CHAPTER VII

TOWARDS THE TRANSNATIONAL PARTY

ABSTRACT: Paragraph 1. The "Roman" group and the others: disagreements and divisions between the parliamentary group and the party and between the "Roman" group and the local and regional groups. The question of the "federate regional parties". Public financing, structure of the treasury, control of the financing, requests to participate in the administrative elections. 22nd congress in Genua, November 1979. 2. The second refoundation, the question of the regional parties. The decade 1980-1990; the 23rd congress, the question of the administrative elections, the campaign for the ten referendums and the socialist support; the 24th congress, final approval of the Preamble to the Statute; 25th congress (Rome, 5-7 June 1981). 3. Referendums: a cycle comes to an end, the diaspora begins; world hunger and rape of the environment. "A cycle of political struggles" comes to an end: new contradictions and internal crises; 26th congress (Florence, 28 October - 1 November 1981): motion on the struggle against "extermina

tion by hunger in the world"; definition of the question of the use of the public funds; 27th congress (Bologna, 1982), Rippa, De Cataldo, Pinto and Boato break away from the party, clash on party rule and its degenerations; 28th (extraordinary) congress, refusal to participate in the elections; introduction of radical lists to contrast the "swindle elections" of the regime; candidacy of Toni Negri and new confrontation with the PSI; 29th congress: the party in the crisis of the regime; dissolution or renewal of the non-violent values? The European elections of 1984, candidacy of Enzo Tortora; 150 members of Parliament introduce a bill on world hunger, which is approved in 1985; referendum on the escalator; 31st congress (Florence 1985); proposal to dissolve the party. 4. Closing down? The Budapest congress. The party will not die. The referendum on "just justice" in cooperation with the PSI and the PLI; 32nd congress (Rome, 1986); launch of the campaign to recruit 10,000 members by 1986; the refoundation is

started, with the objective of creating a "transnational" cross-party, and which is officially decreed during the 34th congress (Bologna, 2-6 January 1988) and especially during the 35th congress (Budapest, April 1989).

(Lorenza Ponzone, IL PARTITO RADICALE NELLA POLITICA ITALIANA, 1962-1989, Schena editore, gennaio 1993)

1. The 'Roman' group and the others

The electoral success of 3 June 1979 was not matched by a parallel numerical and organizational growth in the party. The party had set the objective of recruiting 10,000 members, but with all the huge effort made, only 3,500 were recruited (283). Moreover, the internal controversies persisted, and in fact increased. The divisions between the centre and the periphery had widened to such a point that the Federative Council called a series of regional assemblies of members to settle the dispute which had been building up between the rank and file and the "leading" group.

One subject which strongly exacerbated the fierce and often personal controversies concerned the management of the funds of the public financing, and the relations between the party and the "autonomous subjects", i.e. Radio Radicale, Tele-Roma 56 and the Centro Calamandrei (284). The case of Paolo Vigevano broke out. Vigevano was the treasurer of the party, who had been appointed while he was chief executive of the "Centro di Produzione s.r.l." of the radical radios, and thus charged with a private function within a body that was exterior to the party. In practice, Vigevano was accused of being both the person in charge of controlling, in his capacity as treasurer, and of being controlled himself, as administrator of Radio Radicale.

During the congress of the Radical Party of Lombardia (Milan, 20-21 October 1979) and the pre-congress convention of Florence (September-October 1979), the internal tensions which had initially been expressed in the assembly by way of accusations, counter-accusations, breakaways and reprimands, now assumed the shape of motions. The document approved in Milan on the state of the party advocated a "return" to the Statute (285). Many militants denounced repeated violations of the statute, which had brought about a diminution in memberships (only 263 members attended the congress of the radical party of Lombardy, which accounted for 3,6% of the electorate of the region) and an impoverishment of the grass-roots initiatives. Also, it was said that the federal organs "criminalized" internal dissent (as Laurini said, for instance). As far as the role of the radical party was concerned, the motion passed in Milan believed that the party was to "assume the shape of a centre of political services for citizens, groups a

nd associations wanting to fight on specific themes with the libertarian method and praxis of the radicals" (286). During the pre-congress of Florence, the militants who claimed to be civil libertarians complained that the rank and file, the regional parties and the associations had been excluded from important political decisions, which were "taken in an authoritarian and elitist manner". The document described a deep unrest within the party, with people leaving, retiring to private life or well-justified protests against the way the party was being managed. Several episodes of authoritarianism and decisions that violated the statute were referred, for instance in the formation of the national electoral lists, as well as cases of interference in the local elections. The management of the funds of the public financing was also criticized. Lastly, the most serious political accusation, which completely upset the very concept of a party based not on non-professionalism, was that a generation of officials was a

rising in the party and in the relative structures. Hence the civil libertarianism advocated by the rank and file as a means to reinstate the self-managed, federal and libertarian model outlined by the statute. Principles that were "proclaimed verbally", but more often than not remained pure lip service. The motion of Florence contained concrete and operative proposals on the structure of the party, which was no longer to be centralized, with the consequent prevalence of the "roman group" on the peripheral formations. The motion called for the implementation at the imminent national congress of those statutory rules that envisioned a congress for delegates in order to allow all members, even if absent from the assembly, to participate in the decision-making process. The aim of this demand was guaranteeing the representation in the congress of all members, in contrast to what occurred in the assembly congresses, whose decisions, owing to the absence of many delegates, reflected the will of the small minoritie

s present. These normally came from the cities and regions where the congresses were held, and since 14 out of 25 congresses, both ordinary and extraordinary, were held in Rome, there was an obvious overwhelming participation of Roman militants or militants from the Latium region. These formed a compact and homogeneous group and were always present in national assemblies.

If we consider the geographic location of the congresses, we can assume another fact: normally the cities of central and northern Italy were chosen, and since the radicals had gained seats in Parliament, there had been a clear preference for Rome, and this further enhanced the centralized structure of the party. As to written and oral information, the peripheral organizations and regional parties wanted "Notizie Radicali" and Radio Radicale to become accessible to all members and sympathizers, and cease being the theatre of debates for the lists of the party.

Another matter of pre-congress discussion concerned the administrative elections to be held the following spring. The regional parties were in favour of participating in the local competition because that could have been an opportunity for the radical party to deal with the problems relative to the quality of life in cities and local communities, in the field of the environment and welfare, and link up with movements and groups that operated in the regions on these same issues.

The treasurer of the party, Paolo Vigevano, intervened from the centre and opposed the demands of the regional parties. Vigevano was accused accused of being at the same time the person in charge of controlling the finances of the party and of being himself controlled. By clearly expressing the position of the national direction, Vigevano said "it was not possible to establish, by statute, the existence of regional parties" (287), because such bodies were admittedly "inventions" because owing to the scarcity of the members, they could not truly have any influence on the local and national institutions. Thus, Vigevano suggested to set a higher minimum number of members (over 100) compared to the one established by the current regulations for the constitution of a regional radical party. In a party with few members such as the radical party, a suggestion of this kind would have put an end to most regional formations and prevented the birth of new ones, as well as representing an obstacle to the federalist prin

ciples of the radical Statute.

The controversies between "civil libertarians" and leadership, between "centre" and "periphery" broke out openly at the 22nd congress (Genua, 31 October-4 November 1979). It should be noticed that this congress opened amid a rather tense atmosphere. The secretary of the party, Jean Fabre, had been arrested a few weeks previously in France for conscientious objection. Marco Pannella asked to suspend the congress in order to organize a protest against Fabre's arrest, in France. But the congresspeople refused and Pannella left the assembly. The congress on the one hand reiterated the validity and necessity for a new referendum initiative on qualifying themes (nuclear energy, environment, public order) and on the other hand decided, in the final motion, to strengthen the regional parties and enhance their autonomy and capacity of expression and demonstration (288).

Thus, the demands of the regional parties were recognized and fulfilled by the general motions, albeit the pro-Pannella Rippa-Bandinelli position prevailed in the end (289). The question of the statute was openly confronted, but every decision was entrusted to the Federal Council. Giuseppe Rippa, a pro-Pannella 29 year-old from Naples, and editor of "Quaderni Radicali", was elected secretary.

2. Second refoundation. The question of the regional parties.

For the radical party the new decade opened among bitter internal controversies until the schism caused by a diatribe between Pezzana and Aglietta of the radical party in Piedmont. Lorenzo Strik-Lievers commented the atmosphere in the party at the beginning of that year, writing that "petty interests and petty matters are gaining priority and demanding attention and passion, with the risk of wasting that "difference" which represents the prime reason for existing and the strength of the radical party" (290). The 23rd congress (7-9 March 1980, Rome) was called to define the line of the radical party for the subsequent regional and administrative elections. The assembly's decision on this matter was particularly important for the militants and leaders of the regional parties. It was decided not to introduce radical lists. Many of the regional parties, such as the Neapolitan and Sicilian ones, opposed this decision, which they judged to have been "previously established at the central level".

The deception of the so-called "civil libertarian" front was huge, and the dissent and malcontent re-emerged at a convention held in Bologna (26 April 1980) on the subject: "political and electoral choices of the radical party with respect to the statute and to the collective commitment for the success of the referendums" (291). The document approved invited members to vote for the radical lists and radical candidates in other lists, and in cases where this was not possible, to vote for candidates and lists of the left. Nonetheless, the final indication of the Federal Council - blank vote and non-use of the radical symbol - was not questioned by the local formation, which decided on their own not to participate in the elections. At any rate, the local associations condemned the decision not to participate, albeit this judgment was partially subdued by the success of the campaign for the collection of signature for the referendums.

Signatures were gathered on the ten referendums decided by the congress of Genua between 27 March and 27 June. These were: hunting, nuclear power plants, Cossiga bill (against which the radical parliamentarians had carried out an all-out obstructionist action in Parliament), Codice Rocco, weapons license, life imprisonment, depenalization of soft drugs, demilitarization of the financial police force and depenalization of abortion.

The radicals managed to collect 600,000 signatures for each petition, thanks also to the political commitment of the socialist party in the last few weeks of campaign (292). It was a major success for a party that faced objective difficulties, both internal ones and of political isolation. Because of their repeated use, the referendums had lost some of their impact compared to the past, also because, apart from the contribution of the socialist party, which expressed itself in political support more than anything else, people identified the referendums with the radical party, and this caused other groups to show scarce interest. To this we must add that the most important reason, that probably caused the radical party's failure in 1981: the new referendums asked people to vote for or against the radical party, which was presented as the only one that opposed a regime based on indiscriminate coalitions of parties of all orientation (293).

In some respects, this shift of perspective turned the referendums almost into political elections, and therefore the percentage of affirmative votes would inevitable had been scarce.

In the meanwhile, the "civil libertarian" component met once again in Ancona on 12-13 July 1980, and decided to launch an initiative "of political information, with the participation both of the radicals who wanted to continue their militancy in the radical party and of those who had left it because of the "elitist and anti-democratic criteria" of the central direction.

The 24th congress (Rome, 1-4 November 1980) was complicated by the fact that the entire question of the statute broke out with all its force. At the same time it is a "historical" congress because it assumed the text proposed during the previous congress as the preamble to the statute. On that same occasion, the following matters were discussed: the nature of the relation between party and parliamentary group, the autonomy of the regional parties and associations with respect to the elections, the minimum number of members necessary to form a regional party, the criteria for the use of the funds raised with the enrolments. The congress, while considering the impossibility of facing the statute problems as a whole, recognized that it was no longer possible to postpone the definition of a series of fundamental points, and decided to call an extraordinary congress in August 1982 to carry out a revision of the statute and thus a political refoundation of the radical party.

The preamble to the Statute, which had been approved by the 24th congress, was considered by all militants as a political and programmatic manifesto on the supreme value of non-violence and civil disobedience. The terms of the radical action, both in and outside the party, appeared to be totally innovative.

The preamble developed along three key principles: the centrality of international politics and the fact of overcoming the generic traditional antimilitarist indication by inserting the struggle against world hunger into a global vision; the explicit affirmation, in the radical party's lay horizon, of the traditional values of christian religiousness; the inclusion of natural law as the limit to the action of the State, and the consequent right-duty for citizens to practice civil disobedience (294).

The most significant part, politically speaking, and the most authentically radical one, is the one that concerns the definition of disobedience. It proclaims the duty of disobedience, of non-cooperation, of the supreme forms of non-violent struggle to uphold the law, in the sense of natural law. August 1982 had been chosen as the date for the refounding of the party. On 17 May 1981, almost half-way through, the vote on the referendums was held (295). The outcome, which was negative for the radical party, had the effect of stepping up the refoundation. At that time, the left was exulting for its victory. The PSI had, for its part, left its members free to vote however they wanted to. In the meanwhile, the socialist party seemed to be opening up to the radical area. However, shortly before the 25th congress (Rome, 5-7 June 1981), such hypothesis appeared to be unrealistic, since the two parties pursued different strategies.

But the irksome issue which greatly preoccupied the local parties concerned the first guidelines of the statutory refoundation of the party. In this climate of high expectation, Marco Pannella issued a statement in which he urged radical militants to "free themselves from the Statute". Amid the disbelief of the assembly, he adde, "let's not pretend that we are that plural subject formed by many parties that do not exist. We are a subject, 3/4/500/700 comrades, who have been capable of struggling well together" (296). The statement was the equivalent of condemning the local parties to death. Yet in his replica the leader changed tone and added that the statutory autonomies (the regional parties, associations and leagues) not only were not threatened by his hypothesis of refounding the parties, but would instead have been strengthened by it. He launched the idea of regional parties with their own exclusive symbols, which they would be responsible for on their own. It was a tactical contradiction. The "civil li

bertarian" minority that endorsed the motion signed by Bandinelli and others, far from being convinced by Pannella's promises, reiterated its commitment to apply the statute of the radical party, which in their view continued to represent a model of political and social aggregation.

3. Referendums: a completed cycle. Beginning of the diaspora. Hunger and environmental disaster.

In the meantime, another chapter was coming to a close: the 25th congress acknowledged that the referendum project "was unquestionably completed by the referendum of 17 May" (297); not in the sense that the instrument of the referendum was no longer to be used, but simply that a cycle of political campaigns was over, and that the party, free of referendum commitments, could now tackle the campaign against world hunger with the traditional instruments of popular mobilization and direct actions.

The radical leading class was no longer that mobile, dispersed and occasionally desperate one of its golden years; from the point of view of the local groups, it had become a compact bloc (actually, it had always been a compact bloc, at the Roman level) with hierarchies that pursued self-conservation by following the consolidated praxis of co-optation. The nostalgics of the struggles of the sixties and seventies complained that even the word "radical" had lost its "immediate, narrative and striking" power (298). A third period started for the radicals, with new instruments and new structures.

A sort of radical right appeared on the political scene, which, as we shall see, was completely engulfed by Pannella. At that time, many militants thought the much-hated "regime" and much-questioned party power had contaminated the radical area with its behaviour.

In actual fact, the instrument set up by the leadership to avoid

objectives from being replaced did not stop the onset of a certain type of political professionalism in the party, and, on the other hand, the destruction of the peripheral organization gathered around the regional parties, that were fundamentally rendered inactive after 1 October 1981 (299).

Secondly, the fact that many occasional or casual members left the party when the membership fees were raised in relation to the income (300) marked the end of the turnover, i.e. the spontaneous aggregation which had been the best part of the party's heroic period. Lastly, there is the phenomenon of "radio" members, i.e. members recruited through Radio Radicale, who paid their membership fee without, however, engaging in any form of militancy.

The 26th congress (Florence 28 October - 1 November 1981) marked the return of Marco Pannella as secretary of the party. Pannella had in fact never ceased being the party's "leader". In this congress the radical initiative to struggle against world hunger took on the shape of an explicit, precise and urging motion. That is why Pannella, at a moment in which the party assumed this extraordinary and engrossing task, could not avoid also taking a personal formal commitment. He was the only exponent in the condition to make the question on which the North-South crisis hinged--hunger in the developing countries, the Holocaust of our days--into a political action. The radical party could, on this issue, count on its twenty-year proposal of a unity of the left, which could have united "the democrats, communists, socialists, liberals and all those who believe in other than in power, and for whom each person's right to live and therefore be free is a primary value" (301).

The question of public financing, which had been a subject of conflict among the party's various factions, was decided with a motion, which allowed to separate the management of the public funds from that of the party's funds. The motion decided, namely, that: the public funds were not to be used in any case to cover the expenses relative to the organization and activities of the party; secondly, the payment of subjects outside the party was the responsibility of the treasurer, on the basis of projects: these public funds were to be used mainly to ensure "independent information at the service of the citizens and of the country", thirdly, any remaining sums would have been placed in a special reserve to meet the needs for cash for any preschedule elections; fourth, the shares of financing coming in the following fiscal years were to be used to pay the debts which the party had contracted until November 1st 1981. In any case, the treasurer was authorized to tap the public funds to meet sudden cash requirement

s. In the early eighties the situation of the party's budget was relatively good compared to previous years. The party had slightly over 3,000 members, and therefore the revenues of the "membership fees" amounted to 61 million lire, three times the amount in 1979; to this we need to add "the contribution of members and supporters", for a further 121 million. All this resulted in a very high share of self-financing. But while consistent, the share of self-financing was small with respect to the overall budget, which registered a deficit of about 200 million. To make up for liabilities, the party resorted to bank loans. The budget of the following year (16-10-81/15-10-82) presents a huge deficit for the radical cash, amounting to 800 million, with a diminution of the self-financing to less than 120 million. The internal crisis of the party, the extent and motivations of which we have already examined, led to a deep divide at the 28th congress (Bologna, 20 October - November 1982). The tension between the two f

actions began on procedural matters. After the negative outcome for their group of the first controversies on the order of the day, Rippa and De Cataldo left the Congress and claimed to represent and defend the fundamental rights of 40% of the members - rights which the assembly majority had supposedly violated (302). The two dissidents organized a counter-congress in a side room, attended by about forty congresspeople. It was the first division in the history of the radical party. The following day the deputies Pinto and Boato also left the party, motivating their decision with the fact that the radical party had suffered "a sort of genetic mutation". The congress confirmed Marcello Crivellini as treasurer and Marco Pannella as secretary.

Lastly, the 27th congress approved a detailed financial regulation to discipline the use of public funds and to establish the powers of the treasurer.

Nothing was decided instead on the control of the funds managed by the autonomous subjects (Radio Radicale,Tele-Roma, Centro Calamandrei) on the part of the party's executive organs: hence the controversies that followed on the destination of the public funds, which some found not useful for the political purposes of the party.

At this point we have to say that the refounding of the party, hypothesized by all parts, by the militants, the sympathizers of the radical areas, did not take place despite the fact that the motion approved by the 24th congress (November 1980) envisioned the calling of an extraordinary congress for the statutory refoundation of the party in August 1982. A specially created committee did not manage to express any hypothesis or concrete proposal. Thus, the party's structure remained unchanged, also in the subsequent congresses.

The reason for all this lay in the incapacity to find a new organizational model to replace the one experimented in the previous years. Such new model was to come to terms with the changed political conditions. In practice, the questions to be tackled were: the relationship between the party and the elected members, the participation in the administrative organs of municipalities and provinces, the delegates at the congress, the party officials, the formation of electoral lists, the federate movements and the regional parties.

The motion approved by the 27th congress underscored a first attempt to carry out an in-depth analysis of the political situation created by the end of the government of national solidarity. The fragile remainders of democracy in our country were assessed, and the conclusion was the party power had brought about a sort of constitutional emptiness.

Thus, the radical party advocated "the defense and implementation of the Constitution through proposals and projects overriding the parceling of the institutions, starting with a major popular petition for the establishment of a committee of inquiry on parties' public financing, on their budgets and their financial situation".

A clash emerged at this point of the internal debate, which subsequently was to become deeper, between Pannella's position, highly pessimistic, and that of others, such as Gianluigi Melega and Roccella. Pannella's thesis hinged on the consideration that party power was invincible, and that the only solution was resorting to civil disobedience, i.e. the original radical methods of struggle, based on a strong non-violent, individual action such as hunger and thirst strikes. In the meanwhile, Pannella called an extraordinary congress so that the radicals could decide whether or not to participate in the preschedule political elections to be held on the 26th of June 1983.

With respect to this, it is important to say that the radical party had been denouncing the fact that every trace of legality had disappeared in Italy. Above all, it lamented a constant and growing degeneration of the constitutional system with the rising power of the parties. In the face of this wreck, the radicals organized a voting strike at the election of 1983 and in the following elections, as a demonstration of extreme mistrust towards the other political subjects, which were all more or less united in managing the "regime" in Italy. This intention was patently in contrast with all other parties, and caused the radical party to be isolated both in Parliament and in the country.

It is necessary, at this point, to provide an account of how the decision to refuse to participate in the elections was reached. Gian Luigi Melega said he was against an abstention, because the radical presence in Parliament could have taken on the value of testimony in the institutions. Pannella declared instead that the way they were organized, the elections were a swindle to the detriment of the citizens, who, guided by media that were completely in the hands of the parties, had no real choice. The Melega motion was rejected by the congress assembly with a 400 to 341 vote and 68 abstentions. The congress closed with a non-decision. But it definitely ruled out the hypothesis of an automatic and unconditional presentation of the radical party at the imminent elections.

However, immediately after the federal council took an apparently contradictory decision. It decided to suggest to the radical electorate to abstain from voting as a sign of protest against party power, but also to present radical lists with the purpose of ensuring TV space for the party where it could propagandize "the non-violent boycotting of swindle elections". It was an ambiguous position albeit useful tactically speaking, because it ensured the radical presence in the national media without exposing it to a possible failure in the electoral contest. The radicals seized on the electoral opportunity to continue struggling against the emergency legislation: Toni Negri, one of the defendants at the "7 April trial" for acts of terrorism and subjected to preventive custody for over four years, was presented and elected. Once again, the radicals managed to stir a vast debate in the country on the problems of justice. The radical party obtained 2.2% of votes, despite the pro-abstention campaign--11 deputies a

nd one senator. In contrast to the elections of 1979, where many external candidates were running, in 1983 the elected radicals were all members of the radical party by precise decision of the party: parliamentarians were to be not representatives of the nation, but non-violent militants within the institutions. We have already said that the position of the radical party, which consisted in systematically challenging the system, caused the radicals to clash with all parties, which the radicals accused of participating in the "regime banquet". Even with the smaller parties, and the closest ones in terms of ideals, such as the left-wing parties. In the long history of the radical party, its relations with the P.S.I. have always been troubled. The causes of the conflict between the radical and socialist forces were not unilateral. The socialists considered the radicals to be rivals to the left, in an area which they could have tapped for electors. The radicals for their part were incapable of leading the P.S.I

. on positions of alternative and to leave the centre-left. Nevertheless, the two parties had cooperated in 1980 to gather signatures for the 10 referendums, but the P.S.I. did not support the radical draft bill against world hunger, and in 1982 five radical deputies joined the P.S.I.

But after the elections of 1983, with Craxi as prime minister, the radical party and the socialists came closer, because the socialist prime minister included the problem of world hunger in his programmatic declarations.

The 29th congress of the party (Rimini 20 Oct.-1 Nov. 1983) opened in this sort of political scenario. The radicals seemed at a loss, without prospects, in a dead end. Pannella described the hopeless political situation. According to the radical leader, the crisis of the Italian democracy did not open up any space, in the institutions, for a constructive policy on the part of the radicals. He also denounced the radical party's failure also in its struggle against world hunger. For these reasons, Pannella outlined the possibility of dissolving the party or in any case refounding it, basing it on non-violence, civil disobedience, hunger strike: in other words, a Gandhian party.

The congress assembly was divided between one part that supported Pannella's position (Cicciomessere, Spadaccia) and others (Melega, Roccella) who hypothesized a radical-democratic party with the capacity to influence the political situation. The congress closed with a unitarian motion that confirmed the objective of the "three million living" in 1984 and, valued the necessary funds to pursue such objective at 3 billion, to be raised through self-financing. Lastly, it was decided that the radical party would participate in the European elections of 1984 with the precise purpose of seeking alliances for the campaign against world hunger. Another subject which the radicals submitted to the attention of the public opinion was the one of "just justice". As a symbol-victim of the deformation of the current laws, Enzo Tortora was presented at the European elections of 1984. Tortora had been accused of drug trafficking and other serious offences.

The results of the elections were satisfying (3.4%). There was a prevalence in the South, especially in chief towns, with peak results of 10.2% in Catania and 9.9% in Palermo. The 30th congress (Rome 31 October - 4 November 1984) reconfirmed the line proposed by Pannella: passage of the "Piccoli" bill against world hunger, enhancement of the anti-militarist action, popular bills in the following fields: ecology, environment, health, information, justice. It was decided that the radicals would not participate in the subsequent administrative elections, but that the party would support environmentalist lists. Giovanni Negri, 27, was elected secretary, and Peppino Calderisi was elected treasurer.

In the meanwhile, the radicals continued the campaign against world hunger. Considerable consent had been building up on this subject.

On the 27th of March 1984, 150 members of Parliament (D.C. P.S.I., P.L.I., P.S.D.I.) introduced a special bill that provided for special interventions to save at least three million human lives, with an appropriation of 3,000 billion to be managed by a high commissioner. Marco Pannella went on thirst strikes, hundreds of people went on collective hunger strikes, Nobel prizes launched appeals, the European Parliament passed a resolution, the Italian parliament passed a bill in 1985 that provided for interventions against world hunger and appropriations for 1,900 million for an 18-month period. In 1985 the political campaign concentrated also on the question of the "escalator". On the referendum organized by the radicals to abrogate the Craxi decree on the escalator, the radicals proposed to abstain. The radical party's position appears to be reasonable, considering, as Norberto Bobbio underlined, that "in those circumstances it was necessary to reject not the decision that was to result from the vote, but the

very procedure used in making that decision". Because the value at stake was conflicting economic interests, a solution of compromise was imperative. At any rate, the government's decision on the escalator could not be influenced by the opposition. The communist party, that was accustomed to a system of consociate power, wanted to negotiate on this too, exerting a sort of veto right. The radicals wanted advocated instead a clear distinction of the roles: majority on the one hand and opposition on the other, and therefore the government's right to carry out its program.

In the meanwhile, the radicals continued their analysis of the state of the party. Self-financing had raised 96 million in 1984, which climbed to 2,200 billion in 1985. However, this sum, which was substantial for the radical cashes, was not the result of memberships and contributions, but of political campaigns. This fact was the symptom of a crisis in the militant participation, the traditional linchpin of the radical structure. Apart from anything else, there remained a deficit as an effect of the growing needs of the autonomous subjects (Radio Radicale, Teleroma 56, Centro Calamandrei).

The 31st congress (Florence, November 1985) closed with the passage of a resolution proposed by Pannella, which charged the statutory organs with drafting a project for the cessation of the party.

4. Closing down? The Budapest Congress. The party will not die.

In 1986 the radical party resumed the referendum campaign, this time no longer in a position of isolation, but together with the P.S.I. and the P.L.I. The subject of the referendums was the civil responsibility of the judges, the committee of inquiry, the electoral reform of the CSM (303). The similarity of these battles stressed the special relationship existing between the PSI and the radical party--a relationship which had grown stronger with the advent of Craxi as secretary. The Constitutional Court ruled that three of the eight referendums that had been requested by several promoting committees (the one on the electoral reform of the CSM and the two against hunting) were illegitimate. The 5 remaining ones were voted after the political elections of June 1987--a circumstance which subdued much of the drive of the referendums. About 80% of the electorate declared to be in favour of abrogation for all five referendums.

The radicals however continued to question themselves on whether or not to cease their activity. At the 32nd congress (Rome, November 1986), Pannella suggested to dissolve the party. 80% of the congress participants expressed itself in favour of the party's survival. Alessandro Tessari said that "the cessation does not mean a closure, but the correct way of reinventing what has been defined as the radical thing" (304). The congress decided to set itself the objective of 10,000 members by 1986 or dissolve itself. It therefore postponed the problem of refounding the party to another congress, to be held in February 1987. By 31st January 1987, the radical party gathered 5,000 enrolments. The most relevant fact was the fact that many members were also members of other parties--a fact which crossed the Italian political scene. The singular initiative of the double militancy was strongly opposed by the apparatus of the left-wing parties, that feared that their influence would be weakened and also because it paved

the way for possible coalitions outside the agreements taken by the leaders between single political exponents on the radicals' subjects of campaign. The double militancy placed the radical party in front of the problem of seeking a new organizational model to take into account international affiliations as well.

During the second session of the same congress it was decided to suspend the norms of the Statute, and the first secretary, Giovanni Negri, and eight federal secretaries (305) were charged with the task of refounding the party. At this point the question of dissolving the party had been set aside. In fact, the radicals hoped to strengthen themselves at the international level, with the objective of reaching a few thousand members to be recruited outside Italy "in order to create the premises for the radical party to become the international and internationalist, lay and non-violent party of human rights and of a United States of Europe". Much accent was placed on the need to enhance the party's characteristics as a "cross-party", a second party, which the party had been assuming thanks to the principle of double membership. At the internal political level, the socialist and environmentalist forces were asked to reach an electoral agreement with the purpose of introducing separate lists at the Chamber and com

mon lists at the Senate through the creation of a "front for a federalist and republican reform". If these lists had achieved 30% of votes, there would have followed the proposal of an electoral reform for the introduction of the British majority system. The norms of the Statute concerning the regional parties were suspended. The radicals finally acknowledged the failure of federalism by way of internal organization of the party. What remained was external federalism: the possibility to join non-radical associations. As early as in 1982, the Federative Council, which was to be the organ of the federation of the regional parties, had changed composition and name: it was called Federal Council, formed only by members elected by the Congress. For 1987 the F.C. would have been formed by fifty members picked among the members.

The 34th congress (Bologna, 2-6 January 1988) definitely established the party's transnational identity, on the basis of the belief that the current problems could not be solved in a national dimension. Also, the party gave up any participation in national political elections.

Pannella wanted to include a clause envisioning the automatic cessation of the party if the objectives established by the motion had not been achieved: 4 billion lire of self-financing and 3,000 members outside of Italy.

Pannella's proposal was rejected, and for the first time in the history of the radical party, the leading group was united in opposing its leader.

The congress also approved the changes to the Statute, which redefined the organization of the party.

The debate on the cessation of the party continued throughout 1988 until the Budapest congress (35th, 22-26 April 1989), where the destiny of the party was entrusted to a four-member executive formed by the secretary, the treasurer, the president of the party and the president of the Federal Council.

Instead of dying on the banks of the Danube, the party, which had been refounded in 1962, survived in other shapes: several exponents joined new and old political formations, including the Greens, the antiprohibitionists and the social-democrats. The ideas and the original methods, nonetheless, remained vital and effective.

TABLE 13

ANDAMENTO NEGLI ANNI DELLE ISCRIZIONI

PROGRESSION ANNUELLE DES INSCRIPTIONS

YEARLY PROGRESS OF MEMBERSHIPS

Anno-Année-Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Italia-Italie-Italy 2.959 2.223 3.707 3.412 2.987 10.862 11.645 5.006 1.112

Altri paesi-Autres pays-Other countries 34 149 171 828 247

Totale-Total-Total 2.959 2.223 3.707 3.412 3.021 11.011 11.816 5.834 1.359

Source: Report delivered at the 35th Congress (Budapest, 22-26 April 1989) by Paolo Vigevano, treasurer of the radical party.

NOTES

(283) Cf. Document of the Federative Council in view of the 23rd Congress of the RP (31 Oct.-4 Nov. 1979), "Notizie radicali", n. 148, 15 October 1979.

(284) Foundation of juridical studies, established by the parliamentary group of the R.P. in 1978 with public funds.

(285) Political motion approved by the 5th Congress of the R.P. of Lombardia (20-21 October 1979, Milan), in "Il Radicale", n. 2, November 1979 - In the same issue of the Radical party's Milanese newsletter, the conclusive document of the two pre-congress meetings of Florence.

(286) Political motion, 5th Congress of the R.P., ibidem.

(287) PAOLO VIGEVANO, »Alcune proposte per il Congresso di Genova , "Notizie radicali", n. 147, 10 October 1979.

(288) Political motion, 22nd Congress.

(289) Two conflicting motions were introduced: one signed by Rippa and Bandinelli and the other by Ercolessi and Ramadori. In all radical congresses, voting is by show of hands, with the possibility of asking for a check and cross-check. Such checks represent,in actual fact, new votings, because members are given the opportunity to change their mind. The demonstration of this is that during the 23rd Congress three votings were made on opposite motions, which gave opposite results.

(290) LORENZO STRIK-LIEVERS, »Il nuovo patto radicale , "Argomenti radicali", n. 19. February-May 1980, p. 16.

(291) Cf. RENATO VIVIAN, »Dentro il P R. - Analisi diacronica dei rapporti dei militanti radicali con lo Statuto del partito , a cura dell'Associazione radicale di Udine, 1982 pp. 40 e ss.

(292) M. TEODORI, »Elezioni, referendum, prospettive politiche , "Argomenti radicali", n. 15, February-May 1980.

(293) »Fermali con una firma , pamphlet published by the Radical Party, Rome, 1980.

(294) See also the political motion approved by the 23rd Congress of the Radical Party, which, along with the Preamble, constitutes the political manifesto of the new Radical Party.

(295) The Constitutional Court in February 1981 had rejected five of the ten referendums introduced by the radicals: the one on abortion, nuclear power plants, Codice Rocco, depenalization of drugs, demilitarization of the financial police corps. A bill was passed in 1981 which changed the composition of military courts, thus preventing the relative referendum.

On 17 May 1981 a vote was held on the Cossiga bill, on life sentence, on weapons license and on abortion. Along with these, the referendum to abrogate law 194, introduced by the "Movimento per la vita".

(296) Marco Pannella, Report delivered on 5 June 1981 during the 253rd extraordinary congress of the radical party, Rome, 5-7 June, published by Quaderni radicali.

(297) Political motion passed by the 25th congress of the radical party.

(298) ANGIOLO BANDINELLI, »Il partito radicale è morto, viva il partito radicale , "Referendum, quali, come, perché", Grazia Passeri and Silvio Pergameno (ed.), Rome 1981.

(299) The 24th Congress (Rome, November 1980) had supported a motion in application of the Statute, which fixed the minimum required number of members to create a regional party in relation to the population residing in the region, and indicated 1st October 1981 as the deadline to conform to it ("Notizie radicali", n. 37, 1 December 1980).

(300) In 1982 Pannella decided a substantial increase of the membership fee, establishing a minimum of "200 lire per day".

(301) Cf. Political motion approved by the 25th congress.

(302) Account of the 27th congress in Notizie radicali, n 32, 20 August 1982.

(303) The radicals collected signatures for other referendums as well: three on nuclear energy together with D.P., Il Manifesto, FGCI and the Greens; two on hunting together with the Greens.

(304) Cf. N. BERTOLONI MELI, »Nasce il partito di continuisti , "Il Messaggero", 31 October 1986.

(305) Aglietta, De Stefano, Spadaccia, Stango, Vesce, Valcarenghi, D'Elia, Dell'Alba.