CHAPTER IV

PROJECT FOR A DIFFERENT ITALY

ABSTRACT: The chapter is divided into five paragraphs.

1. Unity of the left, ousting the DC: the course and the contradictions of radical politics from 1967 to 1972; non-violent initiatives of 1968 for east European countries; inner conflicts among the groups of Rome and Milan; the radicals' appraisal of the situation; the DC accused of being the heir of the "regime" (only the radical party can promote a "lay" alternative policy...). 2. Eight referenda to fight the regime: the abstention of 1972 and the beginning of the referendum strategy. First themes, the Concordat, the fascist rules of the penal code, the funding of the clerical schools, etc; the resolution of the Turin congress of 1972; the eight referenda of 1974, the referendum conflict on divorce. 3. Radicals and socialists, an awkward relationship; from the congress of Milan of 1974 ("at least 20% to the socialist forces to renew the left") to the founding of the "Lega XIII Maggio" and of the "ARA", etc. Launch of the campaign on abortion. 4. The second challenge to the Catholics, abortion. The "Pierobo

n case" to the opening of the "CISA", Centro Italiano Sterilizzazione e Aborto" (Italian Sterilization and Abortion centre) to the gathering of signatures. Failure of the proposal of a federative coalition with the PSI (1976). 5. Citizens and the establishment: "The charter of liberties": the elections of 20 June, and the renewal of the referendum strategy to defeat the "regime" of "national unity", established by the DC-PCI governing coalition.

(Lorenza Ponzone, IL PARTITO RADICALE NELLA POLITICA ITALIANA, 1962-1989, Schena editore, gennaio 1993)

1. Unity of the left, without the D.C.

A few months after the congress whereby the party was re-founded, the first of the self-called congresses envisioned by the statute was held in Florence in the first week of November 1967.

The radical analysis (187) was based on an appraisal of the emerging Italian political situation: the radicals thought such situation could seriously jeopardize our democracy. The R.P. identified the clerical dictatorship of the Christian Democratic Party, which neither the P.S.I. nor the P.R.I. had opposed, as the foundation of the regime. In fact, these two parties had been instrumental in perpetuating it, by participating in the centre-left governments. The policy of the P.C.I. was likewise criticized, which appeared to be stuck in a position of opposition and therefore a hostage of the D.C. no less than the other two "collaborationist" parties. Nonetheless, the radicals believed the situation was only apparently stagnant, because the parties of the left could not, in the long term, be subjected to the prevalence of the bureaucratic groups: the lay and leftist parties' position of subordination to the D.C. were in fact the result of an assessment of Italian society and there was a chance that those partie

s would reconsider their current alliances. Consistently, in their political resolution passed by the congress, the radicals indicated anti-clericalism and anti-militarism as themes capable of bringing together communists, socialists and liberals with the radical party.

The material objectives that were put forward for the short term were: the conversion of the military structures into civilian ones, withdrawal from NATO, demilitarization of the police forces, unilateral challenge of the Concordat, seizure of ecclesiastical assets, divorce, affirmation of a lay and libertarian sexual awareness.

The radicals' preferred interlocutor, in those years, was the Socialist Party, as we saw previously when we examined the situation that preceded divorce. This peculiar, often akward relationship is a constant in the radical party's history. The radicals attempted on that occasion to breathe their movementist method into the P.S.I., which was a party with libertarian elements but still organized in a very traditional way. Pannella himself had asked more than once to join the P.S.I.

The relationship with the P.C.I. was instead constantly tense, even though the radical party had been seeking its support ever since its refoundation. Without the contribution of the P.C.I., with its political and organizational framework and its socialist ties, it was impossible to pursue a realistic strategy of alternative to the D.C. The ground of conflict between the two parties was precisely on the themes on which the radical party had been attempting to build a unity of the left, i.e. anti-clericalism and anti-militarism. We have already analysed the first point when we talked about the campaigns for divorce, when the P.C.I. revealed its usual ambivalence. In fact, the entire history of the communist party after the war had been characterized by anti-clerical positions. As for the military structures, the communists did not agree on the radicals' propositions. The radical party advocated the complete elimination of the military structures, which in themselves represented, in their view, a threat to dem

ocracy; the communists were not as drastically against the military institutions (188). While contrary to the militarist ideology, they nonetheless believed that the problem could be solved by maintaining the popular characteristic of the army, constituted by the draft. The positions of the P.C.I. and of the R.P. on the military issue were therefore irreconcilable. The radical initiatives for the acknowledgment of conscientious objection were echoed by a number of catholic organizations; the draft bill for civil service was in fact introduced by a christian democratic member of parliament.

The vastness of the gap between the radicals and the other left-wing was revealed also by the chosen methods of struggle; the radicals used the ones that had been experimented in the United States and by the new European left-wing parties, adjusting them to the Italian situation with promptness and imagination.

This entirely new way of confronting the political struggle, unquestionably detached from the national tradition, intertwined, albeit marginally, with that of the movements arisen in 1968. However, the radicals were in a position external to the movements of '68, even if they shared some common objectives, as argued by Massimo Teodori (189). Teodori maintained that the radicals, together with the student movements, aimed to rock the stagnating political situation by resuming a left-wing initiative, and that both opposed the bureaucracy of the parties. The radicals viewed the students movement, the catholic dissent and the workers' spontaneous demonstrations as a confirmation of the validity of their methods of struggle. Nevertheless, the radical party officially disavowed the action of the movements, as can be clearly seen in a document of the national secretary Gianfranco Spadaccia (190), where he condemns the abstraction, the maximalism, the verbal revolutionariness and the sectarianism of the non-parliame

ntary groups, which he considered to be the heirs of the vices of the leftist tradition of our country. By taking such a stance vis-à-vis the movements, the radical party run the risk of isolating itself, but this was a calculated risk. On the other hand, the radicals considered the struggle for divorce and against the "clerical super-power" as essential (191).

As far as the methods of struggle with which the radicals tried to influence the events are concerned, we will recall the demonstration held in Sofia on September 24th, 1968 (192) by Pannella, Baraghini (member of the radical party's directorate), Azzolini (directive of the Roman federation) and Silvana Leonardi, to protest the Warsaw Pact troops' occupation of Czechoslovakia. On that occasion, flyers were distributed also against NATO and the Vietnam war; the participants in the demonstration were arrested and kept under custody for 24 hours and then expelled. The intention of the radical group was breaking the barrier of silence and proving that the opposition against the Soviet occupation was deeply felt by the Western socialist and pacifist movements, and at the same time demonstrating against the American imperialism. In other words, they wanted to prove that the radicals, consistently with the positions of the European left, were against military pacts.

Moreover, Pannella organized a collective hunger strike to support the pacifist movements in Czechoslovakia.

The pacifist element, which had always been present in the radical party, emerged clearly in 1969 with the creation of the League for the recognition of conscientious objection (LOC), whose militants, who were non-radicals, demonstrated against militarism by acts of civil disobedience (some and them were arrested) (193). These activities attracted a number of young new militants, including Roberto Ciccciomessere, who was to become secretary of the radical party in November 1970 at the age of 24. A first traumatic event occurred in the life of the radical party during the congress of November 1969 (Milan) when the entire Milanese group, the second most important after the Roman one, broke away from the party (194). The reason for the schism was the party's methods. We know that the radical party, and the Roman group in particular, had privileged the single concrete campaigns, and had gathered supporters on these issues without introducing any general theorization. Both the "movementists" and the new members,

who came from various leftist formations, did not agree on this strategy, and demanded a "global" policy, to include the radical party's interventions in the various sectors of society.

This approach conflicted with the pragmatic nature of the re-founders of the party, who had experienced how unfeasable the Milanese groups' demands were. For instance, at the political elections of 1968, the radical party had suggested to give in blank ballot papers, in view also of the small organizational structure (195). The Milanese group, dissenting with the decision of the central bodies, introduced a radical list in the Milan-Pavia constituency, where it obtained 1500 votes--a defeat that damaged the party's image. The positions assumed by the radical leadership, in contrast with those of the Milanese group, on the one hand politically isolated the party, estranging it from the movements that were operating on the Italian and European political scene, and on the other hand contributed to preserve its identity. In fact, in the years to come, the non-parliamentary groups were marginalized or disappeared from the political altogether, whereas the radical party, which had kept out of the movements, was ab

le to continue influencing Italian society. A significant factor of this sixth congress was the extremely scarce participation of its members, barely 31 (196), a fact which reflected the atmosphere of indifference surrounding the issues promoted by the radical party, a non-violent party, at a moment in which forces which contained a strong element of violence were operating. With its "liberal" messages and its democratic methods of struggle, the radical party apparently seemed to be a movement of its own, with no link to history. In the meanwhile, the radicals waged a thorough battle to obtain divorce. During the subsequent 7th extraordinary congress (Rome, 9-10 May 1970), they decided to propose an agreement to the Socialist Party for the regional elections of 1970 (197). In exchange for the passage of the bill on divorce and of that on conscientious objection and for the democratization of the public media, they pledged to guarantee the radical vote to the P.S.I. Pannella justified the radical support of t

he socialists by recalling that the P.S.I. in that period had been an essential element for the passage of the statute of workers and the laws for the creation of the regions (198). The radical leader said the P.S.I., both the base and the leadership, seemed to better understand the need to carry out civil rights battles.

Lastly, Pannella was certain that the agreement with the P.S.I would have had a cementing function for the entire left, from the communists to the social-proletarians, from the socialists to the radicals, for all lay parties and generally for the democratic struggle in Italy.

The scarcity of the party's consent emerged also at the 7th congress (Naples 1-3 November 1970): only 80 members participated, despite the consent of opinion that was spreading throughout the country thanks to the civil rights campaigns (199). It was the eve of the final vote on divorce, and the radical party presented itself as a minority force, but one that could point out new objectives which the political forces would have had to confront in the years to come: the liberalization of women, the liberalization of contraception, the legalization of abortion, in cooperation with the newly founded women's liberation movement (200).

Basically this congress confirmed the validity of the political line established by the previous congresses, despite the huge difficulties caused by the scarce number of adherents and the misunderstanding on the part of the other political forces. It was decided to devise precise instruments of common action with political groups outside the party, such as the liberal left and the republican youth federation and other groups that were generically libertarian, which had guarantied their willingness to carry out common struggles with the radical party.

The congress reiterated the proposal of a referendum to repeal the Concordat, which had already been advanced in 1968 and during the 6th and 7th congresses. During the 9th congress, that was held in Milan on 22/2/71, the constitution of the League for the Abrogation of the Concordat was decided together with the liberals and the republicans. As we saw, the League (201) proved to have scarce initiative, and while all other movements sought a compromise with the Catholic forces, the radicals were isolated on the theme of the Concordat and eventually dropped the idea of the referendum, causing the League to be disbanded.

To come out of its isolation, in the early seventies the radical party sensed that the time had come to reflect on the future of the party, once the bill on divorce had been approved and the relations with the other parties were no longer of cooperation.

The radical leader expressed his ideas in an editorial published by "Notizie Radicali" in the issue of July 1971 (202). He started by acknowledging a continuity between the christian democratic government and the fascist regime, and said that the D.C. had occupied every part of society and of the political system according to the methods of the fascist corporatism, and had reduced the republican constitution to a swindle, a mirage never attained.

By expressing such point of view, the radicals presented themselves as the inflexible champions of the Constitution, of the written law and of the democratic methods. Therefore, they fully embraced the democratic states as a permanent value, a constant in the history of the radical party, which was to express itself in the struggles of the country and in the institutions.

The radicals' fundamental intention was succeeding in reinstating democracy with its set of rules, which had been frozen by those who had occupied positions of power since world war II. The most alarming aspect of such a decaying situation was represented, according to Pannella, by the fact that the progressivist forces, instead of gathering together in an alternative, on the model of the perfect Anglo-Saxon two-party system, cooperated in actual fact with the opposite political expressions. The radicals in other words tried to hinder any reinstament of that system of consociate democracy which, after having been experimented covertly, was to be adopted openly a few years later in the governments of national solidarity. While refusing on the one hand the traditional way of making politics and inventing new types of intervention in society, the radical party on the other hand aimed to a revitalization of the democratic-parliamentary system which had never been fully applied. Basically, the radical party colle

cted the legacy of the old bourgeois battles.

Now that the conditions in which the radical party operated at the beginning of the seventies had changed, at the 10th congress (Rome, November 1971) Pannella suggested to disband the party (203). The "final" solution advocated by the radical leader was justified by the situation of extreme unease for the radical party following the submissive policy openly supported by the communist party headed by Berlinguer, which made any prospect of an alternative ever more difficult. That common element of all parties of the left on which the radicals had based their unitarian policy no longer existed, and it was thus necessary for the party to devise a new role for itself, if necessary refounding the party for the second time in its brief history.

The 10th congress did not accept Pannella's proposal of self-dissolution; among the founders, Mellini, Bandinelli and Teodori opposed the proposal, albeit with different positions (204). Mauro Mellini said the party was to remain in life because there were needs in the party which, in the absence of the radical party, would have remained unexpressed. Until then the radicals had deliberately chosen to engage into specific initiatives rather than strengthening the party. That is why, Mellini argued, the organizations such as the League for Divorce (LID) had expanded to the detriment of the radical party. This said, it was necessary not to destroy an organ such as the radical party, which had proven to be vital and capable of a vast mobilization, and to enrich the federative structures with the moral legacy of all civil rights battles. Massimo Teodori expressed a more optimistic position. He believed that the end of the "regime" in Italy would necessarily have brought about contradictions in which the radical p

arty could have found space to operate: the emerging needs of the Italian society coincided with the radical party's range of action. An intermediate position was expressed by Spadaccia, who appeared to oppose both an unquestioning continuation and Pannella's suggestion. According to Spadaccia the only law that counted was the one on the number and the political force, so that the party was to consolidate itself and create actual structures of struggle. Thus, he considered the analysis outlined by Teodori as inadequate, because he believed that the supposed existence of contradictions in the current political system did not entail the possibility for the radical party to have the necessary strength to take advantage of such contradictions. Spadaccia realistically set a deadline for the party, a sort of trial that would have averted the immediate closure envisioned by Pannella, but also the continuation without changes suggested by Teodori. The deadline would have coincided with the political elections of '73

, where the radicals were to be in the condition to present their own lists.

The 10th congress closed with a resolution that was a compromise between the various positions (205). A specific objective was decided: at least 1,000 members by November 1972 or close the party. However, this objective called for a political type of acknowledgment: the radical party appeared to be the only hypothesis of lay party existing in Italy, and this destroyed any deception about creating a party to express all lay, libertarian and progressivist demands. At least in the short term, the radical party remained the only anti-regime force capable of attracting those "liberal" movements of opinion that still existed in the country despite the conformism of the left-wing parties of the coalition.

2. Eight referenda against the regime

In January 1972, the radicals brought out the problem of direct participation in the political elections of 1973, which were in theory scheduled for '73 but which were more and more likely to be held a year earlier. Gianfranco Spadaccia assumed the most clear-cut position (206). The electoral presence of the radical party appeared to him as indispensable to extend the range of consent around the party, the only means the radicals had to make themselves known and multiply the number of militants.

The occasion to experiment the response of the electorate was provided a year ahead of time on February 28th, 1972: for the first time in the Italian history, the president of the Republic, Giovanni Leone, dissolved Parliament ahead of time and called elections for the following 7 May.

The radicals were to take into account rather unfavorable objective conditions, especially because of the rules of the state-owned television for the elections established by the parliamentary committee of control, whereby only parties that were already represented in Parliament could have access to the media.

The fact of being excluded from the most powerful of media (commercial TVs could not broadcast at the time) placed the radical party in a situation of near impotence. The party lacked any organizational support and could not count on the "tradition" effect of the parties that were already represented in Parliament for the obvious reason that it was participating in the elections for the first time. The only means they had to express their ideas was the magazine "Prova radicale", established in Autumn 1971, but this had a small circulation, was distributed only to subscribers or sold in the libraries of large cities.

Thus, in the context of the policy of unity to the left and also in order to come out of its isolation, the radical party proposed to the group of Il Manifesto to present five common lists (207). The initiative, which was advanced by five members of the directive (Mellini, Pannella, Franco Sircana, Spadaccia, Teodori) struck the majority of the members as rash and incoherent, considering the ideological differences between the communists who had been expelled from the P.C.I. and the radicals. The five exponents justified their choice with the fact that it was necessary to create an anti-regime momentum in an election which they considered to be a "fraud". The ex-communists did not accept "the regime of blackmail of the traditional parties". Moreover - and it was the most important reason of the radical proposal - the two movements converged on the use of the referendum, in refusing state capitalism and in struggling against clericalism. The lists proposed by the radical party were to be "open", capable of at

tracting different forces. However, "Il Manifesto" refused the alliance with the radical party. The former communist group provided a strictly ideological justification.

According to them, the process of aggregation among different forces of the anti-capitalist area had not been advanced enough. They reminded the radicals that in the past there had been no confrontation of positions and experiences. In other words, that there had been no practical verification on the things to be done together.

Following the refusal of "Il Manifesto", the radical party suggested an abstention (208). The radicals assumed this submissive position for reasons that were remote from the reasons proclaimed by the ultra-leftist movements (Lotta Continua, Potere Operaio and similar groups) and not out of a doctrinal mistrust towards this form of democracy. On the contrary, the radicals reaffirmed the value of the elections as a necessary practice for the democratic life.

They distanced themselves from the anarchist conception, and reaffirmed that the libertarian struggles were to pass essentially through the institutions. To abstain from voting was an act of resistance against the regime, an act of civil disobedience, of non-cooperation with a government considered to be "illegal". Refusing to vote was not, therefore, a demonstration of mistrust, but a constructive act of opposition. Actually there was also a practical reason for which the radical party had advocated abstention: the party was not equipped to face the elections. The political structures the radicals disposed of were small, overburdened by tasks and failing those material means which all other parties disposed of, and in large quantities. Lastly, the radicals were sentenced to silence because of the lack of access to radio and television--the only means that would have allowed them to submit the radical project and proposals to the judgment of the public opinion.

The circumstances being what they were, the radicals said they were convinced that the lay, anti-clerical and pro-divorce individuals could not be represented by any of the left-wing parties, whose leaders would one day "negotiate some under-privilege with the clerical world represented by the D.C.".

Hence the radicals' invitation to their supporters to defend divorce, win the referendum, repeal the concordat, unite in the Leagues and above all join the radical party, which needed new contributions more than ever. The radicals' appeal was intended also to the faithful, who would have been oppressed by the suffocating grip of an ever authoritarian Church: the only alternative for the Catholics consisted not in a dialogue with Berlinguer or with the "frontists" of the P.S.I., but to organize themselves personally to affirm their objectives. Thus, the anti-militarists were to come to believe that their theses on the dangers inherent in the military structures were to proceed hand in hand with the other anti-authoritarian battles the radicals had been waging for years. Likewise the socialists, who refused the bureaucratic model, were to come out of the usual channels and join the radicals' libertarian struggles. Lastly, the radicals' invitation was addressed to the democrats, who by joining, participating an

d helping the radical party would have guarantied the survival of this open and available means--the radical party.

According to the radicals, the alternative to voting was creative, and neither remissive nor anti-democratic.

Therefore, even if they invited the public not to vote, the radicals continued their commitment, and kept faith to their traditional organizational philosophy: creating movements through groups of work and intervention (people who share the ideals of laicism, who are in favour of divorce, against militarism and against the Concordat) with their own rules and adhering to the radical project.

Nonetheless, the radical abstention was not irrevocable. The radical party subsequently participated in the vote at two conditions. First: the actual possibility of contributing to the electoral contest on the basis of equal conditions for all parties. Second: the opportunity to present a global political project.

In the meanwhile, having acknowledged in 1972 that part of the experiences of the party were over, the radicals launched a new strategy destined to shake the stagnant Italian political scene for the entire subsequent decade. After the political elections where they had suggested not to vote, before deciding what to do, the radicals asked themselves this question: could a small force such as the radical party face the difficulties and isolation, without reducing itself to an action of mere testimony or, even worse, isolating itself in sectarianism? The radical party had distinguished itself from the other non-parliamentary forces, and had refused to carry out a merely critical function of stirring the large parties of the traditional left. Among other things, it had never carried out any action of disturbance with respect to the policy of the P.S.I., P.C.I., P.S.I.U.P., capable of eroding the margins of dissent.

The radical party's ambition was vaster: it wanted to impose with its political action truly alternative objectives, and seek for such objectives unitarian political solutions that could involve the entire array of the parties of the left.

At this point the radicals wondered with what means they could have effectively influenced the Italian situation. Sectarian initiatives, as in the past, were no longer sufficient. The anti-militarist commitments and the actions in the various movements for civil rights were incapable, per se, of affecting the political coalitions or of getting the public opinion involved. They needed an initiative capable of upsetting the existing situation or of intruding effectively into this situation. To allow for a far-reaching political initiative that could enable a small party to affect the institutional reality of the country, in July 1972 (209) the radicals started to think about a referendum. In other words, about whether this tool of direct democracy could have fulfilled their political project. We said that in the same period the radical party had opposed all compromises that wanted to avoid a referendum on divorce. The referendum was inherent in the very nature of the radical party, therefore resorting to this

constitutional tool of direct democracy could not be privileged by a movement that was based on the participation of ordinary people. It could be managed from the roots, autonomously, through popular mobilization without resorting to the organizational mediation of the parties and of the parliamentary institutions.

Moreover, the radicals viewed the referendum as a potentially unitarian means, in that it would have allowed to seek consent already while collecting signatures, regardless of any schism with the various parties. It was a realistic choice because it took into account the peculiarity of the Italian electorate, which generally voted in the wake of ideological or personal motivations. Thus, the only way to shift it towards progressivist positions was that of stirring its interest on concrete and direct issues. The other point the radicals based themselves on in choosing the referendum was the possibility of including themes which the parties of the left kept aside in order to avoid upsetting the parliamentary balance into the political struggle by means of a parliamentary action. They believed they could upset the legislature which, at that moment, expressed a different and conservative majority (210). Also, the referendum campaign would have ultimately allowed the radical party to gain access, as a promoting c

ommittee, to state-owned television, and thus break the barrier of silence. Lastly, it should be remarked that the referendum provided the radicals with the much sought opportunity of finding an institutional and legislative outlet for the action outside Parliament; failing this outlet, all of the radicals' initiatives seemed pointless, a self-justified demonstration. During the 11th congress, the radical leadership materially launched several projects of referenda, and prepared the plans for the organization of the gathering of signatures. Three referendum initiatives were suggested: one to repeal the rules of the implementation of the Concordat, one to repeal the fascist rules of the penal code and another one to repeal the laws that ensured funds for the clerical welfare and schools (211). It was important for the radicals to succeed in sharing the organizational instruments with the other parties and together carry out information campaigns. The radical party had no other solution, considering that the c

onstitutional regulations and the law that regulated the referendum set such a high minimum number of signatures (500,000 certified signatures) as to call for the support of strong organizations which only large parties had. Quite rightly the radicals remarked that only two forces were in the condition to resort to this institution without problems: the unions and the parishes--two organisms that were extremely widespread on the territory. Apart from these two forces, only the P.C.I. would have had the possibility of gathering such a large number of signatures.

Hence, the radicals argued, the reappearance of the bipolar nature of the political contest in Italy: the Church on the one hand and the communist party on the other. Thus, precisely an institution included in our constitutional system as a complement of representative democracy, conceived therefore to insert into the political contest issues and problems alien from the political and parliamentary balance would have eventually been controlled, for organizational reasons, by the two hegemonic forces. Nonetheless, in the map of the organized forces in Italy, the radical party could boast the experience and a number of basic instruments to seriously and concretely prepare a vast and--for that period--new organizational work. The radicals had acquired this heritage of ideas, of capacity to mobilize and to make an occasionally ruthless use (in a positive sense) of alternative means (hunger strikes, marches, etc) in the struggles for divorce and in the university organizations of the fifties.

Also, the radicals possessed a number of practical instruments such as a mailing list with over 300,000 names collected by organizations close to the party or during radical political initiatives (divorce, anti-militarism, women's liberation, anti-Concordat( (212).

Consistently with their political project, the radicals as a unity of alternative forces, conceived to involve the non-parliamentary movements, the ecclesiastical communities and other organizations such as the women's liberation movement and the movement for the abolition of the crime of abortion in the referendum initiatives, as well as all the lay left-wing parties and the unions. In other words, an opportunity to merge and unite all the progressivist forces.

They addressed themselves in particular to the various non-parliamentary movements such as "Il Manifesto", "Lotta Continua", that were involved in agitative mobilizations, to urge them to contribute to changing the social and institutional reality. Moreover, they concerned themselves with the community of Catholics, who were very active, to make them realize that the struggle for a religious renewal was closely linked to a more explicit civil commitment.

The program proper was to be prepared by a special congress after a debate and a working group.

Before confronting such a difficult struggle for a small movement kept together by non-professionals of politics, the radical party wanted to gather its base to verify whether it could rely on sufficient forces to tackle the responsibilities that would have resulted from such far-reaching initiatives. In other words, whether this shot in the dark would have been worth the attempt. Organization, therefore, was the sore spot for the radicals who were preparing to organize the referendum campaigns. The minimum objective of 1,000 members for an effective functioning had already been set by the 10th Congress, or the party would have chosen self-dissolution. The target had been achieved. At the 11th Congress held in Turin on November 1972, the party counted 1,300 members, of which 900 were first members. 18% also belonged to other parties. This last circumstance is important because it proved that the consent on the radical initiatives could come also from other sectors.

In that period a number of exponents of the republican left, such as Franco Corleone and Mercedes Bresso, approached the radical party, strengthening the Milanese group (213). The problem was also how to widen the territorial structure if the party which, in the intentions of the radicals, was to be lay and libertarian and could not continue to be "Roman, single-headed and charismatic". The militancy of the radical party increased in the imminence of this 11th congress, as a consequence of a number of direct initiatives taken by the party (214).

Proselytism could have had given better results if the radicals had devoted more energies to strengthening the party. But they preferred the radical party to be a force of unitarian and alternative service for all groups of the socialist and libertarian left (215). They operated not to strenghthen the party but to organize civil battles such as that for the release of the conscientious objectors, for the release of the anarchist Valpreda; they spent their energies with unitarian popular demonstrations which they defined "anti-regime". At any rate, the objective established by the previous congress of Rome had been reached; thus, in Turin the party was able to announce its survival and also approve a far-reaching resolution which anticipated the conflict with the D.C. During the Turin congress the project of a popular referendum on civil rights issue was also disclosed. The struggle for conscientious objection and for the release of Valpreda also reached its climax with Pannella's and Gardini's hunger strike.

The resolution passed by the 11th congress (216), consistently with the constant policy against the dominating party, points to the D.C. as the natural heir of the National Fascist Party and stresses that the left, as a whole, was incapable of opposing this "party-regime"; thus, the policy of this left proved "subordinated to the state corporatism which has consolidated itself especially in the public sectors inherited by fascism". As for Parliament, according to the radicals it was reduced to passing, often unanimously, thousands of corporative laws and sub-laws and shunned any real reform; in the radicals' views, the Chambers on the contrary were to be the seat of a debate on major issues, such as divorce, abortion, conscientious objection. The 11th congress, after having pitilessly judged the by now paralysed Italian political situation, thought that it was necessary to pursue precise, clear projects which could be managed at the roots, by the democratic masses, by true socialists, communists, by the mino

rities, which are revolutionary when they link the affirmation of their rights to the advantage of the community. On these political bases, the radical party suggested to resort to the popular will: the only measure that could have lead to the complete application of the constitutional covenant, to the repeal of the reactionary laws in favour of human rights, of the rights of the workers and citizens. The congress resolution suggested and committed to calling five abrogating popular referenda that concerned the laws for the application of the Concordat, the authoritarian provisions of the penal code (e.g. crime of abortion and drug consumption), the military codes, the public funding of private schools, the laws on the press that restricted civil liberties.

Year 1973 opened favourably for the radical party. The first political initiatives were launched (217). On 11 February 1973, Loris Fortuna, in agreement with the radical party and with the women's liberation movement, introduced in Parliament the first bill for the depenalization of abortion. The struggle which had started three years previously by the radical newsletter had begun to involve the institutions and therefore the organized political forces, which would no longer have been able to shun the discussion on a problem which many European countries had already tackled. With a letter to the daily newspaper "Il Messaggero", Pannella opened another front, as trumpeted by "Notizie Radicali" in its January 27, 1973 issue: that of drugs. The radical leader defended the young marijuana and hashish smokers and announced his intention of publicly smoking soft drugs together with other radical militants. It was a provocative demonstration against the strongly punitive bill introduced by the Andreotti government

against drug consumers.

The force of the radical party, formed by some 1,300 members who had decided self-financing and self-administration, was by now a reality; the refounding of the party, decided by the congress of November 1972, no longer appeared to be simple wishful thinking. However, the primary and solemn commitment which the radical party had assumed was far from achieved: the work for the organization of the five referenda made no progress. It took the following congress of November to perfect the political platform of the referendum campaign, but the delay seemed like a huge mistake, because it would have jeopardized other political forces' willingness to carry out together with the radicals this project of tremendous importance for the future conditions of the institutions.

That is why an extraordinary congress was called in the middle of summer 1973 in Rome (July 8-9). This congress, which proved to be one of the most intense and interesting, gave two important results: the adhesion of all major non-parliamentary groups (Il Manifesto, Lotta continua, Avanguardia operaia, Partito comunista marxista-leninista) and of the left-wing current of the Republican party to the radical project (218). The other fact was the declared commitment of many militants from peripheral offices to participate in the organizational work in Rome: the base of participants in the daily activity, which had until then been carried out by a small group living in Rome, was thus extended. The congress also highlighted the convergence on the radical political project of some forces of the left, which the radical party had always shown interest for and which had joined in the battle for divorce. Giacomo Mancini, at the time one of the most eminent representatives of the Socialist Party, had sent a message of

greeting to the radical congress, with expressions of encouragement. Moreover, among the participants in the congress were Vincenzo Balzamo, in charge of civil rights for the socialist party, and Fabrizio Cicchitto of the left wing of the same party. From an operational point of view, the congress decided to establish a committee for the management of the referenda, to assist the national secretariat and the other party organs; moreover, it was to charge a committee with the organization of a radical daily newspaper.

Thus were laid the political and organizational bases to call the abrogating referenda for 1975. However the most important, and in fact unexpected, result of the radical strategy was the convergence of constitutional and non-parliamentary forces on the common project of the entire left, of all those who struggled for a renewal.

That is why the radical party asked its militants and supporters, the adherents of the civil rights leagues to relaunch the initiatives so as to testify the radical presence as a cementing agent for all pro-referendum groups. After the congress, the socialist party of proletarian union also joined in. All these forces, while heterogeneous, joined in the referendum project and stressed their political and organizational independence.

Lotta Continua suggested to select and concentrate the referenda on two or three points: Codice Rocco, military codes and abortion.

Moreover, new mailing lists were created, and the first working committees at the provincial level were formed (219). The 13th Congress (November 1-2-3 1973) specified the package of referenda. The conditions and contents of the project were also laid down. The congress assembly selected eight groups of arguments, eight referenda. It was a highly ambitious project, which raised many a perplexity on the technical possibility of launching eight referendums at the same time, considering the size of the radical party, which counted no more than a thousand members.

The congress, however, decided to maintain the global project, the eight referendums. This decision had a political meaning: it wanted to prove the existence of an alternative to the "regime (DC) and its narrowness" as declared in the final resolution (220).

The party sought the cooperation of the parliamentary and non-parliamentary forces, in other words, of the "liberals" and the revolutionaries, with an open form, devising organizational structures outside the existing ones. It was the only possible process for the democratic minorities, which with the referendum would have been able to urge the masses towards an at least vaguely socialist renewal. The party system, on the contrary, was unable to interpret particular demands because it lacked a background of mobilization; the left-wing parties in our countries were so institutionalized as to avoid any conflicts or tension with the class opponents.

The criterion used to select the eight referenda which we will specify below followed practical reasons as well. The technique of the referendums called for the collection of 500,000 signatures for each law to be repealed, in front of public officials who certified the authenticity and completed the signatures with the electoral certificates of the subscribes. That is why the promoters were to effect a strict choice, starting from the sectors where the survival of the old regulations appeared to be more scandalous (221). The indication for a choice in favour of the radicals was the results of the campaigns of the last years: the battles which the radical party and the other movements concerned, from conscientious objectors to advocated of divorce, to the supporters pf the legalization of abortion. The reflection on all of those civil rights campaigns resulted in the choices of the sectors which it was necessary to involve, also politically, with the system of the popular repeal. The bases of the clerical pow

er, the instruments of ordinary and military repression and the media were to be submitted to referendum. By affecting those four sectors, the radical party meant to unsettle the political balance and the very democratic life of the country, restoring "that amount of truth, confrontation, civil and ideal commitment failing which democracy no longer exists" (222).

The proposed referendums concerned the following issues.

First: art. 1 of law of 27 May 1929 that ordered the execution of the treaty and of the Concordat signed by the Holy See and Italy, that laid down privileges and advantages of the Catholic Church, especially as regards taxation, education, family and penal law; second, articles 17 and 22 of the above mentioned law, which recognized effective civil rights to the ecclesiastic sentences of annulment of concordat marriages; third, the total repeal of the military peace code; fourth: the repeal of the military judicial regulations; fifth: the repeal of the association of journalists; sixth: repeal of the law that restricted freedom of press; seventh: freedom of antenna; eight and last: repeal of a number of repressive norms of the penal code, such as life imprisonment, crimes of opinion and crime of abortion (223). On 15 March 1974 the radical party began to gather signatures for the eight referendums; the organization was territorially organized into 135 local committees, with hundreds of tables in the squares a

nd streets of major centres, from Northern to Southern Italy (224).

At the same time, the campaign for the referendum on divorce was opened, which had been scheduled for 12 May; the radicals thought this coincidence would have represented an element of strength. Things went differently. The radical party was unexpectedly the one only to gather signatures for the eight referendums, abandoned by the non-parliamentary groups on whose organizational assistance the radicals were counting on. As may be seen in chart 7, only two committees had been organized by the extra-parliamentary movements; Lotta Continua said that the commitment for the referendum on divorce was to be privileged with respect to the one for the collection of signatures for the other eight referendums (225). Il Manifesto confirmed its support, but this proved to be mere lip-service. The same position was taken by the P.D.U.P.. The contribution of the P.S.I. and of the U.I.L. was, on the other hand, significant (Cf. table 7), a demonstration of the socialists' attention toward the radical project. The communists

revealed instead an ill-masked hostility toward the referendums. They accused the radicals of wanting to help Fanfani, by squandering energies for referenda of scarce political utility.

With such a shaky situation, a few weeks before the vote of May 12, the radicals decided to stop gathering signatures (226).

After the result of the referendum on divorce, which resulted in a triumphant victory for the pro-divorce front, especially in the economically backward areas of the country, the radicals resumed the collection of signatures on 15 June. The only ones to provide any assistance were the adherents of Avanguardia Operaia. The campaign was a failure nonetheless, and the radicals collected a scant 100,000 signatures for each referendum request.

It cannot be denied that the radical political strategy was almost sensationally confirmed by the result of the referendum on divorce: the real country the radical party had always believed in proved, unexpectedly for the beliefs of the parties of the left, more advanced that the legal one. For the first time, a successful unitarian left-wing coalition had been formed. The alternative of the progressivist forces had been achieved by means of an instrument of popular mobilization such as the referendum. However, the failure of the signature gathering confirmed the need for a more accurate organization, or for a closer link with the other political forces concerned about the problem.

This failure deeply unsettled the radical party: the young secretary, Giulio Ercolessi, who had perhaps been incapable of a strong leadership throughout the signature gathering campaign, resigned his position in summer 1974 (227). The crisis extended to the collegial treasury, elected in the Verona congress in November 73: so that only Gianfranco Spadaccia was left to guide the destiny both of the secretariat and of the treasury. Despite the crisis, the radical party's credibility had immensely increased in the eyes of the public opinion: ordinary people who were weary of professional politicians, viewed the radical message, symbolized by its leader Marco Pannella, as the solution to the evils of party power. In other words, it began to recognize itself in a minority which had managed to impose, opposing the immense conservative forces, the inviolability of the law on divorce. A further growth had been nonetheless hindered by the denied access to state-owned television for the minorities.

In order to acquire such right, which was essential to move the masses in the referendum initiative, a group of radical militants started a hunger strike (228). After the referendum the hunger strike was continued, also by militants of various cities and minor centres. In fact it became an action of civil disobedience proper. In mid-July Pannella's hunger strike, after seventy days, became a dramatic fact, and the media started to pay attention to it: the president of the republic decided to receive the radical leader to show him his interest "for the value of his action". The most important result of the long hunger strike was the renewed mobilization of the militants who, after the failure of the signature gathering for the referendums, had isolated themselves. In view of the consent on Pannella's initiative, they had multiplied the direct actions. It is interesting to note the reaction of the most important political forces with respect to Pannella's individual action. The republican Adolfo Battaglia cons

idered the instruments of the action of conscience "utopian" and inadequate for the reality of the moment. The communists remarked upon the non-centrality and non-urgency for the national life of supporting civil rights, and said they opposed the actions of the minorities, that were not to replace the action of the masses and parties that represented them (229). The conservative lay parties claimed instead that the tradition of the previous radicalism of the fifties had been infringed. Nonetheless, the radical message got through in the end, thanks to the hunger strikes of many militants and by means of televised information. A new factor was that whereas only about a few hundred thousand citizens had come into contact, in some form, with the radical initiatives, in the summer of 1974 there was a sudden leap and millions of people were reached. Therefore a huge improvement was how the radicals viewed their access to television. Now they could extend the area of knowledge of their civil rights campaigns to th

e whole of Italy. It would have been possible at last to carry out general campaigns for the country: the audience was Italy at large. It was a huge progress, if we think that only a few years previously the radicals were a few dozen "desperados".

3. Radicals and socialists: a difficult relationship

Despite the enlargement of consent with the public opinion, the success of the 12 May voting on divorce and Parliament's first commitment to discuss the bill on abortion, the 14th radical congress (Milan, 1/4 November 1974) experienced a widespread pessimism on the political future towards the parties of the left, which concentrated on achieving coalitions or compromises with the traditional enemy, that same D.C. which had imposed a "regime" in Italy (230).

The debate at the congress of Milan was characterized by the effort to define a general political line for the party, a platform for the leading organs and for the militants. This time the confrontation on the political prospects seemed to prevail, whereas the conflict on the immediate objectives was secondary.

The referendums, from the congress debate onward, no longer appear to be an instrument of the radical initiatives. A common alternative program was discussed, which the entire area of the left could not avoid participating in. There was open talk about a participation of the radicals in the subsequent elections. Nevertheless the congress realistically acknowledged the organizational difficulties the radical party would have experienced in order to effectively address the elections. With such prospects, it could only change the relations with the other political formations. To that end, the radical party's role would have had to become clearer: not only the radicals were to carry out an activity of denunciation, pressure, controversy, but they would also have to operate to strengthen the socialist-libertarian component of the left. In other words, promote a coalition at least on given material objectives of the parties of the left. The debate hinged on these issues during the Congress, which clearly highlight

ed the "socialist" image of the radical party, which placed itself in a prospect as government force: in the congress resolution, the party set itself the objective of attaining 20% of the Italian electorate at least for the socialist forces, in order to rebalance the Italian left (231) and thus make an alternative realistically possible.

This congress of Milan, therefore, reiterated those privileged relations which the radicals had always had with the socialists. While leader of the radicals, Pannella had not renewed his membership for over a year in order to move more freely within the various parties of the left, with the constant end of building uo the alternative to the D.C. In such prospect, at the congress of Milan, he announced the founding of the "socialist movement for civil rights and liberties-May 13 League" and declared that from that moment on he wanted to operate as a socialist militant.

Massimo Teodori, who in '71-'73 had already published on "Prova Radicale" debates with exponents of the socialists left such as Riccardo Lombardi, handling the prospects of socialism in Europe, in January 1975 founded together with a few socialist intellectuals the ARA association "Azione e Ricerca per l'Alternativa" (Action and Research for an Alternative) (232). The radicals had chosen the socialist party as main interlocutor, because in that period this party seemed torn between cooperating with the DC or opening itself to "more advanced coalitions".

The radicals judged such perplexity to be a sign of possible changes. The P.S.I., which was in the radicals' eyes the only political movement which also contained a "movementist" force and thus could lead it to be part of the coalition for the alternative. The communist party had instead chosen a final strategy which inevitable lead to a coalition with the Catholic masses.

The pro-socialist initiatives hinging on "ARA" were not developed and remained in the cultural milieu.

The initiatives promoted by Pannella instead such as the campaign to depenalize abortion, received the official endorsement of the P.S.I., which contributed 60 million and gathered the support of many people all over the national territory (68 committees for the gathering of signatures were established) (233).

4. The second challenge to the Catholics: abortion

The radicals launched the campaign on abortion after introducing the above mentioned Fortuna bill into Parliament. The opportunity to mobilize the public opinion on the problem of abortion was offered by the trial against Gigliola Pierobon in June 1973. Gigliola Pierobon had been charged with procured abortion at the age of sixteen. The feminists that adhered to the Women's Liberation Movement took the opportunity of this trial and self-denounced themselves in the same court-room where Pierobon was being tried for committing a crime of abortion. The case stirred a controversy on the press, and even weekly magazines such as "Annabella" gave ample coverage (234). Thus, once again the radicals has succeeded, with a direct action, to break the silence of the conservative press on an issue that affected all women. In September of the same year, the radical daily "Liberazione" published the self-denunciations of fifty more women, while the Movement demonstrated in front of Parliament to obtain the discussion of th

e Fortuna bill.

But all this was not enough to change the situation: the communist party took a stance against the liberalization of abortion; and the radicals thus lost the vital support of the largest party of the left. The non-achievement of the number of signatures necessary to call the referendum was another blow at the radical initiative. When the battle seemed to be irreparably lost, Pannella used the weapon of an all-out hunger strike, and was interviewed by state television. This surprisingly led millions of people to hear about abortion.

In the meanwhile, as the radical initiative was encountering serious difficulties, the CISA ((Centro italiano sterilizzazione aborto) (Italian Sterilization and Abortion Centre) was established. In 1974 it set up advisory bureaus all over Italy, where abortion was performed practically free of charge (235).

The activity of these centres was not clandestine: in fact it was amply publicized. The abortion practices continued, undisturbed, until the right-wing weekly "Candido" published an article where it denounced the CISA centre of Florence, causing the judiciary to deal with the matter. The gynaecologist Giorgio Conciani, who worked at the centre, was arrested. A few days later Gianfranco Spadaccia, national secretary of the radical party, was also arrested after assuming the political responsibility of the CISA's activities (236). There followed a series of arrested and convictions: Adele Faccio and Emma Bonino were tried for their support to the centre for the liberalization of abortion, the first in January 1975 and the latter the following June. The reaction of the police and of the judiciary towards the supporters of the abrogating referendum of the crime of abortion raised the interest of two major weekly magazines, Espresso and Panorama, as well as that of the country's progressivist opinion. On 5 Februa

ry 1975, both the request for the referendum on abortion and on the other four subjects approved by the 14th Congress (concordat, crimes of opinion of the penal code, military judicial regulations and military penal code) were also introduced at the Court of Cassation. Following the introduction of the petitions, the institutional campaign was enhanced by a mobilization based on civil disobedience. A huge amounts of self-denunciations were given to the Court of Cassation and as a consequence judicial notifications were sent to all the self-denounced (237). On 18 February the Constitutional Court declared the rules that punished the crime of abortion partially illegitimate, thus depenalizing medical abortion. In the meanwhile a "parliamentary front" was opened: all parliamentary groups except that of the M.S.I. introduced a draft bill on abortion. On 15 April a signature gathering campaign was launched in the squares and streets of all major centres. Pannella managed to obtain the support of L'Espresso only f

or the referendum on abortion; the U.I.L. labour union and many socialists federations also endorsed the campaign (238). At that stage of the referendum battle, the radicals, considering the support of many lay and progressivist circles on their initiative for abortion, decided to suspend the signature gathering for the other four referendums, and concentrated their organizational effort on the first (239).

They managed to collect 750,000 signatures by the deadline established by the law, and the procedures to call the referendum on abortion were thus started.

However the radical party had not entirely given up on the other proposals, and after the regional elections of 15th June 1975, where the P.C.I. saw a considerable success, the radicals thought of taking advantages of the favourable atmosphere for a political change and decided to resume the battle for the other four referendums; they added a fifth to repeal the Reale law on public order, which Parliament had just passed to fight terrorism (240). Nevertheless, on these five issues the radical party did not receive the support of the other five left-wing political formations, nor of any press organ nor did they receive the support of that large part of the "liberal" opinion which had sustained in in gathering signatures for the referendum on abortion; even the tiny non-parliamentary groups disappeared. The lay unity of the left-wing forces had subsided; as a consequence, they did not manage to collect the necessary quantity of signatures of the other referendums.

The 15th radical party Congress, held in Florence from 1 to 4 November 1975, with the participation of over 1,000 members and several exponents of the P.S.I. on the one hand confirmed the political situation contained in the final resolution of the previous congress of Milan, on the other hand it judged it to be high time to prepare a common economic and social program for all left-wing and lay components, in view of the success of the left at the administrative elections of 15 June (241).

The radicals asked the homogeneous political components to support the institutional struggle for a full application of the Constitution, and for the elimination of all authoritarian norm,s that were still in effect thirty years after the end of the fascist regime. In order to carry out this political project the radical party looked to the P.S.I. and meant to base itself on the French model, that 20% of socialist and libertarian force to be self-managed at the roots. However, it posed the P.S.I. and the other potentially supportive forces a condition: their willingness to discuss, and therefore endorse, the bill on abortion which the Chamber of Deputies was about to discuss. Had it been impossible to gather around a renewed P.S.I., the radical party proposed itself as the cementing element for a new socialist formation, because such request unquestionably came from the base of the country. The radical party formally asked, at the P.S.I. Congress scheduled in February 1976, for a federative pact without canc

eling the differences but which, on the contrary, by "enhancing and multiplying the different experiences, energies and potentials, could lay the foundations for a vaster merger of socialist and libertarian forces" (242).

The tone of the final resolution and of the debate indicate the inevitability for radical lists to participate in the imminent political elections. In an editorial on "Notizie Radicali" of 18 October 1975, Gianfranco Spadaccia and Roberto Cicciomessere had already declared that a historical phase of the radical party was coming to a close, and that a political outlet was at last in view, after twenty years of civil rights battles. 1976 was to be the year of the alternative or, the radicals exponents said, ten more years would have elapsed until those civil rights, which were the object of so many militants struggles by the radical party and the various leagues, would have been achieved. An opinion poll by Demoskopea published on "Panorama" cheered the radicals: those polled said they hoped for a renewal of the leading class and of the political parties. Demoskopea had placed the electorate of the radical party, represented mainly by women, at around 10-12%. Also, and this was vital for the radicals, the same

poll showed that 70% of those asked attached great importance to the civil rights campaigns. If, moreover, the radical party had had access to state-owned television, the rate of awareness of the radical themes would have grown tremendously. In other words, the much hoped for moment had come. Was the "radical dream" about to come true? In the five months since the 15th radical congress of November 1975 to the socialist on in February 1976, no answer came from the P.S.I. to the radical party's proposals for an aggregation (243).

De Martino, then secretary of the P.S.I. provided an answer only at the congress, and it was a clear-cut rejection of the radical political proposals: the P.S.I. invited the Radical Party to a simply electoral alliance. The socialist congress, nonetheless, proved more open than its leader: it charged the direction to promote a political debate with the Radical Party. However, despite the congress deliberation, nothing happened and no relation between the party was established, not even a political discussion.

5. Citizens and the establishment: the "Charter of liberties"

The radicals found themselves alone, so to say, just before the dissolution of the Chambers. The Federate Council decided to present its own lists for the elections of 20 June. The secretary of the radical party remarked, with reference to the socialists' refusal, that the radicals "were not beggars knocking at the socialist party's door with the hope of some place or parliamentary medal: they were not willing to destroy years of socialist diversity" (244).

The radicals had long been underlining the survival of several authoritarian forces, and therefore urged a policy of freedom. They remarked that the very "expansive force" of the Constitution had shrunk. Ultimately, the radical party moved, consistently with its initial tradition, on the line of the major line of European socialism. The radicals' project was acted on in February 1976 with a first popular bill for a "charter of liberties and civil rights" which corresponded to a large extent, to the contents of the referenda promoted years before and then dropped for the reasons we saw (245). On the eve of an election, the radicals considered this "charter of liberties" to be a sort of government and legislature platform. It was an immersion in the institutions with the task of reforming them in a libertarian sense or, more limitedly, to adjust our legislation to the more advanced one of Western Europe. The project was structured into two bills. The first aimed to a constitutional revision of art. 7 of the Co

nstitution and thus to a complete rearrangement of the relations between State and Church, with the transition from the concordat regime to a regulation of the relations capable of guaranteeing the independence of the Church and the lay character of the Republic. The old radical themes were reproposed in political and social context that was about to change in view of the entry into the political scene of the ecclesial groups and the Catholics' new way of conceiving relations with the hierarchies.

The second bill was more complex and rich in institutional implications in that it would have allowed the single citizens and groups to freely and immediately exert the rights they had been acknowledged. It proposed to repeal a few thousand existing norms and pass hundreds of new norms that recognized new rights. The proposal was divided into five headlines, and included, among others, the reform of the Supreme Judiciary Council, the demilitarization of the police, a register of the public positions, and citizens' access to information.

One sector concerned citizens labeled as "underprotected", i.e. the elderly, minors, linguistic minorities, sexual minorities, refugees; lastly, the project meant to safeguard the rights of citizens in the communities, i.e. in schools, barracks, hospitals, mental institutes, prisons, factories.

The line of intervention outlined by the radical party, as it was structured, triggered a mechanism of control on a series of public and private powers, the management of which the radicals judged to be authoritarian or at any rate devoid of any external control.

The radicals' global project was confirmed by the 400,000 votes obtained by the radical party at the elections of 20 June: four radicals became deputies: Emma Bonino, Adele Faccio, Mauro Mellini and Marco Pannella. The socialist party had shrunk, like all minor lay parties: the P.C.I., with 34,4%, gained 48 seats. The only rising lay formation was the radical one.

Despite the success, the party tried to keep faith to its original form, based on self-administration, non-violence, base militancy. And to maintain such characteristics, Pannella launched the slogan "scientific disorganization", triggering internal controversies between those who wanted to maintain the spontaneous aggregation of people on a series of common battles and those who advocated instead a certain organizational stability (246).

The dilemma on the organizational structure to give to the party was deeply felt in the periphery. The radical party periodical of Emilia Romagna, Agenzia Radicale, clearly said that, "the local associations' activity had been very scarce, at best limiting themselves to gathering signatures at Rome's command" (247). It also remarked that the radical party marked a very rapid change of people, who devoted themselves hand and foot to particularly significant battles only to disappear for long periods or forever. A huge reserve of energies was thus wasted. Thus, the party's strong point - the spontaneous activity which periodically concentrated on the battles of the moment - was also its weak spot.

Thus, the base militants required a political continuity, at the same time averting the danger of turning the radical party into one of the small traditional parties.

The problem was felt at all levels of the party and in the following years represented a central motive of debates, controversies, accusations and abandonments.

After the elections of 20 June, a single-party government was formed, headed by Andreotti, based on the "non no-confidence" of the parties other than the D.C. and namely of the communist party. For the radicals the P.C.I. thus became the pillar of the "regime". The 17th Radical congress held in Naples from 1 to 4 November 1976 denounced the "welfarist and fascist corporative state" of the D.C., which was now endorsed by the parties of the historical left.

With the alliance between the D.C. and the P.C.I., the radical party was forced to change strategy, and the PCI was judged incapable of any political alternative; as a consequence the radicals considered resorting to the referendum to apply the Constitution even more necessary. But in contrast to the one on divorce, the referendum campaign would have taken a different political orientation: from a referendum to shift the left and force it to support alternative battles, to a referendum aimed precisely against the "D.C.-P.C.I. regime" (248).

NOTES

(187) Political resolution passed by the 4th ordinary congress of the radical party on 2/4 November 1968..

(188) Speech by the Hon. Boldrini (PCI) and a meeting organized by the radical party in Rome in April 1966, mentioned in AGHINA-JACCARINO, »Storia del Partito Radicale , Gammalibri, Milano, 1977, p. 46.

(189) MASSIMO TEODORI, »Storia del partito radicale, AA.VV. "I nuovi radicali", Mondadori, 1977, p. 105-110.

(190) Document of the radical party secretary Gianfranco Spadaccia: "Il Partito Radicale e il movimento radicale nel paese una strategia politica per la nuova sinistra", quoted by M. TEODORI.

(191) Cf. political resolution passed by the 5th congress, Nov. 1968.

(192) »Un giorno a Sofia , "L'Astrolabio", n. 39, 6 October 1968.

(193) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Antimilitaristi: cronache di 25 anni , in "La prova radicale

(194) MASSIMO TEODORI, op. cit. pp. 123-124.

(195) M. TEODORI, ibidem.

(196) "Corriere della Sera", 4 November 1969.

(197) Political resolution passed by the 7th congress.

(198) MARCO PANNELLA, »La più rossa delle schede , "Notizie radicali", May 1970.

(199) "Corriere della Sera", 2 November 1970.

(200) Political resolution passed by the 8th congress.

(201) Cf. p. 90.

(202) MARCO PANNELLA, »E' ora di decidere con o senza il Partito Radicale , "Notizie Radicali", printed document, 23 July 1971 and in "La prova radicale", year I, n. 1, Autumn 1971, pp. 48-50.

(203) Cf. GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, »Partito Radicale e Partito laico , "La prova radicale", n. 2, winter 1972, pp. 2-5.

(204) Documentation on the 10th congress (Rome, November 1971), partial and limitedly to the speeches quoted in the text and to the congress resolution, in "La prova radicale", n. 2, winter 1972, pp. 186-192.

(205) Political resolution passed by the 10th congress.

(206) Cf. GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, Partito radicale e partito laico, "La prova radicale", n. 2, winter 1972, pp. 2-7.

(207) The documentation relative to this affair was published by "La prova radicale", n. 3, spring 1972, pp. 62-80.

(208) Cf. MASSIMO TEODORI, »Perché ci asteniamo , "La prova radicale", n. 3, spring 1972, pp. 23-28 and all other articles contained in the same issue of the magazine.

(209) Cf. GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, »Un'ondata di referendum per battere un Parlamento clerico-fascista , "La prova radicale", n. 4 summer 1972, pp. 45-54.

(210) Cf. G. SPADACCIA, last art. quoted, p 47

(211) SPADACCIA, ibidem.

(212) Cf. G. SPADACCIA, last art. quoted p. 51.

(213) »Editorial in "Notizie radicali", n. 172, 5 October 1972.

(214) A collective hunger strike was started on 1st October 1972 to step up the passage of a law for the recognition of conscientious objection. On 18 October Marco Pannella and Alberto Gardini, a "faithful" radical, announced they would continue the hunger strike without medical control to the bitter end and to obtain the release of Pietro Valpreda.

(215) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 170, 1· Sept. 1972.

(216) Resolution passed by the 11th congress, Turin, 1/3 Nov. 1972.

(217) Cf. "Notizie radicali", nn. 182-186, 27 January 1973.

(218) Cf. Political resolution passed by the 12th congress, Rome, 8-9 July 1973.

(219) Cf. "Notizie radicali", nn. 201-202, 19 July 1973.

(220) Political resolution passed by the 13th Congress, Verona, 1/3 November 1973.

(221) Cf. »Otto referendum contro il regime , Savelli, Rome, 1974.

(222) Ibidem, p. 10.

(223) »Otto referendum... , cit., pp. 22-42.

(224) Cf. p. 99.

(225) Cf. AGHINA-JACCARINO, "Storia del partito radicale", Gammalibri, Milano, 1977, pp. 92-94.

(226) Cf. MASSIMO TEODORI, "I nuovi radicali", cit., p. 144.

(227) Cf. p. 103.

(228) M. TEODORI, "I nuovi radicali", cit., p. 144-150.

(229) Cf. TEODORI, ibidem.

(230) Cf. articles and congress papers in Notizie radicali, n. 334, 30 Nov. 1974.

(231) Political resolution passed by the 14th Congress, Milano, Nov. 1974.

(232) Cf. ARA, »Per l'alternativa - Dal partito del mutamento al progetto socialista , Feltrinelli, Ml, 1975.

(233) Cf. p. 100.

(234) Cf. MARIA ADELE TEODORI, »Cinque anni di lotte , in MLD-PR, "Contro l'aborto di classe", Savelli, Rome, April 1975.

(235) Cf. p. 90.

(236) Cf. "Notizie radicali", n. 625, 1 January 1975.

(237) Cf. M. A. TEODORI, »Cinque anni di lotte... , cit., p. 15.

(238) Cf. »Per un altro 13 maggio , edited by the P.R., Rome, Savelli, 1975.

(239) Cf. AGHINA-JACCARINO, op. cit. p. 123.

(240 Cf. TEODORI, op. cit. p. 165.

(241) For the debate and resolutions of the 15th Congress, see "Notizie radicali", n. 46, 16 Nov. 1975.

(242) Political resolution passed by the 15th Congress.

(243) For a reconstruction of the relations between radicals and socialists in that period, see GIANFRANCO SPADACCIA, »Creare due, tre nuove poltrone? , "Prova radicale", n. 1, June 1976.

(244) SPADACCIA, ibidem.

(245) Popular bill for the application of constitutional guaranties and liberties, document edited by the R.P., March 1976.

(246) Cf. p. 110 and foll..

(247) Report of the RP's outgoing committee - Emilia Romagna, "Agenzia radicale", n. 10, October (?) 1976, p. 4.

(248) Cf. political resolution passed by the 17th congress of the RP, "Notizie radicali", n. 182,15 November 1976.