CHAPTER V

THE RADICALS BETWEEN DIRECT ACTION AND PARLIAMENT

ABSTRACT: Paragraph 1. Trapped between two churches and increasingly a minority: the R.P. faces new problems

after gaining four seats in Parliament; reprise of the campaigns in the country, controversies and internal debates on the direction to be taken. 2. Five million signatures for eight referendums: congress of Naples of 1976, Aglietta elected secretary, beginning of the campaign for eight referendums; the "Plebe case"; the death of Giorgiana Masi; funding of the campaign and extraordinary congress; success of the campaign. 3. Public financing, take or leave?: July 1977, the party's central activities are discontinued; congress of Bologna and internal debate among the various radical components; the resolution fails to obtain the required 3/4 majority; first deliberation on public financing, the funds are assigned to the parliamentary group; vote on the two remaining referendums (public financing to parties, Legge Reale); attempts to create regional parties; Congress of Bari: the public financing is destined to fund projects and structures of general interest, basically outside the party. 4. The turning point o

f '79, campaign against world hunger: eight new referendums are proposed, including one on abortion and one on the environment; first initiatives and hunger strikes against "world hunger", first "Easter March". 5. The "omnibus" party: Congress of Rome, April 1979: non-violence revisited, judgment on Via Rasella, proposal of "omnibus" lists open to anyone; national and European elections, with candidates such as Leonardo Sciascia, etc.

(Lorenza Ponzone, IL PARTITO RADICALE NELLA POLITICA ITALIANA, 1962-1989, Schena editore, gennaio 1993)

1. Trapped between two churches, and increasingly a minority

The presence of a radical representation in Parliament raised the question of whether the radical party had changed from its original form as a movement into a traditional party. The answer to the question - which was essential for the continuity of the radical idea - was that the radical party would have changed nothing in its structures and way of participating in politics. The leadership hypothesized a double-way policy: operating with the radical peculiarity in Parliament and in the country. The radicals underlined that the party's access to Parliament was but the achievement of another means of struggle at the heart of the institutions. The radicals viewed the attainment of such means as vital to avoid being crushed and irreparably obscured by the new political alliances, i.e. the P.C.I.-D.C. coalition, supported by the other lay and socialist left-wing parties

The party believed, therefore, that the parliamentary representation was an essential condition to be able to resume its battles with success. At the same time, the party was to continue being the party of civil disobedience, of direct democracy, of non-violence, of the referendums, of an inflexible opposition to the "regime". A formation that was a combination of a party structure and the somewhat fading one of movement of opinion.

On the other hand, the political circumstances were tense, with terrorism and the consequent closure brought about by the coalition between communists and christian democrats, which had been sealed by the vote of "non no-confidence" to the Andreotti cabinet. To avoid being pushed into a corner, the radicals therefore decided to resume their mass initiatives in the country with a view to obtaining a change in the political situation. To that end, they considered the abrogating referendum as the appropriate means. The campaign for the gathering of signatures on a new referendum was to go hand in hand with the initiatives carried out by the radical deputies in Parliament. The most important of such concerned the abrogation of the Concordat. If this strategy, based on a dual activity in Parliament and in the streets, had failed, the radical party would have inevitably become one of the countless left-wing minor parties, and would have lost the novelty, messianism and "libetarianism" which had thus far characteri

zed its brief history.

The radical publications clearly reflect the existence at this stage of two trends in the party, which we have already analysed from a different angle. The first, considered to be a sectarian, "isolationist" one, drew its inspiration from an abstract ideal of radical purity, and clearly opposed any partyist compromises and degenerations. It also declared to oppose the privileged relationship with the P.S.I. This conception conflicted with the "double membership" party, and prevented any double militancy. The second trend aimed to come out of the institutions. This was a dangerous thesis for the radical party, which would thus have lost its identity as a political party. This tendency aimed, in practice, to experiment the path taken by the non-parliamentary forces, which were suffering a crisis after the elections of 20 June. On the other hand, the campaigns carried out by such forces had been important in the social sphere, albeit scarcely effective, but they had lacked a political outlet, in other words the

y had failed to involve the entire left or a large part of it. In fact, they had obtained an unwanted result, stepping up the "entente cordiale" between the catholic forces and the communists. The extra-parliamentary itinerary was something to avoid; the civil rights strategy, i.e. the one based on the conflict with the institutions, was instead to be continued. Such a strategy was not be relinquished in the political context brought about by the cooperation between communists and christian democrats. The radicals on the contrary could have found an intermediate position between the Marxist church and the Catholic one, where they could operate.

By doing this, the radical party would have been able to count also on the consent of parts of the socialist and communist base that were more attentive towards civil rights issues compared to the apparatus of their parties.

2. Two million signatures to promote eight referendums

After the 17th congress, held in Naples from 1 to 4 November 1976, where a woman, Adelaide Aglietta, was elected secretary of the party, it was decided, consistently with what had emerged from the debate between militants and sympathizers, to promote the gathering of signatures to call ten abrogating referendums in the months of April, May and June. After the deliberations of the federal council of 12 February (249) only eight of the ten referendums had remained. They concerned the following subjects: 1) treaty and concordat between the Holy See and Italy; 2) military peace-time code; 3) military judicial regulations; 4) rules on the proceedings and charges of the Committee of Inquiry; 5) the repressive rules of the penal code; 6) public financing of parties; 7) Legge Reale; 8) mental hospitals.

The radical party had assumed a huge task, considering its human and financial resources: it was to gather 700,000 signatures, times eight. But this time the radicals did not organize the campaigns with the makeshift and amateurish methods of the previous years, but with great accuracy.

They tried to spread their presence on the entire national territory: they invited militants to use the only capillary political structures, i.e. town secretariats, and prepared, or rather, devised the "carbon copy" forms on which the signatures were gathered. It was a system to avoid mistakes in copying the personal data of the millions of citizens who were willing to endorse the petition on the eight copies.

The radicals managed to set up 170 pro-referendum committees, this time without any external help. This was a symptom of the political isolation of the party. It should be recalled that the media ignored the radical initiatives, or at best scorned them.

The leaders, who were increasingly convinced of operating directly in the country as well as in Parliament, started a long hunger strike on the 11th of January 1977 to obtain access to state-owned television (250). The radicals had been denied access to the media on the ground of a precise political will of the parties of the "constitutional range", that bitterly opposed the intromission of a party that was not part of the consociate cartel.

In addition to an external closure, in those months the party's internal life had been uneasy. A controversy broke out on the "Plebe case". At the beginning of that year, a senator of the MSI, Armando Plebe, had publicly announced his intention of joining the radical party. In contrast to all other parties, the Statute of the radical party established that any citizen was free to join, without the prior approval of any committee. The intention of the deputy of the MSI caused some confusion among the militants and embarrassment for the leaders. Pannella said he favoured the request, and accused those who wanted to refuse the deputy membership of "hysterical reactions" (251). The radical leader's uncompromising position exacerbated the contrasts between those who were in favour and those who were against; a special session of the Federate Council was called to settle the controversy. The thesis of a compromise, advocated by Spadaccia, prevailed. According to this thesis, the statute's fundamental principle, wh

ich envisioned access to the radical party for all citizens, was to be respected. At the same time, Senator Plebe's action was to be judged negatively in political terms (252). The request of the exponent of the MSI had in fact become a political provocation because of the use the media had made of it. Nonetheless, the "case" revealed the real contrasts that stirred within the radical party, that was torn between a "radical-democratic" component, based on a traditional conception of the party, and the "radical-non-violent" one. These conflicts were to explode during the subsequent decade. The killing of Giorgiana Masi, an 18 year-old radical militant, during a demonstration in Rome to commemorate the victory of the pro-divorce front on 12 May 1977, the responsibilities of which were never fully explained, had repercussions on the radical party, which was accused of having organized that demonstration (in truth peaceful) but legally forbidden by the police authorities under a disposition of the Minister of th

e Interior. In this atmosphere of internal and external tension, the difficult campaign for the gathering of the signatures for the 8 referendums decided by the congress of Naples began. It was a difficult moment because the radicals, who were busy gathering 5 million signatures with a makeshift organization based on volunteers and often occasional work, and this time without even any support from the larger parties, were forced to choose a policy of massive indebtedness which was de facto allowed by the share of public financing. Knowing that they had money "in the bank", the radicals decided to spend it (253). But this spending policy was not sustained by adequate initiatives to provide for its self-financing.

TABLE 12

Committees for the eight referendums of 1977

REGIONS Regional Provincial Local Committees Total

committ. committ. committ. with techn.

support from

other forces

----------------------------------------------------------------

VALLE D'AOSTA 1 1 - 1

PIEMONTE - 5 - 6

LIGURIA 1 3 3 7

LOMBARDIA 1 8 2 11

VENETO 1 6 3 10

TRENTINO SUD T. 2 - - 2

FRIULI VENEZIA G. 1 3 3 7

EMILIA ROMAGNA 1 7 5 13

TOSCANA 1 9 6 16

UMBRIA 1 1 - 2

MARCHE 1 4 5 10

LAZIO 1 4 6 11

ABRUZZO 1 3 4 1 9

MOLISE - 2 2 4

CAMPANIA 1 5 14 1 21

PUGLIA 1 3 3 7

BASILICATA 1 1 1 3

CALABRIA 1 1 7 1 10

SICILIA 1 8 2 11

SARDEGNA 1 4 4 1 10

ITALY 19 78 70 4 171

Source: "Notizie Radicali" n. 85, March 31st, 1977, »Basta! Otto firme per un solo grande referendum , Savelli, Roma, 1977; also Cf. MASSIMO GUSSO, »Il P.R.: Organizzazione e leadership , pag. 52.

After a month of referendum campaign, the party had already accumulated debts for about 200 million. The secretary and the treasurer (A. Aglietta and P. Vigevano) decided at that point to call a special congress to decide either the use of the frozen public financing or to start a fund-raising campaign. But the congress would also have to deal with practical problems that had arisen during the signature gathering campaign (254), such as the lack of persons qualified to certify signatures, and the scarce experience of many radical associations.

The Congress (the 18th, which was held in Rome from 7 to 8 May 1977) did not entirely settle the problem it had been called for, i.e. whether or not to use the public funds. Different positions emerged: some rigidly opposed their use and others were in favour of their use, not for the party's structures but for purposes of general interest. The congress approved a compromise between the two positions: while not excluding a future use of the funds for purposes that were not strictly related to the party, it confirmed the temporary freeze of such funds (255) and launched instead a national fund-raising campaign. Contributions were sought for with an initiative organized throughout the Italian territory, which involved the regional parties. The national treasurer assumed the role of general coordinator of the campaign, and was no longer forced to "beg for money in the small environment of the Roman group and of some Milanese circles". The resolution on self-financing set strict objectives: 300 million in contri

butions by the 30th of June 1977. If the objective had not been achieved, every form of national activity would have been suspended. Nonetheless, despite the general mobilization of the militants, a mere 150 million were raised, which were not enough to fill the deficit which the referendum campaign was creating. Despite the disinformation and the lack of means, about five million signatures were gathered between April and June 1977.

3. Public financing: take or leave?

In July 1977, the Federal Council, in fulfilment of the congress deliberation, decided to suspend the party's national political activity; two of the three national headquarters were closed, 7 of 9 telephone lines were closed, printing expenses were restricted. The party faced the objective of raising funds for 200 million, to be completed through an assessment of Lit. 15.000 on all members. But this attempts failed as well, because the campaign raised barely 10 million; it was a failure caused by the militants' scarce commitment after the demanding referendum campaign (256). The 19th congress was held in Bologna from 29 October to 1 November 1977, in the wake of a fiery debate. The campaign for the collection of signatures on the referendums, a feat deemed impossible by all observers, had been a great success; even if the general satisfaction was subdued by the danger that the parties of the six-party coalition would somehow block the referendums by resorting to some legal trick or parliamentary manoeuvre.

The prevailing perception was that the outcome of the battle on the referendums would determine the opportunity for the radical party of becoming a major force, capable of influencing, from a position of opposition, the country's entire political life. The congress of Bologna was also to newly confront the problem of parties' public financing. The two larger left-wing forces, the P.S.I. and the P.C.I., the only ones with which the radical party had cooperated on divorce and abortion, opposed the abolition of it. The opposition between the radical party and the historical left on the problem of public funding would have isolated it, in particular jeopardizing the project the party had been pursuing for fifteen years--an alliance of the left under the socialist and libertarian symbol.

Tensions emerged during the 19th congress not only because of external factors, but also because of internal factors. In the previous congress, reasons of unrest had already emerged, but these demonstrations of dissent had always been solved because the elements of malcontent had never organized themselves into factions. In Bologna the malcontent was stronger than it had ever been in the past. Conflicts emerged between the "leadership" and the "base", between "centre" and "periphery". In other words, between one faction that advocated a traditional radical party and another faction that wanted to underline its being a movement, a temporary aggregation that got together on specific issues. After the huge effort of organizing the signature gathering (five billion were collected) in the squares of Italy, the periphery now wanted to participate in the party's choices. The position of those who favoured a new party was expressed in a document published by the magazine "Argomenti Radicali" published by the Milanes

e group and directed by Massimo Teodori (257). The document basically advanced the idea of a stabler type of organization, widespread in the country and organized into permanent institutions, instruments and channels. It also called for a certain degree of cultural homogeneity. This was to be achieved, Teodori's group argued, by improving the circulation of information within the party: in practice, by removing information from the control of those who had always exerted it. Apart from a series of rather misty arguments, Teodori's document advocated a transformation of the radical party into a party, albeit not a traditional one. This position, and the ones assumed by the local militants, complained about the Roman group's hegemony over the party. By recruiting the best elements from the periphery, it prevented the growth of the regional parties. The Roman group reacted to the criticism, accusing "Argomenti Radicali" of wanting to transform the party (258). For the first time in the history of the radical pa

rty's congresses, the final resolution, introduced by the outgoing leading group, was approved without the 3/4 majority required to make it binding. It was decided to defend the package of eight referendums, and thus to privilege the party's characteristics as a movement. After a debate that lasted a year and a half, the 19th congress deliberated on the question of public financing. A resolution was approved, introduced by Gianfranco Spadaccia, which envisioned the appropriation of state funds to the radical parliamentary group. The deputies could then spend them under their own responsibility, in their capacity as representatives of the nation, and not for purposes pertaining to the party. The parliamentary group had transferred ex lege the public funds to the party: the symbolic meaning of the solution adopted by the congress was that of returning the sum to the electors, who with their vote had made the financing possible, and made the elected representatives guarantors thereof. The radical deputies were

not required to abide by party discipline, and were thus independent. The radical party's financial situation was rather shaky: an overall deficit of over 336 million. To solve this problem, the congress decided to tax members according to their income and to devise self-financing programs for each political initiative. However, in order to guarantee a bank loan which the treasurer had asked to cover the expenses of the referendum campaign, part of the public funds had been used. This part therefore remained locked up in the bank and was in actual fact used for the party (259). Therefore, the congress' decision had not solved the problem.

The Federative Council suggested a one-time assessment on all members and supporters to extinguish the debts (260). If the initiative had failed, the party would have been closed, as the treasurer threatened.

It was not a useless warning: on January 17th, 1978, the national secretary, Adelaide Aglietta, and the treasurer, Paolo Vigevano, announced that the radical party was discontinuing all political activities (261). The continuation of the functions of the party would have been guarantied by the Federative Council, which decided to call a theoretical convention on the party decided by the congress of Bologna for May of the same year, on the topic: "Theory and praxis of a libertarian federative organization, according to the Statute and the actual experiences of the radical party". The political circumstances were difficult for the radical party, because the Constitution Court had just then rejected four of the eight radical referendums as unconstitutional: the referendum on the Concordat, the one for the abrogation of 97 articles of the Penal Code and two "antimilitarist" ones (262).

In the meanwhile, on the parliamentary side the radical were busy defending the referendum on abortion, which had been postponed from 1976 to 1978 owing to preschedule elections. In May '78, Parliament passed the bills on mental hospitals, on the committee of inquiry and on abortion, which annulled three of the referendums asked by the radicals.

On 11 and 12 June, the two remaining referendums - the one on public financing for parties and the one on the Reale bill - were held, with surprising results: 13,736,577 electors, or 43,7%, voted in favour of stopping public funding to parties. The radical party, the P.L.I., D.P. and the M.S.I. had declared to be in favour of its abrogation.

7,323,395, or 23,3% of voters, agreed on repealing the Reale Law on public order. The electorate had shifted in favour of the abrogation - a change that did not reflect the various parties' position on the subject in the two elections.

The radicals considered the results of the two referendums as an achievement. The radical party had faced huge organizational difficulties because it was opposed both by the parties of the left as well as by the other ones. The number of favourable votes revealed that many communist and socialist militants had voted against the indication of their parties.

What were the consequences of the referendum on the radical party? Spadaccia pointed out that the results of the two referendums confirmed the credibility of the radical party as a political force (263). On the other hand, the radicals made a wise use of their previous battles, of their skills in mobilizing the public and of the support of the country's liberal opinion which they had gradually built up. Considering the millions of favourable votes, the radicals could afford to claim to be the true opposition party.

But a series of problems still remained unsolved.

The radical publications pointed out the difficulty of planning and preparing programs having the same driving power as the ones for divorce, abortion and the eight referendums. The radicals also paid high human costs because of the continued hunger and thirst strikes. Also, the need emerged for the party to establish regional parties and local associative structures capable of becoming independent centres for the promotion of the radical campaigns.

Despite the pressure of some internal elements, the "refounder" radicals ultimately continued to oppose the growth of the party in a traditional sense. They wanted instead to further enhance the party's libertarian element, which was to express itself at all times and in all places, not just in Rome or in Parliament. In other words, the choice was between remaining a movement or becoming a traditional party.

Once the party's central structures were closed, attempts were made to create local ones, but at year's end the only truly active local structures appeared to be the ones of Lombardia and Lazio, as in the past. In the rest of the country the party's presence was weak, and seemed to have lost the momentum it had shown only a year before when it gathered five million signatures for the referendums. The decision to "close the party" reflected a moment of confusion on future projects, relative perhaps also to the identity of the party itself, as we saw in the part on the debates of the last congress.

Such hypothesis is confirmed by the political resolution approved by the congress of Bologna in November '77 (264). In contrast to the resolutions voted at the previous congresses, this one was rather vague in terms of contents, and did little more than reconfirm the referendum strategy without pointing out any new initiatives for a party which, in the intentions of its founders, was to die and rise again every year. Despite the drastic decisions taken, the financial problems of the radical party were far from solved. On the other hand, freezing the expenses had brought about a deficit of Lit. 118 million. At the same time, the deficit remained rather high in consequence of the deficit of the previous year, which amounted to 321 million. The membership campaign, which had been somewhat neglected during 1978, had yielded a scant 1911 members, and fees for 92 million (265). To face the deficit the treasurer was forced to ask for a bank loan. The considerable gap between revenues and expenses had noticeably aff

ected the political initiatives.

Thus, the 20th congress (Bari, November 1-4 1978) decided to use the public funds, but only as an "alternative" (266). It was a bitter decision, a political defeat in fact, but necessary nonetheless for the survival of the party which had accumulated debts towards banks.

The congress voted a series of corrections to render the use of the public funds transparent. The funds were not to be listed in the party's budget, nor be used for the direct or indirect organization of the apparatus (headquarters, telephones, staff, reimbursements, and so on); it was to be used to carry out projects that allowed to organize campaigns against the "regime". Having established such ends, the congress charged the national treasurer with the task of administering the funds with the purpose of: 1) eliminating the deficit of the party, contracted in 1977 during the campaign for the gathering of signatures on the eight referendums; 2) investing on information; 3) creating a broadcasting centre and providing technical assistance for radical radio stations; 4) investing on the electoral commitments decided by the Congress.

The congress of Bari was important in many respects. The radical party's policy aimed toward major issues, and slowly began to become less specific in its planning. Also, it extended its interests to Europe, the environment, the regions (267).

Jean Fabre, a Belgian citizen, was elected secretary: it was the first time ever in Italy that a foreigner reached the highest position in a party. And it was a choice that was consistent with the new radical policy.

4. The turning point of 1979: the campaign against world hunger

Two important events in the life of the radical party marked the beginning of 1979: on the 20th of January the Federative Council decided, by majority and in contrast to the resolution of Bari, to propose a signature gathering for a new package of referendums. The first two, for which the petition was introduced, concerned the provisions that limited women's self-determination, contained in law n. 194 of '78 on abortion and the abrogation of a number of articles of law n. 393 of '75 on the sites of nuclear power plants. During a subsequent session, the Federative Council passed six more referendums: for the abolition of hunting, of life imprisonment, for the demilitarization of the police and for the abrogation of the crimes of opinion and of military tribunals (268).

The subjects of those petitions reveal that the radicals had added a series of new subjects to their traditional ones, such as the protection of the environment, that were not part of the historical heritage of the left. It was an innovative choice, that ignored the traditional left- and right-wing coalitions. However, the preschedule dissolution of Parliament made it impossible to start gathering signatures. In early 1979, Pannella announced a new campaign that was to change the nature and role of the radical party. In an article published by "Notizie Radicali" (269), in reply to the petition promoted by the Movimento per la vita to repeal law n. 194, the radical leaders denounced the tragedy of fifteen million children "murdered by hunger" in 1978 alone. Pannella invited people to link their destinies to the ones of those populations that were "sentenced to death". To underline the dramatic nature of the event, Pannella went on a hunger strike and asked the government to appropriate 5 billion for the devel

oping countries of Africa, Asia and central and south America. He set up a committee for life, peace and disarmament, together with thousands of intellectuals and religious authorities.

Pannella's action developed along two guidelines: requesting an immediate intervention to avert the extermination, and informing the public opinion on a problem which he considered to be of a political nature, a "serious threat to international peace and security".

The first results of the campaign on world hunger came at Easter 1979, when the radical party organized the first peace march in Rome, from Porta Pia to the Vatican, with 10,000 people. The demonstration was a huge success. A delegation was received by President Pertini, and the Pope also mentioned the problem of world hunger in his Easter sermon.

The participation of the highest Catholic authority in a radical initiative unquestionably showed that changes had taken place in the radical party, which ten years earlier had organized a pro-abortion demonstration in front of the Apostolic palaces.

Pannella's latest initiative surprised the radical militants. He had drawn attention on an issue which the party had to that moment neglected. Giovanni Negri, then leader of the party in Piemonte and editor of Notizie Radicali, underlined the danger the party ran by uncritically accepting Pannella's positions; nonetheless he invited the militants to support the leader's initiatives with the methods of the radical tradition (270).

5. The "omnibus" party

The 21st congress, held in Rome from 21 to 25 March 1979, was called to analyse the themes advanced by Pannella. But a more urgent problem was brought to the attention of the congresspeople: the dissolution of Parliament and the calling of political elections for 4 and 5 June.

The congress' acme was Pannella's speech. The leader, who had not renewed his membership since 1973, resigned from parliamentarian and returned to the party with his charisma (271). The key point in Pannella's speech was the enunciation of the ethical principle of non-violence as the foundation of the radical party. In contrast to the past, non-violence no longer appeared simply as a method of political action; Pannella said that "at a time when terrorism and violence are causing desperation and are the result of a deliberate strategy, the entire history of violence should be analysed and revised" (272). Pannella particularly stressed an episode of the Resistance, the attack of Via Rasella, when the partisans blew up 32 soldiers from Alto Adige, and the Nazis shot 330 innocents at the Fosse Ardeatine in retaliation.

Pannella said the partisans' attack was an act of terrorism, not a military action. He compared the violence of that episode to the violence of contemporary years. Non-violence, Pannella argued, was a universal value, and no ideology could justify the violation of this ethical principle. For the short term, Pannella invented the "omnibus" party: anyone agreeing on the radical objectives could be accepted as an ally.

Pannella's indication radicalized the "theme" policy which the radical party had always followed. The Congress accepted Pannella's proposal to introduce open lists. The radicals' availability was addressed particularly to "the political and social realities that ran the risk of not being represented or being assimilated by the parties of the regime", first and foremost the militants of Lotta Continua and the regionalist and pro-independence forces (273).

The party participated in the political elections of 5 June 1979 among internal controversies and uncertainty as to how to organize the radical opinion that was growing everywhere in Italy. The introduction of the lists itself was a difficult feat, almost as in a traditional party, because it took place among accusations and counter-accusations. Pannella was accused, among others, of manipulating candidatures and violating the libertarian inspiration of the radical party.

This electoral campaign was different compared to all previous ones because the consent on the radicals had grown.

Many intellectuals of the rank of Leonardo Sciascia, and ex-communists such as M. Antonietta Macciocchi and Alessandro Tessari, accepted to run for the radical party. Above all, the party now had considerable financial means, which allowed for the creation of a television station, Teleroma 56, enhance Radio Radicale and advertise on major national newspapers.

The radical party considered the electoral results a success: 3,4% at the Chamber of Deputies, with 18 seats (4 in the previous legislature), 2,5% for the Senate, and two seats (none in the previous legislature).

A week later, elections for the first European Parliament were held, and the radical party increased its consent to 3,7%, obtaining three seats in Strasbourg.

The data reveal that the radical party remained, as in 1976, a party concentrated in the North, especially in the industrial triangle. At any rate, the most conspicuous fact was the high percentage of voters for the radical party in chief towns, also in the South. Ultimately, the radical party confirmed to be a chiefly urban movement, and this proved that the urban culture was more sensitive to the radical themes.

NOTES

(249) "Notizie radicali", n. 1, 15 January 1977, the deliberations of the radical party's Federal Council, held on 8 and 9 January. The final decisions (F.C. 12 February) in "Notizie radicali", n. 8. 26/2/1977.

(250) For a detailed account of the hunger strike, see for example "Notizie radicali", n. 10; 12 March 1977.

(251) MARCO PANNELLA, "Notizie radicali", n. 5, 10 February 1977.

(252) Cf. »Troppo spazio per un no a Plebe , "Argomenti radicali", n. 1, April-May 1977.

(253) Cf. LAURA RADICONCINI, »Finanziamento pubblico o autofinanziamento: una scelta , in "L'antagonista radicale", Roma, 1978.

(254) Refer to the document of the national secretariat of the RP, published on "Notizie radicali", n. 87, 21 April 1977.

(254) Resolution on self-finanacing, in "Notizie radicali", n. 161, 2 June 1977.

(256) PAOLO VIGEVANO, »Raccolti solo 10 milioni su duecento , "Notizie radicali", n. 186, 6th September 1977.

(257) Dossier, il PR verso il Congresso, "Argomenti radicali", n. 3-4, August Nov. 1977.

(258) Gianfranco Spadaccia revealed in a statement that Massimo Teodori had proposed an agreement whereby he would have been elected president of the Federal Council in exchange for not introducing a resolution opposite to that of the radical leadership. As an effect of this announcement, one of the most eminent exponents of the RP, the jurist Ernesto Bettinelli, left the party.

(259) Cf. »In nome della legge , "Notizie radicali", n. 233, 18 nov. 1977.

(260) Cf. PAOLO VIGEVANO, »Dalla tredicesima deve venire la prima risposta , "Notizie radicali", n. 235, 12 Dec. 1977.

(261) Documentation on the episode in "Quaderni Radicali", n. 2, 1978, pp. 22-60.

(262) For the sentence of the Constitutional Court and the juridical events relative to the referendums: Chamber of Deputies, documentation of the research service, "Il referendum abrogativo in Italia", Rome, 1981, pp. 254-501.

(236) SPADACCIA, »Il dopo referendum , "Quaderni radicali", n. 3, June-August 1978, pp. 6-14.

(264) Political resolution passed by the 19th congress of the radical party.

(265) Cf. M. GUSSO, op. cit.

(266) Resolution on public financing passed by the 20th Congress.

(267) Cf. Political resolution, ibidem.

(268) The deliberations of the Federal Council are in "Notizie radicali", n. 2, 1st February 1979 and n. 3, 15th February 1979. The contents of the proposed referendums are in »Un altro sì con gli otto referendum published by the RP, Rome, 1979.

(269) MARCO PANNELLA, »La nostra lotta per la vita , "N.R.", n. 2, 1 February 1979.

(270) GIOVANNI NEGRI, »Lottare per la vita, qui e subito , "N.R." n. 3; 15th February 1979.

(271) Marco Pannella's speeches delivered at the 21st Congress were published under the title, "Mein Kampf", in Quaderni Radicali, nn. 5/6, January-June 1979, pp. 186-230.

(272) MARCO PANNELLA, speech of 2 April, Q.R., cit., pag. 218.

(273) Cf. Political resolution approved by the 21st Congress.