 1972. 2. Behind the thousand radicals; the movements, the first peripheral centres: the party and its structures until the Congress of Verona in November 1973, and the appointment of Giulio Ercolessi as national secretary. Formation of the first regional and local groups and of the first federate organizations (League for Conscientious Objection, F.U.O.R.I., Women's Liberation Movement, Italian Sterilization and Abortion Centre, etc.). 3. For the referenda: in the streets collecting signatures: the events of 1974 and until the congress of Florence (Nov. 1975). Detailed reconstruction, as far as possible, of the structures for the gathering of signatures for the referenda, in relation of the party's territorial (regional) organization. 4. Counting money. Budgets (1973/74/75): attempt to analyse the financial and budget structures in the indicated period. 5. Italy's answer. Four rad
icals in Parliament: electoral campaign of 1976 and its organizational, financial and political characteristics; creation of Radio Radicale. 6. After the electoral success, scientific disorganization. Onset of an internal rebellion: the problems arisen with the access to Parliament; public financing; the new adhesions from the most varied areas; the debate on the organization and on the statute; Congress of Naples in November 1976, with the change of symbol; new federate organizations; attempt to carry out a sociological study.
(Lorenza Ponzone, IL PARTITO RADICALE NELLA POLITICA ITALIANA, 1962-1989, Schena editore, gennaio 1993)
1. Beginning of the long march
Attempting a reconstruction of the various organizational stages of the radical party is an exacting task, owing to the lack of certified data and because the few reliable ones appear to be discontinuous. The first "report on the state of the party", for instance, was drafted as late as in 1981 by the treasurer Marcello Crivellini. Never before had the whole of the information that so to say physically assessed the party been developed, not even summarily. Admittedly, the party's organizational philosophy reflected its very conception of politics: the radicals concentrated on single objectives, year by year, creating flexible structures fit for each specific purposes and which were then eliminated once the objective had been attained. On the one hand this has produced inconceivable results for such a small party, and has prevented the formation of bureaucracies and apparatus. On the other hand "it has spread in the party the idea that every structure is disposable, and that every organizational support of po
litics should obey a 'use and discard' policy" (124). Thus, the extreme flexibility of the organization prevented the formation of permanent operative structures which might have lead to the creation of a lasting and more cost-effective means for the purposes of the party without necessarily turning into a bureaucratic and thus parasitical infrastructure. Considering the atypical characteristics of the organization, an assessment of the structures should be made according to non-traditional schemes. Otherwise the risk would be making an error of appraisal. The objectiveness of the data cannot be assessed following a sociological type of model, as used for other parties: the members, in terms of quantity, territorial distribution, social and political background, should be appraised under a special profile. The radical party involves different behaviours and quantities of people according to the struggles it undertakes: thus, the number of members is only relatively important, in that lateral and contingent s
tructures, such as the committees for the referendums, should also be taken into account. The statute of the party itself is based on particular federal-type organizational criteria, as we mentioned in chapter I (125). Thus, a first distinction should be made between an internal and an external structure; the internal one was structured into regional parties with independent statutes, whose secretaries were members of the federative council, and which was considered the organ of political permanence between one congress and the other. The national party was to be been nothing other than a federation of various regional parties.
The external structure did not allow for non-radical groups and movements to adhere to the party on a federate basis, and the members of such groups and movements lacked the right to take part in the party's congresses. They had instead the right to appoint a number of representatives in the federative council. This type of adhesion was the most frequently adopted way to federate many movements which had arisen in the period '71-'75. Also, the statute envisaged the possibility of federating non-radical movements, also locally. The second system, local agreements, was seldom adopted.
The fact is that a constellation of associations for specific battles had formed itself around the Radical Party. It can be said that the associations used the party. Occasionally in time some group broke away from the party and even assumed critical positions towards it.
At this point, it is appropriate to explain that some of the associations centred on the radical party did not arise spontaneously and adhered subsequently, according to the sequence envisioned by the statute, bringing into the party the expectations of the people they represented. Some of them were created by the party itself with the precise purpose of organizing a certain consent on specific issues (126). That is why since these movements had been generated so to say by the radicals they must be assimilated as a structure (number of members, territorial distribution, ideological and political positions) to the party itself.
Between 1967 and 1972 the size of the party was very small: no more than 250 members, with minimum peaks of 150, until the end of 1971, and only two headquarters, one in Rome and one in Milan. In itself, however, this is not a relevant factor: "non-adhering" supporters should be taken into account, who were ultimately members. The size of this last category can be placed (failing all point of references) on the basis of the data of the subsequent years at a number at least equal to that of the members. Nonetheless, it is necessary to recall that the radical party was, by specific choice, self-financed. The lack of members or supporters therefore directly influenced the party's financial capacities--essential for any political initiative to be effective--even if the structure and the organization of the party were based on volunteer activity. The radical party lacked any bureaucracies to be maintained.
In fact, the first financing proper came ad hoc, for each political initiative. Every year during the congress the radicals discussed a given subject, on which the party would have concentrated its efforts the following year. Thus, the party asked for contributions to those who were interested in the single battles, as we shall see later on, for example for the referenda.
The period between '67 to the end of '72 is the one in which the party is poorest in members, and with a zero growth. Throughout the tenth congress (Rome, November 1971) attempts were made to strengthen it by posing the alternative "either reach 1,000 members in one year's time or dissolution" for the first time to its supporters (127). Such alternative was to be a constant element in the subsequent history of the radical party. During the same congress the possibility of belonging to more than one party was put forward for the first time, with the purpose of increasing the party's force. Until the tenth congress, the small number of members had not limited the radical strategies because the party was widely present in the parallel organizations, such as the LID. During the campaign for divorce, the latter organization had received widespread support and dozens of thousands of adherents from the most varied countries. So much so that it had become a mass movement, with supporters in many parties and organiza
tions. But once the battle for divorce was successfully accomplished, the party returned to its traditional position, which was now considered insufficient to tackle all the other issues it wanted to confront on an organizational level.
Hence Marco Pannella's psychologically traumatic and appealing idea of self-dissolution, with the alternative of continuing to exist only if the party had reached at least one thousand enrolments, considering that the chronic lack of financial means in particular would have always represented an obstacle in the way of even modest initiatives. The party had always lived on the contributions of its militants, therefore only a sizeable increase in their number could have made up for the party's meagre revenues. It should be remarked that the radical party's income in those years did not exceed ten million lire, a sum which even at that time represented a trifle, and certainly unfit to guarantee the survival of even a small structure. The tenth congress laid the organizational bases to relaunch the party. Two documents point to the first conspicuous result of the mobilization: the final balance of 1st November 1971 - 15 October 1972, and the list of members, with the indication of the place of residence and the
sums paid for enrolment (128).
The final balance (129) lists revenues totaling 25.839.424 lire, and expenses for 30.136.028 lire, with a deficit of 4.046.164 lire. It should be remarked that this balance is three times the size of the last known one: thirty million compared to ten. The income items reveal that the paying members at 15 October 1972 were 598; the item relative to non-members lists payments received by 823 supporters--a number higher than that of the members.
Considering that the enrolment fee had been set at 12.000 lire per year, if we divide the income listed under the item "membership fee" by the number of members we get a sum of about 4.100. This would point to the fact that not all members had paid the requested fees. This calculation makes the data relative to the number of members not entirely reliable (130).
This balance reveals the scarcity of the contributions of the federate movements, smaller by more than half compared to the estimate. A sum of 5 million lire had been calculated preventively for the referendum on divorce, but only 456.000 lire were actually cashed. On the other hand, if we look at the list of expenses, for the same item it can be noticed that a preventive for 6 million corresponded to an expense of 34.000 lire.
The whole of this first meagre balance appears as the radicals' anti-bureaucratic choice. See for example under item "cost reimbursement" listed for a sum of 2.494.630 and 1.590.150 for collaborators, justified in the enclosure as a reimbursement "to a single person who works from 8 A.M. to 1 P.M.". The action of the party was therefore based on voluntary work, on the spontaneity of the few or many who were for the most part people who belonged to the areas that were directly interested in the problem for which they were struggling for at that moment, such as divorce, abortion or conscientious objection.
However, a choice of this type, i.e. a very small balance, could have represented a limit in the party's development which, while very small, was to function and somehow rely on a structure, even if small.
The question of the "media" is related to the poverty of the balance. We will analyse this sore spot which the radicals constantly insisted on in every debate, later on. From the very beginning, the new founders of the radical party had experimented the lethal weapon of silence on their group, on their themes, on their initiatives. This generalized conspiracy of silence lasted until the nature of the rights the radicals upheld did not open up to a wider spectrum. In other words, until it came to clash against huge political, ideal and economic interests. Only once this impact with the reality of the established interests occurred did the media start paying any attention to the radicals, though often just to disparage this "non-conformist", "bizarre" way of conducting politics which escaped the Italian way of doing politics.
An analysis of the list of members of the radical party outlined a strongly urban party, concentrated in the centre-north areas of the country, with a small presence in the South and in the Islands, with a prevalence in Rome, and a significant presence in Milan. 40% of the 636 members at 20 October 1972 were living in Rome; 6% in Milan, two traditional cities for the radicals. A certain presence of the party in Piemonte and Emilia and Romagna can be noticed. At any rate, the radical party is occasionally present with a single member in almost all cities (see tables 1 and 2).
TABLE 1
members of the radical party at 15 October 1972
AREAS N. MEMBERS % OF TOTAL
------------------------------------------
NORTH 276 43,46%
CENTRE 306 48,20%
SOUTH and ISLANDS 53 8,31%
TOTAL 635 100,00%
REGIONS N. MEMBERS % OF TOTAL
-----------------------------------------
LAZIO 264 41,57%
LOMBARDIA 74 11,65%
PIEMONTE 60 9,44%
EMILIA ROMAGNA 54 8,5%
FRIULI VEN. GIULIA 38 5,98%
TOSCANA 35 5,51%
VENETO 23 3,62%
PUGLIA 18 2,83%
LIGURIA 12 1,88%
SICILIA 11 1,73%
VALLE D'AOSTA 11 1,73%
CAMPANIA 10 1,57%
SARDEGNA 6
UMBRIA 5
CALABRIA 4
TRENTINO ALTO AD. 4
ABRUZZO 3
MARCHE 2
BASILICATA 1
MOLISE -
ITALY 635
Source: our calculations on the basis of the list of members published in "Notizie Radicali" n. 173, 20 October 1972.
TABLE 2
CHIEF N.MEMBERS PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS
TOWN IN CHIEF TOWN OF
TOTAL
------------------------------------------
ROME 255 (8)* 40,15%
MILAN 39 (8) 6,14%
TRIESTE 30 (1) 4,72%
TURIN 25 (7) 3,39%
BARI 12 (3) 1,88%
BOLOGNA 12 (4) 1,88%
REGGIO EMILIA 12 (5) 1,88%
AOSTA 11 1,73%
CUNEO 9 (8)
PISA 8
FLORENCE 7 (6)
GENUA 7
VERONA 7
NAPLES 6 (1)
PERUGIA 5
RAVENNA 5
(*) The number in brackets is the number of members in the province.
Note: the remaining chief towns count less than 5 members.
Source: our calculations on the basis of the list of members published on "Notizie Radicali" n. 173, 20 October 1972.
The pressing appeal launched on the eve of the eleventh congress (Nov. 1972) obtained a considerable result. The members totaled 1.300, three hundred more than the established threshold of survival (131). To this we must add 1.100 supporters without a membership card. The dual membership contributed to this expansion: about one fifth of the members was also member of another party, 38.2% of whom was a member of the P.S.I., 31.8% of the P.R.I., 11% of the "class left"; 9.5% of the P.C.I., 9.5% of the P.L.I. (see table 3). As we can see, the majority of dual members came from the socialist party, owing to the common struggles and objectives with this party, with which the radical party held a constant dialectic relationship throughout the years.
TABLE 3
Dual memberships R.P. (11th Congress - November 1972)
PARTY OR GROUP N. (ESTIMATE) % % ON TOTAL
MEMBERS
(n. = 1300)
-----------------------------------------------
PSI (90) 38,2 7,0
PRI (74) 31,8 5,6
CLASS LEFT AND
ANARCHISTS (26) 11,0 2,0
PCI (22) 9,5 1,7
PLI (22) 9,5 1,7
(234) 100,00 18,0
Source: MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP, Padova, 1982 pag. 39 (from ANGIOLO BANDINELLI "Il partito dei referendum" in »La prova radicale , n. 5, 1973).
An organizational indication was contained in the resolution approved by the eleventh congress: it bound the federal party to ensure, with its structures and its function, the formation of regional radical parties with the purpose of a full accomplishment of that federal type of model outlined in the statute of 1967 (132). Only then did the radicals feel the need to implant the party on the entire national territory and were convinced at last that the party's size was sufficient to achieve such purpose.
2. Behind the thousand radicals: the movements, the first peripheral offices
After the eleventh Congress, which had laid the numerical bases for a reprise of the political initiatives, the radical leadership decided to confront another problem: the party's marked territorial imbalance. It had a large presence in the capital, but hardly any one in the rest of the country. The consequence of this was a marked centralization of the party, something which clashed with the libertarian spirit they wanted to give to the organization, and could undermine the effectiveness of the actions undertaken. It was thus decided, at the meeting of the directorate of 5/7 January 1973 (133), to prepare the first organizational instruments to strengthen the party's local structures. Among these, according to the party's leaders, was the strengthening of the newspaper "Notizie Radicali". A first territorial structure of the party was thus devised: 14 offices of the radical party had been set up at 10 January 1973, of which only four with actual headquarters (Cuneo, Turin, Florence, Rome), and nine based in
private homes (Verona, Vicenza, Bologna, Faenza, Pisa, Milan, Trieste, Schio and Mantova) and one (Venice) located at a mailbox (table 4).
TABLE 4
Headquarters and addresses of the R.P. 1973
REGIONS JANUARY 1973 APRIL 1973
------------------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA - 1
PIEMONTE 2 2
LIGURIA - 1
LOMBARDIA 2 3
VENETO 4 4
TRENTINO SUD T. - -
FRIULI VENEZIA G. 1 1
EMILIA ROMAGNA 2 5
MARCHE - -
ABRUZZO - -
MOLISE - -
UMBRIA - -
TOSCANA 2 2
LAZIO 1 1
CAMPANIA - -
CALABRIA - -
BASILICATA - 1
PUGLIA - -
SICILIA - 1
SARDEGNA - -
ITALY 14 22
Source: our calculations, on the basis of "Notizie Radicali" n. 175, 10 January 1973, and "Notizie Radicali" n. 193-194, 10 April 1973.
A series of promoting committees for the constitution of regional parties had also been set up in those days: they were surely formed in Veneto, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany. In the subsequent three months (April 1973), the peripheral offices had grown to 21, almost double (see table 4). The first two offices in the South were established in Palermo and in Policoro (province of Matera), a rural site of the agrarian reform along the Ionian part of Basilicata. Among the offices indicated, about ten are simple addresses.
The peripheral offices started operating and promoting their own initiatives as of spring 1973, as documented by "Notizie Radicali". In Turin, for example, a "Notiziario Radicale" (radical newsletter, transl.) began publications edited by the local office (134).
In the meanwhile, the presence of the radical party was expanding, also thanks to federate movements that were beginning to arise in the early seventies, and that pumped new energies into the party. These movements voiced needs which, while ripe in the conscience of the country, found no outlet in the traditional parties.
The map of movements in the initial period '71-'73 is rather confused. There available data are scarce and non-analytical. The only verifiable news, albeit in a secondary source, refer only to one of the movements, the anti-militarist one, the only one which had created a structure proper.
The anti-militarist movement had originated informally in 1967 during the first march organized by the radical party from Milan to Vicenza. From that year on, in parallel with the radical congresses, anti-militarist conventions had been held, which then lead to the foundation of the Lega Obiettori di Coscienza (League of Conscientious Objectors, transl.) on 21 January 1973 in Rome. We know the number of offices of the LOC (Lega Obiettori Coscienza) in 1973: 31, scattered all over the national territory, from North to South, and we can consider this peripheral structure also referred to the radical party (Table 5).
TABLE 5
L.O.C. offices in 1973
REGION MARCH 1973
------------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA -
PIEMONTE 3
LIGURIA 2
LOMBARDIA 6
VENETO 2
TRENTINO SUD TIROLO 1
FRIULI 2
VENEZIA GIULIA 2
EMILIA ROMAGNA 2
MARCHE -
ABRUZZO -
MOLISE -
UMBRIA 1
TOSCANA 2
LAZIO 2
CAMPANIA 3
CALABRIA -
BASILICATA 1
PUGLIA 2
SICILIA 2
SARDEGNA -
ITALY 31
Source: "Notizie Radicali", 8 March 1973, n. 189-190. From: M. GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , page 44.
Two movements were created on the issue of sexual liberation: the MLD (Movimento di Liberazione della Donna) (Women's Liberation Movement, transl.) and the FUORI (Fronte Unitario Omosessuali Rivoluzionari Italiani) (Unitarian Front of Italian Revolutionary Homosexuals, transl.), (135). The first, established by radical militants, was created in 1970 as a federate movement. It was the party's way to enlarge the consent on the struggle for abortion.
The second, FUORI, was established in 1972, with the material and political support of the RP; its promoter was Angelo Pezzana, a radical member since 1972 who was also part of the party's directive elected at the congress of Turin in November 1972. The FUORI adhered to the Radical Party on a federate basis during the congress of Milan in November 1974. In the constellation of movements hinging on the radical Party, the one called Lega Italiana per l'abrogazione del Concordato (Italian League for the abrogation of the Concordat, transl.) was short-lived. It survived only one year, from 14 February 1971 to October 1972. The reason for the scarce vitality of the anti-Concordat movement lies in the fact that the purpose it pursued, unlike divorce, was not felt, at the base, as a popular feeling. Moreover, the very composition of the League, the expression of parties ((P.L.I., P.S.I., P.R.I., indipendenti di sinistra) for obvious reasons of political chemistry and opportunism (cooperation with the D.C.) was in i
tself an obstacle to its expansion.
In that same period, namely 20 September 1973, the CISA (Centro Italiano Sterilizzazione e Aborto) (Italian Sterilization and Abortion Centre, transl.) began to operate. In the years that followed, this movement gave a fundamental contribution to one the radicals' most important battles (136). The CISA was organized like an operative structure, with the purpose of providing free information on contraception and material assistance for abortion.
As far as the number of members in this period is concerned (November 1972/November 1973), there are no sources to verify it. At the Congress of Verona in November 1973, new elements merged into the radical party's central bodies, coming from the various territorial situations. For the first time the radical party seemed not to be characterized by a prevalence of the "Roman" component, which had been a constant since its foundation. A twenty year-old from Trieste, Giulio Ercolessi, was elected national secretary of the party. On that same occasion Marco Pannella, unquestionably a leader of the RP, announced theatrically that he did not intend to renew his enrolment to the party. He declared, "if this is the time for conflict, then this is the most suitable moment to wage a rigorous and bitter battle for our ideas; it is time to wage these battles in a libertarian shape, with no leaders, no tendency to centralization, no charisma, no standards, no symbols other than those that are functional and instrumental
in carrying out the struggles" (137).
It was a mere declaration of principle, since even as a non-member Pannella intervened with the weight of his political experience and his unquestionable charisma whenever the party went through a crisis.
In Verona the bases for the project of the eight referendums were also laid, to hold which signatures were collected in the following spring (138).
3. For the referenda: collecting signatures in the streets
In 1974 the party channels its energies into the squares and streets, where the problems of divorce and of collecting signatures for the referenda decided are most urgent. The referenda concern: the struggle in favour of the imprisoned, for hunger strikes, against the disinformation carried out by RAI. This type of political action influenced the recruiting of new members from a formal point of view because on the one hand there was growing consent around the radical party, thanks to the committee for referenda and the various struggles underway, on the other hand the membership campaign was neglected (139). Thus, the party counted barely 2.000 members at the 14th congress held in Milan in November 1974. It should be remarked that the figure is uncertain (140).
To this we need to add that the functioning of the structure was always difficult. The scarce circulation of information within the party, between centre and periphery, was certainly the most pressing problem to be solved.
"Notizie Radicali" reports the complaints of the local associations which, unable to be informed in time of the initiatives of the party in Rome, found it difficult to operate (141). Therefore, after the third congress - the first of the newly established party - a periodical called "Notizie Radicali" was created with the purpose of linking the central headquarters with the local offices, inform the militants of the various movements, as well as being a site of debate and point of reference for all.
Despite the considerable financial outlay for this press initiative in relation to the party's budget (24% of expenses in the year 1973/74), the publication of "Notizie Radicali" failed to respect the schedule, and the distribution of the newsletter to members and supporters was erratic. The first series (67/72) was cyclostyled, and each printed issue, even after 1972, had a different cover, format and graphic outlay; furthermore, the writers changed constantly. The radical party clearly lacked the financial capability to produce a daily newspaper. At any rate, it was a precise ideological choice that the message to convey to the public opinion was not to pass through a party organ, but was to be forwarded through the media, with the end of attaining the vastest possible readership. "Notizie Radicali" therefore was a means to mobilize and draw attention on specific political campaigns, within the party, not a means of propaganda and expression of the directives' official line.
The radical press initiatives were consistent with these ideological choices: in 1963 the establishment of "Agenzia Radicale " (Radical Agency, transl.), which we mentioned above (143), and in the seventies the hunger and thirst strikes to obtain space in the state-owned television and broadcasting service.
But not even "Notizie Radicali" was immune from the defects that the party feared: a number of local militants complained that the newspaper was produced in the centre and by a very small number of people; and therefore that while it could not be considered to be a source of power proper, it was not a suitable means to carry out a political debate in the party.
Two more newspapers of the Radical Party started publications in those years: the quarterly "La Prova radicale" (Radical Trial, transl.) and the daily "Liberazione", which survived only one year, from Autumn '73 to Autumn '74. "La Prova Radicale", published from '71 to '73, further analysed the themes of the radical battles, providing documentation. A narrative and informative type of language was adopted for the first few issues. The last ones contained mostly political essays. The daily "Liberazione" was born as a means to support the referendum project, and was an attempt to inform the public opinion on the radicals' political themes. The short life of "Liberazione" did not allow to fill the information gap on the Radical Party. To supply to the lack of links between centre and periphery, it was decided to send flyers and pamphlets to explain the contents of the radical struggles (here too the distribution was erratic) and to adopt the technique of gathering signatures for the referenda. In any case, the
peripheral addresses continued to grow: in a year's time they passed from 21 to 37, seven of which in the South. The actual offices, nonetheless, were 13. The remaining 24 were simple addresses (Table 6). The radical party finally obtained a better distribution of its presence by establishing the committees for the eight referendums of 1974, as may be seen in table 7. A total of 135 committees were set up, in all regions, 50% of which founded by the radical party and by the federate groups.
TABLE 6
Offices and addresses of the R.P. in 1974
REGION MARCH 1974
-------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA 1
PIEMONTE 3
LIGURIA 1
LOMBARDIA 3
VENETO 4
TRENTINO SUD TIROLO 2
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 3
EMILIA ROMAGNA 4
MARCHE 2
ABRUZZO 1
MOLISE -
UMBRIA 1
TOSCANA 3
LAZIO 2
CAMPANIA 2
CALABRIA 1
BASILICATA -
PUGLIA 2
SICILIA 1
SARDEGNA 1
ITALY 37
Source: "Liberazione" n. 9 March 1974, Cf. M. GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP, Padova, pag. 48.
During the referendum campaigns, the R.P. devised a new system to get in touch with the electors. It set up mobile centres, i.e. tables that it laid out in the squares and in the streets to gather signatures and at the same time to inform citizens of the radical themes and to form a mailing list for the dispatch of newspapers and flysheets.
A combative group of new militants was recruited during this same campaign.
Surveys carried out between '76 and '79 on the participants in the radical party's national congresses (144), revealed that in 1977 27.8% of the radical members had joined the party during the campaign for the eight referenda.
In 1979 about 30% of the radical members came from the same experience.
Despite the radicals' commitment, the referendum campaign was not successful: some 150.000 signatures were collected for each referendum, versus the 500.000 required by the law to make the request valid. Nonetheless, considering the small number of members, less than 2.000 (145) compared to the total 1.200.000 signatures gathered, the result was substantial in terms of potential aggregation.
TABLE 7
Committees for the "8 referendums" of 1974 organized by the R.P. and other groups and movements (March 1974).
REGION
PRI- PSI- UIL Community circles PdUP, A.O. and PR, groups
Total FGR FGSI area liber- Christian other non- federate and
tarian and for so - parliamentary sympathi-
anarchist cialism zers
VALLE D'AOSTA 1 1
PIEMONTE 2 6 9
LIGURIA 1 3 4
LOMBARDIA 1 2 1 1 9 13
VENETO 1 1 1 6 9
TRENTINO SUD. T. 1 1 5 8
FRIULI V. GIULIA 4 4
EMILIA R. 3 1 2 4 10
MARCHE 1 1 2 3 7
ABRUZZO 1 3 1 3 8
MOLISE
UMBRIA 1 1 2
TOSCANA 1 4 1 3 1 8 18
LAZIO 5 8
CAMPANIA 1 2 2 2
CALABRIA 2 1 3
BASILICATA 2 3
PUGLIA 3 1 1 1 1 5 11
SICILIA 5 7 2 14
SARDEGNA 3 1 4
ITALY 18 9 29 8 2 2 67 135
Source: "Liberazione" n. 9, 28 March 1974, calculations by M. GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP, Padova, pag. 44.
The failure of the referendum campaign had repercussions on those radical leaders who had concentrated all their hopes on the project contained in the consultations: Giulio Ercolessi, national secretary, resigned, creating a vacuum in the executive. Marco Pannella started a hunger strike on 3 May 1974 to urge the radical party's access to RAI. The protest's aim was basically that of removing the party from its isolation. After seventy days of fasting, the "Pannella case" was given ample coverage by the national press. Several intellectuals and political personalities publicly sympathized with the radicals. Once again the leader, with his charisma had revealed himself to be an important factor of organization, capable of at least making up for the structural shortcomings of the party with an individual action of unquestionable effectiveness.
The 14th congress in Milan (Nov. 1974) confirmed the use of the abrogating referendum and set itself the political objective of reaching 20% of the socialist and libertarian component of the Italian left.
During the sessions of the congress, a bitter conflict broke out on the organizational resolution between a part that suggested that the congress elect a national direction in addition to the statutory "Federative Council", and another part that opposed this idea believing that the direction would have ultimately controlled the secretariat which, by statute, was to answer only to the congress.
A solution of compromise prevailed. It provided for the constitution of a direction with functions of coordination between secretariat, treasury and federal council. The same organizational resolution reveals that the regional parties, which were to represent the party's core, had not yet been set up, presumably owing to the small number of members and scarce autonomy of political initiative on the part of the peripheral centres.
It was urgent to promote the regional parties and therefore also restructure the central bodies. Thus, the congress decided to elect the members of the federate council, taking into account the different territorial situations; the task of the president was to guarantee the integration of the council itself according to pre-established criteria: election on the part of territorial conferences of members, called on the basis of established territorial aggregations (146). Such integration was to be achieved by February 1975. To guarantee the position of the federate movements as an integral part of the party, it was decided that each group or league would have been entitled to appoint two representatives in the federate council. The composition of the council, for the members elected by the 16th congress, reflects the party's imbalance in favour of Northern Italy: only three councillors of twenty-five came from Southern Italy.
There is one aspect of the political resolution of the 14th congress that pertains directly to the organization of the party: it was decided that, notwithstanding the statute, any decision to participate in the elections at the national, regional or local level (147) would have in any case been decided by the federate council according to collegial criteria. This decision obviously did not enhance the autonomy of the local associations. But it was justified by the particular political circumstances and by the state of the party. The lack of information within the party appears to be chronic: there was scarce information on the enrolments from the local offices (except from Milan and Rome). Furthermore, the latter had serious trouble railing the funds necessary to pay in advance for the membership cards to be requested from the federal party (148).
However, the party's leading bodies were soon totally engrossed with a series of events. 1975 was the year of the campaign for the five referendums (abortion, repeal of the military peace-time penal code, repeal of the military judicial system, Concordat, provisions of the Codice Rocco against freedom of expression). The campaign for the depenalization of abortion in particular occupied a central role in the radicals' struggles, and in December 1975 it brought about the arrest of the party's national secretary, Gianfranco Spadaccia, for the activities related to the CISA. For these reasons 1975 was a year of intense mobilization in the squares and streets, where the radicals sought consent on their initiatives rather than formally recruiting members. 463 committees for the collection of signatures were organized, 60% of which promoted by the radical party alone, which increased its presence five-fold compared to 1974 (from 67 organized committees to 277) (see tables 8 and 9). The radicals concentrated mostly
on the pro-abortion campaign, since this was in all likelihood the most deeply-felt social problem. Some 640.000 signatures were collected, well above the minimum number required. Compared to the previous year, the committees for the referendum were distributed more diffusely throughout Italy, and not just in major urban centres. About 80% of the signatures collected came from municipalities with a population ranging between 50,000 and 450,000 (149).
TABLE 8
Committees for the referenda 197
REGION
PRI- PSDI PRI- PSI-FGSI PCI PdUP, A.O. Groups UIL Gruppi AIED PR Total
GLI FGR Circles (*) other non - anarchist labour circles groups
socialist parliamentary and cultural federate
feminists corporate and symp.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA 1 1
PIEMONTE 1 5 4 2 1 4 5 29 47
LOMBARDIA 8 1 3 1 3 37 56
LIGURIA 4 1 3 11 19
VENETO 1 3 1 2 8 15
TRENTINO SUD. T. 1 4 6
FRIULI V. GIULIA 2 2 1 7 10
EMILIA R. 2 6 1 7 21 39
MARCHE 3 1 1 8 13
ABRUZZO 2 3 10 15
MOLISE
UMBRIA 2 2 1 5
TOSCANA 1 1 5 3 5 26 41
LAZIO 1 4 2 1 4 26 38
CAMPANIA 1 1 8 1 1 1 4 25 42
BASILICATA 1 1 2 3
PUGLIA 2 10 3 1 6 2 9 22 55
CALABRIA 2 1 1 17 22
SICILIA 2 1 1 4 12 20
SARDEGNA 1 1 2 2 10 16
ITALY 3 2 7 68 1 17 4 15 13 56 277 463
(*) PCI Section of Giffoni Valle Piana (Salerno). Source adopted: "Notizie Radicali" n. 22 of 21-31 March 1975.
Table taken from: MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , Padova, Cleup, 1982, page 46.
TABLE 9
Committees for the referenda of 1974 and 1975
PARTY OR MOVEMENT 1974 % 1975 %
n. committees n. committees
organized organized
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Radical Party (Federate
groups and supporters) 67 49,63 277 59,85
UIL 29 21,48 15 3,24
PRI/FGR 18 13,33 7 1,51
PSI/FGSI 9 6,67 68 14,68
Libertarian and
anarchist circles 8 5,93 4 0,86
Community of Christians
for socialism 2 1,48 - -
PdUP, AO, other
feminist groups 2 1,48 17 3,67
PLI/GLI - - 3 0,65
PSDI - - 2 0,43
PCI - - 1 0,21
Union and corporate
groups - - 13 2,81
AIED, cultural circles
miscellaneous - - 56 12,09
135 100,00 463 100,00
Source: Cf. Table 8.
Once again, Marco Pannella's idea had favoured and promoted the action of the party's structures, which proved to be more solid compared to previous years.
The radical leader invented the "Lega XIII Maggio - Movimento Socialista per i Diritti e le Libertà Civili" (XIII May League - Socialist Movement for civil rights and liberties, transl.) to obtain consent on the question of abortion (150). He managed to obtain a whole page on a weekly magazine, "L'Espresso", that supported the initiative financially. The fact of breaking the isolation and the hostility that surrounded the Radical Party, linking vast forces (U.I.L., Socialist Party, P.R.I.) through the action of a press organ was instrumental in the favourable outcome of the signature collection.
In 1975 the radical party's offices and addresses increased considerably: on 24 May there were 69 of them, 17 of which in Southern Italy (almost all of them private addresses) and in October they reached the number of 82. Except for Molise, all regions had an address of the party (table 10). As far as the regional parties are concerned, at the end of August 1975 five of such had been officially established (151). In that period, the peripheral structure could also count on the local organization of the movements that adhered on a federate basis: the LOC had 52 offices throughout Italy, including small centres in Southern Italy, and thus enhanced it assumed greater autonomy, while maintaining close ideal ties with the radicals. The women's liberation movement had 18 offices, and its presence was influential in the centre-north regions (152). The latter movement was assisted and somehow antagonized by the CISA, which declared the existence of operative centres for abortion and contraception in the following ci
ties: Cagliari, Florence, Genua, Milan, Rome, Turin, Ancona, Pisa, Sassari, Siena, Mestre (153). It can be considered to be an attack group: it publicly declared to have assisted 10.141 women to abort from February to 30 December 1975.
TABLE 10
Offices and addresses of the radical party in 1975
REGIONS MAY 1975 OCTOBER 1975
----------------------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA - 1
PIEMONTE 6 6
LIGURIA 6 6
LOMBARDIA 5 6
VENETO 5 7
TRENTINO SUD T. 3 3
FRIULI VENEZIA G. 4 4
EMILIA ROMAGNA 8 8
MARCHE 1 3
ABRUZZO - 2
MOLISE - -
UMBRIA 3 3
TOSCANA 8 7
LAZIO 1 1
CAMPANIA 3 5
CALABRIA 2 1
BASILICATA 1 2
PUGLIA 3 4
SICILIA 4 5
SARDEGNA 4 4
ITALY 69 82
Source: For the month of May, "Notizie Radicali" n. 34, 26 May 1975 and "Per un altro 13 maggio", edited by the radical party, Savelli, 197; for October, data taken from MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP, Padova 1992, pag. 48.
The 15th congress (Florence, November 1975) was held at a particularly important moment for the radical party in organizational terms: the systems for popular mobilization, the collection of signatures in the streets had stepped up the public opinion's interest for the radical party, but it had also driven new militants to join. Nonetheless, the congress participants were confronted with the problem of managing a structure; in fact, of how to construct it in order to make the contribution of the forces that were emerging from society towards the radicals more effective. Until a few years previously, the radical party had been a marginal movement.
Accordingly, in order to adjust the party's structures according to this reality, the organizational resolution of the 15th congress committed the party's leading organs to call periodical organizational conferences of members with the purpose of promoting a debate on the model of federal party established by the statute and which had never been put into practice.
1.635 people were registered as members in 1975 (154), a third of which had joined for the first time, and only one third was renewing its membership for the following year. The frequent renewal of the militants was probably caused by the fact that several of them approached the party for contingent reasons, related to the campaign for the referendum on abortion. The territorial distribution of the members revealed once again an imbalance in favour of Rome (37,5%) and Milan (12,72%). In the remaining cities the number of members remained below 100, even if the radicals were present in almost all chief towns. If we consider the global data of each region, Latium occupies a preminent position (38%) followed by Lombardia (18,22%) (155).
4. Counting the first funds. Budgets 1973/74/75).
It is interesting to follow the party's expansion from the period following the relaunching congress of November 1972 until 1975, in the wake of the budgets presented by the federal treasurers at the congresses. The balance of the period November 1972/November 1973 amounted to some 33 million lire (156). More exhaustive data may be drawn from the draft budget relative to the semester 16 October/30 April 1973, which reveals a deficit of one million lire versus 16 million expenses. A twofold budget compared to that of the previous year (157), which nonetheless underlines the decisive contribution of the volunteer work in the organization: the management expenses amounted to a scant 6.560.000 lire.
The budget of the following year (Nov. 1973/Nov. 1974), amounting to some 60 million, revealed a double income compared to 1973. If to this result we add the data relative to the local offices of the daily "Liberazione" - a self-financed newspaper, as all radical initiatives - we obtain a sum of 150 million lire. The party was therefore assuming a size that was inconceivable only a few months previously. The administrative expenses were as usual very limited: about 23 million, of which only 5% were reimbursements for people who worked in the party's headquarters. Most of the expenses were for information and for the referendum campaign.
The budget presented at the 15th Congress of Florence (November 1975) reflects the considerable increase in the consent on the party with respect to the previous years. The number of supporters and sympathizers had doubled. The revenues amounted to circa 160 million--a considerable sum if compared to 1974. The two most important items in the chapter of the expenses concern once again the expenses of the party's publications and for the referendum campaign. Another interesting thing, in the chapter of the revenues, is under the item "contribution of the P.S.I."--60 million, almost a third of all revenues. Self-financing, which had been constant over the previous years, declined, or at least was not prominent compared to other revenue items. The party still had organizational problems, as can be seen from an analysis of the fees paid by the members: 8.545.000 lire for 1.635 members. Each member therefore had paid an average of 5.000 lire versus the 15.000 required for enrolment.
To understand the radical party's actual financial capacity we need first to add to the data drawn from the party's budgets those relative to the federate movement and, above all, those relative to the referendum campaigns.
As far as the movements are concerned, we have found only the data relative to the LOC for 1974 and to the CISA for 1975. The League for Conscientious Objection had a budget of about 6 million lire, and still depended on the radical party financially. The latter contributed both financially and by providing its structures; for example, the space on "Notizie Radicali" for the publication of the account of the congress of the League (158).
In 1975 (159) the CISA's financial budget was rather substantial: 79 million revenues, 90% of which issuing from women's contributions; 73 million expenses, thus divided: 44.5% for contributions to abortions, 30% for the management of the headquarters and for expenses of organization or purchase of material, and the remaining 25.5% for public demonstrations.
As far as the referendum campaigns were concerned, there is a considerable quality improvement between that of 1974 and that of the following year. The final balance of the former amounted to 22 million circa (160), totally self-financed, through contributions collected at the stands and through public demonstrations.
The campaign of 1975 counted instead on a balance of 316 million circa, fourteen times that of the previous year (161). The fundamental difference lay in the method: in 1975 the contributions of the P.S.I. (60 million) and of "L'Espresso" (52 million) for the referendum on abortion accounted for most of the revenues. As we know, the initiative was successful, also and especially because it was supported by a greater financial capacity and not just by the limited forces of the Radical Party. The political formulation of these referenda was also different: the radical party returned to the strategy of the U.G.I., i.e. a coalition of forces that believed in the laicism of the state for the achievement of a precise objective, without identifying into the symbol of a single party.
5. Italy's response. Four radicals in Parliament
1976 was a year of extraordinary expansion for the party: new offices, associations, a number of members threefold compared to the previous year, but above all new militants approaching the party at the occasion of the electoral campaign for the political elections of 20 June 1976.
The data of the temporary budget 15 October '75/20 January 1976 reflect the party's extraordinary expansion (162). In three months' time the budget registered revenues for 45 million, 15 million a month--an inconceivable figure until a year before. It should be noticed that a deficit of 38 million was listed for the first time, a large sum, considering the size of the radical party. But this deficit witnessed the party's extreme activeness in confronting the various initiatives. To fill the deficit the radical party's secretariat launched a membership campaign with the objective of attaining at least 10,000 enrolments for 1976 in order to guarantee the party's self-financing (163). But things did not proceed according to the established lines, if we remark that at 20 March of that year (164) there were only 1,174 members, and not all of them had paid their fees. At the end of November, when enrolments were closed, there were only 3.827 members (165). The failure to reach the objective did not jeopardize the
party's finances entirely. An analytical analysis of the budgets of the previous years and of '76 shows that the share of self-financing is represented, in proportion, by over 50% by contributions from non-enrolled supporters and sympathizers. This confirms the aforementioned fracture between enrolment and active but external support to the party. Thus, the party's great appeal on its themes represented a very small operative group of actual members.
Other significant data are those relative to the number of offices and addresses, of which there were already 125 in April 1976, and which totaled 249 the following July, although this last figure should be considered with caution, considering that 206 of 249 are, on closer inspection, simple private addresses and not party headquarters. (166) (table 11).
TABLE 11
Headquarters and addresses of the radical party in 1976
REGIONS APRIL 1976 JULY 1976
------------------------------------------
VALLE D'AOSTA 1 1
PIEMONTE 9 14
LIGURIA 7 9
LOMBARDIA 11 23
VENETO 9 18
TRENTINO SUD T. 3 4
FRIULI VENEZIA G. 4 4
EMILIA ROMAGNA 9 15
MARCHE 10 9
ABRUZZO 5 12
MOLISE - 3
UMBRIA 2 6
TOSCANA 13 24
LAZIO 7 15
CAMPANIA 4 22
CALABRIA 1 2
BASILICATA 3 4
PUGLIA 9 25
SICILIA 12 30
SARDEGNA 6 9
ITALY 125 249
Source: "Notizie Radicali" n. 6, 16 April 1975, and "Notizie Radicali" 5, 6 July 1976; Cf. M. Gusso, op. cit.
The first political initiative launched by the radical party in 1976 was the one for the gathering of signatures on a popular draft bill called "charter of liberties". "Notizie Radicali" of April 1 (167) notifies the creation of 14 regional committees for the collection of signatures, as well as "tables" scattered all over the country, from the deep South to the North, both in small and large centres. However, the project was eventually dropped because preschedule elections were called.
In April, after the P.S.I. refused the radical party's suggestion to join on a federate basis, the party decided to present its own lists for the coming elections.
In early May the radical party opened its electoral campaign in a somewhat adventurous style, with an initial debt of 20 million (168). The lack of funds prompted the radical leaders to devise imaginative solutions to attain the electorate without spending money. It enacted a series of propagandist moves consistent with the history of the new party. People were drawn to participate not out of emotion or ideological reasons, but because they were truly interested in the themes promoted by the radicals. Hence the popularization of every initiative, even the apparently most extravagant ones, yet but clear to all in their purposes. Opportunities for contact with the public were created: rallies in front of prisons, impromptu concerts and debates in the markets, in the neighbourhoods of the city, offering roses to passers-by; in the few traditional rallies, the speakers handed out microphones amid the people. Everyone was given the opportunity to speak about everyday problems; hunger strikes and occupation of RAI
headquarters all over Italy--unusual systems of protest at the time, and that were to become consolidated techniques used by other political forces (169).
All these sparse and impromptu initiatives were completed by the foundation of Radio radicale in Rome on 20 March 1976 (170), an event that represented a turnabout in the systems of communication: a new classification of "media" not at the service of a party but of citizens as such, who were thus allowed for the first time to participate, i.e. also be a subject of communication.
The contribution of this radio is considered to be vital in the achievement of the share that allowed four representatives of the radical party to enter Parliament: the share was obtained in Rome, the seat of radio radicale and of the most substantial group of supporters from the beginning.
At the elections of '76, the radical party obtained 1,1% at the Chamber. A separate analysis of the electoral results clearly reveals the urban characteristics of the radical vote (171). The vote obtained in chief towns represented 47,3% of the total, while the whole of valid votes of the chief towns accounted for 30,8% of the votes cast in the whole country. The vote seemed to be concentrated especially in the centre and north. Nonetheless, the prevalence of urban votes is constant from the north to the south of the country: in fourteen cities the percentages of the radical votes exceeded the national average.
An analysis of these electoral results point to the fact that the radicals' presence was widespread throughout the country, regardless of the size of the party's organizational structure.
6. After the electoral success. Scientific disorganization. Onset of an internal rebellion.
After the unexpected electoral success, the radical party suffered a sort of earthquake which caused strong internal tension. Admittedly these were the ailments of growing up, since the number of regular members leaped from 1600 in 1975 to 3.800 in 1976; above all, a few thousand sympathizers approached the radical party, giving a considerable contribution to the electoral campaign. Nonetheless, the most significant fact is that new energies were breathed into the party's orbit: of 3.827 members, as many as 3.300 - a very high percentage - were new militants (172). This renewal forced the original leading group to confront the problem of how to use the new vast militancy without altering the original and peculiar characters of the party itself. The new founders of the party, in other words the "Roman group" which, as we saw, constantly endeavoured to keep a strong identity and homogeneity, was suddenly and unexpectedly placed under siege by people who were getting into touch with the radicals for the first t
ime and with their own methods: they came from other political experiences, therefore they harboured different expectations and wanted a traditional party (territorial sections, accurate organization, financing from the central headquarters). This new mass of militants, mostly young people, had a different theoretical heritage with respect to the radicals: they had been the leaders and witnesses of the revolution of 1968. Many were ex-members of non-parliamentary groups, therefore supporters of experiences that were alien to the radical tradition.
It was impossible for Pannella, Spadaccia and the others to accept the demands expressed by this plurality of people of the most varied cultural and ideological origin, because the organization laid down by the statute of the radical party outlined a socialist and libertarian society which they pursued as objective. Thus, for the old group of the party any deviation from the federative model could cause the radical political project to fail.
Actually this statute, which the original leadership of the party extoled and defended, had never been implemented until then: the failure to enact the fundamental charter of the radical party was caused, according to the secretariat, by a constant defect in the objective, quantitative and numerical conditions. Therefore either the statute was inadequate for the country's situation, or the radical party had done nothing to create the suitable conditions for the radical presence's expansion. A sort of vicious circle that trapped this party which had nonetheless an enormous potential in its constitutive idea.
In the previous years the party, formed by small groups, had obviously been more homogeneous; the groups that were homogeneous because of the many battles conducted together and because of their common ideological origin were unprepared for the arrival of so many unsolicited militants into the life of the radical party. And these new militants were not content with an assemblary and occasional participation, but wanted to contribute and invent a party in constant progress.
The newcomers expressed unusual proposals for the radical tradition. For example, they wanted the party to start dealing with economic issues and, above all, they wanted subjects of general politics to be discussed in congresses, considering the concrete and limited objectives which the radicals had always pursued as insufficient in defining the strategy of a party. With regard to this, Pannella remarked that "if the radical congress had surrendered to the instincts of the great political debates, if the irresponsibility of certain members who viewed the party as a plaything for their oratory skills, the radical party would have become the echo of the fake problems inoculated by the system and by the regime" (173).
And in referring to the sudden growth of the radical party, the leader wrote that this was the replay of an old fable by Aesop: the frog who bursts because it thinks itself an ox (174).
The radical secretariat, after the elections of 20 June 1976, was thus confronted simultaneously with the problems ensuing from the sudden expansion of the party and those relative to the law on the public financing of parties. The radical party had constantly opposed the law that had authorized such financing. In fact, it had tried to collect signatures for an abrogating referendum the previous year, but failed in the intent. All parties had been able to manoeuvre their organizational apparatus thanks to the few and uncertain funds coming from enrolments and especially from covert sources. The radical party instead, constantly on the verge of collapse, had always been proud of its poverty, its lack of means, its impossibility to adequately convey its message to the national public.
The propagandist inventions and the expedients and "tricks" could not, however, replace an organizational structure, even if this was elementary but vital to make the political choices operative.
That is why the radicals' decision on the subject of the public financing of parties was not easy: on the one hand they opposed it for obvious reasons of principle, on the other hand they were pressed by vital needs of survival of the party. A first solution to this dilemma emerged from the radical party's federative council held in Rome on 5 July 1976 (175). The council decided to refuse the public financing except for the share relative to the reimbursement of electoral expenses, because it believed that the latter type of expense was useful for the "collective political life". In other words, those public funds would have allowed categories that were until then unrepresented to gain access to politics. However, the final decision on whether or not to accept the public funds was entrusted to an extraordinary congress scheduled for 16-18 July 1976. This congress would also define the question of the party's organization.
The extraordinary congress took place in a particularly tense atmosphere. The congress participants started to introduce motions to modify the statute. Angiolo Bandinelli, one of the leaders who had refounded the party, proposed instead to enact the federative model, so that the council itself would no longer need to be formed by the assembly of the members but by delegates of the single associations (176).
Pannella's line of "scientific disorganization" prevailed in the congress and was endorsed also by the national secretary Gianfranco Spadaccia. It was a way to prevent the radical party from turning into a traditional, bureaucratic and clerical party (177). Pannella motivated his choice referring to the libertarian, self-administrative and federative indications of the statute. He believed that the party's national structures and the existing local ones were to be "disorganized" in terms of praxis and instruments in order to allow for the organization of the new militant and associative reality present in the radical party. Concretely speaking, he expressed the hope that the party be structured in the following way: the national structures would have become simple means of information and service; the regional parties were to concentrate on a few common objectives and for the rest carry out tasks of coordination and service for the local associations. Even the latter, which had until then been formed by terr
itorial associations, in contrast with the spirit of the statute, were to dissolve themselves so that each member could establish a new association which in turn was to gather its members on an issue and not by common territorial belonging.
In other words, the idea was doing away with the system of sections or units, the site not of original debates by only an echo of the central organs. The idea of the new organization exposed by Pannella was strongly opposed by the congress participants, namely by Giulio Ercolessi, former secretary of the party, who remarked that the "scientific disorganization" advocated by Pannella was nothing but the "organization of the leadership that expels the base" (178). The line of opposition to Pannella did not prevail: the congress was held in Rome, and therefore the Roman group expressed its support to Pannella, whose resolution was eventually passed with a majority of more than 3/4 of the voters.
Only 596 of some 3.000 members voted, and most of them presumably came from Rome and Latium (179).
As far as the irksome question of the public financing of parties is concerned, the congress supported the line of the federative council, i.e. accepting a reimbursement of the electoral expenses, to be distributed among the regional parties. It also instructed to collect the remaining share the party was entitled to in order to avoid other parties from being given such sum (180). In practice, the decision regarding the use of the public funds was postponed sine die.
At the conclusion of the congress, the federal secretariat circulated a document on the conditions of the party (181), with the purpose of justifying the organizational choices of the party's first ten years of existence. This document underlined that the radical constituents of 1967 did not concern themselves with drafting a statute regulating the internal coexistence of the fragile newly re-established party, but rather to outline a different and alternative type of organization with respect to the one experimented by the left".
Thus, the statute was to be considered not a point of arrival, but a point of departure, and therefore a model to be constructed. The failure to apply the party's fundamental charter was motivated by the scarcity of the militant forces. As far as the party's territorial structure is concerned, the document said that the regional experience was to be considered a failure. Since the only regional parties created until then had a merely "promotional" function (Latium, Campania, Emilia-Romagna) or of simple coordination between the various associations of the region (Lombardia, Piemonte, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Tuscany), in all other regions the party did not exist.
The turmoil within the radical party continued beyond the strictly congressional phase, so much that Marco Pannella took a precise stance on the theses that were the object of a fiery debate and confrontation in the party. Pannella explained his position in an article published on "Prova Radicale" in October 1976, where he remarked that many of those who had approached the party for the first time could not carry the weight of their entire past, the "dead wood of the prevalent culture of systems and regime". This heritage could have transformed the party into a different organization compared to the one conceived by the new founders.
Pannella warned that the radical party was not a party "in the sense generally attributed to the word party, precisely so as to subtract from the other parties even the term which they have historically and perniciously assumed" (172). The intense growth of the radical opinion and the consequent growth of the movement transferred contradictions and situations into the party which the radical party was immune from. The radical success was not to be used to occupy positions of local power.
In other words, Pannella said, "we need to understand that the radical party is nothing but a central tool of service, of coordination, of execution of the conflict with the institutions". The great battles, according to Pannella, were to take place in the territory. Thus, if the regional parties were more adult and active, the national moment would be less oppressive, and the central organ would not need to assume responsibilities such as ever dangerous hunger strikes, ever frequent and long arrests which convey signs of "existence and linkage with the people in the critical moments of battles that would otherwise be lost from the beginning". Pannella concluded by disclosing his intention of leaving the party and starting anew on his own, if the Congress was to give a result inadequate to the irrenouncable needs of the political battles of the time. At the 17th congress (Naples, November 1976) contrasts broke out for the first time within the "Roman group", between Pannella and Spadaccia on the one hand and
Teodori on the other. Teodori had come to represent that wing that advocated a reorganization of the party in the wake of the electoral success that was to reveal to the country the existence of a substantial radical opinion. He wanted to prevent this consent from being wasted and in order to keep it, he asked that something be done to organize the party, even if in an elementary form (183).
The congress closed with an organizational resolution (184) that reflected the positions of Pannella and Spadaccia. The key points of the resolution simply reiterated the party's original organizational approach, which was necessarily linked to the political one, and instrumental in the strategy of the referenda for civil rights. The creation of 13 regional parties and the presence of seven federate groups was acknowledged.
Eventually a more structured organization among the various central, territorial bodies and federate groups was decided - a vaster circulation of inside information through "Notizie Radicali" (to members) and of the radical newsletter to be sent to the regional parties. It was decided to establish a national coordination committee to perform all technical tasks during the referenda. Also, it was decided to call demonstrations in every region, according to the radical party's specific tradition; to ask for access to the state-owned TV and broadcasting service, resorting to free (commercial) radios and television stations whenever possible; to seek agreements with daily newspapers and periodicals. An array of initiatives aiming at breaking the silence which the "media" connected to the parties and the then dominating clerical conformism had used against the radical party.
The 17th congress formally decided to replace the symbol of the party, "a woman's head with Phrygian cap and the caption 'radical party', with the symbol of a rose in the fist, and the same caption 'radical party' in the statute. From then on, the public identified the radicals with the symbol of the rise in the fist.
After the political elections of 20 June 1976, seven new organizations which "Notizie Radicali" calls "struggles, not names" (185) were created in the radical party's headquarters in Rome in Via di Torre Argentina.
The facts reveal instead that these new committees remained dead letter, except for the CARM (Comitato abolizione regolamenti manicomiali) (Committee for the abolition of mental hospital regulations, transl.) and the FRI (Fronte radicale invalidi) (Radical association of invalids, transl.). The aims of the CARM were abolishing the regulations of mental hospitals and the administration of the mental institutions on the part of the patients themselves, and to struggle against any form of repression in psychiatric institutions. Two of these organizations, while remaining pure names, are important in that they pinpointed, well ahead of the time, a number of fundamental civil needs to defend which opinion movements had been created only at the end of the eighties. We are referring to the MLB (Movimento Liberazione dei Bambini) (Children's Liberation Movement, transl.) and BRAVA, "Battaglia Radicale contro la violenza sugli animali" (Radical Struggle against violence on animals, transl.) which was set up to fight
every form of violence practiced on animals, starting from animal experimentation.
During the congress of Naples, a first survey of the social structure and political attitudes of the radical militants was carried out. This survey represents a fairly in-depth and reliable study of a party which, while having originated and developed outside of the Italian political tradition, already counted on a considerable consent and militancy (186).
According to this survey, 64.9% of those polled lived in cities with a population of more than 150,000, confirming what had already been remarked about the radical party's prevalence in urban areas. It seemed that 61.4& of the militants were under thirty; as far as their position and occupation is concerned, 28% of the radical members were university students, 14.7% civil servants and 13.6% professors of every order and degree. Therefore, a militancy that came from the middle-upper bourgeois classes, young and urban and living in the industrial triangle. Among the members under 25, the social bases included the proletariat--which is explained by the libertarian drive of the radical campaigns.
Another aspect of this survey concerned the investigation of the reasons for joining the Radical Party: 75% of those polled said they had joined the radical party with the purpose of contributing to the campaigns on civil rights; 56.1% because they thought the radical party was a libertarian and anti-bureaucratic organization, 40% because it privileged non-violent methods in its political struggles, and 42% because it agreed with the strategy of the left-wing alternative. As we can see, their adhesion was not based on a specific theme, but was rather an "ideological" choice, a way of approving the radical party's political project.
The question form adopted for the survey asked those interviewed whether they had joined the federate movement before or after joining the radical party. The interviewers wanted to check whether the movements were concretely operating as channels of recruitment for the party. The answers gave no clear-cut indication, because a very similar percentage had joined the radical party both before and after joining the federate movement. At any rate, considering that 55.3% of the total number of members of the federate movements joined the party at the same time, it was assumed that the federate movements did not represent a channel of recruitment for the party; and this is confirmed by the ideological motivation expressed by most members. As to the party's strategic prospects, an important indication emerged from these answers: 29.9% of those interviewed declared that the continuation of the radical struggles was to correspond exclusively to a strenghthening of the radical party and to its expansion. Other sets of
questions revealed that 70% of the militants advocated a greater organization. In other words, they revealed the desire to create a structure of some sort, while not a bureaucratic or centralizing one.
At that turning point, the radical party confronted the dilemma of choosing between an organized expansion or accept a decline of consent. However, an organized expansion would have clashed with the original principles of the radical party, which were based on a refusal of any professionalism of politics, and on the accomplishment of the libertarian and socialist aspirations, to be achieved with heretic methods, until then unprecedented in the country.
Actually the figures had surprised the radical leaders, who were not entirely convinced that their message could have such a vast echo.
Unexplainably, owing to a political game or to a psychological reaction, as in the subsequent moments of success, the leaders developed a "suicidal" tendency; in other words, they longed for the times in which they were few, ill represented, isolated and unknown to the masses, and developed the desire to start anew. Was this a strategy or an emotional reaction? Or perhaps a form of pessimism that came from the forefathers "amici del Mondo", who mistrusted large parties? It is hard to answer with certainty in the light of the almost thirty years of the radical party's history, whose constant element appears to be scarcely intelligible at times for a historical investigation, at any rate in the absence of sufficiently accurate documentation.
NOTES
(124) MARCELLO CRIVELLINI, »Rapporto sul partito federale : ottobre 1982, Ciclostilato,
(125) Cf. pp. 53-56.
(126) Cf. MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il partito Radicale, Organizzazione e leadership , CLEUP, Padova, 1982, pp. 88-89; ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Sul federalismo radicale. Ricordando Giuliano Rendi , "Quaderni Radicali", n. 7, October-December 1979, pp. 58-74.
(127) M. PANNELLA, »E' ora di decidere con o senza il Partito Radicale , "La prova radicale", n. 1 autumn 1971, PP. 48-50.
(128) "Notizie radicali" n. 173, 20 October 1972, ciclostilato.
(129) See Appendix p. 225.
(130) Until 1982, even those who had not paid the whole membership fee were considered members, in contrast with the statute of the party. Cf. »Rapporto sul partito federale - 82, cit., pag. 32.
(131) Cf. TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit. p. 138.
(132) See appendix p. 216 and following.
(133) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Il partito e le lotte , "Notizie radicali", n. 1, N. 5., 10 January 1973, p. 1 and p. 8.
(134) Cf. "Notizie radicali" nn. 193-194, 10 April 1973.
(135) TEODORI, »I nuovi radicali , cit. pp. 344-354 - For an account of the first five years of struggles of the MLD: MLD-PR, »Contro l'aborto di classe , edited by M. A. Teodori Savelli, 1975.
(136) TEODORI, OP. cit., Ibidem.
(137) MARCO PANNELLA, »Il PR ha deciso: otto referendum , "Liberazione", n. 34 9/11/1973.
(138) Cf. p. 137 and foll.
(139) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 334, 30 November 1974, p. 8.
(140) Figure taken from "Notizie radicali", n. 334, Ibidem. According to MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il PR: Organizzazione e leadership , cit. p. 45, the members were in fact less than 1,200.
(141) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 151, 28 November 1975.
(142) Cf. appendix p. 226.
(143) Cf. pp. 43-44.
(144) PIERO IGNAZI, »I radicali dal 1976 al 1979: tre ricerche a confronto , "Argomenti radicali", n. 16, June-October 1980, p. 63.
(145) Cf. pp. 137-141
(146) The expected blocs are the following: 1) Piemonte-Liguria (without La Spezia)-Valle D'Aosta; 2) Lombardia; 3) Veneto-Trentino Sud Tirolo; 4) Friuli Venezia Giulia; 5) Emilia Romagna-Marche; 6) Lazio-Abruzzo-Molise; 7) Toscana-Umbria-La Spezia; 8) Campania-Calabria; 9) Puglia-Basilicata; 10) Sicilia, 11) Sardegna. Cf. "Notizie Radicali", n. 334, Ibidem.
(147) Administrative elections were scheduled in 1975.
(148) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 265, 18 January 1975.
(149) Cf. MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il PR organizzazione e leadership , Padova 1982, p. 49.
(150) It is true that the Lega XIII Maggio was identified with Marco Pannella: it was barely more than a label to place on the initiatives, perhaps with the purpose of making them more credible.
(151) Regional parties were established in Lombardia, Piemonte, Lazio, Emilia Romagna and Veneto. "Notizie radicali", 10/10/79, p. 7 table VII.
(152) For the LOC: Contro il servizio militare, Savelli, 1975. For the MLD: CISA-MLD, »Aborto: facciamolo da noi , Rome, 1975.
(153) CISA-MLD, »Aborto... , Ibidem.
(154) "Notizie radicali", 10/10/79, p. 7, Table VII.
(155) Our calculations, on the basis of "Notizie radicali", n. 42,13/10/76.
(156) TEODORI, op. cit., p. 138.
(157) Cf. pp. 82-83.
(158) »Necessaria l'autonomia finanziaria , "Notizie radicali", n. 625, 18 January 1975, p. 5.
(159) CISA, »Bilancio di un anno di disobbedienza civile , "Notizie radicali", n. 4, 3 March 1976, p. 3.
(160) Cf. calculations by M. GUSSO, op. cit.
(161) Cf. calculations by MASSIMO GUSSO, op. cit.
(162) Budget published on "Notizie radicali", n. 2, 7 February 1976, p. 4.
(163) "Notizie radicali", n. 2, Ibidem.
(164) "Notizie radicali", n. 5, 1st April 1976, p. 3.
(165) "Notizie radicali", n. 42, 13th April 1976, p. 4.
(166) The list was published on Notizie radicali, n. 15, 6th July 1976.
(167) "Notizie radicali", n. 5, 1st April 1976, p. 2.
(168) »Cronache elettorali, una campagna radicale , "Prova radicale", n. 2, July - August 1976, p. 13.
(169) The campaign, described by the leaders with a certain self-complacency, in "Prova radicale", »Cronache elettorali , cit., Ibidem.
(170) "Notizie radicali", n. 5, 1st April 1976, p. 4.
(171) For an analysis of the electoral results we referred to "Prova radicale" which, in the second quote, publishes a number of tables and analytical diagrams by GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA (pp. 16-22). We based ourselves also on an essay on the radical vote, published in the book "I nuovi radicali", edited by Angelo Panebianco with the assistance of Massimo Teodori.
(172) "Notizie radicali", 10/10/79, p. 7, table 7.
(173) MARCO PANNELLA, »E se smettessimo di fare i radicali , "Prova radicale", n. 2, October 1976.
(174) PANNELLA, ibidem.
(175) "Notizie radicali", n. 17, 26th July 1976.
(176) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Torniamo allo statuto , "Notizie radicali", n. 15, 6th July 1976, p. 3.
(177) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 17, 26 July 1976.
(178) Giulio Ercolessi, quoted by RENATO VIVIAN, »Dentro il PR: Analisi diacronica dei rapporti dei militanti radicali con lo statuto del partito , published by the radical association of Udine, 1981, p. 28.
(179) "Notizie radicali", n. 18, July 1976, special insert "atti 16· congresso straordinario", p. 2.
(180) Resolution of the 16th congress.
(181) »Documento postcongressuale della segreteria sullo stato del partito , published on "Notizie radicali", n. 13, ibidem.
(182) MARCO PANNELLA, »E se smettessimo di fare i radicali? , cit.
(183) Cf. GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, »Con i referendum contro il regime , "Prova radicale", n. 5, December 1976, p. 10.
(184) Organizational resolution, 17th ordinary congress of the radical party, November 1976 "Notizie radicali", n. 182, 15th Nov. 1976.
(185) "Notizie radicali", n. 17, 26th July 1976, p. 2.
(186) PIERO IGNAZI, ANGELO PANEBIANCO, »I militanti radicali: composizione sociale e atteggiamenti politici , in AA.VV., "I nuovi radicali", Mondadori, MI, 1977, pp. 213-262.
