HOTEL ERGIFE - ROME - 4-8 FEBRUARY 1993ABSTRACT: These notes and documents have been prepared for the participants of the 2nd Session of the XXXVI Radical Party Congress.
The material was written in Italian, and has been translated into Croat, French, English, Romanian and Russian. It is divided into three sections.
The FIRST SECTION, which explains the Radical Party's situation and its projects in the various countries, was edited by Danilo Quinto, with contributions from:
Angiolo Bandinelli, Rita Bernardini, Gianni Betto, Michele Boselli, Marino Busdachin, Marco De Andreis, Gianfranco Dell'Alba, Sergio D'Elia, Olivier Dupuis, Alessandra Filograno, Luca Frassineti, Basile Guissou, Massimo Lensi, Sandro Ottoni, Giorgio Pagano, Paolo Pietrosanti, Marina Sikora, Antonio Stango, Andrea Tamburi, Marco Taradash, Anna Tothfalusi and Maurizio Turco.
The SECOND SECTION features a contribution from Olivier Dupuis on possible actions and commitments to be undertaken by the Transnational Party.
The THIRD SECTION, the draft of the Transnational Party Statute, was written by Gianfranco Dell'Alba and Lorenzo Strik Lievers, and is the product of a work group of which also Angiolo Bandinelli, Roberto Cicciomessere, Danilo Quinto and the Party Secretary took part.
Introduction
1. The Budapest Congress. Its historical and political significance.
2. The following period.
3. "Full congressional powers".
4. The Radical Party's non-competition in elections.
5. The "political project".
6. The first session of the XXXVI Congress.
7. The value of the approved motion.
8. The adjournment to this second session.
9. The significance of this report.
10. The need for new statutory rules.
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Radical Party Activity in Europe and in the World
A.1. RESPONSES, MEMBERS, PARLIAMENTARIANS
A.1.1. The political response to the project.
A.1.2. Membership
A.2. ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
A.2.1. Poland
A.2.2. The Former Czechoslovakia
A.2.3. Hungary
A.2.4. The Former Yugoslavia
A.2.4.1. Slovenia
A.2.4.2. Croatia
A.2.4.3. Bosnia and Hercegovina
A.2.4.4. Macedonia
A.2.4.5. Vojvodina
A.2.4.6. The Kosovo
A.2.5. Romania
A.2.6. Albania
A.2.7. Bulgaria
A.2.8. The Former Soviet Union
A.2.8.1. The Baltic States
A.3. RADICAL ACTION IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
A.4. BURKINA FASO, THE SAHEL COUNTRIES, AFRICA
A.5. PROJECTS
A.5.1. Antiprohibitionism with regard to drugs.
A.5.2. The international parliamentary campaign for the abolition of the death penalty in the world by the year 2000.
A.5.3. The nonviolent initiative for democracy in Cuba.
A.5.4. The right to communication and the right to language.
A.5.5. An international policy of environmental and ecological responsibility.
A.5.6. The reform of the UN: An "International Court of Justice".
A.5.7. The European institutions, "Maastricht", the Radical position.
INTRODUCTION
1. The Budapest Congress. Its historical and political significance.
The Budapest Congress of April 1989 was without a doubt the most important event of the last five years for the Radical Party, from the XXXV Bologna Congress to the present day.
The Party came to Budapest with its own history, experience, and human and financial resources. Back then it was for the most part Italian, with just a few dozen non-Italian members, but nonetheless, the Party has never defined itself as solely Italian, and has even had a non-Italian secretary. The Radical Party, a non-Communist party, held its Congress in an Eastern European capital that was living a "spring of democracy and freedom", in the hope that this "spring" would soon spread throughout Europe, strengthening and renewing the tired and stiff Western real democracies.
In a situation as fragile as glass, and in a setting that foreshadowed the events of six months later - the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent upset of the political, social, historical and even cultural attitudes in the "real socialist" countries - the Radical Party raised its flags: the flag of lay tolerance, of Ghandian nonviolence, of liberal and libertarian socialism, of democratic intransigence and of liberal advocacy of civil liberties, of a new ecological humanism for our society and for our age. We call on all forces of democracy and tolerance in every country, particularly ruling classes and their freest and most responsible exponents, to join us and thereby ward off the very serious membership and resource problems of the Party.
Even before the Budapest Congress, the Party had already averted the threat of bankruptcy. At the Madrid Federal Council, just four months after the January 1988 Bologna Congress, the Party leadership - its First Secretary, Treasurer and the Federal Council - had documented and debated "with ever-greater insistence and precision, rigour and vigour, the ruinous situation, in which ostracism, mystification and anti-democratic use of private and state authority powers had reduced the Party" and, providing a precise analysis of the "state of the Party", the leadership had posited the idea of a risk of fraudulent bankruptcy at the focal point of their action, even so without succeeding in finding a solution to avoid simple bankruptcy.
At the Budapest Congress the Radical Party reformed itself for the purpose of avoiding simple bankruptcy, by delegating its "congressional powers" to the First Secretary, Treasurer, to the Chairpersons of the Party and the Federal Council, as a compact body - including the power of not convening Congress in the case of closure of the party and liquidation of its patrimony - and by deciding to not withhold "any energy or vigour, personal and financial" from the goal of guaranteeing the existence of the Party and its patrimony. "If closure is unavoidable - ran the motion - it is nothing but the result of a violent act by the powers that be, and is in no way a decision of the Party."
The Budapest Congress constituted the grounding of a political "itinerary" which in the following sixteen months included Federal Council sessions in Brussels, Madrid, Grottaferrata, Jerusalem, Trieste-Bohinj and Strasbourg, culminating in the bid, refused by the Croat authorities at that time, to hold the Congress in Zagreb. This bid was pursued with dedication and determination: a nonviolent hunger strike was organized involving hundreds of people from many nations - led by the Party Secretary - firm in the knowledge of the need to put the Yugoslavian question at the very centre of Europe's (and the world's) political agenda. The Yugoslavian question is a matter of interdependence and integration in political Europe of a state that for decades was considered independent, in the illusion that this independence could guarantee a balance between East and West and, at the same time, resolve the ethnic and social tensions that in later years have burst into acts of violence, war and massacre. This failu
re has, once more, unleashed the worst demons of this century in the heart of Europe.
2. The following period.
The period that followed the Budapest Congress was marked by a first phase - roughly six months - during which Party leaders debated what to do, aware on one hand of the gravity of the situation, particularly its economic and financial aspects, and on the other of the need to understand the meaning and the political value of "full powers", which if assumed would most certainly have initiated an "exceptional" period, in statutory and other terms, for and of the Party.
3. "Full congressional powers".
At the end of December 1989, at a time when the scenarios and vicissitudes of world history - with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the irrepressible blooming of "spring" in the former Communist countries - appeared to bear out the Radical Party's stance of the previous years and seemed to give hope to its political proposal and to its project, the assumption of "full powers" was considered the only possible way forward.
The assumption of "full powers" was formally ratified by the Federal Council in January 1990. At that Council session a speech was made by Achille Occhetto, secretary of what was then the Italian Communist Party, at that time undergoing a process of reconstitution and potentially in a position to accept the opportunity offered by the Radical Party and its leadership to come together and create a new perspective for Europe and for Italy. We are still patiently awaiting an answer.
The second phase spans the whole of 1990 and the first few months of 1991. By suspending all activities save those underway in Eastern and Central Europe, and by reducing the Party's staff from 40 to 6, the Party leadership succeeded in bringing about economic and financial recovery. In addition, approval of the parliamentary initiative for a law recognizing "Radio Radicale" as a "service of general interest" definitively relieved the Party from economic responsibilities towards the radio station that for almost ten years had absorbed all the resources made available by public financing of political parties as laid down by Italian law. By early 1991, the Party found itself with a "one-off opportunity" to invest 7 billion Italian lire (roughly US$5 million) in political activity.
Nineteen ninety-one, which began with the world plunged into its most serious crisis for some time, the Gulf War, was the year of the "political, transnational and transdivisional project" and of the "New Party" newspaper.
4. The Radical Party's non-competition in elections.
A further fact is of prime importance: the Radical Party's non-competition in elections, and its refusal to participate in any electoral contest.
This choice - an example the Party wished to set to itself and to other political forces in Italian and European "real democracies" - was risky and difficult, though at the same time it was a clear and transparent move. It was also a brave choice, considering that the Party was effectively giving up its claim to sure sources of income and renouncing a place within the Italian institutions, within which it could quite easily have "muddled through" for at least twenty years more.
The Radical Party's decision to "pull out" was in answer to its wish to become a transnational and transdivisional organization and back up this desire with a strong sign; and to its wish to create a "segment of theory within the practice", in other words of political practice, to offer up to the leading groups in every country, so that the Party's motives could be understood and its goals shared.
The foundation of the "New Party" was, above all, a function of this choice. The choice made it possible for everybody, members of parliament and citizens alike, in Eastern and Western Europe, to join the Radical Party without disavowing their own national political orientation. Their membership would thus stand as "value added" to the political involvement of each person within their town, their region and their national borders. Alongside and beyond local and national political involvement, there must be a different sort of commitment which contributes to the creation of an organization operating beyond the confines of national borders and bestows impetus, determination and background on the first type of involvement.
After the decision taken at the Bologna Congress of January 1988, ratified at the Budapest Congress of April 1989, the Radical Party declined to present a list of candidates for the 1989 European elections, and in Italy for the 1990 local elections and the 1992 general election.
The Party's First Secretary refrained from presenting himself for office on lists promoted by or containing other well-known Radical representatives, for the purpose of "underscoring" this non-competitiveness, and in the hope of developing in Italy's other political forces and their leaderships an awareness of the need - for the life of the Radical Party and for its autonomy, particularly its financial independence, from the Italian institutional situation - for a transdivisional dimension as an essential precursor to a transnational dimension.
For the Party, one consequence of this choice is that it may no longer count on its share of public financing ascribed by Italian law to party electoral lists whose candidates are elected.
This consequence is of great import, considering that in 1989, at the Strasbourg Federal Council session, the Party had decided to directly invest its annual share of public financing in its activities. As the Party may no longer count on this income, and as the shortfall has not been compensated by independent fund-raising (either direct, from members or supporters, or indirect, the issue of Party activities, and entrepreneurial ventures) the matter is of crucial importance for the continuing existence of the Party.
The Radical Party's declared and demonstrated desire not to enter into competition with other Italian parties is closely linked to two themes: the Radical Party's stand against public financing of political parties, which has led to the promotion of a referendum, the second in fifteen years, to repeal the existing law; the not wishing its life and its existence to suffer the negative effects of the "partycratic" regime and its multi-party government, by supporting a uninominal Anglo-Saxon type electoral system in which there are two opposing formations and in which citizens are not cheated of their right to choose who is to govern and who is to be in opposition.
The Radical Party's decision to stand down from the electoral ring, the fact that it is becoming more and more an "instrument" at the service of and for politics, is once again an example for "others".
5. The "political project".
What is the idea behind the project?
The "scenario" we are attempting to win for our society and our age, for the militants of nonviolence and for the political class of democratic parliaments in all nations, is the following: laws and resolutions, all but identical, to be simultaneously presented and approved at an ever greater number of national parliaments, the European parliament, the Assembly and various other organizations of the United Nations.
Only a new political entity, capable of action on a transnational level - and of working to overcome the separation between on one hand science and consciousness, and on the other power and policy-making - may measure up to the task of subverting what appears to be the natural order of things. In Eastern and Western Europe, and in the third and fourth worlds, there is a need for new laws, new institutions, new parliamentary actions, new models and a new world order; new objectives for political action and new projects for a world that seems to have lost the very reasons for civil and political life, a world that is suffering enormous new and terrible problems that any one individual State within its national orbit, or existing international organizations, patently find impossible to control.
In order to realize this "project" we must have an efficient organization, culturally and politically capable of translating into "political undertakings" the many values and ideals which have never thrived or prospered. This entails creating and realizing "programmes" for estimated expenditure, annual statements, resource management and disciplined expenditure (1).
6. The first session of the XXXVI Congress.
This bid has borne fruit; everything possible has been invested in this "project".
News of this attempt was related during the first session of this Congress, in a scenario which for the first time - and against all expected logic, because of the short space of time and the small amount of resources invested, in human and financial terms - constituted a concrete representation of our desire to be: a nonviolent and federalist International of members of parliament and government and of citizens of every nation in the world. During 1991 this International slowly came into being, with two further meetings of the Federal Council in Rome (September) and Zagreb (November).
The first session of Congress was attended by 1,141 people, of whom 322 were not Italian. One hundred and two were current members of parliament, 88 of whom were not Italian, from a total of 42 countries in Eastern and Western Europe, Africa and America.
By April, 162 members of parliament and government from roughly 80 national parties and 50 separate parliaments were members of the Radical Party and of its Federal Council; 3,219 non-Italian citizens and 1,841 Italians were members. Although impressive, this result was on one hand a consequence of rapid expansion in some parts of the world - particularly in the immense expanse of the former Soviet Union - and on the other, of inadequate political response in the West, and particularly in Italy.
The Party leaders arrived at the first session sure of having complied with the mandate of the Budapest motion - the attempt to build the New Party - and of having averted liquidation of the party - "a condition imposed by third parties". They were also certain of not having completely fulfilled the mandate, seeing as the indispensable presuppositions for achieving the objective, namely breathing not just life but vitality into the "new venture", had not yet come into being.
Indeed, personal and collective efforts and abilities alone were insufficient: it was exceedingly difficult to reconcile the organizational and operative processes with the urgency of the political initiative: resources, human and financial, were lacking.
A further cause for dissatisfaction was that we had not been able to make full use of the response in terms of enrolment, particularly of members of parliament, nor of the overall response to the "project".
At the end of the Congress - taking into account the lack of public financing - the Party had around one billion lire ($750,000) left, "barely enough to keep the Party going for another four, at most five months, without spending anything on political action; this is just enough time to organize the winding up process, and make sure that assets are retained."
The situation was different to that of April 1989: in Budapest there had been no question of retaining the assets, as they did not formally exist. The only prospect was bankruptcy.
Until April 1992, the assets were not pledged, but a continuation of activity would have led to debt guaranteed solely by these assets. Although the situation was bleak, there were still some possibilities open, not least the possibility of choice. Closure was not the only option available: others included setting up a foundation that does not directly engage in political activity but serves as a support, or else liquidating the assets and continuing with political activity until all resources are completely used up.
The reason why Congress was convened lies in the fact that the political and financial situation still allowed room for manoeuvre, and closure was not the only option.
The "variable" in this situation was the "Italian reservoir" made up of members, non-members and of possible contributions from other parties.
Thus Congress was asked to decide on the following topics: "how much time is required to arrive at a definitive judgement concerning minimum necessary activities and an indispensable amount of money?", bearing in mind a political framework and outlook full of positive signs; membership, particularly that of members of parliament, attendance at Congress, and high Party penetration in some areas.
The report requested democrats, Western Europeans, and especially Italians - during a very serious political and institutional crisis for Italy's "real democracy" - to provide an answer to the above queries as to what to do, how to do it and when to do it.
7. The value of the approved motion.
How did Congress respond?
The motion of amendment to the agenda approved at the first session of this Congress, taking note of the extremely novel situation of the Radical Party "whose transnational and transdivisional dimension is manifestly a fact, saluting the engagement in the Radical Party of activists from over 50 nations, members of parliament and government belonging to more than 80 parties or national formations", is of the opinion that "as the political conditions are ripe, it is time to move on to the reconstitution of the transdivisional and transnational Radical Party, and, to this end, the Party deliberates to adjourn its work to a second session - to this second session - in the meantime with full faith and support and group commitment and responsibility inviting the Secretary, Treasurer and Chairpersons of the Party and Federal Council to ensure the continuation of the precious work carried out so far, for the purpose of suitably consolidating and restructuring the New Party."
8. The adjournment to this second session.
The Party has complied with this mandate in the knowledge of having, on one hand, to continue the job of building the "new", on the other of "facing up, on a day-to-day basis, to the lack of available human input, and to the dramatic shortage of financial resources.
The time has come to draw conclusions about what we have achieved, regarding the way forward.
In this sense, the adjournment of Congress to this session takes on what may be defined as crucial significance. We recognize this without undue emphasis and in complete tranquillity.
The conclusions that must be drawn are in relation to the positive results of our actions, to the number of people we have succeeded in involving, to the goals we set ourselves, to the chances we have missed, to the responses we have obtained and to those we expected to obtain but did not.
9. The significance of this report.
From this point of view, this report serves to update the report presented to the first session of this Congress.
Stock must be taken of what has been done, of the initiatives undertaken during this period, over these ten months.
This does not make it an obligatory, blow by blow account of what has occurred. The intention has been to imbue this report with significance, first and foremost of the political kind.
We have attempted to supply all possible elements to facilitate decision-making, to aid analysis, "operating", as ever, "without a safety net", conscious that the life of the minority we make up - if it is to continue - is in the hands of those who understand the extraordinary potential and timeliness of its initiatives and its project; of those who know how to harbour and cultivate freedom, justice, a right to life and a life of rights; of those who are prepared to recognize in the other or in others not enemies to be felled, but adversaries to be convinced through the practice of democracy.
10. The need for new statutory rules.
One of the objectives of our activity has been to give this Party new statutory rules, a "new rule of freedom and living together", considering what the Radical Party actually is: a "political instrument", a place for a great number of people, from very different backgrounds, each remaining true to their self, to come together and redouble their own abilities in pursuit of common objectives.
This Party has no wish to be a guardian and protector of people's consciences. Its statutory rules prevent it from becoming a sect to which people entrust their selves, and which seeks, or from which people seek, a closed circle of political engagement.
As a starting point for debate, the First Secretary believes it useful to provide Congress with an hypothesis for reform of the statute, in the knowledge that a reasonable objective at this point in time is to adopt an openly transitional first rule, to be added to and amended to whatever degree is deemed necessary in the light of the experience gained, as the "New Party" takes shape as an organized political entity.
Radical Party Activity in Europe and in the World
A.1. RESPONSES, MEMBERS, PARLIAMENTARIANS
A.1.1. The political response to the project.
By the beginning of January 1993, 6,400 replies had arrived for the political project via "The New Party" newspaper, the "Radical Newsletter" and advertisements in the Eastern European press.
Over one third (36.3%) of these replies came from people who were 1992 Radical Party members, with a further 2.5% coming from supporters. Around 5.2% of replies came from 1991 members or supporters.
Of the total, 38% came from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, mainly from Russia and the Ukraine, followed in order by Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Lithuania.
In descending order, 27% came from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Albania.
Western European countries accounted for a total of 17% of replies, a figure that increases to 30% if the 13% from Italy is taken into account.
The United States, Canada and Australia contributed 2%, as did the countries of Latin America; just under 1% came from Africa, with Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast in the lead.
In 1991 the greatest number of replies came in October and November, partly as a result of the first shipments of "The New Party" newspaper, partly as a result of the headline adverts in the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" newspaper; this holds true for Central European countries too. Since then, the flow of correspondence to various Party branches has been fairly constant, with the exception of a peak after the fourth issue of the newspaper, containing a supplement edited by the "Radical Esperantist Association" (ERA), was sent out to the Esperantist list of addresses.
Even considering 1991, the greatest number of replies occurred between July and September 1992, following distribution of the seventh issue of the newspaper and of the subsequent "Radical Newsletter".
Indeed, that issue of the newspaper contained a questionnaire - whereby impressions and opinions were solicited concerning the transnational Party, its initiatives and its organization - and a postcard to send to the president of the republic of the Ivory Coast requesting him to free Laurent Akoun and other democrats in prison, as well as a coupon to adhere to the "appeal for democracy in Cuba". All told, 3,000 replies arrived.
The 1,109 questionnaires sent back - 530 from 1992 members and 135 from members who joined in other years - make up a sample from which some useful judgements may be drawn.
Federalism and a United States of Europe are the most heartfelt subjects for those who sent in the questionnaire. In decreasing order came: the structure of the nonviolent transnational Party, abolition of the death penalty in the world by the year 2000, initiatives on the crisis in former Yugoslavia, legalization of drugs and, lastly, Esperanto. These are the subjects that we included on the questionnaire, but others were also added.
As far as questionnaires that came from the former Soviet Union are concerned, suggested initiatives revolved around ecology, human and civil rights, minority rights, a cessation of conflicts between different nationalities, conscientious objection to military service, freedom of personal movement and the struggle against weapons.
Those who wrote were for the most part either engineers, lawyers, teachers, historians, workers, students, journalists and artists. Many are former members of the Communist Party and/or the Pan-Soviet Union of Communist Youth, and are either members of the "Democratic Russia" movement, the Social Democratic Party, or of organizations in favour of democratic reform, or else they belong to committees for the defence of human rights. It is interesting to note that many of these people wrote that they belonged to or supported initiatives run by Amnesty International or Greenpeace.
Another heartening element is the degree of activism evident in the replies: a majority of those who responded intend to become active in Radical Party initiatives. Moreover, there is a desire for greater coordination of members in the various Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of more information on Party activities via radio and television, as well as a desire to make a greater effort towards finding financing for the Radical Party. On the whole, people were satisfied with the newspaper, though some criticism was levelled at the complexity of the language used and at its layout.
Regarding replies from Italy, one thing is particularly apparent: namely, the influence wielded by the antiprohibitionist campaign on the type of person who sent in the questionnaire. Almost all of them, in fact, either are or have been a member of "CORA" (the Radical Antiprohibitionist Organization), while others have taken part in the campaign to collect signatures for referenda in Italy. The most pressing initiatives here were for federalism and a United States of Europe, as well as the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty. Suggestions for action include antimilitarism, the struggle against starvation, human rights, the environment, reform of the UN, the "Gozzini" legislation, prison reform and electoral reform.
Most of those who wrote from Hungary are either students, professors or journalists. Clearly, great significance is placed on commitment to a federal Europe, as well as on the defence of ethnic minority rights and the struggle against nationalism. Interest was also focused on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and on the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty.
Czechoslovakia provided a large number of replies, many from people who, though not members, became acquainted with the Party through demonstrations and meetings. Some of these people are members of political organizations, especially of the Civil Freedom Movement and Civic Forum - or else they are former Communist Party members. Czechoslovaks expressed great interest in European federalism, in the situation in the former Yugoslavia and in the transnational project. One of the main reasons why people are interested in the Radicals concerns the topic of drugs; there were also many calls for a commitment to the struggle against all types of dictatorship and anti-Semitism.
The replies that came from Romania, in particular, and from Poland and Bulgaria, are very interesting. In these, the transnational aspect and federalism were highlighted, along with the problems of the former Yugoslavia.
The Esperantist contribution from countries such as Lithuania and Bulgaria was greater in terms of political commitment. Replies registering support and, rather more rarely, money, came from France and Spain.
The appeal for signatures in favour of democracy in Cuba, and the appeal for the liberation of Ivory Coast political prisoners prompted a reasonable response.
The Cuba appeal was signed by 801 people, of whom 445 were 1992 Party members. In descending order, these people are citizens of: Russia, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine and Belgium. The appeal addressed to President Boigny was signed by 1,029 people, 464 of whom were 1992 Party members, from: Italy, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, France and the Ukraine.
Postcards sent out to non-Italian members in early November 1992 with the leaflet about Congress entitled "Nonviolence" have been arriving back. So far around 200 have been received, many with contributions or requests to attend the second session of Congress.
A.1.2. Membership
In 1992 there were 2,594 citizens resident in Italy in the party, against the 2,860 registered in the previous year. Up to the first session of Congress - 30 April 1992 - 1,841 people had joined, 71% of the annual total.
As of the start of Congress, members of parliament who joined numbered 36; by the end of the year, the number had risen to 145. At the time of writing, the number of 1992 acting members of parliament stands at 136, of whom 11 are Euro-MPs.
Membership of citizens resident outside Italy totalled 6,879, spanning 65 countries, compared with the 1991 figure of 1,437. Up to the start of Congress, 3,219 new members applied.
The total number of members of parliament stood at 326, of whom 162 joined before Congress.
There were 86 Western European members (Belgium 26, France 15, Germany 2, Great Britain 3, Netherlands 5, Portugal 7, San Marino 1, Spain 23, Switzerland 4). The 1991 figures stood at 56, all but one of whom joined before Congress.
Members of parliament, including a French minister, amount to 6 (France 2, England 1, Holland 1, Spain 1), two of whom signed up before Congress. One of the French members and the Dutch member are Euro-MPs.
Six hundred members are from Eastern Europe (Albania 30, Bulgaria 110, Czechoslovakia 103, Poland 15, Romania 290, Hungary 52); the April total stood at 292, that is to say 48.6% of the total.
The total number of members of parliament from this geographical area came to 118: (Albania 8, 2 ministers and 42 members of the Bulgarian parliament, Czechoslovakia 7, Poland 3, a deputy minister and 55 MPs from Romania). Seventy-seven of these (65.25%) joined before Congress. At present, 77 of these are currently in parliament.
The former Yugoslavia - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, Vojvodina, The Kosovo, and Macedonia provided 576 members, 385 of whom live in Croatia. Up to Congress, the number stood at 307, equivalent to 53% of the final annual total.
These figures include 72 members of parliament: 9 from Bosnia and Hercegovina, one deputy minister and 26 MPs from Croatia, 13 from the Kosovo, 2 ministers and 16 MPs from Macedonia, one from Slovenia, the Sangiaccato Minister for Education and 5 MPs from Vojvodina; up to Congress, the total was 37, equivalent to 51.4%. Of those who enrolled, 65 are currently in parliament.
Membership from the former Soviet Union totalled 4,660 (Armenia 53, Azerbaijan 293, Belorussia 145, Georgia 82, Kazakhstan 180, Kirghizia 310, Moldavia 52, Russia 2,472, Tadzhikistan 6, the Turkmen Republic 44, the Ukraine 902, Uzbekistan 121). Until Congress the figure stood at 2,245, in other words 48% of the year-end total. The greatest number of enrolments came in March, with 1,022.
Members of parliament in the former Soviet Union who joined before Congress numbered 40, equivalent to 36.7% of the year-end total of 94 (Armenia 11, Azerbaijan 8, Belorussia 1, Georgia 4, one deputy minister and 10 MPs from Moldavia, Kazakhstan 11, 3 members of the parliament of the autonomous republic of Nagorno Karabakh, the Ukraine 4, Uzbekistan 3, Russia 38).
In 1992 there were one hundred and twenty-one members from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Before Congress, 26 had joined, in other words 28.5% of the final year-end total.
Three members of parliament joined, one from each Baltic state; two out of three of them joined before Congress.
Asia (China, Japan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and the Middle East (Iran and Israel) contributed 15 members, twelve of whom joined before Congress.
This figure includes Shulamit Alonti, an Israeli minister, who joined after Congress.
The 1992 enrolment campaign in Africa (Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mauritius, Mali, Niger, South Africa, Togo, Senegal, the Seychelles) produced 570 members, 277 of whom (48.6%) joined before Congress. Burkina Faso alone accounted for 533 members.
Eighteen members of parliament from these countries joined (1 minister and 12 MPs from Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast 2, Mali 1, Senegal 1, South Africa 1), only one of whom joined before Congress.
A total of 40 people joined from North and South America (Argentina 3, Brazil 10, Canada 1, Cuba 21, Mexico 1, United States 3, Venezuela 1). Five of them joined before Congress.
Members of parliament numbered 4 (1 Argentinian, 1 Bolivian, 1 Peruvian and 1 Venezuelan), all of whom are still in parliament and two of whom joined before Congress. (2).
A.2. ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
A.2.1. Poland
Public opinion and political tension in Poland focus on abortion, conscientious objection to military service, and prohibitionism for drugs.
On the subject of abortion, parliament is debating a repressive bill which is being blocked by a collection of signatures for a kind of preventive referendum, which unfortunately does not look like it will be successful. More likely the debate will end in compromise and the repressive law will make it onto the statute books. Equally likely is the introduction of a prohibitionist drugs law, in a country where until now the situation has been one of relative tolerance.
For those who look at Poland from outside, it is hard to understand quite how invasive the presence of the Roman Catholic church is in every aspect of the country's socio-political life. In reaction to this, there are signs of civil impatience towards church interference: this is fertile ground indeed for the cultural growth of lay and libertarian ideas.
The Radical Presence in Poland
In such a context, the Party's presence in this country has taken on great importance: members are placing great hope in the Party, for its commitment to the themes outlined above.
Since the end of September 1991, a "Polish front" of Radical activity has opened up once more, especially in Warsaw. As a result of new Polish members joining the Party, including some well-known figures, a small apartment has been rented in the centre of town - equipped with nothing more than a telephone answering machine.
The 1992 total of Polish members stands at 15. This number includes three members of parliament from different parties: the Independent Poland Confederation, the Party of Economic Platforms (PPG) and the PSL.
A.2.2. Former Czechoslovakia
The two republics of what was Czechoslovakia are united only in a common a customs policy. These are two different States, with two armies, two currencies, and two approaches to citizenship: the Slovak Republic allows dual citizenship, while the Czech Republic allows a Slovakian to acquire citizenship only after giving up Slovakian citizenship.
The process that put an end to the Czechoslovakian state took place for the most part within the political circles that formed after the fall of the Communist regime, during and after the "revolution". Indeed, although the initial push for national sovereignty came from Slovakia, and Slovakian politicians tend to be blamed for the break-up of the Federal Republic, at the present moment in time nationalist feelings and expressions of national pride are more widespread in the Czech lands than in Slovakia.
The process that ended in "divorce" on 1 January 1993 has not just run parallel to the birth and rapid consolidation of "partycratic regimes" in both republics, it is a direct and almost exclusive consequence.
The "delicacy" of the separation, which occurred without any major incidents, bears testimony to the substantial extraneousness of the Czech, Moravian and Slovakian peoples to events. Only the Magyar and gypsy minorities, each in their own way, perceived as a threat the end of a state that was formally made up of two or three different nationalities. In all likelihood, one of the major problems with the new Slovakian State will be respect of minority nationalities, considering the nationalist nature of the Meciar government and a total lack of Slovakian democratic opposition in the Bratislava parliament. Indeed, this is the main reason why it is so difficult to establish links with political forces in Slovakia.
Pressure for independence in Slovakia was exerted by the political forces in that region as an easy tool for the creation of room for manoeuvre. This was the case since the national government formed after the revolution was toppled in favour of the premiership of the Christian Democrat leader, Jan Carnogurski, the first politician to glimpse the chance of using Slovakian independence as an electoral trump. But inability and the Christian Democrat reluctance to take the independence theme to its natural conclusion of an independent Slovakian republic meant that Carnogurski found himself wielding a "blunted" policy instrument: Vladimir Meciar wasted no time in declaring himself the champion of independence and creating a Slovakian political force around the theme.
The June 1992 elections were thus fought in a climate of polarized political and national conflict. Slovakian desire to achieve national sovereignty was catalyzed by Meciar's new party. Czech consensus for economic reform - and a general reluctance to split the state - was catalyzed by the party of Vaclav Klaus, a conservative. These parties and political leaders obtained relative majorities in their respective republics.
Following the elections President Havel appointed Klaus - leader of the party that had won a relative majority on a federal level - to form a federal government. Ensuing negotiations unfortunately ignored the task in hand, and degenerated into negotiations on the future of the federal state. In the meantime Klaus and Meciar, who had stood for their respective national parliaments, and not the federal parliament, became respectively Czech and Slovakian prime ministers. This heralded the beginning of the technical process that was to end in the birth of two independent states, and the death of the federal state.
The political situation differs in each republic.
The leadership of Klaus's conservatives in the Czech Republic is uncontested. His party's control of power is typical of a "partycratic regime": anti-Communism continues to work as a rallying cry, often at the expense of social democrats, who suffer the brunt of fading support for the Communist party, as it is still called in the Czech Lands.
Meciar's government in Slovakia has all the trappings of solidity but little substance. Many commentators remark that feelings of dissatisfaction with the country's new-found independence are growing. The people of Slovakia supported Meciar, giving him an almost absolute majority in the national parliament, on the strength of his promises for general national redemption and a slower, more cushioned transformation to a market economy. The Meciar government has reacted in an unbecoming manner, taking tight control of the media and journalists. They justify their actions as defence against "the onslaught of anti-Slovakian propaganda" that, according to the government, is the reason why foreign capital has steered clear of the republic.
The "divorce" was the final act of a long process that practically monopolized political debate for many months. During that period, power was wielded exclusively by the party secretaries, for whom the government and parliament were merely appendages. Negotiations between the two parties led to the "divorce", subsequently ratified by the federal parliament: the two parties decided that the parliaments of the two new states would be filled with members of the national parliaments of the old federation, and that the members of the dissolved federal parliament would make up the Senate, a new chamber, without resorting to new elections.
The Radical Presence in Czechoslovakia
The Radical presence in Czechoslovakia was established early, thanks to the nonviolent demonstrations organized long before the "revolution".
An organized presence dates back to early 1990, when a Prague office was opened. For some time there had already been a small, active group of party members, which later played a significant role in the constitution of the Civic Forum, the political structure that together with its Slovakian counterpart VPN, led to the establishment of the new democratic regime. It should be remembered that after the first democratic elections, held in June 1990, the Radical Party was one of the parties allotted a share of the Civic Forum electoral reimbursement fund, as one of the bodies involved in the founding of the democratic coalition.
During the first few months that the Radical Party was up and running in Czechoslovakia, it was active in the mobilization that led in May 1990 to the abolition of the death penalty in that country, a legislative reform that constituted - in the shape of the general amnesty declared by President Havel - the first juridical gesture of the new order. It was in fact thanks to the Radicals - to a hunger strike by hundreds of Radicals and by Czech Radicals too - and to President Havel's concerted efforts that the federal parliament removed capital punishment from the country's statute books.
In May 1990 President Havel invited a Radical Party delegation, including not just the party leadership but also the activists who during the Communist period had been tried and sentenced to permanent exile from the country.
The first Czech MPs to join the Radical Party did so in 1990. At the end of that year, one of the most important gypsies in the world, Emil Scuka, leader of the World Rom Union, joined the party, along with a group of gypsy members of the Czech national parliament, three of whom added a Radical membership to membership of the Rom Civic Initiative.
Nineteen ninety-one members of the Radical Party included a federal member of parliament for the Hungarian Slovakian minority and another federal member of parliament elected on the Slovakian Communist Party list, later the Democratic Party of the Left. Several members of the Czech national parliament from the Moravian National Party and the Conservative Party also joined.
With the June 1992 elections, the number of Radical members of Czech parliaments - national and federal - fell to just one. The divorce between the Czech and Slovakian republics then removed even this residual presence, in view of the unlikely setting up of a Senate in Bratislava.
Once more it is worth highlighting the fact that the international appeal launched by the Radical Party in 1991 "for abolition of the death penalty in the former Soviet Union" received the support of the highest offices of the state and the two republics, starting with President Havel; the same is true of the appeal for "Democracy in Cuba".
There were 103 Czech members of the Radical Party in 1992, and 124 in 1991. Of this number, ten or so may be considered activists.
The environment is sure to become an important future theme, not just in Czechoslovakia but right across Central and Eastern Europe. On this subject, there are two potential areas for Radical initiatives in the former Czechoslovakia.
The first concerns the construction of a nuclear power station being built at Temelin, in southern Bohemia. The decision to build this nuclear power station was made back in the days when the Communist party was still in power. As soon as the regime fell, there were demonstrations and Greenpeace-led initiatives against the project. The new Czech government is strongly in favour of continuing work on the project, citing the need to provide the country with a new energy source. The real purpose, though, is to export the energy produced at the new nuclear power station. Moreover, parliament's decision-making powers on the power station have been curtailed.
The other topic concerns the dam to change the course of the Danube (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros). Here, the Radical Party has already launched a proposal to set up a transnational and supernational administrative and governmental authority, that arrogates to itself administration of the river valley, removing this power from the states that the river flows through, as was done in the 1930s when President Roosevelt set up the "Tennessee Valley Authority".
A.2.3. Hungary
In Hungary the two years of transition from Kadar and Grosz's socialist regime to the current Jozsef Antall government have been characterized by the sharing out of real positions of power, and by an often intense battle for control of the media. A "partycratic" policy has come to the fore, based on "do ut des", on exchange and on a lack of concrete differences between political forces.
Among ordinary people there is evident disaffection with "politics", a tendency to perceive the political sphere as separate and distant from real, everyday problems. Parliament has recently passed a new law on abortion that is more restrictive than the one it replaced, a Socialist legacy that was blocked by the entire opposition. Nonetheless, the Hungarian people were not moved to react in any way. That said, there has recently been a noticeable phenomenon of internal instability, with a return of Magyar nationalist sensibilities. Istvan Csurka, a famous writer and member of parliament, heads a movement that has stirred up tension and staged a much-talked-about demonstration accusing Arpad Goncz, current President of the Republic, of being pro-Semitic. Csurka's nationalists want to revise the current Hungarian borders, restricted by the "Trianon Treaty", to include the Magyar minorities now living in Slovakia, Vojvodina and Transylvania.
The nationalist "fire" has been further stoked by conflict between the Hungarian and Slovakian government about the building of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam on the Danube, proposed by Slovakia and blocked by Hungary.
The Radical Presence in Hungary
In Hungary the Radical Party has 52 members, 70% of whom live in Budapest, none of whom sit in the National Assembly. A member of parliament from the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) was a member only for 1991.
Radical action must centre on the "partycratic" nature of the system in order to organize a political approach that has both direct effects on Hungarian political life and is true to its own values and characteristics.
There are many reasons why members of the Hungarian political class have shown little interest in the Radical proposal, but the roots of this phenomenon lie in their tight grip on all aspects of social life: this blocks other kinds of initiatives that are not directly connected with the sharing out of real positions of power or with the internecine fights that break out every now and then within all Hungarian parties. As they already have strong links with party Internationals and are hence "confined" to this way of thinking, they display a certain degree of snobbism towards people who define themselves as champions of a "new International".
Common standpoints have in the recent past existed with the Magyar Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) on the former Yugoslavia, and there has been a useful exchange of views on antiprohibitionism with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Only the Young Democrats' League (FIDESZ) has shown consistent hostility to every overture. Lastly, Arpad Goncz, President of the Republic, in a personal capacity, supported the "campaign to abolish the death penalty."
The matter of reform of the electoral system according to an Anglo-Saxon model could be the right way to enable membership of the Radical Party to constitute "added value" to the efforts of the Hungarian political class. Similar potential lies in the antiprohibitionist proposal on drugs.
The Radical Party's Budapest office coordinates technical activities - membership, databases, correlation and management of address lists etc. - not just in Hungary but also between offices in Warsaw, Sofia and Bucharest, and between existing points of reference in the Kosovo, Vojvodina, Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. The work involved is performed by ten people in the various centres.
Data links and transfer via direct lines between working terminals are under experimentation between the Budapest Centre and the Rome Central Membership Office, and could herald a quantum leap for Party work, a vital step if the Party is to oversee and manage data from large geographic areas in real time.
A.2.4. The Former Yugoslavia
Well before war broke out, it was obvious that the crisis in Yugoslavia - in an authoritarian State based on false federalism and substantial centralism - was very serious. It was equally obvious that in each republic the opposition to the regime and its economic collapse was taking on a more and more nationalist character.
As early as 1979, the Radical Party put forward a proposal for Yugoslav membership of the European Community to the European parliament and the Community, and to the Yugoslav authorities and the country's citizens.
In 1989, in support of this proposal, the Radical Party contacted the Belgrade authorities about holding its Congress in Yugoslavia, partly because of the country's significant number of members of the Radical Party, the first democratic party to form in Yugoslavia since the end of the last world war.
As you know, both the proposals were rejected. The Belgrade regime grew more stubborn in presenting itself, cloaking its authoritarian leanings in nationalism, and prompting a bloody war. The European Community once more failed in its political ambitions, taking up minimalist and merely economic positions.
Current "greater Serbia" nationalism can be explained by the loss of the privileges enjoyed by the Serb nation and its ruling class over the other peoples that made up Yugoslavia. Unlike in the former Soviet Union, this was possible because of a hardening of old-style Communists in the Yugoslav army and because of the "Belgrade gang", insensitive to any democratic and pacifist transformations in the country and too exposed to losses, considering the economic weakness of Serbia in comparison to the other Yugoslav Republics.
This creeping nationalism, strongly repressed during the Socialist years, has asserted itself fully in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and in the Kosovo.
In all likelihood, this climate of nationalist and populist demands would have been a short, indispensable, transitional phase in the former Yugoslavia, if other factors had not glorified it and endowed it with a kind of political depth. In a market as tightly interdependent as the Yugoslav one, a federal/democratic solution seemed the most likely, if not the most immediate. It was a matter of using democratic consolidation and peaceful negotiation to overcome the inequalities, disparities and discriminations that derived from the complex ethnic make-up of all Yugoslav Republics and that Communist policy had artificially attempted to resolve. The deaths and destruction of today are another thing.
The confirmation of Milosevic as prime minister of Serbia not only underscores the totalitarian nature of the nation's government, it is a further step towards the scenario of all-out war in the Balkans military experts are so afraid of.
With regard to this military aggression, the role played by the European Community and the international community has been decisive. Milosevic came to power, the war started, "Time" put the dictator of Belgrade on its cover as a saviour of the Yugoslav nation, and every war action until the fall of Vukovar was followed by silent assent: politicians and the international mass-media would do no more than "wait and see", while other commentators directly supported the Serb regime. The prudence of Milosevic's first military actions was directly proportional to the threat of international reaction, which dissolved in general appeals, hypocritical negotiations, resolutions of condemnation and an equally spectral civil war. Only now, after a year and a half of war, a few individual states have started to denounce, unequivocally, the sole responsibility of the Serb regime.
The war in the former Yugoslavia is the epiphenomenon of a crisis affecting the West and its democracies. It is revealing the limitations of the system. The failure of the international community to come to terms with the situation contains the seeds that caused this war. Once again, just as has happened too often over the past two centuries, the sovereignty of state and its ideological hypostasis, nationalism, has played lord and master.
The Radical presence in Yugoslavia
In June 1991, as soon as the Radical Party received news that the Yugoslav federal army had attacked the Republic of Slovenia following its declaration of independence, Marco Pannella and the Radical Party immediately came out in favour of international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and the other Republics of the former Yugoslavia that had democratically proclaimed their independence. The Radicals took this position months and months before the international community made its various choices.
Lack of responsibility, weakness, cowardliness - and also impotence - conflicting interests and a painful lack of adequately-equipped institutions, caused this international recognition to be delayed, which, had it been granted in time, would have prevented the horrors which are still being committed today. Neither did the international community know how to transform its recognition, which came tragically late, into a strength and into a principle of law, in order to immediately impose effective measures which would have stopped the blood bath and brought about the downfall of the regime of Milosevic and his military acolytes and terrorists.
The first session of the Federal Council was held in Rome from 19 to 22 September. Many well-known politicians from Croatia, Slovenia and the Kosovo took part in the proceedings regarding the Yugoslav crisis. Sdravko Tomac, Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia, was amongst them: he joined the Radical Party at the end of the Congress. The deputies of all nationalities who were present resolved to strive to obtain international recognition of the democratic Republics of the former Yugoslavia in their respective parliaments. Marco Pannella began a hunger strike, which lasted until 3 November, for the recognition of the independent Republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, and of the human, political, constitutional and democratic rights of the Albanian people in the Kosovo."
The Radical deputies of the European Federalist Group presented various motions in the Italian Parliament for the recognition of the independent Republics; for the withdrawal of the Italian Ambassador from Belgrade, and for an embargo against the Republic of Serbia. These motions were rejected, even though they gained considerable support.
The second session of the Federal Council was held from 31 October to 3 November in Zagreb. The proceedings were interrupted several times by air raid warnings, obliging the participants to take refuge in the underground shelter. Many new members by right took part in the meeting, including numerous parliamentarians from the former Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Italy and the European Parliament. Among those present were the Prime Minister of Croatia, Franjo Greguric, and the two Deputy Prime Ministers, Mate Granic and Zdravko Tomac; Ministers Brank Salaj, Drazen Budisa and Vlado Veselica, and Iliaz Ramajli, Speaker of the Kosovo Parliament. Numerous initiatives supporting international recognition and respect for the rights of all ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia were provided for in the motion that was approved.
From 8 to 15 November, the Radical Party organized many demonstrations in front of the embassies of the former Yugoslavia in Brussels, Budapest, Madrid, Moscow, Prague and Rome. The Radicals asked the ambassadors to end the war and to recognize the independent Republics, and then invited them to withdraw. When the fall of Vukovar, which had been under siege for three months and practically razed to the ground, was announced on 17 November, Pannella went on another hunger strike. A number of Russian, Czech and Croat deputies participated in this nonviolent initiative for some days.
On 9 and 10 December hundreds of Radical activists and Croat citizens demonstrated at Maastricht and Strasbourg against the "European Community's Shame", and for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the admission of the Kosovo representatives to The Hague, and the withdrawal of ambassadors from Belgrade. The European Council did not address the Yugoslav problem at the Maastricht meeting; however, a few days later Germany's example obliged the European Community to announce its recognition, which would only become official on 15 January 1992.
On 22 December, more than 100 deputies from the Italian Parliament signed an appeal, presented by the Radical Party, for the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, but not of the Republic of Serbia unless it fully guaranteed to uphold the rights of its ethnic minorities.
On 28 December Marco Pannella announced in Zagreb that he would take part in "a direct, nonviolent Radical action on the democracy, peace and liberty front, with the Croat defenders of Osijek", together with Italian parliamentarians Roberto Cicciomessere, Lorenzo Strik Lievers and Alessandro Tessari, and Radical activists Lucio Bertè, Olivier Dupuis, Renato Fiorelli and Sandro Ottoni. That same day Emma Bonino, Leader of the Radical Party, met various members of the opposition in Belgrade and, in particular, Dragoslav Micunovic, Deputy and Leader of the Democratic Party.
On 30 December, the Radical activists arrived at Osijek, the Croat city that had been under siege for months, and where there were already 650 dead and 3500 wounded, half of whom were civilians. It was on New Year's Eve that the unarmed, nonviolent Radicals joined the defending Croat army at three different points along the front. The morning after, Pannella and Dupuis went to Nova Gradiska, another city on the front, where they met local government and military representatives and the deputies Babic, Zugaj and Zupancic, all members of the Radical Party.
The 4th Italian Radical Party Congress took place in Rome from 9 to 12 January, and one of its Commissions occupied itself with the situation in the former Yugoslavia and with Radical institutional and nonviolent initiatives. The First Session of the 36th Radical Party Congress was held from 29 April to 3 May, once again in Rome. It was possible, via the contributions made by well-known politicians from Macedonia, Vojvodina, the Kosovo, Serbia and Croatia, to agree on a position that was expressed in the motion presented by Zdravko Tomac, launching a renewed appeal to the international community. Hundreds of signatures were collected from Radical members and prominent figures, for the release of prisoners of war in Serbia and Croatia and against concentration camps: the petition was presented to the EC.
In the days that followed, Pannella began another hunger strike to mobilize the Italian and European Parliaments against the attack launched against Bosnia and Hercegovina. More than 2200 Italian citizens participated in the hunger strike for some days, while 120 mayors and 350 deputies (an absolute majority) signed a parliamentary motion, supported by parliamentarians from a wide political spectrum, proposing that immediate measures be taken against the Serb regime.
This same motion was presented in the Romanian, Russian and Macedonian Parliaments. There were Radical demonstrations in Rome and Moscow against the attack on Bosnia and Hercegovina. Two Croat deputies joined Pannella on his hunger strike, and the Croat Prime Minister, Greguric, expressed his support and heartfelt thanks for the initiative in an open letter.
During the following months, the distribution of "The New Party" newspaper and the "Radical Newsletter", combined with assemblies and meetings in many places in the former Yugoslavia, resulted in a considerable number of new members: 576.
A.2.4.1. Slovenia
Slovenia is unique in that it is the only one of the former Yugoslav Republics to be well on the way to acquiring a solidly based, democratic political system supported by an even more solid economy. With an inflation rate lower than that of Greece, Slovenia is quite justified in requesting to become more and more integrated with European political and economic organizations.
We have noticed a certain receptiveness amongst Slovenians towards antiprohibitionism with regard to drugs and to our "Campaign to Abolish the Death Penalty". In fact, these two initiatives would permit us to recommence our actives in this country, where we have 8 members, including just one deputy: an exponent of the Slovenian Democratic Coalition (DEMOS).
A.2.4.2. Croatia
Croatia has a number of serious problems to solve, such as: curbing inflation, which currently stands at 30% per month; raising salaries to match the cost of living; deciding how to deal with the Bosnian and Croat refugees, which now number about 750,000, and liberating the zones still occupied and controlled by the Serbs.
In a situation as dramatic as this, democracy plays a fundamental role. The party in power - the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) - which gained 40% of the vote, in part thanks to its nationalist rhetoric, shows recurring authoritarian and "partycratic" tendencies: rigid control of the mass media and State-owned companies, and total indifference to initiatives undertaken by opposition parties. Notwithstanding this, it would seem that the Party is neither united nor unanimous in its beliefs, but rather an agglomerate of diverging interests which also comprises democratic elements.
As far as the opposition parties are concerned, valid proposals for the democratization and modernization of Croatia can be perceived under the veneer of nationalism that each party has adopted to further its interests. During the talks we had with the representatives of these parties, it was evident that they were very keen on renewing relations with Western European political institutions. It is in this area that the Radical Party should take action, including assuming an intermediary role.
Even after the Radical Party had immediately created a good image and obtained many new members - 700 or so enrolments between '91 and '92 - following our committed effort to have this country's independence recognized, the number of new members continued to increase steadily: 385 in 1992. The fact that only 9 deputies joined the Radical Party when Parliament reassembled in June '92 was not so impressive. As well as exponents of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), the Serb People's Party (SNS), the Istrian Democratic Diet (IDS), the Croat Party for Justice (HSP), the Croat Social Liberal Party (HSLS) and the Party for Democratic Reform (SDP), it must not be forgotten that Vera Babic, Deputy-Minister of Labour, also joined the Radical Party.
About 20 enrolments were obtained thanks to the initiative of the Gay and Lesbian Man Action (LIGMA) group, which was constituted at the Radical Party headquarters in Zagreb.
Regarding antiprohibitionism, it should be noted that Zagreb has given its support to the "Frankfurt Resolution". This could be a starting point for undertaking a Radical Party action in the area of drugs. Lastly, we would like to remind you that many well-known politicians and intellectuals have supported the Radical Party initiative against the death penalty.
The Radical Party is the only democratic force which fervently supports a concept of Europeanism and federalism. We must work in this direction, both to increase the number of members who joined the Radical Party on the basis of this in '92, and to help party members and parliamentarians who are sympathetic to democratic federalism to openly declare their views.
A.2.4.3. Bosnia and Hercegovina
Almost three-quarters of Bosnia and Hercegovina is occupied by the aggressor; two hundred thousand people have died; one and a half million Bosnian refugees have sought refuge in a number of different countries.
Even though precise legislation exists (Art. 43) and many attempts have already been made by the UN to bring about peace as opposed to simply following a neutral "peace-keeping" strategy, the lack of any real political will blocks all decisions.
The events in Bosnia will have terrible consequences in the following decades, which cannot but directly involve Italy. This being the case, it seems incomprehensible that the Italian government is neglecting the matter by simply agreeing to the decisions made by the EC, without formulating any specific proposals.
One of the first actions undertaken by the Radical Party was intervention to obtain the release of Izet Muhamedagic, a Bosnian deputy and a member of the Radical Party Federal Council. A municipal councillor of Bosanski Novi he was put under house arrest in May '92, but without being charged. A number of his colleagues had either been killed or sent to concentration camps. In the months that followed, the Radical Party began to "pressure" the police department in the city and the authorities in Belgrade with letters and phone calls. After four months Muhamedagic was finally released and taken to Croatia, the only explanation being: "They want you in Europe..."
It was also thanks to him that we were able to contact the Sarajevo authorities, and actually send a delegation from the Radical Party to visit the occupied city. Following this visit, the Mayor, the Serb member of the Presidency of the Republic and 8 deputies joined the Radical Party.
At the end of December '91, the Radical Party launched a "campaign" for the twinning of Italian cities with cities in Bosnia and Hercegovina and their legal administrations, and in particular the capital of Rome with the capital of Sarajevo. The aim of this "campaign" was to recognize the conditions that existed before the war, conditions that the international community had legitimized but which the aggression and the war deliberately denied.
There were 20 members of the Radical Party in Bosnia and Hercegovina by the end of 1992, including 9 deputies, 8 of whom are exponents of the Democratic Action Party (SDA) and one a member of the Party for Democratic Reform (SDP).
A.2.4.4. Macedonia
It is more than a year since Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina were recognized internationally, and Macedonia is still the one republic of the former Yugoslavia that has not been recognized by the countries of the European Community and, consequently, by the great majority of countries in the international community. This situation persists, even though a report commissioned by the European Community itself (the Badinter Report) shows that Macedonia is the republic of the former Yugoslavia which best meets the conditions laid down for international recognition.
As well as not having been recognized internationally - which has meant, and still means, that this country is unable to be part of many of the international organizations that oversee agreements on economy, finance, transport and trade between the members of the international community - incredible pressure has been brought to bear on Macedonia by a number of countries, and, above all, Greece (supported, strangely enough, by France). This pressure has manifested itself, for example, in enormous quantities of crude oil - legitimately bought by Macedonia - being blocked in the port of Thessaloniki for months on end.
This kind of isolation at an international level is certainly not conducive to resolving the problems that have arisen after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, including the need to transform a "self-governing" economy into a market economy, and also those problems involved in organizing the majority and the minorities (Albanians above all), in order that they might peacefully co-exist.
The Radical presence in Macedonia
The Radical Party has enjoyed a continued presence in Macedonia since about a year ago, when four deputies from the Party for Democratic Prosperity (the party representing the Albanian minority) joined the Radical Party. Many other members of this party (PDP) quickly followed suit. This party constitutes a "weighty" presence, and for months it was looked on with considerable suspicion by the other parties, those of the Macedonian "ethnic groups": the one notable exception to this rule was the positive attitude shown by leading exponents of the Democratic League.
This situation has been overcome gradually, thanks mainly to the Radical Party's growing commitment to obtaining international recognition of Macedonia. This commitment first took the form of Radical Party demonstrations in various European capitals, and then of direct Radical intervention, carried out more and more insistently, in various parliaments. Particularly activity was reserved for the Italian parliament, where Radical action was transformed, last December, into a motion - which was approved - that committed the Italian government to breaking with "Community" politics and to recognizing the Republic of Macedonia as soon as possible.
A.2.4.5. Vojvodina
Vojvodina is one of the regions of the former Yugoslavia that was administered by the statute of an autonomous region, with its own legislative and administrative bodies, until it was deprived of this - as was the Kosovo - by Milosevic's regime, which went on to dissolve the parliament of Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, without fixing a date for new elections. Last year the Vojvodina parliament, comprising 120 deputies, reassembled after the May elections. It is, however, completely under the control of Belgrade and possesses no real powers.
Fifty-four per cent of the two million inhabitants of Vojvodina are Serb. Hungarians, Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, gypsies, etc. - more than 20 different races in all - make up the other 46%. Thanks to the region's history and traditions, this mixture has not resulted in nationalistic feelings being strengthened, as they have been in Croatia, Slovenia and the other republics, and also in the Kosovo - the region governed by the same autonomous statute. Nationalist sentiment has, with the exception of the Croat community, remained at a low level. In this sense, the Hungarian minority (18%) somewhat resembles the Croats. The policy of the VMDK, the party which represents the Hungarian minority, is in fact based on the concept of cultural independence, evidence of national feeling which, as the war has progressed, has increased steadily. This is partly a reaction to the fact that the percentage of Hungarians sent to the front was twice the percentage of Hungarians in the former Yugoslavia. Bearing t
his in mind, the position taken by Vojvodina during these war years is extremely interesting. Its nonviolent opposition to the war and the conscientious objection promoted by the various parties, organizations and individual citizens in this region, have in fact been of a nonviolent transnational nature, something that appears to be instinctive.
The Radical presence in Vojvodina
For these reasons, the value of the Radical presence in Vojvodina can be appreciated, as can the necessity, and also the very real possibility, of furthering our activities in this region.
In fact, Radical polices have always been very well received - after the initial shock of our name being similar to that of the extremist Seselj party - not only by Croats and Hungarians, but also by the majority of Serbs, deputies or members of different parties (Party for Democratic Reform, Social Democratic League of Vojvodina, Serb Renaissance Party, etc.), with whom we made contact. However, there were no Serbs among the 50 or so inhabitants of Vojvodina who joined the Radical Party, the only exception being Vera Vebel Tatic. The fact that the first six editions of "The New Party" newspaper had only been translated into Croatian when they arrived at the Belgrade parliament and that a large number of Croats, and more particularly deputies, in Zagreb had already joined the Radical Party, became an obstacle that none of the Serb leaders dared try to surmount by joining the Radical Party, even though they - Nenad Canak, the Chairman of the Social Democratic League, for example - might have been ver
y attracted by our ideas.
The members of the Radical Party are, for the most part, important figures on the Vojvodina political scene, including: Bela Tonkovic, leader of the Croat Democratic Union of Vojvodina (DSHV), the Mayor of Subotica and the deputy Jozsef Kasza, as well as other deputies of the Belgrade parliament, such as Nagy Sandor, Ferenc Csubela, Antun Skenderovic, Ivan Poljakovic of the Vojvodina parliament, Balla Lajos, organizer of an important conscientious objection movement, and Vegel Laszlo, the famous Hungarian writer from Novi Sad.
A.2.4.6. The Kosovo
Tens of thousands of "public employees" have been deprived of their jobs simply because they are Albanian. Thousands of young Albanians risk being called up by the army of the Serb-Montenegrin regime (where, together with the Hungarians of Vojvodina, they are vastly "over-represented"), in relation to the percentage of Albanians in the so-called "little Yugoslavia". An entire people is being obliged to flee en masse.
Civilians have been arrested, and killed. Albanian language newspapers, radio, television etc., have been shut down. Political leaders have been persecuted. An entire population has been put under surveillance, their conversations monitored... This constitutes the daily life, and the political "landscape" of almost two million people.
It is therefore a miracle that, with this domestic situation, and with the "West" showing as much initiative and responsibility here as it has towards the other tragedies in the former Yugoslavia - so to speak - the Kosovo leaders, starting with President Rugova, have succeeded in making progress in their battle to have the Law, and people's rights, respected, without ever rising to the provocations of the Belgrade regime.
The Radical presence in the Kosovo
The Radical Party's existence in the Kosovo is very difficult - it could almost be said that we merely "survive" - and is, in fact, made almost impossible by the heavy restrictions on freedom of movement, and freedom tout court, that are imposed on all the Albanian inhabitants who, do not let us forget, comprise more than 90% of the Kosovo's population.
A situation such as this certainly doesn't make it easy to organize a Radical group in the Kosovo, or to contact Radical Party offices abroad. It is also a situation that has led us to favour, here more than anywhere else, quality rather than quantity. This strategy has certainly brought results, as more than one tenth of the members of the Kosovo parliament have now joined the Radical Party, together with the leaders of various political parties in Pristina.
Radical proposals and actions have concentrated primarily on publicizing the nonviolent struggle, an exemplary form of resistance, that is taking place in this country, in every possible way: in the national parliaments and in the European parliament; in the mass media; and in all our actions against the fascist and racist regime of Belgrade.
We propose that the international community grant the same kind of diplomatic status to the Kosovo parliament that it conceded to the PLO.
A.2.5. Romania.
In Romania, a "partycratic" regime is rapidly taking hold, inspired by the model which is already well established in Eastern Europe. Each party is doing its utmost to control public administration and the mass media. This situation is aggravated by the lack, in many areas of civil life, of new rules - or rules tout court - which defend the rights of citizens, starting with the defence against libel and slander. None of this is helped by a legal system which for decades has been a tool of the politicians in power.
This "partycratic" fragmentation is also reflected in the new parliament itself, with its nine different parties.
Economically speaking, the Romania finds itself in a very difficult situation, exacerbated by the country's hesitant progress in privatization and encouraging foreign investment. Its current strategy is deeply-rooted in the nationalist-communist system of the old regime, which still conditions present day economic policy, by concentrating on developing a national economy when it is a world economy that prevails.
Regarding the problem of ethnic minorities, things are still very tense. Two Romanian nationalist parties, in particular, continue to add fuel to the fire with their ceaseless provocations. However, we are seeing various political forces taking the first tentative steps towards opening up. Some of them have also declared that they are very disposed to meeting and discussing those themes and subjects which, up until very recently were completely taboo, such as: federalism, self-administration, self-government and autonomy.
The Radical presence in Romania.
Even though the number of Radical Party members increased last year, there has not been a similar increase in their commitment, in the form of direct action, either in parliament - with regard to the deputies who are members - or in the country itself - with regard to the other members; neither has there been a similar increase, as far as both groups are concerned, in their efforts to bring new people into the Radical Party, to enrol new members. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely by the a lack of citizen involvement in Romanian politics.
It should be noted that there is a considerable number of gypsies amongst these members (almost one tenth). This group, however, still needs to organize itself and find its voice.
A.2.6. Albania.
Albania, for reasons we all know, is now one of the poorest countries in Europe, primarily because it has been totally isolated for more than forty years. The fact that the average monthly salary in Albania is just 10 (ten) dollars is a prime example of this.
Apart from a telephone system that competes well with the systems in many other countries in Central Europe and the Balkans, Albania is almost devoid of infrastructure. Everything still has to be done: everything has to be constructed, and rebuilt, starting with laws of civil life (penal code, civil code, commercial code, highway code...).
This extremely difficult situation is made all the more problematical by the relations between the majority (the Democratic Party, above all) and the opposition (Socialist Party - former Communists): "past" questions often hold sway over concrete political choices.
The Radical presence in Albania
The Radical party has only had a continued presence and a basic organizational structure in Albania for a few months. It is only most recently, in fact, that the first deputies and well-known exponents of the main parties have joined the Radical Party, together with a number of important people from the world of culture.
An advertising campaign in all the major Tirana newspapers and Radical participation in widely-followed radio and television programmes has enabled Albanians to identify the Radical Party they knew from the Italian mass media (above all television) - which they receive there - with the new transnational, transdivisional Radical Party.
Many people have expressed interest in the transnational party, either by getting in touch with the contact points in Tirana or by sending letters to the Radical Party headquarters in Rome. The number of "potential members" has, therefore, increased considerably. After the Congress, it would be opportune to step up our information offensive and build up our organization there - if this is allowed us.
We would also like to mention the agreement between Radical Radio and Tirana Radio, which will allow the majority of Albanians to listen to Radical Radio from next spring. Radical Radio, together with the BBC, is the only foreign network broadcasting in Albania.
A.2.7. Bulgaria
The long governmental crisis in Bulgaria was recently resolved by the formation of a new "transverse" majority which, centred around the Movement for Rights and Freedom, manages to combine the less extremist factions of both the right and socialist left in a delicate balance that could result in early elections in the spring. Ethnic tension may be evident - it mainly involves the Turkish and gypsy minorities - but it is not rife, as in neighbouring countries.
Though relative, Bulgaria's political stability and racial tolerance are a positive sign in the Balkans: Bulgaria is the last country the Belgrade nationalists would dream of attacking. On the other hand, the danger of Bulgaria entering the war in the event of a Serb attack on Macedonia - or of Serbia destablizing its population by attacking the Kosovo, thereby setting Bulgaria against the Albanians and almost making the former an ally of Serbia itself - seems very unlikely, considering the strong political presence of the US in Bulgaria, brought about by the country's strategic position as regards the Middle East.
The Radical presence in Bulgaria.
About a year ago, the Radical Party decided to guarantee its continued active presence in Bulgaria.
In July 1992, we opened a small but efficient office in Sofia, equipped with a computer and a fax, where we also employed two secretary/interpreters, one full-time and the other part-time. Apart from other activities, thousands of addresses of professional people were filed in the archive, bringing the Bulgarian total up to twelve thousand names.
Two government members joined the Radical Party: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Valentin Karabashev, and Rumen Bikov, Minister of Industry. Forty parliamentarians also joined our ranks.
Thirteen out of 40 belong to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) parliamentary group or are independents elected on this same list, while the majority are members of the Social Democratic Alliance faction, including the entire leadership of this political force within the BSP: party leader, Chavdar Kiuranov; deputy leader, Aleksander Tomov; secretary, Rossen Karadimov; party officials, Sonia Mladenova and Philip Bokov, Member of the European Council and Communications Chief, and Elena Poptodorova, fluent in Italian and Head of Public Relations.
Other new members include: Yovcho Russev, an economist specializing in North-South development problems, and Yanaki Stoilov, who was recently proposed as Speaker by the Socialist Party but not elected. Three other members, namely, the Deputy Speaker, Kadir Kadir, and two secretaries of the parliamentary group, Remzi Osman and Ilhan Mustafa, belong to the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), the political force which mainly represents the Turkish minority and which, as it stands "in the middle", between two "impenetrable walls" - the left and the right - has always had the good fortune of being indispensable as the party which "tips the scales" to achieve a parliamentary majority. The most recent example of this can be seen in the vital role it played in determining the "transverse" solution which resolved the long government crisis. Another 23 members belong to the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), the limited majority coalition comprising 15 parties bound together by an anti-Communist bias. The
y include: independent Sasho Stoyanov - who was arrested in the summer of '68 - at almost the same time as Pannella and for the same reason - when he was a communist youth leader of seventeen; Georgi Petrov, leader of one of the Bulgarian agrarian parties; deputies Emil Kapudaliev and Rumen Urumov of the Radical Democratic Party; a number of deputies from the Alternative Social Democratic Party; liberal Krassimir Stefanov, a supporter of a uninominal Anglo-Saxon type electoral system, and a number of deputies belonging to the Social Democratic Party.
Two former ministers and three former deputies of the former Constituent Assembly also became members of the Radical Party.
The average age of the 110 members is thirty-eight. Twenty-five per cent of them are women, 16% are Esperantists. Four out of 5 live in Sofia and only 1 in 5 elsewhere. More than 10% paid almost twice the minimum enrolment fee. The European federalist campaign may have been the main reason why Bulgarian parliamentarians have shown such enthusiasm for joining the Radical Party, but a number of them also expressed interest in other positions adopted by the Radicals; that is, support of a uninominal Anglo-Saxon type electoral system and the abolition of the death penalty. Antiprohibitionism with regard to drugs and environmental problems could also awaken interest, and not just amongst politicians.
A.2.8. The former Soviet Union
The last great revolution of this century was a nonviolent one. It took place gradually, and was born and nurtured in the Kremlin where it gathered force. And, as long as the Kremlin held the reins, it seemed that the transition from Communism to democracy would take place smoothly, without incident.
For years, the western world had illuded the Soviets that, economically speaking, it would be possible to "fill" the bottomless pit, that is, the fraudulent bankruptcy of the communist system. The post-communist governments - which are still not democratic - of Eastern European countries have also illuded themselves, in turn, that they would be able to use the international monetary system in the same way that they used the Soviet "mint": "The books don't balance? We'll just print some more money!"
The fall of Communism has caused economic collapse on a vast and almost incalculable scale: an enormous, accumulated debt, which cannot be made good. The West has no intention of remedying this collapse, and the new democracies of the post-communist world are not capable of remedying it. This is problem number one: it is considerable and extremely serious.
The second problem is that the Europe of the Twelve's biggest failure has been to sacrifice its most significant function: that of being the point of reference, the main strength and inspiration, the valid basis for a United States of Europe. Only a project such as the creation of a large European Federation could have represented the "new", at a political level, to which the countries who have recently cast off the chains of Communism could have entrusted their destinies. But the opposite happened. The European Community was not able or willing to make the Federation a concrete possibility, or even to develop concepts along these lines, with the result that Communist barbarity is being replaced by nationalistic and irredentist barbarity. The European Community is fully responsible for what is happening in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. This denunciation must be shouted out, and then used to provide the foundations for a political project which would guarantee European countries the possibilit
y of a federalist United Europe. This, and only this, can today prevent Europe from being drawn into disastrous conflicts, such as the ones that have exploded the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Only European political unity - which embraces places as far apart as Iceland and Vladivostok - can curb the nationalistic barbarism which is becoming more and more rampant. It is, therefore, the Radical Party's task - and duty - to relaunch the idea of a United States of Europe and European political unity, which is the EC's strength.
The Radical presence in the former Soviet Union
The first groups of Radical Party members began to spring up in the former Soviet Union in 1989. They were concentrated in Moscow and were, in fact, almost clandestine. During the next three years, the Radicals gradually became active in the entire territory of the former Soviet Union, enrolling more than 5,000 new members and managing to capture the attention of parliaments, governments and parties, and also public opinion, with its transnational transdivisional platform. We are, therefore, justified in saying that the Radical Party has become an active political force in the institutional and civilian life of the newly-formed post-communist Republics.
It was not easy to achieve this kind of growth. In a world that finds itself on the edge of an abyss, as a result of political aggression, war and starvation, we in fact had to deal with extremely tough conditions and policies which were, above all, in considerable contrast to the beliefs and identity of the Radical Party itself.
Without patting ourselves on the back, we can honestly say that the "New" Party has taken its first step in the former Soviet Union. A Radical organization exists - however inadequate it might be to meet current needs - and it is a reality that must be consolidated, regardless of all the problems that are involved. Aside from the number of members - more than 5,000, including about 100 parliamentarians - we have also acquired a certain amount of political identity and recognition, at least regarding such initiatives as the abolition of the death penalty - we have a very real possibility of winning this battle in the next few months - conscientious objection and antiprohibitionism with regard to drugs. Regarding initiatives related to national conflicts and minors, we are the only people who, on the basis of work in progress, will be able to finalize a series of political projects and initiatives within 3 or 4 months. The Radical Party can now rely on political initiatives being organized in Moscow
, Kiev, Baku, Vilnius and St. Petersburg, and also in about thirty smaller cities, where Radicals, either singly or in groups, continuously communicate our message and gather new members. Administrative, enrolment and mailing systems exist, which are on a par with those adopted in Rome. In '93, we anticipate raising 20% of the necessary financing actually in the former Soviet Union, and it should only take 4 or 5 years before we are completely self-financing in this part of the world.
We would also like to draw your attention to the following projects: our work with the "Gorbachev Foundation" and with the parliamentary Legislative Committee; our political project for the coming elections in Azerbaijan; our being the only Christian political movement in the West to have penetrated the Muslim world: 20% of the members - and 30% of the deputies - who have joined, are Muslims.
Lastly, we think the following is a question we should all be asking: What does the Radical Party represent for the hundreds of Azerbaijani, Kazakhs, Turkmenians, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Ossetians, Bohemians, Tatars, Circassians, Kabardians, Bashkirs, etc., for all those people who are Muslims, and who do not live in a Slav Republic or region?
It is not easy to grasp how a "Zionist" party could be a point of reference for those Muslims in this vast region who reject the neo-unitarianism of Gheddafi and the Iranian ayatollahs. In the Muslim world, and particularly in this area, there is a current which opposes the unitary principle, a profoundly lay and reformist current, which no longer believes in "holy wars" but thinks in terms of, and is planning, a "Muslim Renaissance", in which the state and religion would take separate roads. As the Muslims of Central Asia are Turks - with the exception of the Tajiks - they view the modern and lay Turkish State as an alternative to the confessional politics of the Arab States. And that's not all. They also aim at creating a democratic opposition to the ethnic clans and the ethnic dictatorships of the clans, which could not be more different. Our nonviolent approach, our Gandhi symbol, our respect for freedom and for all religions, are the main reasons why hundreds of Muslims - believers and non-bel
ievers alike - have openly joined the Radical Party. The Radical Party is, to a small degree, already the answer and the instrument for realizing a dream which does not oppose Islam; which perhaps represents the more or less conscious possibility of progressing towards a democracy in which human rights will be given top priority.
The Radical Party's political activity in the former Soviet Union in '91/'92 may be divided up into three principal phases: the first phase was dedicated to locating hundreds and thousands of addresses and setting up the "Moscow Centre", which had already been begun in '90; the second phase was devoted to "The New Party" newspaper project, that is, to telling people that the Radical Party existed, and the third phase concentrated on re-structuring the Party in order to organize its members.
All this was done with a single aim: to create the transnational Party, first, and then to build it. Generally speaking, people do not join the Radical Party on the strength of one particular campaign, but principally to affirm their existence, and their right to life, while at the same time affirming a life of rights, and supporting the "Party of the law", of standards, of initiatives against all ideological, unitary, isolationist and nationalist tendencies.
In the former Soviet Union, more than 500,000 copies of "The New Party" newspaper were printed and distributed. It was featured on TELEVISION and its aims were communicated in the national press. In other words, it functioned as an organizational and political instrument.
During the Radical Party's four years of activity in the former Soviet Union, it has organized more than 50 Press Conferences and Organizational Conferences in places like Moscow, Baku, Minsk and Biskek, and in dozens of other towns.
But it was only when the First General Conference of Radical Party Members took place at the end of January '92, with the participation of Emma Bonino, the leader of the Radical Party, that we were able to make the jump which permitted the Party to organize individual local projects, due to members having assumed, for the first time, the tasks of organizing and promoting initiatives. We can, therefore, say that from that date, the life of the Radical Party in the former Soviet Union was regulated by decisions that were translated into documents, thanks to the participation of hundreds of members. Following this first Conference, the Moscow Conference was held in July and the Kiev Conference in December, with the First Secretary, Sergio Stanzani taking part in the latter.
The motion presented at the January Conference made obtaining 1,000 members before the First Session of the Radical Party Congress its prime objective; in fact, the actual number of members at that date was 2,300. It also indicated the main campaigns that were to be pursued throughout the year, which we summarize below:
The creation of a conscientious objection law and of an alternative civilian service.
The Radical Party began this campaign back in 1990, by collecting signatures and communicating information concerning the most symbolic demonstrations of conscientious objection. This was followed by the drafting of a bill, which was also supported by other movements and organizations. Alexander Kalinin, a Radical Deputy, was responsible for organizing and drafting this bill, which was then presented by Zolotuhin and other deputies in the parliament of the Russian Federation. More signatures were collected in '91 and '92, and Radicals also campaigned to have the bill discussed in parliament, and to awaken public opinion to the reconversion of military spending into civilian spending. As the Radical Party's representative, Kalinin made a memorable contribution to this campaign with his many articles in "Komsomolskaja Pravda", and literally dozens of other newspapers, and appearances in lively television debates.
The campaign to abolish the death penalty.
Immediately after the failed coup in August '91, the Radical Party spearheaded a campaign to abolish the death penalty in Russia. The appeal was launched by the First Secretary of the Radical Party, Sergio Stanzani, and was supported by 80 deputies and dozens of important figures in the former USSR, not to mention hundreds of well-known people throughout the world. The petition, signed by hundreds of deputies and prominent figures, appeared in the "Komsomolskja Pravda", which then had a total circulation of 20,000,000 copies. Following the break-up of the Soviet Empire, the campaign was continued in the individual Republics. The following initiatives should not be forgotten: the bill presented in the Kazakhstan parliament by Radical Deputy Konysbaev and others; the campaign in the Ukraine with appeals to Kravciuk, and the resolutions presented by Radical deputies Moskovka and Zbitnev, which were approved by the "New Ukraine" and "Rukh" political movements; the debate in the Rada Ukraine parliament;
the Radical initiatives in Azerbaijan, which resulted in the President of the Republic coming out in favour of abolishing capital punishment; the work carried out in Russia, which led to the Radical Party collaborating with the Legislative Committee in the Russian parliament and, more specifically, working jointly with Bezrukov, the Chairman of the Committee, to arrive at the presentation of a bill for the abolition of the death penalty - a bill that was also supported by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, which was certainly of no little importance.
The antiprohibitionist campaign with regard to drugs.
The antiprohibitionist campaign in Russia and the other Republics began in May '90 with a demonstration in Moscow, and the Chairman of the Drug Policy Foundation, Arnold Trebach's volunteering to participate in same. The next phase concentrated on communicating information and organizing debates, in which health officers, jurists, state organizations engaged in the fight against drugs, and even the Ministers of Health and of the Interior were involved. In St. Petersburg, this campaign is now being given precedence by members of the Radical Party, and the presence of Radicals in government bodies concerned with combating drug-trafficking in the region is significant.
Important informative initiatives have been launched in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, two of the major drug-producing countries in the former Soviet Union.
The Second Conference was attended by more than 400 participants, who approved a motion which, besides reconfirming and extending the commitments laid down in the document produced at the January Conference, proposed a number of initiatives which are, in essence, the following:
The increasing number of Radical Party members amongst the deputies from the various Republics, and particularly those Republics where ethnic or national conflict has exploded in war, or threatens to do so, makes drawing up a new international law to combat the wars already underway a real necessity.
The document approved at the Conference proposes that parliamentarians in the Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in the territory of Nagorno Karabakh, call a series of meetings with the aim of organizing a Conference for Law and Peace, in order to examine the problems deriving from the various conflicts. We are planning a series of meetings between Radical Party representatives and the presidents and governments of the Caucasian Republics, including Shevarnadze, President of Georgia; Elcibey, President of Azerbaijan, and Ter Petrosian, President of Armenia. Zdravko Tomac, former Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia and a member of the Radical Party, was to be one of the members of the Radical delegation. Unfortunately, due to fighting breaking out anew in Georgia; to the attempted putsch in Azerbaijan; to the fierce conflict between the government and the opposition in Armenia - and due to Tomac being momentarily unavailable - we have had to postpone everything until after the Radical Par
ty Congress. However, everyone is still in favour of attending these meetings. Radical deputies in the various Caucasian countries are still attempting to discuss the various positions, but it is not at all easy.
We also proposed applying this same working method to the conflict in Moldavia over Transnistria. However, the meeting organized for Radical deputies, in which government representatives from the Republics of Moldavia, the Ukraine, Russia and Romania, and representatives from Transnistria, were invited to participate, was postponed at the last minute because it was difficult for the Romanian deputies to participate, and the Moldavians were no longer disposed to attend.
However, the work that went into the preparation of this Conference at a political level has shown: on the one hand, that many government representatives are involved in the Radical Party's proposals; and, on the other hand, that "democratic" parliamentary initiatives can be particularly effective when combined with the official undertakings of governments and international bodies such as the EC, the CSCE, etc.
The rights of ethnic minorities.
The collapse of the communist system, and the Soviet Union's consequent break-up into 15 new Republics, which are becoming more like national states every day, has given rise to the serious, and very dangerous, problem of the rights of ethnic minorities. The problem is evident, above all, in the very large Russian minorities in the Baltic States. We specifically intend to organize a series of initiatives aimed at deputies who have joined the Radical Party, in order to create legislation common to the three Republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, concerning the problem of the rights of minorities and the right to citizenship. More generally speaking, we found it was necessary to propose joint legislation regarding energy, the environment and military security, which would be created by issuing a federative mandate to a single authority representing all the Baltic States.
The Third Conference in Kiev, was held in a more subdued atmosphere than the two previous ones. The fact that we encountered organizational difficulties at the beginning; that many deputies were still unprepared on a political level, and that it coincided with various parliamentary sessions, resulted in our political progress, which had seemed so certain in the summer, coming to a standstill. A rapid reassessment of the possibilities for growth and, therefore, of our planned initiatives - for which we now need more time - will, therefore, have to be carried out.
Various people who spoke criticised, for the first time, the inadequacies of the Party and the "Italian" leadership in that area. In the course of the Conference, the decisions taken at the two preceding Conferences were confirmed, but criticism was also voiced because the objectives set in July, and more fully defined by the work of the organizing committees which met in Moscow during August, had not been reached.
Two documents were approved, one political and the other related to the Statute. Amongst other things, these documents maintain: that the political instrument of the Radical Party is suitable for dealing with the "deficit" of democracy in the post-totalitarian countries, and also that the Radical Party has sufficient power to attract members, particular in democratic countries or countries in poor economic condition; that the new post-communist democracies could play an innovative role as regards the renewal and development of democratic systems, if they are able to overcome the challenge of nationalism, of conflict and of "partycratic" tendencies; that only the pursuit of a policy of interdependence between states and of European federalism, and the creation of an international law, to prevail over nationalistic interests, will allow us to build a new Europe and a new democracy, at the same time proceeding with the democratic reform of the UN and of international government bodies, by proposing a grad
ual changeover to parliamentary representation. (3)
On 6 January 1993, the members of the Radical Party in the former Soviet Union totalled 4,660, including more than 100 deputies. They can be divided up as follows: Armenia 63, Azerbaijan 193, Belorussia 145, Georgia 82, Kazakhstan 180, Kirghizia 310, Moldavia 52, Tadzhikistan 6, The Turkmen Republic 44, the Ukraine 902, Uzbekistan 121 and Russia 2,472.
A.2.8.1. The Baltic States
The annexation of the three East Baltic States to the Soviet Union following the "Molotov-Ribbentrop" pact of 1939 was never officially recognized by the West, and was declared illegal by the Russian Supreme Soviet itself.
The independence that had either been obtained or regained as early as 1918 (Latvia and Lithuania) and in 1920 (Estonia) had never, in fact, been lost de jure and was also restored de facto in August 1991, following the unsuccessful coup in Moscow.
During the centuries, the languages and cultures of the Baltic peoples have naturally been influenced by those of their neighbours, particularly the Germans, Finns, Russians, Poles, Swedes and Danes. Lithuania, which was for a long time one of the largest European States, was for a number of centuries allied with Poland, but Vilnius was annexed by Poland between World War I and II. The Poles may have been in Lithuania in ancient times, but the Russians, and Russian-speaking people in general, have been in the three States, and particularly in Estonia and Latvia mainly since the years of sovietization: as well as very heavy pollution, Stalinist industrialization projects brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants, who took the jobs left by tens of thousands of deportees, refugees and political victims.
Last year's events, and consequent changes in the relations between the various ethnic groups, took place against a historical background in which the Estonian and Latvian people risked losing their culture and their language.
The dream of swiftly regaining a degree of economic well-being and achieving democratic development comparable to that of the most advanced countries in the western world was soon to end, but Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - the latter perhaps to a lesser degree - continue to look to the West rather than to the ruined Soviet system. For this reason, they are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, even though the majority of their import and export trade is still carried out with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, they are reaching out, on the one hand, towards the Scandinavian countries and, on the other hand, towards the European Community.
Having re-affirmed their independence, the Baltic States, as well as having obtained a seat in the UN, have joined the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and have applied to sit on the European Council.
Trade links with western countries, and with Scandinavia in particular, have not yet been sufficient to put the economy well and truly on its feet. Among other things the energy crisis continues to be serious, due to the fact that the appropriate agreements with Russia have not yet been signed. It is also a fact that, while a number of Western countries are obviously interested in acquiring, or even consolidating, a strategic geopolitical position on the east coast of the Baltic, it is still too risky and unprofitable for investment in these countries. A number of big private investors are attracted by the possibility of exploiting certain natural resources, which are not plentiful, such as minerals and forests; however, industry in general is not competitive with Western competitors. The food industry can usually produce enough to meet the needs of each state. The ports of Tallinn and Riga, on the contrary, are extremely large, and run a very high risk of being used more and more as a transit poi
nt for drugs produced in Central Asia.
At the end of the '80s, various movements and popular fronts in the Baltic States made an attempt, helped by glasnost and perestroika, to reawaken and revitalize their national cultures, to emerge from Soviet totalitarianism, to avert ecological catastrophe and to become fully independent. In the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviets many Communist deputies also supported the nationals' demands to sanction the supremacy of state laws over Soviet laws, to reintroduce the symbols of state government and to legalize multi-party government. In Lithuania, the majority of Communist deputies, led by Brazauskas, actually broke with the PCUS in 1989, and formed the Democratic Labour Party (PDL) the following year. If it is true that the Lithuanian elections in 1990 were won by the "Sajudis" nationalist, reformist movement led by Lansbergis and that the "Sajudis" movement pushed for the re-establishment of formal independence on 11 March 1990, then it is also true that the former Communists supported this p
rocess. It is not, therefore, surprising that in the Lithuanian elections which took place in October and November last - in two rounds - the PDL achieved considerable success: this did not signify a desire to return to the past in the sense of establishing ties with Moscow and the communist system, but rather of their having assumed a more "moderate" position to counter the "Sajudis" movement's inability to achieve satisfying results in the economic field.
In Estonia, the elections took place for the 101 seats in the new parliament on 20 September 1992, with 38% of the population deprived of Estonian citizenship, and therefore not having the right to vote: the resulting majority is what we would define in the West as "centrist-traditionalist".
In Latvia, the first post-independence elections are scheduled to take place in the spring of '93.
The law on citizenship currently in force in Estonia was first adopted in 1938. However, it was suspended when Estonia was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. Estonia regained its independence on 20 August 1991 and the resolution "on the application of the law on citizenship" was passed by the Supreme Soviet of Estonia on 26 February 1992, making the law effective once again but with some slight modifications.
The law of 1938 stipulated that citizenship was either acquired by birth or by law - via naturalization; but an Estonian citizen could not acquire citizenship in another state. In particular, the following categories were recognized as citizens: people with an Estonian father; illegitimate children who were either born or found in Estonia; women married to Estonian citizens and their children, if they were minors and resident in Estonia; children adopted by Estonians, and people classified as Estonian citizens by international agreements. Foreigners wishing to become naturalized Estonians have to be resident in the State for at least two years before, and one year after, presenting their application to the Ministry of the Interior, and they have to have a certain knowledge of the Estonian language. Exceptions are made for people of Estonian origin or for those who have rendered valuable services to the state. The government has the right to recognize citizenship or not, in the same way that it has
the right to revoke it upon request of a citizen, as in the case of citizenship being acquired in another state, or enrolment in the armed forces of another state without the Estonian government's permission.
The resolution of 26 February 1992 modified the law by stipulating: that two years of residence in Estonia, prior to applying to become a naturalized citizen, must date from 30 March 1990 onwards; that people who are Estonian by birth are allowed to possess dual citizenship; that the clause stating that people who have acquired citizenship in another state or served in the armed forces of another state most forfeit their Estonian citizenship, does not apply to the period in which Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union; that the requirements for naturalization now include a promise of loyalty to the state; that the people who were Estonian citizens before 16 June 1940, and their descendants, and also people who were granted citizenship by the government, are automatically recognized as Estonian citizens.
Citizens of other states who emigrated to Estonia during the period of annexation do not possess Estonian citizenship. They can, however, apply for citizenship, according to the conditions specified above, but must renounce any other citizenship they might possess.
On 19 October 1991, the centrist-traditionalist parliamentary groups (the Party for Estonian Independence, Pro Patria, and the Moderates) signed a joint agreement which constituted a new government programme. The various undertakings specified in this agreement include a commitment to amend the law on citizenship, to bring it in to line with the new constitution. Various amendments are planned, including: acquisition of Estonian citizenship through one's mother as well as one's father, as long as the former is Estonian; men and women who married Estonian citizens before 26 February 1992 having equal right to citizenship; minors born and educated in Estonia, but who are not Estonian citizens, being eligible to apply for citizenship one year before they come of age, which would then permit them to acquire citizenship without having to wait the required amount of time.
The constitution is democratic and incorporates the guarantees given to citizens and individuals at an international level. The law on citizenship is vitiated, like many others, by the fact that it does not grant equal rights to men and women to automatically acquire citizenship by marriage but, in the main, it meets with the normal requirements of legislation in this area. However, it deliberately does not take into consideration the extraordinary fact that 38% of the population do not have Estonian citizenship. The absolute need to defend the ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity of a people that, in the past, has been threatened by extinction combined with the fear of a strong minority vote in favour of a political and social regime unpopular with the majority of citizens, explains why it has been made difficult - particularly by requiring a certain standard of knowledge of the Estonian language - to become a naturalized citizen, and why this was in fact rendered impossible - by having to wa
it one year after submitting the application - before the elections of September 1992. The aforementioned joint agreement, if it is respected, will make it possible to correct many of the instances in which citizenship is denied; however, the scheduled amendments must be made as soon as possible.
One cannot but understand, and also greatly sympathize with, the protest launched by many, many Estonian residents without citizenship, at their being denied a vote - at least for the moment; even though the majority of them seem to be moved by a fear of the economic consequences of not possessing the status of a citizen rather than a real need to take part in the democratic life of a country which has regained its independence without desiring to, or even against its own will. From a legal point of view, the Estonian law-makers have undoubtedly remained within the limits of international law; however, from a political point of view, they have probably made a serious mistake, which the international community should help them to quickly rectify - with the Radical Party possibly being instrumental in this initiative. The decision to not grant citizenship to all Estonian residents automatically is not, in itself, negative, especially at a time when troops still occupy the territory, but the conditions a
nd specified periods of time seem excessive.
No political force in Estonia today can possibly ignore the question of citizenship when carrying out the necessary legislative reforms. Even if armed conflict and secondary secession - a possibility raised by the Russian-speaking population - did not occur at the time of the elections nor immediately afterwards, and do not, in fact, look as though they will occur in the immediate future, it is still necessary to fully guarantee the rights of every individual. In the political "workshop" known as the Balkans, the issue of citizenship in Estonia could perhaps function as the fulcrum for political initiatives, and its resolution act as an example for the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.
The Radical presence in the Baltic States
Prior to the Baltic States having regained their independence the Radical Party had very few members, partly due to the infrequent visits made by Party representatives, and the even less frequent meetings between national activists. The Radical Party, and its Russian and Latvian members in particular, took part in the demonstrations staged on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on 23 August 1989, in Moscow, Riga and St. Petersburg (still known as Leningrad) and other cities, to have the annexation recognized as illegal. Numerous arrests were made and many people were beaten up.
From August 1991 onwards, the profile of membership in the Baltic States was radically modified, and membership itself began to increase considerably, as it did in other parts of Eastern and Central Europe. On the one hand, the distribution of "The New Party" newspaper from that same time onwards and the Radical Party's active presence in the Baltic States from October of that year, made it possible to communicate a large amount of information for the first time, and to enrol new members personally, especially parliamentarians, journalists and other professional people who have a degree of influence in society; on the other hand, the fact that independence had already been acquired and rapidly consolidated, resulted in the positions of Slavic and indigenous minorities being reversed, and also those of the people who were still bound to the communist system and others who were not only extraneous to it but also openly opposed it. Russian-speaking people and former Communists were, therefore, those mos
t interested in joining the Radical Party.
One hundred and twenty-one people in the Baltic States joined the Radical Party in 1922: in Estonia and Latvia, where the Slavic immigrants are still decidedly uneasy about their situation, the majority of members are Russian; there are more indigenous members in Lithuania. Members include: an Estonian Deputy - leader of the Agrarian Party of the Right - a Latvian independent, and two Lithuanians - one of them being a Social Democrat and the other the leader of the Union of Poles and Belorussians in Lithuania.
Numerous meetings were held in 1992, and also three meetings for Radical Party members in the Baltic States: at Riga (Latvia) in April; at Tallinn (Estonia) in July, and at Vilnius (Lithuania) in October. All three meetings received excellent press, TELEVISION and radio coverage, both in the local language and in Russian, and - for the Vilnius meeting - in Polish.
The Radical Party opened its first office in the Baltic States in October, at Vilnius; while there is a P.O. Box at Tallin which, like Riga, has a phone number to contact.
A.3. RADICAL ACTION IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
"The attention attracted by the Radical Party in the former communist world is a sign of the tremendous challenge the people are facing there: that of not allowing themselves to be bound by the hopeless alternative of the old Soviet "people's prison" as opposed to an unavoidable return to the absolute supremacy of the national state: in other words, political "tribalism". It is also necessary for Western Europe, and particularly its individual countries, the European Community, the democratic forces and those people who say they are European federalists, to rise to this challenge by accepting its responsibilities. They must become involved. In another sense, it also requires an effort by the economically advanced West, to avoid the economic crisis in the East sweeping away the hope for democracy and the hope of ensuring the governability of the world. By the same standard, the fact that citizens of the former communist world have joined the Radical Party is a 'provocation' to Western Europe, a provo
cation to consciously assume its responsibilities which cannot be avoided simply by pretending they don't exist. On the other hand, the weak response that the Radical Party appeal has gained so far in Western Europe is symbolic of the attitude adopted by this part of the world during the crucial period of transformation we are now experiencing: the West is shirking its responsibilities."
We have quoted this passage from the April report, because it perfectly expresses the attitude of this part of the world, that is, Europe and the West, to the Radical Party and what it has to offer.
Where does Europe's interest lie, which "lever" does one have to pull to get its ruling class moving? Why doesn't Europe defend an individual's right to life and a life of rights? Why doesn't Europe - if a political Europe truly exists - intervene to uphold laws and human rights where they are jeopardized, scorned and risk being annihilated? Why are there only a few dozen members of the Radical Party in Europe? Why has the European response been so lukewarm - considering the human and financial resources that the Party has invested - and, indeed, laughable, when compared to the current response - which is still inadequate but has tremendous potential - of the "poor" world, a world that has to construct its own democratic model, its model for civil and social living?
There is only one possible answer to these questions: Europe, or rather the West, does not understand that the wars, the poverty, the hunger and the democratic "deficit" that many parts of the globe have to contend with, are a product, without a doubt, of the total inadequacy of its policies; of its cultivating its own interests; of its lack of interest in human rights.
In which European countries, apart from Italy, has the Radical Party invested its human and financial resources over the past years?
France is the country where Marco Pannella has had the greatest influence; where he has been able to establish political relationships, and where he has had an "entrée" at all government levels. The fact that he was elected to the European parliament in 1979 - the year in which the "Italian Radicals" probably enjoyed their greatest popularity; that Jean Fabre, a French conscientious objector, was Party Secretary, and the fact that Pannella is, perhaps most importantly, virtually bilingual, has permitted him to create his own political identity in France since that time. Without mentioning, of course, Pannella's "Paris" years as correspondent for the Italian newspaper "Il Giornale", and the relationships that were formed then, and still continue today.
From at least 1979 to 1982, Pannella and the Radicals were considered to be a French party. Almost every month, Pannella invited well-known figures, who constituted an "alternative" to the Giscard d'Estaing regime, to Strasbourg; he became a point of reference for families who were already ecologically aware; he was invited to appear on television many times; he founded with Bernard Henri Levy and Jacques Attali - subsequently a counsellor of Mitterrand - the "Action Internationale contre la Faim", the first organization to proclaim the "right of intervention" on a humanitarian level which is only applied now, and which many people unjustly claim to have pioneered; he campaigned for Mitterand's election - more than 2,000 people took part in a "Radical" meeting in Paris. It was in France more than anywhere else that the great nonviolent initiative of September-October 1981 was planned and developed, culminating in the Radical Party resolution: "Five Million Alive Now".
Our strong presence in France created the conditions for a membership campaign in which "quality" was certainly the keynote, if not quantity. New members included such people as Marek Halter, Eugène Ionesco, André Bercoff, Brice Lalonde, Edgard Morin and Leonid Plioutsche, as well as many well-known personalities, including some of the country's leading figures, from the political, scientific and cultural world, from that "intelligentsia" so peculiar to French society, and to the Parisian microcosm in particular.
In 1987/88, these people, who had been joined by many others, still constituted the Radical Party in France, together with "radical" groups of activists based in Paris and Nantes.
Fifteen French citizens were Radical Party members in 1992, including Minister Baylet, leader of the "Mouvement des Radicaux des Gauches", and Socialist Euro-MP, Leon Schwartzenberg.
Pannella's election to the European parliament favoured Radical action in Belgium. Jean Fabre's presence there made it possible to form a small group of activists which was later to expand when the campaign against death from starvation was launched. "Food and Disarmament International" was then founded in Brussels. In 1981/1982, there were than 50 members of the Radical Party in Belgium.
After the Belgian law against death by starvation was passed - a year before the Italian law which is, unfortunately, used to equally bad effect - more and more peopled gravitated to the Radical Party, boosting the number of members to over one hundred, thanks to Olivier Dupuis' battle to uphold the right of conscientious objection. The only thing that prevented Olivier Dupuis, who collected more than 2,000 votes, from being elected on the "Ecolo" list was the Belgian electoral system. Olivier's eight court trials the Radical Party profile high, in terms of activism and information campaigns. The same can be said for the next phase, during which priority was given to building a United States of Europe. Pannella was often featured in the Belgian press because he was a Euro-MP, but more precisely because he acted as a European, and was as much a Belgian as an Italian.
All this took place in the French-speaking part of Belgium, where Pannella could address himself to people directly. There was very little activity in the Flemish-speaking area: not a single Flemish person has joined the Radical Party in all these years.
There were 26 Belgian members of the Radical Party in 1992.
The Radical Party initiative in the UK - and also the results - cannot in any way be compared with the ones in France and Belgium. A "breach" was opened up, to some degree, in 1989 when David Steel, the former Liberal leader, joined the Radical Party; and Pannella established contact with a number of the leading exponents of the Liberal Party. There were 3 British members of the Radical Party in 1992, including Lord Spencer Douglas Northampton, a member of the House of Lords.
In Germany the world "radikal" is used to describe the "extremists of the far Right". They are now known as the RadiKahl - which literally means "bald extremists" - the leading group of the home-grown skinheads, all of which does not help the Radical Party's nonviolent image.
There were only 2 German members of the Radical Party in 1992.
Spain was one of the first countries in which the Radical Party became active. It was in 1976, that Marco Pannella went on one of his most severe "thirst" strikes, and succeeded not only in having the trials of the conscientious objectors at the beginning of the post-Francoist period suspended, but also in having them stopped altogether. This made both Pannella and the Radical Party very popular in Spain.
This first renewal of contact with Spain was followed by a further period of contact, between 1985 and 1988, when Marco Pannella, Emma Bonino and Giovanni Negri were in Spain, and the Party sent various "ambassadors" there. This made it possible to form Radical groups in a number of cities and to create the right climate for a number of well-known figures to join the Party, such as Fernando Savater, Miguel Bosé and others. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that for the local elections in Madrid in 1990 an "Antiprohibitionist List" was created, which unfortunately did not do particularly well.
There were 23 Spanish members of the Radical Party in 1992, including Raul Morodo Leoncio, a Euro-MP and a member of the Social Democratic Centre (CDS).
Radical action in Portugal, which was embarked on later, can perhaps be considered more important, and more effective, than it was in Spain. A first group of sympathizers was formed, led by Luis Mendao, after which "envoys" from the Party, preceded by Pannella who was in Portugal in 1987, succeeded in enrolling a fair number of people within a few months. The Radical Party in Portugal counted more than one hundred members, at least until 1989.
There were 7 Portuguese members in 1992.
We would like to point out that in Holland there were 5 Radical Party members in 1992, including Jans Wilhem Bertens, a Euro-MP and a member of "D66" (Liberal and Democratic Reform Group), and there were 4 members of the Radical Party in Switzerland.
Israel is certainly one of the countries in which we have invested the most. We could say that the Radical presence there dates back to 1986, when Pannella made a trip to Israel, and Emma Bonino followed him on numerous "missions". First and foremost, Italian-Jewish organizations contributed to the success of those visits, press conferences, newspaper articles and meetings, while the almost immediate association formed with Shulamit Aloni's "Ratz" Party resulted in the "Radicals" being considered, from the very beginning, one of Israel's "important friends", an impression confirmed by specific Radical actions. The Radical Party's campaign supporting the "refusniks" served to consolidate this "friendship".
We would also like to mention that one of the sessions of the Radical Party Federal Council was held in Jerusalem in 1988 - in an area subject to attack by the "Intifada" - when we were more of an "Israeli" Party than we have ever been since.
There were just 2 Israel members in 1992, including Shulamit Aloni, Minister of Education and Culture, and leader of the "Meretz-Democratic Israel" coalition in parliament.
The Radical Party's experience in Turkey was relatively short-lived. Through the various gay organizations, we managed to make contact with the leader of the movement. He was instrumental in bringing in a considerable number of new members in this country, particularly in circles frequented by people who were "different", in Istanbul and Ankara. He was, in fact, virtually the founder of the Turkish Radical Party, using the model of our Party as inspiration but adapting it to his own life and aims. It was when Secretary Giovanni Negri returned from a mission in Turkey, that we became aware of the divergence of views which prevented us from understanding one another and, after the Turks had put in a brief appearance at the Bologna Congress, our relations with this country fizzled out.
That leaves Greece, where we embarked on a certain amount of activity in 1987, during the "Radical Trophy" campaign; that is, when five or six groups of activists were advertising the Party, and enrolling new members in France, Spain, Portugal, and indeed Greece. We obtained a few members, one or two of whom were more involved, including at Federal Council meetings. We were given a certain amount of publicity which derived, above all, from Pannella's contacts with "Avriani", an important Athenian newspaper, but it appeared sporadically and did not lead to anything. Nevertheless, the 2nd International Antiprohibitionist League (LIA) Congress was held in Athens, in November 1990.
A.4. BURKINA FASO, THE SAHEL COUNTRIES AND AFRICA
The future of democracy in Africa is seriously threatened by the very people who pretend to be its defenders.
African countries are in the grip of military dictatorships or single-party systems, on the one hand, and of revolutionary groups, on the other, which refuse to accept the verdict given by the ballot-box. The no-holds barred struggle for power results in the rights and fundamental interests of the various peoples being sacrificed.
The perfectly just aspirations to a rule of law brought about by free and "transparent" elections stumble, in reality, upon a number of obstacles. The multi-party system splits government up into hundreds of small parties, which are formed on a tribal or regionalist basis, or something similar. Even in places like Ghana, the Congo, Mali, Burkina Faso and Angola, where democratic and "transparent" elections have been held, those who have been defeated refuse to respect the constitutional laws and the verdict of the ballot-box. Alliances are formed and broken from one day to the next. Majority governments have their work cut out to make any headway, and also to survive, in a relatively unstable political climate.
In the meantime, the socio-economic situation has deteriorated. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank impose their "Structural Adjustment Programmes" on all African countries, in order to make good their debts by the "democratization" of hunger, disease and ignorance. The right to a decent life, and the right to education and health for women and children in particular, is disregarded and made a mockery of daily in the name of liberalizing "trade laws".
The entire southern part of Africa - South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya - finds itself in the grip of drought and famine. There has been no rain. The farmers have not been able to sow. And there is nothing to reap. The cereal deficit amounts to millions of tons of maize and millet.
The Radical presence in Africa
The 1st Congress of the "Radical Association for a Rule of Law in Africa" (A.R.E.D.A.), which took place at Ouagadougou, in Burkina Faso, on 23 and 24 October 1922, gathered together 300 activists from Senegal, Niger and the Ivory Coast. It was the first big political event staged by the African Radicals, and was reported in all the national and privately-owned newspapers in Burkina Faso.
There are 533 members of the Radical Party in Burkina Faso and a total of 37 in the combined territories of the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mauritius, Mali, Niger, South Africa, Togo, Senegal and the Seychelles.
There are 18 deputies amongst the members: the Minister appointed to the Presidency of the Republic and 12 deputies from Burkina Faso, and members of the Organization for People's Democracy/Labour Movement (ODP-MT), the Progressive Democratic Movement (MDP) and the National Convention of Progressive Patriots; two deputies from the Ivory Coast, and members of the Ivory Coast People's Front (PPI) and the Workers' Party (PTI); a Deputy from Mali, who is leader of the "RDA" parliamentary group; a Deputy from Senegal, and member of the Socialist Party, and a Deputy from South Africa, and member of the Solidarity Party.
What is at stake in Africa is an incredible possibility of a democratic transformation which needs foreign support: a Radical presence is more necessary here in order to beat intolerance and sectarianism, and to uphold new rights and new freedom.
A.5 PROJECTS
A.5.1. Antiprohibitionism with regard to drugs
The antiprohibitionist campaign in Italy was characterized in 1992 by a number of important events, destined to have widely-felt consequences: the "Radicals for the referendums" committee gathered around 750,000 signatures on the referendum against the most repressive parts of the 1990 law on drugs; an antiprohibitionist intergroup, formed of about 150 parliamentarians of all political colours with the exception of the extreme right, was set up within the Italian Parliament and amongst Italian deputies in the European Parliament, and subsequently in a number of regional councils; the "3rd Conference of the European cities that have signed the Frankfurt Resolution for a new drug policy" was held in Italy, on the initiative of the "Radical Antiprohibitionist Association" (CORA); as a result of his open relationship with the "European Federalist" parliamentary group, based around the "Lista Pannella", the Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato promised to support a revision of the 1990 drugs law.
These successes were the fruit of constant efforts in the organization of antiprohibitionist campaigning and political struggle. In 1992 there were considerable changes in the attitudes of the general public and the Italian political world towards the issue of drugs. It is now possible in Italy to put forward the idea of a new drug policy based on the legalization of the production and commerce of substances which are at present illegal.
The situation at an international level, however, is different. This is clearly illustrated by three episodes involving the government and the Parliament of France which took place in the last few weeks of the year.
During the Edinburgh summit of the European Council, the French Home Minister Paul Quilés expressed his government's view that the tolerant drug policy of the Netherlands is responsible for the postponement of the integration of the member countries, decided at Maastricht. The fact that this was merely a pretext was clear, for it was common knowledge well before the Edinburgh summit that the European borders would remain in place on 1 January 1993. However, it is significant that one of the main European partners decided to bring the question of opposition to the Dutch drug policy into the debate.
A few days after the Edinburgh summit, Quilés presented a bill to modify the French drugs law, already amongst the most repressive in the world; the bill contains measures that are even more restrictive than those currently in force, and which would make the French law almost identical to the current Italian law.
A confirmation of this line of thinking came in the report published at the end of December by the Anti-Mafia Committee of the French Senate. The document contains an unprecedented attack on the idea of legalization, and gives names and surnames of the enemies of prohibitionism, who are also accused of being the greatest allies of the Italian and international Mafia. The report urges a political campaign (and maybe, between the lines, more than just a political campaign) against these enemies. They are, according to the report, the LIA (International Antiprohibitionist League), its Treasurer Antonio Contardo and its Executive Secretary Marco Taradash, member of the European Parliament and of the Anti-Mafia Committee of the Italian Parliament, Marco Panella, leader of the Radical Party and a member of the Italian and European Parliaments, and Dr. Leon Schwarzemberg, French member of the European Parliament. Who knows what the writers of the report would have added to their conclusions if they had known
that Leon Schwarzemberg is a member of the Radical Party!
The French situation is only an example. Although it is true that the movement in favour of the depenalization of the use of illegal substances and the revision of the prohibitionist system is spreading amongst the cities and the local authorities of Europe, there is no doubt that the international trend is to continue along the path of prohibition, characterized by disinformation, business interests and reactionary aims, a path which has sown violence, corruption, and injustice throughout the world, especially in the last fifteen or twenty years.
The reintroduction of the death penalty as a deterrent against large-scale drug-trafficking, the reduction of legal rights, in particular, like in Italy, of the legal rights of those suspected of belonging to criminal organizations, the use of enforced treatment for citizens who refuse to undergo state-run therapy, and the obligation to conform to the prevalent consumerist model of drug-use, a model which is accepted at a cultural as well as an economic level - alcohol, tobacco and the psychotropic drugs that are produced in massive quantities by the Western pharmaceutical industry - are all part of an attack against liberalism, justice and legal rights, and the spirit of tolerance, an act of aggression that uses laws and international bodies as its weapons. When the prohibitionist regime is confronted by the increasing spread of illegal drugs and the expansion of criminal drug-trafficking organizations, the police state begins to reduce civil liberties and undermine the democratic mechanisms which ens
ure that political power is subject to control and to free election.
This is shown by the instrumental use, based on the selfish interests of foreign policy, that the United States and Europe have made of the "war on drugs" in recent years.
If legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco were taken as terms of comparison, the number of victims of illegal substances would appear insignificant. Let's leave this observation aside, however, and compare the two main hard drugs - heroin and cocaine. In the US, as in Europe, drug-related deaths are almost always caused by heroin or by Aids contracted by heroin-users. Drug addiction in Europe almost always means addiction to heroin. In the US, too, where the situation is different due to the widespread use of crack, heroin is the main health problem (apart from tobacco and alcohol, that is).
And yet the military objective of the "war on drugs" declared by Reagan and Bush, and underwritten by Thatcher and Mitterrand, is neither the "golden triangle" - Burma, Laos, Thailand - nor the "golden half-moon" - Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran - in other words the regions and the countries of Asia which produce most of the heroin consumed in the West. Against all logic, even against military logic, the strategic, economic, chemical and moral weapons have been aimed for the last five years only at Latin America and the three countries that produce the coca leaf - which is not cocaine - or export cocaine: Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. The US has always exercised or tried to exercise strict military and political control over these countries: the "war on drugs" now allows this control to be developed through so-called economic aid, subject to strict observance of the dictates of the US government.
Europe, despite the relatively limited influence of the use of cocaine, has followed the strategy of its main ally, so that almost all the agricultural conversion projects financed by the Italian government are located in Latin America, whilst last year France had no "moral" scruples, and laid down no conditions in relation to heroin, when it completed negotiations with Pakistan for the sale of 40 planes and a nuclear power station.
However, the fact that governments are attracted by the prohibitionist system because of its advantages in terms of realpolitik is not the only problem that the antiprohibitionist movement has to overcome. All the various prohibitionist policies are also invested with moral overtones in order to convince the general public that they are necessary. Thanks to the threat of widespread and inevitable addiction amongst young people, a threat brandished by well-paid politicians, public officials and intellectuals, the state is finally able to exercise all the moral authority that democratic procedures bar it from exercising in every other area of the life of society. Aside from drugs, the state is losing all moral rights and authority in the private life of citizens: the use of drugs by a very small minority justifies the interference of the state in everyone's life. Power lost in the sphere of the family, with the legalization of separation through divorce; power lost in the sphere of sexual relations, wit
h the acquisition on the part of homosexuals of full or greater rights of citizenship and the affirmation of women's right to abort legally and safely; this ethical power of the state, which is therefore clerical, that power which Moslem states share with Islam with respect to alcohol and sex, is now being recovered by Western or Westernized states in the sphere of drug policies.
A whole host of right and left-wing reactionaries, the clerics of politics or religion, have operated under the protection of this state morality; above all, it has been taken advantage of by regimes which deal with social conflict through repression and use the criminalization of "drug addicts" as an expedient to avoid solving fundamental questions of social justice. For these regimes the antiprohibitionists are not the supporters of a practical solution to a political and legislative dilemma, but the most dangerous destroyers of an order which, contrary to the modern juridical model of laws that are justified by their effectiveness, is established by entrusting laws with the task of imposing moral virtue at any cost. At the cost of disorder, violence, and the loss of the civil virtues of tolerance and solidarity.
The principal cities of the United States have been beset for years by unprecedented violence, despite mass arrests - every year one and a half million people are imprisoned in the US for violation of the drug laws - and the threat of capital punishment for drug-traffickers. Unprecedented, or comparable only to the period of the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, though much greater sums of money and far more advanced weapons are now involved. We know about the situation in Central America. And we are beginning to find out about the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe: drug-trafficking profits which are swelling the poor economies of the ex-Communist countries; poppy and cannabis plantations which are spreading like wildfire; the growth of drug-trafficking Mafia organizations which have inherited the networks and the methods of the traditional black market Mafia and the corrupt and conniving secret police forces; the rehabilitation for anti-narcotics operations of the evil secret services and the
ir methods.
Turning to Europe and Italy, there is a constant increase in the use of prohibited drugs, particularly in the use of hard drugs; there is a very high risk of Aids for drug addicts, and through them for the rest of society; drug-related crime has reached dangerous levels in all the large and medium-sized cities of Europe; there is a spread of drug-trafficking networks, in the form both of traditional criminal organizations and economic and political criminality, whose growth is much less evident but much more dangerous for law and order, democracy, and justice.
We have now come to the third great obstacle which the antiprohibitionist movement has to fight against: the power and the influence of the drug-trafficking organizations.
In September 1982, Leonardo Sciascia, at the time a Radical member of parliament, wrote the following comments on the Mafia in the "Corriere della Sera": "More than twenty years ago I gave a definition of the Mafia which I still believe to be both synthetic and exact: the Mafia is a criminal association, with the aim of making illegal gains for its members, which plays the role of intermediate, parasitic and imposed by means of violence, between property and work, between production and consumption, and between the citizen and the state. After more than twenty years what has changed is this: that as far as drugs are concerned the Mafia is no longer an intermediate but a producer; and that in the intermediation between the citizen and the state, and in its own use of the state, the Mafia does not enjoy the same security that it used to enjoy." Sciascia continued, prophetically: "You don't have to be particularly perspicacious to see that drugs represent a problem that has to be dealt with, even in Italy,
where it seems that the political will to do so is lacking."
Ten years of prohibitionism later, Michele Pantaleone, the great historian of the struggle against the Mafia, said in an interview with "ll Manifesto": "The Mafia knew and still knows that it does not have to account for its actions before the courts of law, for it has always carried out the duties of the feudal system. The Mafia is now an organization for the conquest and maintainance of power. The Mafia does not need political power to accumulate wealth. The wealth of the Mafia comes from drug-trafficking."
Immense illegal wealth and profits on one side, immense deployment of sentences, prisons, propaganda, prestige and money on the other. In the middle of this never-ending war are the people, the rights to liberty of the whole population, drug-users or otherwise, the laity of the state, tolerance, solidarity, scientific knowledge, and the legitimacy of the laws.
What, then, is to be done? We have already spoken about Italy, and the hard work carried out by CORA. We have also spoken about LIA, which, thanks to the pact of federation with the Radical Party - ratified in the first session of this Congress - has fully resumed its activities: providing information and acting as a link between the various initiatives and associations that support antiprohibitionism, or that simply work for a more human, civilized and effective policy (4).
What, then, is the role of the Radical Party, of the nonviolent, libertarian, liberal, and democratic Party? The two focal points of transnational action are inevitably Italy on the one hand, and the United Nations on the other.
Italy, because the debate is now more open and advanced than in any other country in the world; so much so that CORA, in the motion approved at its last Congress, after recalling that "the antiprohibitionist battle must be international and internationalist, otherwise it risks creating illusory reforms which will not change the substance of the violent attack on justice which characterizes the current world drug policy," binds its executive bodies "to evaluate the timing and the methods of a campaign aimed at making Italy the first country to reform its drug policy on the basis of antiprohibitionist views, beginning with the legalization of the production, sale and use of cannabis and its derivates."
The framework of the initiative is clear: although legalization must have an international dimension to eliminate the consequences of the prohibitionist system, it remains true that every state must, within the sphere of its responsibility, create the conditions for the fulfilment of this objective and decide on the timing and the methods of the move from a system of prohibition to a system of legality. This line of thought was also followed in the motion presented by the antiprohibitionist intergroup and approved by the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 4 August 1992, which commits the Italian government to open a debate in the international assemblies on the results of prohibitionism and the possible alternatives.
The United Nations, on the other hand, is necessarily a fundamental point of reference. It is on the basis of UN Conventions (the latest, and most repressive, was approved in 1988 and is still to be put into effect in many countries of the world) that the prohibitionist system has been developed and consolidated. It is under the cover of the UN that governments justify the reintroduction and use of life sentences and capital punishment, the pointless expenditure on conversion of plantations, and more generally the refusal to evaluate the human, social, economic and political costs of the failure of prohibitionism. This is why the transnational Radical Party must organize a "UN campaign", with the aim of opening, within a fixed date, and involving as many countries as possible, a real debate of the prohibitionism-antiprohibitionism issue.
In the view of the antiprohibitionist initiatives, we cannot underestimate the need to develop ever-closer relations with the organizations that tackle the issue of prohibitionism from specific, though ultimately converging, angles. From the "Conference of European Cities that have signed the Frankfurt Resolution" to the "Drug Policy Foundation", from the movement of doctors and health workers who support a policy of damage reduction to the Latin American movements for the liberation of society and democracy from the drugs war, the opportunities for collaboration are enormous.
A.5.2. The international parliamentary campaign for the abolition of the death penalty by the year 2000.
On the issue of the death penalty, the Radical Party's objective goes beyond the "human rights system" of the United Nations, beyond the contrast between the death penalty and the right to life. What we intend to achieve is a new civil right, a new personal right: the affirmation in the fundamental documents of the international community, and in the laws of single states, of the right not to be killed as the result of a sentence or a judicial measure, even if issued in accordance with the law.
The pro-abolition movement that we want to create has to be a transnational and transdivisional political body, an instrument of parliamentary and militant struggle with objectives to be achieved by a fixed deadline. A body that will follow a strategy aimed at abolition, through the progressive, rigorous introduction of regulations.
The "International League" - formed of parliamentarians, ministers, Nobel Prize winners, scientists and nonviolent activists - must be able to ensure that the same bill or resolution for the progressive affirmation of the new right is presented "on the same day and at the same time" in different parliaments, supported by demonstrations outside the parliaments themselves and by action to increase awareness among the general public. We have stated that this must be achieved by the year 2000 in order to give credibility to the project: we must fix deadlines for our intermediate and final aims, render an account of our initiative, and measure its success.
The seminar of the "Organization for Peace Among the Peoples of Europe and the Mediterranean" (POPEM), held last November in Tunis, set up a committee for the abolition of the death penalty in the Mediterranean countries. The committee, which according to its statute is to work within the framework of the Radical Party campaign, has two objectives: the organization in one year's time of a convention of Arab and Mediterranean countries, with the participation of jurists, parliamentarians, associations and parties, and an agreement in the direction of abolition among Islamic countries.
From Tunisia, one of the most advanced countries in the Islamic world with regard to human rights, an important message could be sent to the other Moslem countries. A moratorium, for example, to allow time to develop a parliamentary project aimed towards abolition.
Then there is the United States. We can test the Clinton administration, plan initiatives to obtain a moratorium of 3-5 years and the immediate ratification of the "International Pact for Civil and Political Rights", which lays down strict limitations on the execution of minors, pregnant women, and people with mental illnesses. The presentation in many different parliaments of motions which commit the government "to object" to the "reservations" which the Unites States intends to place on the ratification of the International Pact could be the first confrontation between countries in favour of abolition and the United States.
The United States represents a decisive front in the battle for abolition at an international level: because of its international role and prestige, the United States is to a large extent responsible for the formation of international rules of conduct - in this case of a pact which would ratify the principle that states cannot do as they wish with the lives of citizens, and make this principle the foundation of the international system of human rights. This type of regulation, which is the outcome of the active participation of a very large number of countries in international agreements, would be binding for all countries and would take precedence, according to international law, over national law.
Similarly, with respect to the United Nations a further deadline for our campaign is represented by the "World Conference on Human Rights", organized by the UN, to be held in Vienna at the end of spring '93.
The following initiatives could be proposed: an appeal for a general moratorium on the execution of death penalties; limitations on the application of the death penalty; the establishment within the UN of a form of international tribunal authorized to sit judgement on certain issues or on presumed criminals, especially with respect to coups d'état.
The Security Council must be able to intervene to impose the right to a fair trial for prisoners and a moratorium on executions for a period of six months to one year, and to ensure that these rules are respected, at the cost of sanctions and the withdrawal of international recognition.
A "Europe without the death penalty" must be the intermediate aim of the campaign, to be realized by 1995/96.
Once the "League" is set up, it will be possible to initiate parliamentary action in those countries of the European Community which have still not abolished the death penalty, and action in the Republics of the ex-Soviet Union which are drawing up new penal codes, and in countries which are about to decide on the ratification of the European Conventions: in this sense Russia and Bulgaria are the countries in which our knowledge of the juridical and legislative framework and our presence in parliament allow us to operate most effectively.
In order to draw up bills and motions to be presented in the various parliaments, we have begun research into the juridical and legislative situation in all the countries of Europe.
Finally, we must immediately enter into dialogue with the Vatican, as the New Catechism of the Catholic Church, which was published recently, upholds the legitimacy of the death penalty. One possibility is a march to St. Peter's in support of abolition, at Easter or Christmas of this year.
In recent weeks two leaflets, "Nessuno tocchi Caino" and "Dall Europea: non uccidere", have been published in Italian in Stampa Alternativa's "Millelire" series. The leaflets, which are the first links in a chain of political promotion and fund-raising activities, were sent to 3,000 Italian members and supporters of the Radical Party and 1,000 Italian parliamentarians, and were available at the desks set up over Christmas throughout Italy to raise contributions for the constitution of the International League. The formula used was "One million lire for the constitution of the League: contributors become members of the organizing committee". At the time of writing more than twenty people (parliamentarians, regional councillors and citizens) have contributed at least one million lire for the constitution of the "International League". The aim is to raise at least 100 million lire, the amount necessary for the promotion and the first activities of the "International League", by the time of the Congress.
Other initiatives are also being planned: these include an exhibition on the history of the death penalty; an exhibition of contemporary painting in an important gallery, with the publication of a collection of short stories on the death penalty; a promotional campaign on TV.
Is all this credible without the Radical Party? As with the conservation of the Danube and ecology, Bosnia and anti-nationalist federalism, Somalia and famine, and the Mafia and antiprohibitionism, the battle for the abolition of the death penalty must be transnational and transdivisional, with planned action undertaken at the same time in different places. Otherwise the aim to abolish the death penalty in the world by the year 2000 is futile. Only a political body founded on direct intervention, parliamentary and militant action and attention to legislative processes can achieve this objective by a given deadline.
A.5.3. The nonviolent initiative for democracy in Cuba.
During the first session of the XXXVI Congress, the idea was born for an appeal to Fidel Castro for the release of two political prisoners and the right to expatriation an ex-prisoner.
The Radical Party had already addressed Cuba on 17 January 1992, in the ambit of the "Campaign for the abolition of the death penalty by the year 2000", asking Fidel Castro - also on behalf of the 600 parliamentarians from all over the world who had adhered to the "Campaign" - to commute the death penalties given to Eduardo Diaz Betancourt and Daniel Santovenia. A demonstration had also been held outside the Cuban Embassy in Rome to protest against the execution of the two men. These actions signalled the begining of a relationship with the Cuban exiles belonging to the "Directorio Revolucionario Democratico" of Miami; Orlando Gutierrez and Calixto Navarro subsequently took part in the first session of the Congress and joined the Radical Party.
The appeal, published in the seventh issue of "The New Party" and in the following issue of "Radical Newsletter", was signed by Tadeus Reichstein, winner of the 1950 Nobel Prize for Physics and Medicine, and more than 200 parliamentarians (including 36 members of the European Parliament) belonging to 51 political parties from 20 countries (Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the United States, and Venezuela). The total number of signatures to the appeal, including those of citizens from all over the world, was 800.
On 28 July demonstrations were organized in Rome, Brussels, Prague, Moscow, Kiev, Sofia, and Bucharest to deliver the first batch of signatures to the Cuban ambassadors; Cuban exiles demonstrated in Miami and New York. As a result of this initiative, and above all of the characteristics of the transnational transparty and its activities, 18 more Cuban exiles in Miami joined the Party.
A few weeks ago the President of the "Association for the Defence of Political Rights in Cuba" wrote to Marco Pannella, thanking him for the work carried out by the Party and announcing his intention to join.
There are a number of reasons why the Castro regime has launched this new attack against domestic opposition. In the last few years the opposition has grown at great pace, both in the activities of opponents at home and in exile and in the continual episodes of dissertion by soldiers and requests for political exile from politicians, athletes, and intellectuals. The international community has made its voice heard on several occasions, such as the reproval of the UN over the continual violation of human rights. The forthcoming elections called by the Castro regime will be invalidated by the elimination in advance of any possibility of organized opposition. The recent election of the new US President opens the way to a renegotiation of political relations with Cuba, especially in the light of the recent decisions of Congress to reduce the current embargo.
In this context, the enrolment of the President of the "Association for the Defence of Human Rights" (ADEPO) of Havana is of particular significance. Once again the function of the Radical Party is that of a "place of democracy": a place necessary for the defeat, through nonviolent political action, of a dictatorial regime that is otherwise firmly in power.
A.5.4. The right to communication and the right to language.
In the last year and a half the Radical Party has tried - partly through the mailing of four of the seven issues of "The New Party" to a total of 14,000 Esperantists in around 50 countries - to raise the problem of communication and the right to language, which is essentially a problem of democracy.
The need to consider the view expressed by Esperantists, who believe that a "neutral", supernational language must come into use, and to address the Esperanto "area", was immediately evident.
There are estimated to be about 10-15 million people around the world in the Esperanto "area": the main Esperanto organization is the "Universala Esperanto-Asocio" (UEA), a non-governative UNESCO organization, which has 8,200 members in 105 countries, with around 50 national federations. There are also many flourishing local associations - especially in China and Iran - as well as around 50 international associations of professional categories.
The Radical Party has begun to carry out initiatives addressed to, and in view of, this transnational movement. In 1992 these initiatives led to the enrolment of around 350 Esperantists: these include Andrea Chiti Batelli, former secretary of the Italian parliamentary delegations in the European Parliament; Hans Erasmus, co-ordinator of the "Europa Esperanto Unio"; Angelo Pennacchietti, Vice-Chairman of the International Academy of Sciences and President of the "Italian Esperanto Institute"; Emiljia Lapenna, writer, a leading figure in the "International Esperanto Movement" and the founder in 1945 of the "Kroatia Esperanto-Ligo".
In 1992 the members or supporters of the "ERA", the Radical Esperanto Association, amounted to around 450; there were over 300 replies, from 60 countries, to the seventh issue of the newspaper, whilst 317 letters were received in relation to the other three issues.
After the first session of this Congress - in the course of which a commission was devoted to the subject of a "Federal Language" - many initiatives and activities have been undertaken: the letter sent to all the heads of delegation of the CSCE states and participants in the Helsinki meeting in June, asking them to include an article on the safeguard of linguistic identities in the final agreements of the negotiations; our presence in June at the first "European Congress of Esperantists", held in Verona, and the 77th World Congress of Esperantists, held in Vienna; the draft resolution, presented to the European Parliament by Marco Pannella, on the teaching of Esperanto as an aid to the learning of foreign languages - in November the Culture Committee of the European Parliament decided to carry out a study on Esperanto and internatonal languages; the constitution in the Italian Parliament of the "Federalist intergroup on language and for the reform of language policy", with the support of members of pa
rliament belonging to the Lega Nord, the PDS, the RETE, the Green Party, the Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Lista Pannella, and Rifondazione Comunista.
There have recently been two requests for federate membership of the Radical Party: the first from the "Albana-Esperanto-Ligo" (Albanian Esperanto League), which could lead to hundreds of new members from Albania; and the second from the "Litova Esperanto-Asocio", announced by its Vice-President during an assembly of Esperantist members of the Radical Party and the ERA, held last December in Vilnius.
The question of a federal language in Europe and of linguistic democracy in the world concerns both European unification and the possibility for the "right to language" to be exercised and ratified all over the world. If political action is not taken immediately, there is a serious risk that our languages, and therefore our very identities, will disappear. One language, English, has assumed a hegemonic position as the lingua franca in Europe and in the rest of the world. The hegemony of one language threatens, within the space of a few generations, to eliminate all other languages; this is demonstrated by the example of Latin, which destroyed the native languages of ancient Europe, and of the languages of the white colonizers of the New World, which destroyed the native tongues of the two Americas. In these two cases the process only took longer because international communication was much less advanced and, in particular, because the mass media did not yet exist.
A clear and increasingly firm stand on the need to adopt a European and international vehicular language such as Esperanto was expressed recently by Umberto Eco, who strongly criticized the lack of a political decision on the issue. "Many things in the world have changed," wrote Eco, "and nobody wants a dominant international language, even if we use English for the sake of convenience. Recent events have shown that Europe is not moving towards the unification of languages, but towards the multiplication of languages. We should therefore think about a vehicular language to be used in the European Parliament, in airports and in congresses; I believe Esperanto would suit the purpose, preventing a battle between nations to impose their own language."
A.5.5. An international policy of ecological and environmental responsibility.
The Rio de Janeiro Conference was perhaps the last chance to establish an international policy of ecological and environmental responsibiliy: we were, in fact, beginning to see the birth of a wider and more responsible policy on the management of the environment and of the quality of life and resources, valid for both the North and the South of the world; a policy capable of consolidating and extending the principle of "subsidiarity" which had already began to emerge in embryonic form in the European Community and had established itself as the rule for social problems and issues. A policy on the environment and resources, therefore, that would not only be a policy of compatible development (a question which mainly concerns the developed North), but also a policy of planetary intervention on the issues of poverty and famine, controlled demographic growth and, above all, the development of democratic institutions.
Such a policy could only be guaranteed within the framework and under the aegis of the United Nations.
It is our fear that this new ecological and environmental policy is doomed for a long time to remain no more than a hope.
The United Nations has not even managed to put into effect any kind of "monitoring system" for the evaluation of the various enrironmental situations and their development, or to create any system of sanctions for violations of decisions and measures taken at supernational level. Perhaps the United Nations, too, has entered an alarming crisis.
It has to be said that much of the responsibility for the failure to deal with the great international problems of the environment lies with the cultural failings and therefore the inadequate policies of environmentalist forces and green parties, in Italy, in Europe, and maybe all around the world. We have been saying this for a long time, and we say it once again today. It is a warning that is intended to be constructive, to encourage dialogue and the search for common objectives and common battles and initiatives: in Italy and in Europe, many aspects of the policy of the greens have contained unacceptable elements of nationalism and substantial neutralism which have fed and continue to feed on the false hope, on the illusion, of the possibility of solving the problems of the environment by looking no further than the back garden. This approach was and still is, unfortunately, alright for the countries of the North, of so-called well-being, of the industrial development of consumption, but insensitiv
e and indifferent, except for occasional outcries, to what happens in the rest of the world, in the underdeveloped or newly-developed countries.
Without too much effort, without even leaving Europe, we need only look around us to see the wretched inadequacy of that negative Utopia. In Europe there are, together with Chernobyl, spectacular examples of environmental and structural degradation which require a massive programme of intervention at transnational and supernational level, of an openly federalist and strongly democratic nature. One example will suffice: after being used relatively freely for centuries, the Danube, one of the main routes of trade, culture and civilization in Europe, is now being fought over by petty nationalistic forces which are threatening to make it unusable and even to damage its complex ecosystem: this is a problem which concerns not only the countries along the Danube, or the Austrian and Slovakian greens, if there are any; it is a problems which, in cultural, environmental, and economic terms, affects the whole of Europe, if not the whole world. And then there are also the problems of rational and balanced distribu
tion or electrical energy and other forms of power, and so on... There are a whole host of environmental issues and problems requiring wide, complex solutions that are only possible at a transnational and supernational level.
Large areas of the green movement, in Italy and in Europe, vainly believe that they can ignore these issues and concentrate on their own mediocre local interests. They are wrong. Modern environmentalism, if it wants to be responsible and effective, needs exactly the opposite. It needs the reinforcement of transnational "values", and consequently of supernational and federal practices and policies, guaranteed by profoundly democratic institutions. These policies will respect local concerns by including them, bringing them together and making them grow within the framework of a wider and more general approach. Only the ability to develop projects on the basis of supernational and transnational juridical and institutional frameworks can be valid and effective, also simply in terms of sound economics.
The greens should realize that it is no longer acceptable to talk of "sustainable growth" without also facing all the environmental issues and problems of the world, of the South as well as of the North, and facing them immediately, with actions and plans and not just with words. If they do not do this, they will very soon lose all credibility. At present, unfortunately, environmentalism or the so-called "green culture" is only capable of producing a series of movements of a clearly nationalistic and substantially neutralist nature which refuse to assume transnational and supernational responsibilities. This refusal leads the greens to be, at most, "cosmopolitans", their cultural framework and their procedures completely unable to deal with the present situation of the world and the problems and issues of a wide and effective environmental policy. This is what is happening in Italy, and also in other countries, in Europe and in the rest of the world. It is disheartening to see that such a valuable her
itage of political struggle, which the Radical Party has supported in the past and intends to support in the future, is being squandered so badly and maybe even destroyed.
As far as it can, the Radical Party will try with all its force to avoid this degradation. But if the values of federalism, transnationalism, dialogue and tolerance were to to be threatened, that is if the transnational Radical Party were to close down, where, and with what instruments, will it be possible to deal with and discuss such important problems from the appropriate and necessary viewpoint, and not from the narrow, mistaken viewpoint which would inevitably be adopted? (5)
A.5.6. The reform of the UN. An "International Court of Justice".
Everthing which is happening around us leads us to the conclusion that the transnational choice was right, that it is necessary to go beyond the narrow limits of national policies. The Radical Party's present difficulties are essentially the reflection of the difficulties the world has in understanding the fact that the only meaningful political approach today is the transnational approach.
Why did I say "the world"? Becaue both in the North and South the ruling classes still cling to their own powers, great and small, and give no sign of wanting to yield any of these powers to wider, more representative, more universal institutions.
In the North, the Union of Europe cannot work because nobody really wants to transfer or devolve power to the European Parliament, to the citizens, to the consumers. The governments in the North of the world are addicted to their summits, their power of veto, and their position as permanent members of a small group which decides for everybody.
In the South, the regional organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America cannot work because the fetish of the nation-state and national powers are the only concrete things on which the rulers of the member-states are able to lean in order to preserve their power. What's more, there is a tragic, direct relationship between poverty and nationalism, the effects of which are evident not only in the Third World but also in the countries of the ex-Communist world. The very countries that most need the transnational dimension are blinded by its opposite: nationalism, narrow interests, and intolerance.
What is needed for the government of the world is simple: it is basically a matter of the very things which allow a state to function. We must support the law with the power to impose sanctions. This explains the need for an "International Court of Justice" and for military forces under the command of the UN.
Everyone finds it perfectly logical that a state should tax its citizens in order to provide itself with the means to ensure that the law is respected in relations between citizens: a judicial system and police forces. It doesn't take much to understand that law, and not violence, is needed to regulate relations between states in the same way: what is needed, that is, is an international judicial system and international police forces. The policy of the Radical Party, therefore, is not a remarkable intuition; it's simply a matter of putting two and two together!
The simple things are clearly the most difficult in politics, because neither the Radical Party nor the transnational project (which became the same thing after the Budapest Congress) have managed to assert themselves.
Leaving aside the consensus that the Party has managed to attract, it is true that other people, too, think along the same lines. The current UN Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, who is giving energetic support to the idea that the UN should be put in a position to resolve conflicts and impose peace. We are therefore witnessing the repetition, at the highest levels, of a concept which we have been supporting for years: the duty of the international Community to interfere in the domestic affairs of states when respect for the fundamental human rights are at stake.
However, even Boutros-Ghali and his "Agenda for Peace" are still tied to a limited vision of the problem. In fact it is not only a matter of having the military means to intervene when the violation of the law has already taken place, as the UN Secretary seems to believe. It is a matter, above all, of preventing the outbreak of conflicts through an international Court of Justice with a real power of arbitration regocnized by all states. In the whole document, Boutros-Ghali continues to appeal to the inviolability of the sovereignty of the member-states. The Radical Party, on the other hand, believes that national sovereignty should be violated, voluntarily, by the states themselves, through the devolution of some of their powers to transnational institutions - above all the Court of Justice (6).
A.5.7. The European institutions, "Maastricht", the Radical position.
In Edinburgh the foundations were laid for the flexible Europe so dear to the British, who performed their own small miracle of diplomacy by advancing the proposal of extending the Community to Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway without even commiting themselves firmly to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. A large free trade area in strict respect of national sovereignty: this was and continues to be their objective; they are managing to achieve it also as a result of the weakness of Mitterrand and the crisis in Germany and Spain; Italy, on the other hand, is in a sort of void after the hurricane De Michelis and the failure of Amato and Colombo to pick up the thread.
The serious crisis of the European Community, at least in the forms outlined so far, is a threat to the development of civil and human rights. From the end of the Second World War to the present day there had been a process of construction of "supernational" values, which were effectively eroding what was an age-old principle of the theory and of the very life of states: the "principle of sovereignty", which was accompanied by the principle of "non-interference". The tragedy of the world war had shown what follies these two principles could lead to when interpreted and applied in the strictest manner. We had thus seen the beginning of the slow and difficult, though in the end apparently "inevitable", construction of a supernational society and supernational institutions which gave priority to and protected old and new civil and human rights. The European Community, to which wider political and economic powers should have been transferred at the beginning of this year, was the most striking example of th
is tendency.
The current crisis of the European Community is therefore the crisis of an ideal and civil process more than a political process: the national states, and now the "ethnic" states which are being created in Eastern Europe and in the Third and Fourth Worlds, are tending to apply, in an extreme manner, the "rights" and powers which accompany so-called "absolute sovereignty", and to use them unscrupulously in the pursual of their own selfish interests: one dramatic consequence of this vision of sovereignty and nationality is the practice of "ethnic cleansing" which is raging in the ex-Yugoslavia and in other countries, where intolerance is leading to the horrors of genocide.
Faced with new forms of nationalistic ferocity, the "Western" world, the home of a form of "real democracy" which is a fair match for the "real socialism" of the totalitarian countries of the past, has chosen to "close its eyes" and take the path of egoism and irresponsibility. For a long time, since the beginning of the Yugoslavian crisis, the Radical Party has been warning of the terrible dangers and risks of this attitude, evoking the horrors of 1936, when the non-commital attitude of the European democracies made Spain the testing-ground of the Second World War. Let's hope that we're not right in this case, too, like unheeded Cassandras!
NOTES AND APPENDICES
(1) The most suitable instrument of communication was inevitably a written publication: a newspaper written in Italian, translated into and printed in many other languages, to be sent initially to all the parliamentarians of both Eastern and Western Europe.
The plan was to establish direct contact, at a later stage, with the democratic parliamentarians of the whole world: here lies the uniqueness of the Radical Party project.
The achievement of this aim was preceded by several months of hard, intense work gathering over 40,000 names from embassies and from direct contact with the various parliaments. No other organization, as far as we know, has taken the trouble to set up a data-bank like ours, which contains all the information necessary for mailing and updating the list of names.
A fully-fledged "publishing business" was set up to edit and organize the newspaper - the instrument chosen to establish and consolidate contact - during the first six months of 1991. We had to choose all the technical and organizational staff for the production of a newspaper written in Italian, translated into and printed in 14 other languages (Albanian, Czech, Croatian, Esperanto, English, French, German, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, and Spanish), and sent all over the world to almost 300 destinations.
Amongst other things, this involved finding the word-processing software, which wasn't always available in Italy; setting up a team of translators; finding a printer capable of dealing with so many languages; rendering the speed of the lay-out and printing process suitable for the requirements of the newspaper; carrying out thorough research in the various parliaments and assemblies in order to choose and try out the best means of transport and delivery; getting hold of the names and addresses of parliamentarians, entering them in the data bank, and acquiring the information necessary for mailing and updating the list of names; choosing the issues and problems to be dealt with in the newspaper; selecting the editorial staff; choosing the graphic lay-out; organizing procedures for checking on distribution; selecting the staff and the technical and political means for dealing with response and replies to the newspaper.
At the end of July 1991 we published the first issue of "The New Party" (the "red issue"), written in Italian and translated into ten other languages (Polish, Hungarian, German, Romanian, Spanish, Serbo-Croatian, English, French, Czech, and Russian), sent to over 40,000 parliamentarians and 200,000 other people in over forty different countries: twelve pages in a tabloid format, the equivalent of about eighty 25-line typed pages of the Italian text. The Russian and Czech editions both contained 4-page supplements.
230,700 copies of the first issue were printed; 197,700 copies were sent to 249 destinations in 41 countries.
From the very first issue it was apparent that we would would have to respect a strict timetable with regard to the various stages of the production of the newspaper - writing and lay-out in Italian, translation into and lay-out in the other languages, revision, printing, packing and mailing, all within the space of around 45 days. Such a strict timetable was necessary to make sure that the contents did not become out of date.
Up to the time of the first session of the Congress, held in Rome from 30 April to 3 May 1992, five more issues of the newspaper were published.
The second issue (the "green issue") was published in July 1991: in addition to the languages of the first issue, it was translated into Albanian, Portuguese and Slovenian. 302,000 copies were printed; of these, 268,000 copies were sent to 254 destinations in 46 countries.
The third issue (the "blue issue") was sent out in September; with the addition of Esperanto, it was translated into fourteen languages. 289,000 copies were printed; of these, 258,000 were sent to 260 destinations in 71 countries.
The fourth issue (the "orange issue") was sent out in November. Unlike the previous issues, it contained sixteen pages. 242,450 copies were printed; of these, 205,574 were sent to 274 destinations in 106 countries.
During the period between the publication of the fourth and fifth issues, a letter was sent out to all the parliamentarians on the mailing-list.
The fifth issue (the "purple issue"), this time containing 24 pages, was sent out at the beginning of February 1992. 270,000 copies were printed; of these, 212,642 were sent to 274 destinations in 106 countries.
The sixth issue (the "light green issue") was sent out at the end of March. 238,000 copies were printed; of these, 178,478 copies were sent to 274 destinations in 106 countries.
In view of the first session of the Congress, three special issues of Radical Newsletter, translated from Italian into 11 other languages, were sent to more than 70,000 people. Ten ordinary issues of the Newsletter, translated into 9 languages, had also been sent out during 1991 to a total of around 25,000 people.
The translations, the lay-out and the printing were carried out in Rome, with the exception of around 100,000 copies printed in Moscow. From the third issue onwards, the copies that had previously been printed in Budapest were now printed in Rome, since it was found to be less expensive.
The mailing operations were organized in Rome, with the help of the party offices in Brussels, Budapest, Moscow, Prague and Zagreb.
The Brussels office, as well as organizing distribution to parliamentarians in the countries of Western Europe, also saw to the distribution of 3,000 copies in French and 3,500 copies in English to other addressees.
The Budapest office organized distribution to parliamentarians in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Hungary, as well as the mailing of a further 5,700 copies of the Hungarian edition, 700 copies of the Russian edition, 200 copies of the Albanian edition, 5,128 copies of the Polish edition, and 4,000 copies of the Romanian edition.
The Moscow office, as well as distribution to the parliamentarians of all the republics of the ex-Soviet Union, also saw to the mailing of a further 100,000 copies printed in Moscow to addressees almost all over the territory of the ex-Soviet Union.
The Prague office, finally, organized distibution to the members of the Federal Parliament and the two national parliaments.
After the Congress, in June 1992, a seventh issue was produced. A total of 176,000 copies were printed, divided as follows: Albanian edition, 5,000 copies; Czechoslovakian edition, 6,000; Croatian edition, 11,000; Esperanto edition, 16,000; French edition, 9,000; English edition, 13,000; Italian edition, 50,000; Polish edition, 5,000; Portuguese edition, 5,000; Romanian edition, 6,000; Russian edition, 22,000; Serbian edition, 5,200; Spanish edition, 7,300; German edition, 7,500; Hungarian edition, 8,000. A total of 128,290 copies were sent out to 276 destinations in 107 countries.
Compared to the previous issues, 100,000 Russian addressees were eliminated from the mailing-list. The mailing operations were carried out in England, where postal services are cheaper and more efficient than in Italy. The seventh issue of the newspaper was sent to parliamentarians and citizens in the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Byelorussia, Bolivia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Kazakistan, Kirghiz, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldavia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of San Marino, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sloven
ia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tagikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
The list is added to by the following countries from the Esperanto mailing-list: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Japan, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Vietnam, and Zaire.
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The membership figures given in this paragraph and in subsequent paragraphs refer to the time of writing (7 January 1993).
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MOTION APPROVED AT THE CONFERENCE OF RADICAL PARTY MEMBERS IN THE EX-USSR - 25/26 JANUARY 1992
(The document was approved by a majority of votes; five members abstained).
The conference of Radicals from the countries of the ex-USSR held in Moscow on 25 and 26 January 1992:
Confirms the necessity of the constitution of the transnational Radical Party, the only possible instrument for the affirmation around the world of the life of rights and the right to life, through nonviolence, the respect of human, civil and political rights. To this end, in view of the first session of the Congress, to be held in Rome from 30 April to 3 May, commits the members present at the Conference to work for the following aims:
a) to obtain the acknowledgement of the right of conscientious objectors to refuse military service, the introduction of an alternative civilian service, the immediate release of "prisoners for peace" in the ambit of the campaign for disarmament and for the conversion of military spending and infrastructures for social and civilian purposes. Particular attention in this respect should be dedicated to the problem of North-South relations;
b) to promote the international campaign for the abolition of the death penalty in the world. In a period in which the legislation of the ex-Soviet Union has ceased to exist and the future legislative codes have not been completed, we demand that death penalties no longer be inflicted and that executions be suspended. We believe that there must be civilian control over the actions of the authorities in this area. In every state of the ex-Soviet Union;
c) to continue to carry out the antiprohibitionist campaign on drugs, which we believe to be the only effective means of defeating the traffic of drugs, corruption, drug addiction as a social problem, and the Aids epidemic. On this subject, we believe that the free distribution of self-blocking sterile syringes and condoms is extremely important;
d) to work for the confirmation at the next Radical Party Congress of the transnational initiatives for the constitution of the United States of Europe as an aggregation of citizens. We believe that is necessary to promote this idea first of all amongst political leaders and in the press;
e) to be fully aware that the main burden of the cost of the activities of the Party is borne by the Radicals in Western Europe; regretfully aware that this situation is at present inevitable, we appeal to the women and men of all countries to support the Radical Party in the struggle for its generous aims, in order that its initiatives may be fully realized;
Those present at this Conference appeal for an intensification of the membership campaign and undertake, by means of an intensive propaganda campaign, to reach a total of 1,000 members in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union by 1 May 1992;
f) in the knowledge that the organizational needs of the Party are pressing, the Conference will elect a co-ordinating committee of twenty people, taking into account the need to represent all the areas of the ex-Soviet Union, from Siberia to the Caucasus, from Estonia to Kirghiz;
g) considers one of the essential objectives of the Radical Party to be the struggle for human rights, and in particular for the right to life, in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union during the transition to a free market economy, and the organization of a campaign for humanitarian aid (food, financial support, technology, information and education) in order to ensure a peaceful transition to the values of democratic society - the only social system which allows the needs and the characteristics of the biological nature of man and of the system of property to match the level of technological progress and the system of universal, spiritual and moral values;
h) considers as necessary the Radical Party's efforts to promote all possible initiatives to urge the organs of supernational law and the international organizations to intervene in order to restore peace in countries afflicted by nationalistic conflicts, and in particular to defend persecuted minorities;
i) appeals to citizens and political parties to work for the development of a policy of peace and respect between the Republics of Russia and Ukraine, and in the tormented Caucasus, in order to avoid conflicts and wars which would lead to a world-wide crisis.
MOTION APPROVED BY THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF RADICAL PARTY MEMBERS FROM AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA, BYELORUSSIA, ESTONIA, KAZAKISTAN, KIRGHIZ, MOLDAVIA, LITHUANIA, RUSSIA, THE UKRAINE AND UZBEKISTAN, HELD IN MOSCOW ON 4 AND 5 JULY 1992.
The conference, attended by over 400 members who are aware that they can only vote in their own name;
CONFIRMS the validity of the document approved at the conference held in Moscow last January, and in particular of the invitation to increase the force of the Radical Party through a membership campaign;
TAKES NOTE of the need for co-ordination of our activities, and proposes that it take the following forms, hopefully with the involvement of those members who are not present at this conference;
INVITES members to form associations on specific issues, not restricted to particular geographical areas, starting with an association for the abolition of the death penalty and for an antiprobitionist drug policy;
URGES members who are parliamentarians in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorni Karabakh to organize, together with the Radical Party, a meeting on the dramatic problems of the Caucasian region, with the aim of deciding, in the framework of international law, on initiatives in favour of peace and democracy;
URGES members who are parliamentarians in Moldavia, the Ukraine, Russia and Romania to organize, together with the Radical Party, a meeting to decide on initiatives, including initiatives at international level, on the problem of Transdniestr;
PROPOSES the constitution of a working group, including experts on international law, to promote meetings between the parliaments of the Baltic states with the aim of obtaining common legislation, based on the international conventions, on the subject of minority rights;
PROPOSES the constitution of three working groups, in view of the second session of the Radical Party Congress, on the following issues:
1) THE STATUTE
2) FEDERALISM, NATIONAL ISSUES, MINORITY RIGHTS, NONVIOLENT INITIATIVES;
3) ASSOCIATIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND INFORMATION OF RADICAL PARTY MEMBERS IN THE STATES OF THE EX-USSR.
PROPOSES the constitution of a "COMMITTEE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF RADICALS IN THE EX-USSR", formed of the three co-ordinators of the working groups and six other people, with the task of organizing a third Radical Party conference, to be held in Kiev during the first half of October, to present the proposals of the three working groups to members;
RESOLVES that the three working groups be co-ordinated, respectively, by Sergej Sheboldaiev, Aleksandr Kalinin and Maria Ivanjan, who, together with Ruslan Sadirkanov, Mamuka Tsagareli, Vladimir Ivanov, Dimitri Petrov, Stephan Grigorian and Genik Israelian, form the COMMITTEE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF RADICALS IN THE EX-USSR.
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONS (25/29 AUGUST 1992)
The commissions met in Moscow from 26 to 30 August at the Congress Centre of the Russian Parliament.
The proceedings were opened by the reports of the three Co-ordinators, Sergej Sheboldaiev, Sasha Kalinin and Maria Ivanian.
The debate of the Statute Commission led to the following proposals: the creation of a Transparliament of Radical deputies; the confirmation of the principle of the direct participation of members, though with proposals for the inclusion of voting by proxy; the confirmation of the essential political value of the preamble with the proposal to add to the seventeen adjectives listed in "The New Party"; finally, the request to maintain the annual character of the life of the party and the Congress.
The debate of the Commission on Federalism and National was much wider and fuller. The main points of the debate were the conflicts in the ex-USSR and the need for a New Order of international law. In this sense the first interparliamentary working groups on the conflicts in Moldavia, Nagorny Karabach, and Georgia-Abkhazia were set up, and the first proposals on the democratization of the UN, on European Federalism and on interdepency between nations were put forward. In particular, the debate was particularly lively on the existence of contradictory principles of international law and their management, such as those of the right to self-determination of peoples connected to the non-revision of peoples and of the rights of the individual and of minorities.
The third Commission focused on Associations and the Party's policy of self-funding. The debate concentrated on the creation of future Radical Associations on specific issues. In particular, an Antiprohibitionist Association, based in St. Petersburg, an Association against the death penalty, based in Kiev, and an Association for the right to life and the life of rights, based in Moscow.
The Commissions called a further meeting for the end of September, in the meantime setting up a series of initiatives proposed during this first phase of debate.
Kiev, 12 and 13 Decmber 1992
POLITICAL DOCUMENT PROPOSED BY THE CONFERENCE OF RADICALS IN THE EX-USSR, HELD IN KIEV ON 12 AND 13 DECEMBER 1992, TO THE TRANSNATIONAL RADICAL PARTY CONGRESS.
(Approved by a large majority, with 11 votes against and 7 abstensions)
The third Conference of Radical Party members in the New Independent States (ex-USSR), held in Kiev on 12 and 13 December 1992, following the fifty speeches made and the five days of proceedings of the Commissions held in Moscow in August 1992:
NOTES the exceptional nature of the results achieved by the political and organizational efforts of members in the New Independent States (ex-USSR), results that are clear both from the organization of precise political initiatives which constitute a considerable step on the road to the construction of the transnational Party, and by the number of members - more than 4,500, including 100 deputies - who represent more than 50% of the total number of members and make it possible to reach the target of 5,000 members by the time of the February Congress;
NOTES the fact that the difficulties in funding the Party in accordance with its needs represent an obstacle to the construction of the transnational party;
CONFIRMS the exactness of the Radical analyses of the international situation, and in particular of the situation in Europe, and the need and demand for the existence of the Radical Party in Eastern Europe and in the ex-USSR;
NOTES a precise political indication in the fact that the undeniable success of the membership campaign in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Africa contrasts with the notable lack of success in the "rich" countries of the West and the North of the world, and also notes the suitability of the Radical Party as a political instrument to deal with lack of democracy, especially in those countries which are emerging from totalitarianism;
UNDERLINES the fact that the weak and precarious "new" democracies that have risen from the collapse of the Communist system will be able to stimulate renewal in the "real democracies" and the "partycracies" of Western Europe if we succeed in defeating nationalism and ethnic conflict and in building a policy of interdependency between the countries and the different regions of Europe;
STRESSES the priority need to develop new international law and to reform the international organizations, which now suffer from criminal and irresponsible weakness with regard to the international political situation and the present conflicts in the ex-Yugoslavia, the ex-USSR, Africa, the Middle East and other areas;
PROPOSES that the Transnational Congress of the Radical Party should undertake to work for the democratization of the international organizations by promoting a series of projects aimed at the replacement of government representation with one member of parliament from each of the member countries;
PROPOSES that the Congress should undertake to promote meetings and dialogue between the parliamentarians of the countries, the regions and the peoples which are currently at war, starting with parliamentarians who are members of the Radical Party, and more generally the organization of an international conference of parliamentarians of all parties with the aim of promoting Associations and Committees of parliamentarians from different countries on specific issues and in parallel with the foreign policies of the single nations, with the aim of involving different parliaments in a single project;
PROPOSES that the Congress should undertake to intensify activities in situations of serious conflict such as in Bosnia and in the Balkans, and in serious situations of conflict such as in the territorities of the New Independent States;
PROPOSES that the Congress should undertake to organize antiprohibitionist initiatives both at the level of information and at a parliamentary level in Europe, giving a transnational dimension to experience and proposals that are for now at a national level, with particular regard to the urgent need to deal in Eastern Europe too with the rapid expansion of drug-trafficking and of the free market of drugs, run by the multi-national Mafia;
PROPOSES that the Congress should undertake to invest the maximum human and financial resources in the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty in the Russian Federation and in the other New Independent States, where political collaboration is possible with the Legislative Committee of the Supreme Soviet, in order to produce a law prohibiting the death penalty by the end of 1993.
ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE STATUTE: PROPOSALS VOTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF MEMBERS IN THE EX-USSR AS AN APPENDIX TO THE GENERAL POLITICAL DOCUMENT PUT FORWARD TO THE TRANSNATIONAL CONGRESS
The third Congress of Radical Party members in the ex-Ussr, held in Kiev on 11 and 12 December 1992, having heard the proposals made in the speeches and by the Statute Commission, which met in August in Moscow:
PROPOSES that the transnational Radical Party Congress should confirm the substantial validity of the present statute, with several additions rendered necessary by the new transnational dimension that the Party has achieved;
PROPOSES that the Congress should modify the article which establishes the annual nature of the Congress and rule that it be convened once every two years, and should confirm the direct participation of members in the Congress;
PROPOSE that the Congress should include an article in the Statute to establish the organization of Congresses for geo-political areas, to be convened before the Congress, with the function of forming proposals for the transnational Congress and subsequently of deciding on initiatives;
PROPOSES that the Congress should change the name of the Federal Council to General Transnational Council, to be composed as follows:
20 members elected by the Congress;
30 members from the Assembly of Deputies and from members elected by the regional Congresses, the respective quotas to be laid down by the Transnational Congress;
PROPOSES that the Congress should include an Assembly of Deputies among the statutory organs of the Party, to be formed of members who are deputies in the different countries, with the task of elaborating and promoting Radical initiatives in the various parliaments; the Assembly should meet at least once or twice a year; it should elect a President and a Co-ordinating Committee and a quota of thirty members of the General Council of the Radical Party;
PROPOSES that the Congress should provide in the Statute for a Secretarial Committee and a Treasury Committee, each formed of no more than seven members, in which one of the members should assume the role of Vice-Secretary and Vice-Treasurer with the task of co-ordinating transnational activities.
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The Executive Committee of the LIA, which is based in Brussels, is composed of Marie Andrè Bertrand (President), Marco Taradash (Executive Secretary) and Antonio Contardo (Treasurer).
The LIA has drawn up a strategic plan for the next few years, sent to all its members (over 300, including 50 new members); it has deposited a new international statute with the relevant bodies in order to be recognized by the United Nations and by the European Community; it has appointed its executive organs, an International Council of fifteen members and three Research Councils covering the medical/social sector, the economic sector, and the juridical sector; it has created its own instrument of communication, accessible also through "Agorà".
In November the LIA launched "Liafax", the international version of "Corafax", now sent to almost 200 journalists in Europe and North America; every week it produces a press review of articles published on the issue of drug policies and drug-trafficking.
The aim of the LIA is to set up organizations in the various countries in favour of antiprohibitionist policies and for the affirmation of antiprohibitionism as the basis of the struggle against the consequences of the illegal status of drugs.
One of the ambitions of the LIA, already being worked on at a preparatory stage, is to publish a "World Drug Report", a compendium on the costs of prohibitionism which would become a standard reference work and eventually take a rightful place beside other publications of the same type.
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INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
BRASILIA, BRAZIL, 23 - 28 NOVEMBER 1992.
DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.
The Drafting Committee* set up by the Conference for preparing the Draft Final Document met on 26 November at the Convention Centre Ulysses Guimaraes.
To start with, the Committee elected Mr. S. Holemark (Norway) as Chairman and Mr. F. Feldmann (Brazil) as Rapporteur.
For the elaboration of the Draft Final Document, the Committee took as a basis the preliminary text that had been drafted by the Preparatory Committee and took into account the amendments to the text proposed by several delegations as well as the suggestions made by its members.
At the end of its deliberations, the Committee adopted the enclosed draft text.
* The Committee was composed of Messrs. A. Abbaspour Tehrani Fard (Islamic Republic of Iran), M. A. Baby (India), L. Clark (Canada), H. El Serafy (Egypt), F. Feldmann (Brazil), Mrs. M. Ganseforth (Germany), Messrs. M.A. Gonzalez (Costa Rica), S. Holemark (Norway), R. Legnani (Uruguay), L. H. Makgekgenene (Botswana), T. Praisont (Thailand) and T. Sindikubwabo (Rwanda).
INTRODUCTION
1. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was the starting point for action to establish models of social co-existence, guided by the contnuing need for peace, the ethical demands of human dignity and the need to care for the viability and productivity of the earth. The Inter-Parliamentary Conference pays tribute to the world's governments, including particularly the Government of Brazil, the host country, and to the UNCED Secretariat for the historic accomplishments of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
2. UNCED was attempting to do more than simply redirect sectors of economic activity or produce temporary solutions; rather, it was trying to redefine the notion of development - to establish it on a basis of rationality, solidarity and equity, as the way of guaranteeing the sustainability of adequate living conditions for all.
3. It achieved this and now, therefore, is the time to carry the process further, to produce a clear response to the huge resposibilities generated by the Conference for all countries alike. UNCED covered an extremely broad range of subjects; this conference has therefore chosen to focus on those actions which reflected the major elements of the Yaoundé Declaration in which parliamentarians attending the 87th Inter-parliamentary Conference expressed their views on the main directions of UNCED and its prospects (Annex).
4. The products of UNCED emerged without adequate direct contribution from parliaments. But as the results of UNCED are being implemented, action by parliaments is needed, not only as a statutory requirement but also to fill gaps and add the political and practical dimensions of action that parliamentarians are best able to define. Parliamentarians will find themselves involved in two broad categories of follow-up action:
- First, to secure primarily national benefits, to take actions that will contribute to a cumulative global effect and to set useful examples;
- Second, to ensure that the positions put forward and the programmes supported by governments foster sustainable development worldwide.
5. Parliamentarians convey or withhold the political legitimization of social action. Because they are charged with this vital and over-riding responsability they will be the first to be held accountable by present and future generations for success or failure in achieving sustainable development.
6. Th purpose of this Conference was to assess the results of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in light of the views expressed in the Yaoundé Declaration; define priority areas for action - particularly at the parliamentary level; and propose mechanisms for follow-up and evaluation. At the end of the Conference, the participants adopted the following "Plan of Action", which appears below and is followed by their views and recommendations concerning the results of UNCED.
- BRASILIA PLAN OF ACTION -
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PARLIAMENTARY
FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION
ACTION BY PARLIAMENTS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS
7. The Conference urges parliaments and parliamentarians to ensure that the process which was initiated with UNCED is strengthened and furthered and, to this effect, recommends that they take the following actions at the NATIONAL LEVEL:
(a) Ensure that the Governments which so far have not yet signed the Convention of Biodiversity and the Convention on Climate Change do so without further delay and as promptly as possible ratify these two instruments;
(b) Ratify or accede to, as appropriate, other regional and global treaties which relate to the protection of the environment and sustainable development, in particular:
(i) The Convention of the Law of the Sea
(ii) The Basel Convention of the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
(iii) The Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol and the 1990 and subsequent amendements;
(c) Adopt enabling legislation as well as review and amend, as appropriate, existing legislation to ensure that it is compatible with the commitments contained in these instruments and agreed at UNCED and that it facilitates and does not hamper their implementation;
(d) Review and amend, as necessary, existing legislation in the light also of the recommendations contained in this Final Document;
(e) Review and revise, if necessary, national legislation, administrative structures and procedures such as environmental impact assessment in order to establish an effective integrated decision-making process and fiscal and economic policies conducive to sustainable development;
(f) Adopt legislative provisions which ensure the effective involvement of concerned individuals and organizations in the decision-making process;
(g) Work towards the creation of national committees for the definition and promotion of integrated policies and plans of action in the field of environment and development - to be composed of representative of concerned public instutions, Parliaments and, as necessary, non-governmental organizations, business and other interest groups.
(h) Work for further development of the Rio Declaration into a full-fledged "Earth Charter" for adoption by the UN General Assembly in 1995 at the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations.
8. To facilitate the accomplishment of these tasks and render more effective the follow-up action of Parliaments, including through their oversight function, the Conference furthermore recommends that Parliaments:
(a) Review their committee structures with a view to ensuring an integrated treatment of all issues and questions which are relevant to environment and development;
(b) To this effect, also establish a parliamentary Committee on Environment and Development with the mandate of ensuring an integrated approach or review the mandate of existing parliamentary Committees dealing with the environment to ensure that they can effectively carry out this task;
(c) Invite the competent national authorities to submit periodic and comprehensive reports to Parliament on governmental policy and action - both taken and planned - to implement the results of UNCED.
(d) Take the necessary actions to empower women and others generally under-represented in the Parliamentary process to participate fully in the review of legislation to implement sustainable development; and to ensure that the full participation of women is reflected in national legislation, administrative structures and processes, national committees and the preparation of reports.
9. Given the close link between peoples and their elected representatives, the Conference recommends that parliamentarians intensify their efforts to bring the issues of environment and development to the attention of the general public as well as special interest groups. In this context, the Conference recommends that extensive use be made of public hearings so that account can be also taken of the views and needs of local communities.
10. Financial and technical resources are indispensable to the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Conventions. The Conference recommends that parliamentarians commit themselves to use their influence, so that the necessary resources are re-allocated to national projetcs which give priority to sustainable development. In the developed countries, they should ensure the fulfilment of the international agreements reached at the Earth Summit with respect to the transfer of technical and financial resources needed to assist the sustainable development of the whole planet.
11. AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, the Conference recommends that Parliaments and parliamentarians take the following steps:
(a) Exchange information on action taken to implement the results of UNCED at the national level, including on new or changed legislation;
(b) Where possible, establish a legal requirement that they be involved in formulating positions for international negotiations and meetings and that parliamentarians be included in national delegations;
(c) Encourage co-operation at the regional level between parliamentarians on policies and action for the promotion of sustainable through regional parliamentary assemblies or institutions;
(d) Work for the harmonization of legislation wich touches upon transboundary environmental issues between the countries concerned;
(e) Ensure that the government of their country extend all necessary co-operation to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development and provide information in the form of periodic communications or national reports regarding the activities undertaken to implement Agenda 21.
(f) Ensure that updated information is provided through competent bodies such as UNEP on the implementation of the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity, and that parliaments are kept fully informed on progress toward a forest convention and fisheries conventions.
ACTION BY IPU
12. The Conference recommends that National Groups of the Inter-Parliamentary Union bring this Final Document to the attention of their respective Parliament and its competent committees as well as to the relevant governmental institutions.
13. Moreover, the Conference urges members of the Union to give the greatest possible publicity to these results, notably by disseminating them to the media, social and special interest groups and concerned non-governmental organizations.
14. It also invites all National Groups to inform the IPU of steps taken by Parliament and Government in their respective country in pursuit of the recommendations of this Conference, as well as related developments, so that these can be brought to the attention of the Union's members.
15. The Conference also urges the IPU to take the following measures:
(a) Bring the Final Document to the attention of the United Nations as well as to all interested international and regional organizations including parliamentary assemblies and institutions;
(b) Consider organizing follow-up meetings, particularly at the regional level, for the purpose of exchanging information, evaluating progress and promoting strengthened policies and actions;
(c) Consider making the full integration of women and their concerns and aspiartions in the implementation of the results of UNCED the focus of an up-coming Inter-Parliamentary Conference;
(d) Publish an international directory of parliamentary committees dealing with environment from the point of view of sustainable development, in particular with a view to facilitate contacts and exchanges between these bodies;
(e) Invite its Committee on the Environment to make specific proposals for the consideration of the Union's governing bodies on further concrete steps which can be taken by the IPU to assist the UNCED process, in particular by:
(i) Supporting the Commission on Sustainable Development;
(ii) Serving as a clearing house for information on parliamentary activities;
(iii) Monitoring the ratification and evaluating the implementation of the Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change.
(iv) Examining the linkages between environment and trade, especially in preparation for the next round of multilateral trade talks.
16. Finally, the Conference invites the Brazilian National Group to ensure that this Final Document is transmitted on time to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF RIO
THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
17. Early in the preparatory process it was decided that UNCED shoud signal the common concern and commitment of the participating countries by a comprehensive, inspirational statement of the principles that should govern the relationship between environment and development. The Rio Declarartion can, in fact, be seen as an overview of our common concerns for the future and the principles that must guide our way to overcome them.
18. The Conference recommends that States continue to build on the Rio Declaration by preparing a binding comprehensive charter which would include basic principles for a sustainable planet and would give greater emphasis to the notions of responsibility, equity, interdependance and complexity. In this connection, the Conference draws to the attention of States the Yaoundé Declaration, which contains a comprehensive statement of principles for a sustainable planet, and the work of the Environmental Law Commission of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), which is drafting a document that could provide Governments with elements for further work.
AGENDA 21, THE CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
BIODIVERSITY AND THE STATEMENT ON FOREST PRINCIPLES
19. The Yaoundé Declaration of the IPU called for certain general characteristics to be reflected in Agenda 21: it should contain concrete provisions specifying measurable objectives, priorities and targets within specified time horizons; it should cover national and regional action as well as coordinated action by international institutions; and it should make clear statements of responsibility for meeting agreed commitments.
20. The Conference recommends that the Commission on Sustainable Development give high priority to regular review of Agenda 21, and the development of measurable objectives and precise targets and schedules. In doing so, it should draw on national, regional and international plans to implement Agenda 21, collaborate with the new Interagency Committee on Sustainable Development, and take account of the requirements of the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity.
21. The Conference recognizes that to achieve a significant reordering of priorities in the management of the world's finite resources, consistent with the Yaoundé Declaration, that the differential effects of decisions, plans, actions, and allocation of resources on women must be fully taken into account. The Conference therefore recommends that all its assessments and recommendations be understood and applied to include the need to define the specific differential impacts on women and to achieve equitable results in the implementation of sustainable development.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
Making trade and environment mutually supportive (Agenda 21: Chapter2)
22. Increases in trade flows are needed to support sustainable development and an improvement in living standards in developing countries. But a continuing effort will be required to ensure that international economic institutions, such as GATT, UNCTAD and various regional groupings, consistently recognize the interdependencies between environmental and trade considerations, particularly the fact that increasing trade flows cannot be sustained without maintaining the productivity of natural resources. It is also necessary to ensure that environmental standards are not used as a pretext for protection against imports.
23. The Conference recommends that the economic and environmental implications of ongoing trade negotiations be examined in all countries and that multilateral and bilateral trade agreements take full account of environmental implications.
24. The Conference further recommends that States reformulate economic policies that constrain sustainable development such as those that result in discriminatory trade practices, restricted access to markets, unstable prices for commodities, inappropriate subsidies to agricultural production and restrictive commercial practices.
Providing adequate financial resources to developing countries (Agenda 21: Chapter 2) (see also paragraphs 68 - 72)
25. At UNCED it was recognized that the implementation of Agenda 21 will require substantial new and additional financial resources to developing countries. In addition, relevant technologies must be made more easily available to developing countries. These are the main critical factors on which the success or failure in implementing Agenda 21 in developing countries will depend.
26. The Conference calls on all industrialized countries to meet the 0.7% of GNP target for official development assistance by the year of 2000 and to provide new and additional financial resources to meet the incremental costs of developing countries in addressing global environmental problems. It likewise recommends that the efficiency and effectiveness of current programmes of development assistance be carefully evaluated with a view to increasing their utility per unit of cost, and that both the official and commercial debt of developing countries be reduced by forgiveness or concessions at a more rapid rate. First priority should be given to reducing the debt burden of the least developed countries. Debt reduction should, when possible, be linked to programmes aimed at sustainable development.
Focussing on human development, combating poverty, population dynamics and unsustainable patterns of consumption (Agenda 21: Chapters 3, 4 and 5)
27. Human impact on the earth depends both on the number of people and how much energy and resources each person uses or wastes. Greater awareness of the complexity of issues related to the environment, population growth, resource consumption, and poverty, and new approaches to development are needed to achieve sustainability - to improve the quality of human life in keeping with the physical limits of the earth. Human development, recognizing human physical, mental and spiritual dimensions, must be more widely recognized as a prerequisite to sustainability.
28. The widening gaps between rich and poor, between and within countries are unacceptable. The Conference therefore recommends that all governments consider that policy changes to intensify the fight against poverty must be a main element of the follow-up to UNCED. Technical and financial assistance, job creation, human resource development, improved market access and further debt reduction, as well as ensuring wide public participation in decision-making at all levels, and most importantly the development and articulation of a new ethic, are essential elements. Consumption patterns must be changed to reduce their adverse impact on the environment, and active population policies are called for. The question of population growth must be dealt with through an integrated human development approach, including education and the enhancement of the status of women, improved public health and family planning.
29. To combat poverty, Agenda 21 calls for the development of country-specific programmes with international support. The eradication of poverty and hunger, greater equity in income distribution and human development remain major challenges. Agenda 21 defines the struggle against poverty as essential in the achievement of sustainability and as the shared responsibility of all countries.
30. The Conference therefore recommends that each State develop its own plan to combat all forms of poverty and support human development. As appropriate, such plans should include basic health care, education, housing, cross-sectoral policies and special measures to assist vulnerable groups or populations living in ecologically vulnerable areas. International co-operation will be required, particularly in the financial sphere, to bring such plans to fruition.
31. The status and rights of women are a critical dimension of human development. National programmes and legislation should ensure equal access to property and credit and the availability of job opportunities. They should also guarantee women's reproductive rights including the right to information about family planning and the availability of safe contraceptives. National preparations for future UN Conferences, including the 1993 Conference on Human Rights and the 1994 Conference on Population and Development, should give special attention to the critical steps leading to human development.
32. The Conference further recommends that action to combat poverty and respond to population concerns, taking full account of the rights and aspirations of women, be integrated into national planning, policy and decision-making process and receive adequate support from the international community.
Reducing Health Risks from Environmental Pollution and Hazards (Agenda 21: Chapter 6)
33. In many locations around the world the health of hundreds of millions of people, particularly children, is affected by environmental pollution and degradation. These conditions are often persistent, but, in addition, serious environmental emergencies occur from time to time such as spills of hydrocarbons and toxic chemicals. Consideration should also be given to reducing health risks that result from exposure to banned pesticides, radioactive compounds, toxic wastes, etc.
34. The Conference recommends that the States determine priorities for action in their countries among regions and among the various categories of pollution, having in mind partiuclarly the impacts of pollution on human health. The Conference stresses the need for States to:
(a) Act in accordance with Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration which relate to international notification of emergencies or activities that may have a significant transboundary effect;
(b) Consider the establishment of national and international environmental emergency response centers and recommend the strengthening of the UN Centre for Urgent Environmental Assistance;
(c) Promote better public awareness of the problems of environmental pollution and the means of combating them;
(d) Ensure more effective enforcement mechanisms.
(e) Act in accordance with Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration by strengthening the international Conventions and legal instruments for the protection of the environment in time of war.
Promoting Sustainable Human Settlements Development (Agenda 21: Chapter 7)
35. Human settlements, particularly major urban centres, are points at which many problems of environment and development converge. Because the process of urbanization is continuing world wide and increasing numbers of people are affected by the problems that occur there, cities are priority areas for working towards sustainable development.
36. The Conference recommends that high priority be given to improving the planning and management of human settlements. Key actions should be included in innovative strategies for cities, towns and rural settlements that integrate decisions on land use and land management, mobilize human and material rsources and public and private investment so as to provide adequate shelter for all inhabitants, support sustainable energy and transport systems, and promote human resource development and capacity building.
37. The Conference also recommends that international assistance to refugees in developing countries be strengthened to minimize any negative impact on the environment.
Integrating Environment and Development in Decision-Making (Agenda 21 : Chapter 8)
38. Sustainable development requires a decision-making process that fully integrates the consideration of environmental and socio-economic issues and allows a broad range of public particpation. The Conference recommends that States:
(a) Review their national legislation and the administrative structures they create, and revise them if need be in order to establish an effective, integrated decision-making process and fiscal and economic policies conducive to sustainable development;
(b) Ensure that there are adequate mechanisms for the involvement of concerned individuals or organizations in decision-making.
(c) Attempt to quantitfy, to the extent possible, adverse environmental impacts and incorporate mitigating measures in project costs as well as implementing them.
39. For the effective integration of environment and development, appropriate laws and institutions need to be complemented by the effective use of economic instruments and incentives. A first step is better measurement of the quantitative relationships between environment and the economy, A practical and equitable principle which could be applied by all States at the national and international level is that of full valuation of natural resources.Full valuation of natural resources within internationa trade would be profitable and equitable for human beings and sustainable in terms of conserving natural capital.
40. The Conference recommends that systems of national accounts go beyond the traditional economic dimensions to take full account of the environmental and social, as well as the economic, costs and benefits of natural resource use. These factors should be integrated into decision making. The current system of national accounts based on Gross National Product should be supplemented by a calculation of net sustainable national income.
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT
Protection of the Atmosphere (Agenda 21: Chapter 9; Convention on Climate Change)
41. The deterioration of the stratospheric ozone layer and increasing concentrations of "greenhouse" gases in the atmosphere will have significant, mainly adverse, impacts on all countries. The depletion of the ozone layer is already having an impact on human health and on the biological productivity of marine systems. The build-up of greenhouse gases and the consequent changes in climate and sea level will require profound adaptations in the world's agricultural and natural production systems.
42. The framework Convention on Climate Change and the actions recommended in Agenda 21 offer opportunities for a useful start to protecting the atmosphere. The Convention and the process by which it was developed, which involved close collaboration between scientists and negotiators, can be taken as a model for the development of such instruments. The Climate Change Convention does not establish global targets for the level of emissions and conveys little of the urgency to which it was supposed to respond. but it is a foundation upon which improvements can be built; it recognizes the principle of precautionary measures and the need for equity in dealing with the problem. The need remains to approve a set of precise guidelines and priorities for the sustainable production and consumption of energy as called for by the Yaoundé Declaration.
43. The Conference recommends:
(a) The immediate ratification of the Convention by all states;
(b) Commitment to the principal actions for which it calls;
(c) Review and revision, as necessary, of the full range of national legislation and regulations with a view to implementing the Convention;
(d) Resumption of negotiations to establish targets and a schedule for emission reduction in all countries, especially in industrialized ones.
44. The Conference also calls for the implementation of a long-term, coherent information programme to provide decion-makers with a better understanding of the causes and effects of climate change. The Conference urges, therefore, that the UNEP/WHO Information Unit on Climate Change (IUCC) be asked to develop, in close collaboration with IPU, an information system to keep all parliamentarians fully aware of the dimensions and causes of climate change, of the means of minimizing it and of possible adaptations to it.
45. Meanwhile there is an urgent need for States to follow up the action recommendations of Agenda 21 aimed at:
- More efficient enrgy production, transmission, distribution and use;
- Reducing the adverse environmental effects of the industrial, transport and resource development sectors;
- Realizing the objectives of the Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol and its 1990, and subsequent, amendments;
- Enhancing efforts to reduce transboundary air pollution;
- Developing strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of ultraviolet radiations reaching the Earth's surface as a consequence of depletion and modification of the stratospheric ozone layer;
- Strengthening effort to introduce renewable energies.
Integrated Approach to the Planning and Management of Land Resources (Agenda 21: Chapter 10)
46. The strong and continuing influence of sectoral interests has had damaging and long lasting impacts on components of the environment (air, soil, water, living resources) and consequent adverse effects on the productivity of the natural and modified ecosystems, without which human life could not endure nor economic development occur. Powerful planning and incentive systems should be developed, which reflect agreed social and economic goals, to ensure that land resources are used sustainably in accordance with their highest inherent capabilities. at different levels, these include land capability inventories, certain indigenous methods of land management, primary environmental care (PEC), and strategies such as strategies for sustainability (caring for the Earth) and national environmental action plans.
47. The Conference recommends that parliamentarians emphasize the importance of adopting land use planning and management systems and strategies. Moreover, in accordance with Rio Declaration Principle No. 23, the Conference also calls for protecting the environment and the natural resources of peoples under oppression, domination and occupation.
Combating Deforestation (Agenda 21: Chapter 11)
48. Policies, methods and mechanisms to support and develop the ecological, socio-economic and cultural roles and values of forests and forest lands are indequate in almost all countries. The consequent costs fall not only upon countries individually but also, as the global scale of forest loss increases, on the world community.
49. Agenda 21 adopts a comprehensive approach calling for, inter alia, stregthening of national institutions, international co-operation for the exchange of knowledge and the enhancement of international research, co-ordination of the programmes of different international organizations dealing with forest matters, reforestation and the creation of reserves, full valuation of the goods and services obtained from forests, recognition of the social, economic and ecological importance of forests and an increase in the scientific and technological means available for forest management. With the Declaration of Principles regarding forests, this represents the first expression of a high level consensus by the international community on the conservation, management and sustainable development of all type of forests. The Declaration of Principles embodied the notion that forests and their ecological functions are an economic resource under the jurisdiction of the State where they are located, the treatment of whic
h must take account of domestic economic factors, with special consideration for the needs of people living in forests, and requires a favourableinternational economic order.
50. The Conference recommends that States review the proposals in Agenda 21 for better forest management and implement them as appropriate. The Conference further recommends that the Statement of Forest Principles be analyzed with a view to improving it and to the reopening of international negotiations on a framework convention.
Combating Desertification (Agenda 21: Chapter 12)
51. Desertification is caused by many factors including climate variation and human activities. It reduces the carrying capacity of land for humans and other animals, causes soil fertility to decline and results in widespread poverty. Desertification can be combated most effectively through the good and timely management of lands that are at risk or only slightly affected. Agenda 21 provides details of desirable programmes on:
- Strengthening the relevant knowledge base;
- Combating land degradation through intensified soil conservation, afforestation and reforestation;
- Eradication of poverty and promotion of alternative livelihood systems;
- Integration of anti-desertification programmes into national development plans and national environmental planning;
- Drought preparedness and drought relief schemes;
- Encouraging and promoting popular partecipation and environmental education.
52. The Conference recommends that States review the proposals in Agenda 21 for combating desertification and land degradation and implement them as appropriate. The Conference further recommends that States promote the establishment under the General Assembly of an inter-governmental negotiating committee for the elaboration of an international convention to combat desertification in countries experiencing serious drought or desertification, particularly in Africa, with a view to finalizing such a convention by June 1994.
Biodiversity and Biotechnology (Agenda 21: Chapters 15 and 16; Convention on Biodiversity)
53. Biodiversity is an irreplaceable capital asset, yet it is being rapidly depleted. Widespread concern about the consequent foreclosure of options for the future stimulated the preparation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. It is a framework convention, i.e., one which leaves it to each government to decide for itself how best to conserve its biodiversity: but has been a major step in creating an international consensus on the principles that must govern effective action. Its implementation will require the transfer of additional financial resources to developing countries, but the exact amounts required have not yet been defined nor have the mechanisms for transferring the funds.
54. Biotechnology is a rapidly emerging field which can enable the development of better health care, enhanced food security, more efficient industrial processes, etc. The further evolution of biotechnology must take account of complex requirements for the safety of human health and the environment, nationally and internationally. it is essential to ensure that countries which supply genetic resources participate fully and fairly in the benefits of biotechnology.
55. Important national actions for the conservation of biological diversity and the management of biotechnology are set out in greater detail in Agenda 21.
56. The Conference recommends that governments carefully review the Convention on Biological Diversity and the detailed recommendations in chapter 15 and 16 of Agenda 21 with a view to identifying actions that they should undertake. They should review and revise the full range of national legislation affecting implementation of the Convention. The Conference further recommends that governments:
(a) Ratify the Convention on biological diversity and, as a matter of urgency, establish a secretariat for the Convention, ensuring adequate financial support and the creation of strong links with relevant international organizations, such as IUCN and with the CITES Secretariat;
(b) Establish and independent International Council on Biodiversity with close working relations with the Secretariat of the Convention;
(c) Establish within a more comprehensive system such as the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS), a cpacity for timely dissemination of information on biodiversity;
(d) Integrate strategies for the conservation of biodiversity with national strategies for sustainability and national development strategies and plans;
(e) Develop national biodiversity conservation plans;
(f) Develop mechanisms and agreements to enable and regulate access to genetic resources on mutually agreed terms;
(g) Transfer skills, technology and knowledge and provide funds for the management of biodiversity and biotechnology on concessional and preferential terms;
(h) Notify the International Council on Biodiversity of the bilateral agreements concluded under (f) and (g) above;
(i) Develop methods for equitable sharing of benefits arising from making use of genetic resources on mutually agreed terms;
(j) Empower individuals and local communities to benefit from biodiversity conservation and biotechnology development and application;
(k) Determine where transboundary ecosystems and migratory species warrant joint action by States and consult to that end.
(l) Support the inception of negotiations to strengthen existing mechanisms for drawing up a list of endangered species which must be protected by States and to define criteria for the identification of areas where biological wealth is of worldwide importance.
Protection and Management of the Oceans and Coastal Zones (Agenda 21: Chapter 17)
57. The marine environment is a vital component of the global life-support system and a capital asset upon which sustainable development can be based. But it is being increasingly degraded by pollution largely from land-based sources, with adverse effects on marine living resources, which are also threatened by over-exploitation. A major reason for the persistence of land-based pollution has been failure to take account of marine pollution in the full range of land and watershed management policies and in the laws governing sources of airborne pollution. Sectoralized legal and administrative structures complicate this effort, which is even more difficult where ships, fish and currents move from one jurisdiction to another and even beyond to areas where there is no territorial jurisdiction.
58. The Conference recommends that States ensure that their conservation and management measures conform to those recommended in Agenda 21. The Conference particularly recommends that each country assess the major causes of marine pollution and coastal and marine habitat degradation. Parliaments should then review and revise national laws so that they will enable a significant reduction of marine pollution and habitat degradation. The Conference further recommends that those countries that have not yet done so ratify without delay the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other global and regional legal instruments dealing with marine pollution or the conservation of marine living resources.
59. Management of high seas fisheries is inadequate in many areas and some stocks are overutilized with serious socio-economic consequences. There is a need to address inadequacies not only in management but also in biological knowledge and statistics. There is also a need to consider management on a multi-species, i.e. ecosystem, basis.
60. The Conference recommends that States adopt the measures for better management of high seas fisheries set out in Agenda 21, and particularly that they convene as soon as possible an intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices with a view to assessing problems relating to highly migratory and straddling fish stocks and consider means of improving co-operation for their resolution.
Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Freshwater Resources (Agenda 21: Chapter 18)
61. The importance of freshwater is well known, yet supplies are increasingly and often dangerously polluted in many parts of the world, threatening human health and the integrity of vital ecological processes. In many areas the quantities of water available will soon be unable to meet the demands that growing populations will place on them. Failure to integrate the management of freshwater resources with the management of other resources and with industrial and urban development is a major problem. Conservation of aquatic species and ecosystems is inadequate in most countries. International action is needed to manage freshwaters and aquatic resources in shared river basins, but appropriate institutional arrangements are generally lacking or inadequate.
62. The Conference recommends that States pay particular attention to the importance of a dynamic, intersectoral, interdisciplinary approach to planning and management at a national, strategic level when implementing relevant recommendations in Chapter 18 of Agenda 21. For boundary and transboundary waters where appropriate intergovernmental mechanism do not exist, governments should consult with a view to establishing them. It also recommends that Governments start working, without further delay, on drafting a Convention on Drinking Water".
Waste Management (Agenda 21: Chapters 19, 20, 21 and 22)
63. Effective management of hazardous and solid wastes is of paramount importance for human health, protection of the environment, natural resource management and sustainable development. Yet increasing numbers of people, particularly in developed countries, are generating ever greater per capita amounts of wastes, exceeding the management capacity of most countries. Agenda 21 highlights the need to reduce production of wastes as much as desirable, to promote their safe disposal and to restrict severely or prohibit altogether, according to circumstances, any traffic in the substances.
64. The Conference recommends that States:
(a) Review and, if necessary, strengthen national laws and systems of incentives to ensure that they are effective in reducing or eliminating the generation of wastes, and strengthen legislation concerning transboundary movements of hazardous materials, including radioactive wastes;
(b) Institute reuse and recycling in cases when that is possible, and promote the disposal and treatment of unavoidable wastes in an environmentally sound manner;
(c) Adopt a materials management approach to industrial processes as a means of reducing waste and optimizing efficiency.
(d) Develop effective measures to prevent dumping of toxic substances in developing countries such as hospital wastes, banned pesticides, nuclear wastes, etc.
65. It also recommends that States that have not yet signed and ratified the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes should do so without delay and that criteria and guidelines necessary for the implementation of the Convention be developed as soon as possible. The Conference also recommends the signature and ratification of other relevant conventions and strengthening of efforts to promote the environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes as called for in Chpter 22 of Agenda 21.
STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF MAJOR SOCIAL GROUPS
66. Public and NGO involvement in the UNCED process was unprecedented as compared to any other international negotiation process. This made it a unique learning experience in the handling of complex relationships between environment and development for governments, scientific communities, business associations and NGO's. The active participation of non-governmental organizations, business and industry, labour unions, scientists and groups representing women, youth and indigenous peoples will be of utmost importance for strong follow-up of UNCED at the local, national, regional and global levels.
67. The Conference recommends that States:
(a) Review the comprehensive set of recommendations on this topic contained in Chapters 24-32 of Agenda 21 with a view to ensuring that their legislation and administrative arrangements support the implementation of these recommendations;
(b) Support the participation of women, youth and indigenous people and of interest groups in planning and undertaking programmes for sustainable development at the local, national and international levels. Parliaments should sponsor public hearings and consultations, require public participation and access to relevant documentation by law, and make appopriate budgetary provisions.
MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Financial resources and mechanisms (Agenda 21: Chapter 33)
68. Agenda 21 and the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity clearly recognize the need for new and additional transfers of funds from developed to developing countries to implement the conventions and respond to the recommendations of Agenda 21. The extreme complexity of environmental challenges (global, regional, national, provincial and local) requires a flexible system made up of diversified financing mechanisms (IDA, regional banks, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and other multilateral funds, UNDP, United Nations Specialized Agencies, technical co-operation institutions, bilateral ODA programmes, debt relief, private funds, new forms of financing, etc.).
69. Agenda 21 include indicative estimates of the costs of the actions that it recommends. These totalled over $ 600 billion annually for the period 1993-2000, including about $125 billion on grant or concessional terms to be made available to developing countries from the international community. Thus, it is clear that financing of the implementation of Agenda 21 to a large extent will have to come from the public and private sectors of each country. The costs of implementing the Biodiversity and Climate Change Conventions are not yet clear, mainly because they are framework conventions awiting further definition of the precise action needed to put them into effect.
70. Several possible sources of the $125 billion per year resource transfer required are noted, but there is no indication of how much might be sought from one source to another. However, some developed countries reaffirmed their commitments to reach the target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA, thus doubling the present flow, some agreeing on the year 2000 as a target date. The extent to which achievement of this target would satisfy the total requirement is not clear. The GEF is presently funded at about $1.3 billion for the period 1990-1993. The GEF should be restructured to expand its scope and should be provided with increased resources. To enable a balanced and equitable representation of interests of both developed and developing countries, it should be democratic and transparent in its decision-making and operations. The GEF will be the source of some of the resources necessary for implementation of the conventions on biodiversity and climate change. Further commitments, at least in respect of the conventions
, presumably in the form of pledges to replenish the GEF, may be tied to more precise definition of the needs.
71. The Conference recommends that governments:
(a) Identify the possibilities for increased concessional aid in support of sustainable development, perhaps by cutting back on objects of expenditure that do not meet agreed tests of sustainability, particularly military expenditure in all countries;
(b) Arrange for more rapid reduction of both the official and commercial debt of developing countries giving priorities to least developed countries and when possible linked to programmes aimed at sustainable development;
(c) Support the further technical network and international political agreement needed to clarify the extent of additional technical assistance required for the implementation of the conventions on climate change and biodiversity.
72. The implementation of technological projects and resource management in each country and region depends on available intellectual and technical capacity. The emigration of trained persons, the "brain drain", diminishes that capacity. The Conference recommends that international consultant agencies help by giving preference to local technicians selecting them by competition and maintaining them in their positions.
Transfer of Environmentally-sound Technology and Capacity Building (Agenda 21: Chapter 34)
73. The achievement of sustainable development is slowed down in many developing countries because they lack access to safe and environmentally sound technologies for application in industry, agriculture etc. There is also a corresponding need for training related not only to the application of technology but also to relevant scientific and professional fields. The long-term benefits of investments in this area are likely to be at least as great as of those in infrastructure.
74. The Conference recommends that governments individually and through the appropriate intergovernmental organizations take whatever steps are needed to:
(a) Ensure access to and transfer of safe and environmentally sound technologies on concessional and preferential terms to developing countries;
(b) Support the development and funding of international networks on technology availability and technology assessments.
75. The Conference further recommends that programmes of development co-operation give greater emphasis to capacity building and to projects of primarily local concern and scale, and less emphasis to megaprojects, which generally yield an unsatisfactory flow and distribution of benefits.
International Institutional Arrangements (Agenda 21: Chapter 38)
76. The Conference encourages and supports the efforts being made towards more effective coordination of activities within the United Nations System. Multilateral co-operation offers important comparative advantages in the form of a multisectoral approach to development. To make optimal use of these opportunities, the UN should be strengthened in the social, economic and environmental field. A stronger and more effcicient UN will provide better support to developing countries in their pursuit of sustainable development objectives.
77. Agenda 21 establishes a framework for promoting the integration of economic, social and environmental factors affecting sustainable development. Its implementation requires new mechanisms to harmonize and coordinate the activities of global and regional organizations within that framework, both conceptually and programmatically.
78. The most visible change in the system of international institutions after Rio will be the creation of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), a high-level body intended to rationalize inter-governmental decision making on environment and development and review progress in the implementation of Agenda 21.
79. While the mandate, structure and precise role within the system of the Commission are still being discussed, the Conference believes that, together with the new Interagency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD), it should be charged with:
- Maintaining a strong political commitment to implement and update Agenda 21 and set new goals;
- Ensuring an integrated approach to its updating and implementation;
- Monitoring progress at international, regional and national levels;
- Responding to new issues and problems and identifying priorities;
- Mobilizing financial and policy commitments to advance sustainable development.
80. The Commission should become operational as soon as possible. It should maintain a central role within the economic and social structure of the United Nations as that system is reformed. The Secretariat for the Commission and the IACSD should report directly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It should have appropriate and flexible procedures for effective participation by and contributions from inter-governmental and qualified NGOs, including such bodies as the IPU.
81. The Commission on Sustainable Development should also be mandated to monitor the measures taken by donors to honour their financial obligations, thus safeguarding the link established between the implementation of Agenda 21 on the one hand and the provision of financial resources on the other.
Information for Decision-Making
82. Action must be based on accurate information. A great deal of information relevant to pursuit of sustainable development exists now and its volume is continually growing. The most significant problem is the lack of capacity to integrate information relevant to environment and development and to work out useful indicators of sustainability. This has been a particular difficulty in developing countries.
83. Agenda 21 calls, among other things, for the development of a range of indicators of sustainability at the national and global levels and for strengthening UNEP's Earthwatch, the Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS), and the Global Resource Information Database (GRID), and the Information Unit on Climate Change (IUCC). It also calls for establishing a new Development Watch to collect and interpret economic and social information, linking the two systems through an appropriate UN office. It calls in addition for human resources development and capacity building relevant to the developing countries' needs for information. It also stresses the importance of improving the availability and accessibility of information.
84. The Conference recommends that governments and parliaments identify the needs for improving the supplies and flows of relevant information in their own countries and take action to meet those needs, and that they further support the improvement of international mechanisms for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and for strengthening national research, monitoring and assessment capabilities.
Promoting Education for Sustainable Development (Agenda 21: chapt. 36)
85. Public awareness and understanding of sustainable development provides the basis for the political action needed to achieve it. There is still a need for a greater awareness and better understanding on a world scale.
86. The Conference therefore recommends that educational programmes in which environment and development concepts are clearly explained be made available in all countries from primary schools to post-secondary institutions and adult education programmes. There should also be extensive programmes for the eradication of iliteracy.
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ASKS THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION TO TAKE A SPECIFIC INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO INVITE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES TO SIGN AND RATIFY BOTH THE CONVENTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS/WORLD CONFERENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
In Cooperation with the United Nations
A Satellite Conference to the 1993 World Human Rights Conference
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Siracusa, December 2-5, 1992
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Co-Sponsors: »Association Internationale de Droit Penal (»AIDP ); »DePaul University International Human Rights Law Institute (»DPU-IHRLI ); »International Bar Association (»IBA ); »International Centre for the Reform of Criminal Law (»ICRCL ); »International Commission of Jurists (»ICJ ); »International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program (»ISPAC ); »Parliamentarians for Global Action (»PGA ).
Under the Auspices of the Italian Minister of Justice.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. The Time is Ripe.
Nearly half a century after the establishment and work of the first International Criminal Tribunal, specialists in international criminal justice, government officials, and parliamentarians, coming from all continents, assembled at ISISC, at Siracusa, Italy (December 2-5, 1992). The purpose of the meeting was to take stock of developments in international criminal justice, to assess its failures, and to note the persistent, but slow progress toward the establishment of an international criminal justice system, noting particularly the recent progress of the International Law Commission toward formulating the statute for an international criminal court and drafting an international criminal code (of crimes against the peace and security of mankind). However, it had become all too obvious that advances by the academic community had far outstripped the drafting effort of intergovernmental bodies, and the capacity of these bodies to benefit from scholarly progress.
The point had been reached at which academic advances should and could, be put to profitable use at the intergovernmental level. Once regarded as esoteric academic exercises, these advances are now at the diposition of the world community which has become keenly aware of massive and widespread crimes against the peace and security of mankind, on nearly all continents. This international criminality increasingly challenges the international community to set up an international system of criminal justice so as to prevent further commission of international crimes and to bring to justice those responsible. Not since 1945 has there been such a massive, world-wide public call for international criminal justice. Not since then has there been such an opportunity for the world community to institutionalize an effective system of international criminal justice.
2. Past Failures and Future Obstacles.
Several participants emphasized the causes of past failures and, thus, the potential obstacles in the path toward achieving universal criminal justice, and all participants fully shared the concerns of these colleagues. Among these obstacles were:
(a) Continuing conflict among national interests;
(b) The changes inherent in the establishment of yet another international bureaucracy with possibly minimum benefits to the world community;
(c) The reluctance of states to yield any part of their sovereignty;
(d) Chauvinism in regarding one's own national laws as superior;
(e) The difficulty in agreeing on the subject-matter jurisdiction of an international tribunal;
(f) Concerns about the selection of an international judiciary;
(g) The conflict of an international system of criminal justice with national jurisdictions;
(h) The remoteness of an international criminal justice system from the peoples of the world;
(i) The difficulty of agreeing on a general part;
(j) The difficulty of agreeing on procedural rules;
(k) The role which individual states should play in the international criminal justice process;
(l) The problem of invoking (initiating) the international criminal justice process;
(m) The ost to the international community;
(n) The lack of enforcement power of an international criminal tribunal.
3. Current Issues.
Participants recognized that, in the minds of some policy makers, the legacy of past obstacles still lingers. But they noted that some of these problems had been resolved, some were non-existent to begin with and others could be oversome if the political will to impose international criminal justice could be mustered. Thus, by way of examples, the cost issue is insignificant if the administrative apparatus of the international court of justice could be extended to service the international court of criminal justice. As to differences in legal systems, the Nuremburg tribunal had little difficulty in accomodating principles of common law and civil law. As regards the selection of a judiciary, in the case of the ICJ, such problems had long been overcome, (but the system could be improved). Many of the procedural issues had long been proposed for resolution by the Draft Statute -- International Criminal Tribunal, and other documents.
It was agreed that the current obstacles were of a rather different sort, legal and technical issues not being unsurmountable. Foremost among current problems is that of the political will.
4. The Political Will.
Both parliamentarians and academicians were encouraged by the new political support which an international criminal court has attracted from many governments over the past few years, and the recent call in the United Nations for stronger action toward its establishment. Notwithstanding the legal complexities and the difficulties ahead, the question of a court was essentially political. Progress depends upon the political will of governments.
The key to success will lie in intensifying the dialogue amongst academicians, parliamentarians, government officials and diplomats, relying heavily on the support of the mass media. Politicians will respond to public awarenew and pressure, calling upon their governments to act.
In the past, academicians had talked to academicians. This conference afforded one of the first opportunities for academicians to share their views with parliamentarians.
The interest of the public in international criminal justice has been aroused by widespread abuses in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Liberia, and elsewhere, even though in some countries media attention is limited. It is necessary, therefore, to increase public awareness of current abuses and the potential role of international criminal justice to provide remedial action. It was noted that no country is in fundamental opposition to the establishment of a system of international criminal justice. Skeptical governments will be moved to intensify their efforts only when the call for international criminal justice had been given a chance to provide its objectivity and effectiveness.
5. The Role of the International Law Commission.
The participants noted with great satisfaction the progress made by the International Law Commission during the past three years, commenting favorably on the ILC's report to the 47th General Assembly. Indeed, this progress is highly encouraging, given the fact that the Commission's efforts during the preceding four decades had been persistently doomed to ineffectiveness. The participants encourage the ILC to continue their work and to, redouble their efforts, in the hope that the work on the creation of the international criminal court and the code can be completed swiftly. There remains the danger that failure to make progress on either the court or the code might affect progress on the other. The assembly therefore strongly endorses the trend to separate these issues, without detriment to progress on either.
6. The Question of Jurisdiction.
There have been three traditional views on the initial jurisdiction of an international criminal court.
(a) Jurisdiction over all international crimes;
(b) Jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes (aggression, war crimes, genocide, etc.);
(c) Jurisdiction over some specified international crimes, such as terrorism and international drug trafficking.
In the case of (b) and (c), it is the general view that, gradually jurisdiction should be increased to cover additional international crimes. But there continues to be a difference of views as to whether to adopt options (b) or (c). It may be necessary and possible to negotiate a pragmatic compromise on the question of initial jurisdiction. There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches (b) and (c), it being generally agreed that the wholesale international approach (a) might tax a fledgling international criminal court.
7. Universal Jurisdiction.
It was agreed that the ICC should have universal jurisdiction, but not exclusive jurisdiction. Any country with territorial (or other internationally recognized) jurisdiction, could, under the most recent conventions, institute its own proceedings, extradite the defendants to a requesting country with jurisdiction, or to the I.C.C. Under these circumstances the question of consent does not arise. It was left open whether the I.C.C. should have original and exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the most serious international crimes (crimes punishable directly under international law).
8. Applicable Law and Procedure.
The ICC should apply international law and fashion its own rules of procedure, consistent with its statute, international law, and the United Nations standards, norms and guidelines in criminal justice and human rights. There was a preference for the court's applying a truly international law in interpreting the definitions outlined in the conventions and in codifying (fashioning proportions of) the general part, until such time as these may be elaborated by convention. To that extent the court, in fashioning its law, may have to rely on propositions of relevant national laws.
9. Transnational Crimes.
There are a variety of transnational crimes which could be likened to crimes under international law. It may be feasible to invest the I.C.C. with jurisdiction over such crimes on the application of countries with jurisdiction. Such crimes may include transnational economic crimes, environmental crimes, the selling of children for organ transplants, and others.
10. Invoking the Jurisdiction of the Court.
It was agreed that the Jurisdiction of the court could be invoked by any state with jurisdiction, and it was furthermore suggested that international agencies, especially the Security Council, could likewise invoke this jurisdiction.
11. I.C.C. Services.
It was agreed that the I.C.C. needs the personnel for the investigation, accusation and prosecution of international crimes. It also needs an appellate division, in accordance with international law.
12. Enforcement Power.
The I.C.C. must be invested with enforcement power, to be exercised or supervised especially by the Security Council.
13. Execution of Sentences.
There was general agreement that the I.C.C. needs a correctional system for the execution of sentences which cannot be executed in the home state of a defendant.
14. Conciliation Procedures.
It was suggested that the court might be invested with a mechanism to seek conflict resolution and conciliation, or even on ombudsman-type process for the evidence of impending conflict.
15. Regional International Criminal Court.
It was recommended that international criminal justice could be achieved by the establishment of
(a) Regional chambers of the I.C.C., or
(b) Separate regional international criminal courts to be established by regional intergovernmental organizations.
In the case of (a), decisions could then be referred on appeal to the I.C.C., particularly so as to achieve uniformity of law. It was also suggested that the regional tribunals should exercise jurisdiction over all but the most severe international crimes (crimes punishable directly under international law), as to which the I.C.C. should have jurisdiction. It was also suggested that the judges of the I.C.C. could sit on assignment at the various regional chambers, as the need arises. Under no circumstances should support for regional criminal courts or chamber detract from the primary emphasis of achieving the establishment of the international criminal court.
16. No Selective Jurisdiction as to Crimes.
The proposal was made that states should be able to accede to the jurisdiction of the I.C.C. as to only some crimes, but not as to others. There was considerable concern about this proposed approach which could lead to an uncontrollable disregard of recognized crimes which, to begin with, are universal. The idea was rejected.
17. No Discriminating Jurisdiction as to Defendants.
To avoid any semblance of discriminatorily selective enforcement, all countries, rich and poor, strong and weak, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the I.C.C., even though, in some cases, it may only be possible to indict (and thereby stigmatize) a defendant without the possibility of trying him or her. Any notion of "victor's justice" should be avoided.
18. Standing Committee of States Party.
It was agreed that States Party may wish to constitute a Standing Committee, to deal with purely financial and administrative aspects.
19. The Instant Need for Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals.
Regret was expressed about the failure of Member States of the United Nations to constitute, through the Security Council, an international ad hoc criminal tribunal to deal with the question of the Iraqui aggressiona against Kuwait. The hope was expressed that this mistake not be repeated in the case of the alleged war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unless criminals under international law can foresee that they will be held accountable under international criminal law, they are not likely to desist from offending, nor would other potential offender. Consequently, it is deemed necessary that an international ad hoc criminal tribunal should be constituted as soon as possible, under either of two auspices, as hereinafter described.
20. A United Nations Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The Security Council has already requested the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into violations of the Geneva Convention and other international crimes reported to have been committeed in the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council has appointed five experts to constitute the Commission, which has assumed its task. However, note was taken of the fact that the Commission is understaffed and underfunded. Concern was expressed that under these circumstances the Commission might not be able to accomplish its task within a reasonable time. Even if the Commission will be able to complete its assignment and produce evidence of the commission of war crimes, the Security Council would have to establish an ad hoc tribunal for the trial of persons charged. The assembly wishes to urge that the Security Council take all necessary steps in order to accomplish international justice in the case of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
21. A European Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal.
Fearful that the United Nations may be unable to urgently take the steps suggested above, the assembly urges the C.S.C.E. to follow up on the appointment of its own commission of inquiry by establishing, in the shortest possible time, an ad hoc system for the judicial determination and disposition of alleged international crimes in the former Yugoslavia, by
(a) creating an expert body for investigating all relevant facts,
(b) providing for electronic access to all evidence (assembled facts) for the purpose of
(c) submitting them to a prosecuting organ, to be established, and an
(d) accusation chamber, which would ready the case before
(e) an ad hoc tribunal for trial, with
(f) an appeal to an appellate tribunal.
22. Converting Ad Hoc Tribunals into Standing International Criminal Courts.
As to either of the above two possible ad hoc tribunals, if their efforts turn out to be successful, the constituting body may wish to consider keeping them in place for possible conversion into permanent international criminal courts.
23. From Vision to Necessity.
The assembly wishes to emphasize that what once was vision has now become a necessity. These recommendations are made with the sober realization that just a few hundred kilometers from here international criminal law, and the human rights of millions, are being violated constantly, systematically, and without fear of consequences on the part of the offenders. The time to act is now. We appeal to the conscience of all those whose political will is necessary for achieving international criminal justice now and for all future.
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SECOND PART
BEYOND THE BORDERS
2. Europe
2.00 The crisis in Europe
2.01 The crisis in the European Community
2.02 Reform or refoundation
2.03 Further analysis or Expansion
2.04 The party of the European constituent
2.05 Anti-Maastricht
2.06 The party of the United States of Europe
2.07 Beyond the crisis
2.08 The party of the Marshall Plan for Europe
2.09 The Transbalkan party
2.10 Europe: the plague of party power
2.11 The party of anglosaxon style government
2.12 For the creation of European parties
2.13 Europe and minorty group rights
2.14 The multi-ethnic party
2.15 The minorities party
2.16 The Gypsies party
2.17 The issue of communication and the right to language
2.18 The party of linguistic democracy
2.19 News from the field of international rights
2.20 The party for UN reform
2.21 The environmental disaster
2.22 The party of the Danube High Authority
2.23 The party of the United States of West Africa
2.24 The non violent party
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The Transnational, transparty, nonviolent Radical Party has grown and is growing from an intuition to idea, from idea to project, from project to the first real, although fragile, outline. Thi process which has been, and still is, difficult and painful, drawn out and far from complete, threatens to end, rather to be terminated because of a radical lack of correspondence between its ambitions and the means by which to make them concrete, between what needs to be done and who is willing to do it.
The width the depth and the seriousness of our crisis is known all too well. It is only by taking a large step in quality and quantity above all in the wealthier nations that we may be able to make it and this is little more than a faint ray of hope from
which we have chosen to start to create some hypotheses first about what could be done, what we could do, IF...
2. Europe
2.00 The European crisis
Four years after the fall of the Berlin wall many of our hopes have turned into nightmares. From Vukovar to Osijek, from Bosanski Novi to Sarajevo, from Sangiaccato to Kossovo, from Nagorno Karabak to Ossetia, from Somalia to Togo, from Iraq to Iran,
everywhere wars and evil repression reign.
Simultaneously for many, the federalist European hopes and ideals, the objective of the United States of Europe have been shattered, dissolved in a void.
Dispair, or at least delusion and resignation have taken over the conviction that federalism could have been a practical solution for many other areas of the world.
We do not agree. Actually, our opinion is completely contrary. We are more than ever convinced that federalism is a fundamental key to a peaceful and prosperous future, starting from, but not only for, the European continent.
We are not saying that one can pretend that nothing ever happened, as if the federalist commitment has not been multiplied by three with the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe, as if focussing solely on the economic and bureaucratic construction of Europe in the last few years hasn't had terrible consequences on the building of the community as well as on European public opinion.
Far from it. The effects of this bureaucratic, oligarchic, antifederalist, antidemocratic contamination based on economy are enormous and profound. We should, we must confront them. Radically. Hoisting our flags, the flags of European federalism and nonviolence. Aiming higher...given that we can still allow ourselves to do so.
2.01 The crisis in the European Community
It is no mystery to anyone that the European Community is going through a crisis. The knowledge and understanding of the nature of this crisis is however uncertain. A specific attitude, of mystification and disinformation, by governments and national bureaucracies on one hand and by a large majority of mass media on the other, have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the public opinion in the EEC and in other European countries, to understand the nature and width of this crisis.
Further, a number of events, from the German reunification to the monetary crisis in Great Britain, Spain and Italy, from the Danish "no" to the tiny French "yes" to the referendum on the Maasticht Treaty , from the global recession to the European agricultural "reform" and the resignation from GATT, from the enormous , painful and often undervalued conversion processes of the ex-communist countries to the terrible war of agression by the Serbian regime in ex-Jugoslavia and Europe's equally terrible resignation. From the rebirth, in the West, of intollerant attitudes toward foreigners, toward the different, have made the understanding of the crisis - which logically had developed in the European construction process - even more difficult.
The crisis is therefore not a result of the economic crisis but is actually inscribed in the basic model construction of the community, i.e. the one based on the assumption of the prevalence of economy over politics, on the dogma that saw - and still sees - the convergence of the western economies as a natural unification of the policies of the continent.
Forty years work in this direction were not lacking successes with regard to one of the original objectives, that is the convergence of the various economies. Today, "thanks" to the incredible external factors which we have already mentioned, the limits of this construction are brought to the light. The incapacity of reacting with reliability and timliness to the new problems, or catastrophes, even on the European continent.
From the Gulf war to the war in ex-Jugoslavia, from Somalia to the Caucasus, Europe finds itself being towed along by the United States of America.
At the same time, the norm adopted by the ruling classes of the various countries in the European Community is to hide behind the directives or pseudo directives from Brussels to pass measures of rationalization or restructuring within their own countries and this has progressively brought the citizens, especially those whose professional field is most at risk such as farmers or workers in "old" sectors of industry, to regard the European Commission as responsible "de tous le maux" (of all evil).
The executives in Brussels, who are not insensitive to the technocratic and bureaucratic sectors' alluring calls, have belatedly heard the repeated appeals from the European Parliament and especially from some federalist groups, not least the Radical Party, for a dramatic change of strategy, for the realization of a reform which will allow for a solid democratic base in the construction of the community, with a structure that is clear and understandable for all european citizens.
In particular the proposal was to begin to bring the community building to the rules of classic federalism and democracy, to the division of power, to the transparency and control of these and to the essential role of the citizen.
The delay of the commission, the insufficient pressure from the European Parliament, the lack or inadequacy of the European federalist parties and movements have therefore opened the way for the national governments, or rather to the European council , and to its usual practices based on national "do ut des" and these are by nature as well as by choice and interest in power far from, if not estranged from, the issue of democratization in the construction of Europe - the issue of its democracy deficit.
2.02 Reform or refoundation
If this is, as we believe, the situation Europe currently finds itself in, it is not possible to delay the choice of background nor the choice of what kind of Europe is desired. In our opinion there are two, somewhat roughly outlined, strategies for a renewed battle for a united Europe.
The first, points to the maximalization of the Maastricht agreements, or rather, intends to work within the existing framework, highlighting some of the more important institutional appointments, in particular the next European elections ( June 1994) and the next intergovernmental conference foreseen to be held in December 1996 to improve the tranparency and democracy of the European institutions and, in general, their functions.
The second, points (or ought to point) to a decisive clarification of the European construction and given the choice between a substantially intergovernmental cooperation, even though profound and institutionalized, and a true and proper democratic federation of the European States, the choice falls without any doubt on the latter.
Given this choice, it is therefore a question of overturning the theory which has been the base, and later the fundament, of the process of European integration for almost forty years, that is, that the union would be complete at the finalization of a
process of progressive economic integration.
As we have already shown, the current economic and financial crises - and not only these - demonstrate the frailty of such a vision. It is actually risking to have to face the destruction of a long and patient process, developed in relatively prosperous times, due to the various current crises.
The new theory could therefore be the concentration on the political dimension of "staying together" of the federation. It is not at all a question of denying that the differences between the states should be faced and overcome but, contrary to the current economicist logic which states that the conditions to the participation of the common mechanisms is the overcoming of economical and financial differences, the political logic states that it is the union which defines the criteria and timetable for unification investing the means and resources until the respective country or regione in question is capable to doing so independently.
2.03 Further analisis or Expansion
If this does become the criteria then it is obvious that the approach to the issue of expansion will change radically and this will also result in the a diminished debate on the issue "in depth or broadening".
The federalist approach would probably consent to an immediate joining of many of the countries in central and eastern Europe with some reservation with regard to the issue of civil and human rights in Turkey and Israel; it would on the other hand stop countries such as Great Britain, Denmark and Greece from unilaterally imposing their "cooperativistic" intergovernmental vision of Europe.
In order to avoid the German approach to unification which has, in many cases, had devastating effects, it is obvious that for the central European countries the transition procedures in the economic and financial areas would be lengthy and numerous. However, their capacity in participating in the policies which are not strictly of economic or financial nature from the very beginning, are indisputable and this is what the European citizens today are missing.
With regard to the countries which are currently members of the European community but who do not share the federalist ideals, the solution may be to guarantee that they make use of a "cooperativistic" or "intergovernmental" system which today is called "the big market" and which will be called, after Maastricht "the European Union".
Such a choice would force some countries, such as France, to abandon their ambiguity and make a definite choice, one way or the other.
The issue of expanding to the EFTA countries, unless one refers to the expansion of Europe according to Maastricht, has little political value in the hypothesis that concerns us, that is the creation of a nucleus of states which would bring to life the real and true United States of Europe.
From a European perspective, the expansion to the EFTA countries could offer the opportunity to introduce some democratic reforms in the institutions of the European Union or in exchange for the awarding of powers constituent to the European Parliament.
It still remains to be seen whether the European Parliament is capable of using its limited yet real power to evaluate if there is till enough room within the structure of the European Union to make way for the indispensible reforms so that Europe can affront the tragedies of today as well as the predictable ones which trouble the world, and also face the environmental, social and economic challenges which are on the agenda daily. The usefulness, in terms of "real-politik", of the institutions of the European Community today (of the European Union tomorrow) is so internalized by the European political classes that to us it seems difficult that they will give it up without there being a strong push from the outside: from the public opinion and from the petitions of civil society. From the agricultural policy to the war in ex-Jugoslavia, from the problem of unemployment to the Third World policy, the Europe of Brussels has become the alibi behind which the member states of the E.C. hide their obvious lack of p
olitical good will.
2.04 The party of the European constituent
If, as we believe, very little room is left to "play" within the existing European institutions , in order to obtain a substantial reform, in a democratic and federalist direction, we have to evaluate if the conditions are feasible to conceive and to carry on a federalist struggle ex-novo from outside the E.C. institutions, for the creation by some European states, of the real and true United States of Europe.
First and foremeost such an hypothesis should take into account the considerable repercussions of the Danish and French referendums on the public opinion of western Europe, even that of the countries traditionally considered to be "European federalist". The repercussions, largely negative, have been added on to the concern that the destitution of the East be dumped onto the West after the fall of the Iron Curtain, overwhelming the existing European issue with a "consensus mou". Fears and anxieties that have often been catalysed by the new nationalistic movements, thanks to - and maybe even because of - the lack of credible and convincing answers from the European institutions and the various ruling classes. Fears and anxieties which, together with the perceived democratic deficit of the European institutions, have contributed to the refusal, more or less explicit, by a consistent part of the public opinion of the Maastricht treaty. These impromptu and momentary attitudes must not be underestimated . There i
s a possibility that they can be overcome ina relatively short time, once the modest reforms found in the treaty of Maastricht are integrated and perceived by the people. The doubt however remains that the crises brought about by the referendums and, above all, by the rising racial intollerance is not comparable to other, previous crises; they express a deeper social and political discomfort, an evident incapability by the ruling classes to mobilitate, to incite, to give hope or even only to deceive the public opinion with a "European project" which is so restrictive and not only highlights the bureaucracy and technocracy but is also evidently lacking in democracy. Perhaps the true question to ask, faced with such a commitment, is whether we as the Radical Party are competent to assume this task and therefore if we are capable of finding the human and financial resources to develop the transnational and transparty party, strengthening it in central and eastern Europe and - above all - creating a foundation f
or it in the western European states where there are premises for a popular good will in favor of the creation of a real and true European federation. Maybe it is by relaunching the issue of the European construction in a new campaign for membership in the western countries that the Radical Party can once again gain ground in western Europe and reinforce the positions in the eastern and central region. It goes without saying that the struggles for the abolition of the death penalty, Esperanto, antiprohibitionism must continue and also be integrated into this new campaign.
2.05 Anti-Maastricht
An evaluation should be made as to the hypothesis of the edition of a new constitution of the future United States of Europe: an anti-Maastricht in the true sense, a manual for the New Europe. A clear and simple document which is accessible to all the European citizens, to counter both in style and contents, the booklet on the Treaty of Maastricht distributed in occasion of the Danish and French referendums. A document which can serve as an outline for the federalist commitment taken by the Radical Party in the next five years but which can also serve as a point of reference for the parliamentarians and citizens of western Europe who are interested in joining the Radical Party in its struggles.
This constitutional project should define the following:
- the fundamental rights and obligations of the citizens of the United States of Europe (starting from the right to life, to the right to language);
- the institutional design ( and therefore also the unified electoral system and the European Institute of Referendum);
- the competences or grounds for action (and therefore the principles of subsidiarity) of the United States of Europe, together with competences of the states and regions.
These competences should include:
- foreign policy
- security and defence policy
- macro-economic policy
- fiscal policy
- macro-environment policy
- energy policy
- monetary policy (short term for some states, medium term - for the above stated reasons - for others);
-the conditions for joining and leaving the federal
union.
Even though the institutional aspect is of relatively little interest to the public opinion it is, and remains, fundamental if we want to avoid repeating the errors of the past in the Community's experience. Of fundamental importance, to us, is the necessity to clearly divide the legislative and executive powers. The legislative power could be represented by a commission from each state (the "European Affairs" comission from the various parliaments) together with a joint comission representing regions and/or linguistic communities in a European Senate. This structure differs from the existing European Community where the European Council which summons the heads of state not only mixes the legislative and executive functions but in some cases it actually monopolizes all types of powers going against the fundamental democratic division. Imagining theses United States of Europe, one can claim that the structure of a parliamentary republic is the one most consistent with the necessity to respect the diversities
and to guarantee the eqilibrium between the various powers and their different levels (federal, national and regional). In order to clearly mark the need for a division of powers and of the levels of power within the federal framework, the presidency of the federation should be taken away from the heads of state and government. The system currently in use by the parliamentary republics whereby a president is elected by the two chambers should be installed instead. Finally, the federalist structure should absolutely not be in constrast with what we have called the europeist structure but should instead be complementary to it. The United States, or the federation, should be developed parallelly to the European Union (E.C.) as stated in the Treaty of Maastricht. Only the states that completely adhere to the abovementioned constitution would join the United States and the European Union.
2.06 The party of the United States of Europe
The Europe we are talking about is defined by the contents and not by geography and therefore we distance ourselves, as we have already done with the European Community, from the various hypotheses of a "Paneuropean Union". Not that our intent is to esclude from the process of European federation some countries rather than others but because in the new logic that we wish to propose, the essential aspect is included in the contract to be stipulated between the various joining states and it is therefore a question of quality, not quantity in that in its initial phase it may involve only a few countries (from the East or the West), and later go on to involve others but always based on the values of democracy and fedralism. If we are to adopt this train of thought then we have to try and understand how to develop it and along with it the tool "Radical Party" in order to make it a political battle. For this reason it seems absolutely necessary that we evaluate the possibility of re-establishing some of our old ra
dical connections in western Europe, obviously keeping in mind that every program or plan is seriously limited by the financial situation the Radical Party finds itself in at the moment. First of all, the structure at our disposal (until the elections in 1994) at the European Parliament in Brussels should be used to its full potential. Simultaneously an evaluation should be made as to the possibility of setting up some very small operational units of the Radical Party in some of the Community countries which could be used as points of reference in our development of a radical presence in the various parliaments. All this should, of course, be done without compromising our concentrated efforts on the establishment of a parliamentary network in eastern and central Europe which has so far been a priority. Apart from the "financial" criteria we have to take into consideration the possibility of the "political context", that is the possibility of gathering interest in such a project from the political class as we
ll as from the public opinion. If this were to be the case, we cannot bypass Germany which has insisted, even if lacking in the necessary conviction, on a reform for the building of the community in a democratic direction. Other than Germany also France, Spain, Portugal could be considered, with due reserve, and the BENELUX countries in which our presence can be reinstated from the European Parliament. At the same time, the Radical Party's idea to start presenting a proposal for the creation of the United States of Europe should be taken into consideration, if a nucleus of committed parliamentarians from the East and from the West is created to start looking into a new constitution, based on the existing drafts, such as the one presented by Altiero Spinelli.
2.07 Beyond the crisis
A rebirth of Europe is therefore possible if it is capable of facing and dealing with some of the current major crises. An outline of what we perceive are the crises today: 1. The global recession and it's financial and social implications in western Europe; 2. The "post communist" crisis with it's enormous internal implications in economical and social but also political terms, it's external implications such as the pressure created at the borders and the new competition for some of the economic sectors in western Europe; 3. the persistent lack of development in a large part of the Third World or the development of a commerce based on forbidden substances (drugs primarily); 4. the development of nationalistic and nationalcommunist ideologies especially in countries in eastern and central Europe and in some cases the degeneration of these; 5. the continued destruction of the environment on a global level; Beginning with this general analysis and side by side with the political-institutional commitment for th
e creation of the United States of Europe, it is therefore a question of singling out some sectors of intervention which could mark the change of direction in Europe, that is toward a Europe that is willing to affront a problem rather than a Europe which puts up with a problem. We will try to highlight some of the political proposals, keeping in mind two parameters: on the one hand a symbolic parameter, that is the capacity of the proposed reform, were it to be assumed, to cause the creation of other reforms; on the other, a transversal parameter, or the possibility that the proposed reform will allow for answers to some of the different crises listed above.
2.08 The party for the Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe
The world of today is distinguished by over-capacities in production and therefore a policy based on expenditure could be the only way out. An expenditure policy which could, however, become concrete only marginally with the increase of family consumtion and in an increase of investment by companies, given the increase of interests. Given such a complete economical framework the only room left in which to maneuver is the expenditure for infrastructure, training and research. The liberalization of exchange, the deregulation, together with the post-industrial revolution - characterized by the introduction of software, of new methods of communication which cancel time and distances - have caused a true globalization of the economy. A devised and, as far as possible, global approach is therefore indispensible in order to face the current crisis and to enact any policy with an end to relaunch the economy. If we add two fundamental political criteria to this economical one, that is the promotion of the creation of
a true and proper democratic federation of States - not only in Europe - and the environmental issue, then we have a complete frame within which to define some political objectives pertinent to the seriousness of the crises. A Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe could offer an opportunity, in addition to being a tool for such a task, if accompanied with some concret reforms within the European Community, even with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy. How could such a plan be managed? The realization of the plan is on the first hand of a political nature and would need a single management, on a European level. In the absence of a true and proper European government, is it conceivable to hand over the management to a structure such as the current European Commission? Which intervention? An intervention aimed at the realization of new means of communication in the sectors of low energy consumtion with a greater respect for the environment and of a higher technological value; a plan for the modernization of t
he telephone networks, on the creation of electronic networks, on the renewal and completion of the railways with an introduction of high speed connections between the major cities of the west and of the east and between those of the east (avoiding thus the concentration on automobile traffic which was the tragic development in post war western Europe); all this would offer splendid occasions to the firms specialized in advanced technologies in western Europe. An opening should be effected on the western European market for products from the East. This is a measure which needs to be accompanied with a new reform of the PAC, which in some ways opposes the reform which has recently been effected. The current criteria for the awarding of community assistance to compensate for the "freezing" of areals of land, calculated on the level of production previous to the reform ( a measure which largely favors areas of richer land and within these, it especially favors the big producers), would be changed to a criteria
which favors any activity for the protection of the environment by the farmers. This kind of planning would also help stop the desertification of the western European countryside and consequently block a further concentration of population in the large cities. This type of proposal should be reconciled with the deregulation of the community agriculture, on the one hand because it would restore the function of regulation of prices to the market. The reestablishment of the rules of the market would give other, equally as important, results. Thus the reestablishment of the rules of the market with its consequent balance of demand-offer, would allow the producers to redirect their production toward some sectors which today are ruined by the import agreements but also toward quality products, using less energy, fertilizers and pest control chemicals. Last but not least, such a policy would eliminate many of the arguments the North Americans are using in the Uruguay Round and thus allowing the Europeans an escape
from their position of surrender.
2.09 The Transbalkan party
This Marshall Plan could become an initiative for a stabilization policy resulting from the consequent economic development . The realization of a communications infrastructure could assume a strong political role, favoring for example the interdependence of neighboring countries and therefore increasing the capacity for dialogue and could also obstruct the abuse of positions of revenue by some countries in relation to others. Thus a railway communication betwen Durazzo-Tirana-Skopje-Sofia (with a possible extension toward Bucharest, Chisinau, Kiev and Istanbul) would encourage the development of an entire region and its connections to other areas of Europe (southern Italy on the first hand) as well as reduce the predominance of the north-south rail track (Athens-Thessaloniki-Skopje-Belgrade) on the Balkan connections and would weaken the power of blackmail that Serbia and Greece are currently using on Macedonia. There are several other connections that can be developed apart from the "cross Balkan" one. Exa
mples such as the East-West connections between Berlin, Warsaw and Moscow and between Paris, Vienna, Budapest and Kiev and between Munich, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest or the East-East, between Kiev, Chisinau and Odessa and between Bucharest, Budapest and Warsaw. This plan would be of a different magnitude than those studied by the E.C. today, it would be a concrete plan which could facilitate the transition to market economy in the ex-communist countries, it would encourage the progressive compatibility of these economies with the western ones and make it possible for them to become entirely integrated into the European economy.
2.10 Europe: the plague of party power
From Warsaw to Rome, from Paris to Bucharest, from Prague to Berlin, from Brussels to Budapest, from Bratislava to Madrid, almost everywhere on the European continent the effects of a perception of democracy based on representation is spreading like a plague. In the East, where this system has only recently been reinstated, the disastrous effects are still limited to the capacity of the executive to govern efficiently, to the effective capacity of control by the parliament. In the West where THE system has always been in force, the consequences of this system, especially in these difficult and dramatic times, are all too evident and are due to the corruption which has spread thanks to the system. There are several examples, the "Tangentopoli" in Italy which involves all political parties, the many "affairs" which in the last twenty years have dominated the political scene in Belgium and which have always been carefully covered up, the scandals of the party financing in France and other scandals which have in
volved personalities in very high positions - lately the case of the blood contaminated with the AIDS virus, the resignations of ministers in Germany and the sad downfall of the Spanish socialist modernism which has also been overwhelmed by abuse of power for personal or party ends. Almost all the European states have been touched by corruption and, even if it varies depending on the country, by the lack of government and the lack of rotation of government.
2.11 The party for British style government
This is not a recent discovery for the Radical Party. In the last ten years in Italy and in other western countries and since before the fall of the Berlin wall in countries in central and eastern Europe, we have been attempting to counter the myth of proportionalism and of the so called representation with the British model of democracy where the government governs and it is the opposition which controls and prepares itself to govern. In Italy, after years of censorship, the radical proposal has been accepted by large sectors of the major political parties. Before the fall of the Berlin wall, many opposition leaders in the East were convinced of the effectiveness of the British model of democracy but despite this we see today that none of the new democracies have chosen this system, with the due results: 11 parties in Romania, 18 parties in Poland, 7 parties in Hungary, 9 parties in Bohemia-Moravia, 6 parties in Slovakia, 9 in Macedonia etc. etc. Other countries, such as Bulgaria, which had chosen a prevail
ing majority rule system, have modified it later. There is one exception: Albania where the majority system is in force, British style uninominal with a proportional correction for the attribution of twenty percent of the seats. We can therefore witness, in these countries as we have been able to do for some time in the West, the same endless bargaining for the formation of governments, the same crises in the executives, and the same fights for the control of public administration, of the mass media. Faced with such a situation, the proposal of the Radical Party is presented again with great determination on the entire European continent and even in many African countries which are in phases of democratization after many years of one party rule. The choice of British style rule is not only a question of "good" or effective government, but also of a crucial question in our times: that of nationalities, of national minorities and majorities and their cohabitation. Even in this context this choice could favor t
he opposition on some concrete government proposals instead of inciting to divisions based on ethnic groupings which tend to defend special interests. If such a proposal would effectively take into consideration the interests of minority groups, that is that the party which commits itself to defend the rights of minority groups also would get their consensus (as is the case in some ways in the USA) it may be opportune to conjugate it with federlism. A federal (or regional) system would bring the power closer to the citizens and give minorities the concrete possibility to self-government in the areas where their diversity is especially expressed, such as education, culture and communication. This issue brings us to another topic of our interest, the reform and unification of the procedure for election of the European Parliament. A reform of the current procedure could prove to be a precious element for the re-equilibrium of the E.C. powers in favor of the European Parliament, so far the only institution with
a democratic legitimacy. In fact, a reform would strengthen the ties between voters and who they vote for and make the latter more independant of the governments in their countries of origin. The Maastricht Treaty opened a perspective of a greater regional involvement which could be developed to include these uninominal constituencies in the existing regions of the member countries. In any case, a British style election would enhance solidarity between groups not necessarily bound by nationality ties. It is not easy to identify what needs to be done in this area, even less on a transnational level and if it really is the case, as we believe and as we have tried to show, that the fact of partitocracy is a common element in the degeneration of the European continent (and not only there) it does not necessarily mean that an immediate solution can be found at hand. The levels of degenerations, as well as the understanding of the reasons for this degeneration, are very diverse. The question is, are we mature and
convinced enough, on the first hand amongst the parliamentarians who are members, about this topic to be able to create a tool, such as a transnational league for the promotion of the anglosaxon system?
2.12 For the creation of European parties
We must affirm that the Radical Party is not a European party but this does not mean that it shouldn't or can't commit itself wherever possible to the procedures of regional or continental federation. The Maastricht Treaty maintains this position but there is a risk that it would be interpreted and used, by the ruling European political classes who are united in coalitions in the existing peudo-parties of today, as another source of public financing. There should be a possibility to offer special services to those parties that are interested in committing themselves to the European Union.
2.13 The issue of nationalities, of minorities
Marco Pannella specifically and the Radical Party in general, has ever since 1979 been proposing, at the European Parliament, in the Italian Parliament, on the streets and in the newsletters, that the problems of the Basques, Northern Ireland and Kossovo should not be dealt with in Madrid, or London or Belgrade but in Strasbourg or Brussels. This is something that has dramatically been confirmed by the latest events and it is a proposal which has been ridiculed and brushed aside as unrealistic by the ruling classes of the European Community and its member countries. Today, almost four years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, another ten problems have been added on to the list of the Basque, Irish and Kosovian ones. Problems which were considered obsolete in Europe but which were simply repressed by 50 years of totalitarian Communist rule. Therefore everywhere in Europe the nationalist pot has started boiling again and in some cases this terrible old ideology has really got out of hand as political classes o
f the old regimes have desperately been searching for new grounds for consensus. There is no need to dwell on the results of these once demagogues and now criminals who are responsible for tortures, rapes and mass murders: the proof can be found in Croatia and in Bosnia.
2.14 The multi-ethnic party
It is unfortunate that to add to the tragic and horrific situations in ex-Jugoslavia and Caucasia and to the situations of great tension in many other parts of the ex-Eastern Bloc there is the total political absence of Europe and its international institutions. Within this framework there is obviously not much sense to talk about an intervention by this Europe nor about how it should be organized to defend the rights of various minority groups and to organize the cohabitation between different nationalities. The question is quite clear - what to do? What needs to be done to stop this madness, to stop the racist and nazi policy of the regime in Belgrade? What needs to be done in order to create the grounds for a new start for Bosnia, not based on the theory of ethnic purity? At least one thing is quite clear. Our struggle must aim to re-establish a political and institutional order which brings out exactly what the ethnic purity policy wanted to cancel, that is the co-habitation of different ethnic communiti
es on the same territory. It should therefore start from the antipodes of the logic in the negotiations in Geneva: that is the division of the region (badly hidden behind a psudo decentralization) which is nothing less than the leglization of the result of the policy of ethnic purity by the regime in Belgrade and its warlords in Bosnia. It is therefore necessary to turn back to the "status antes". The people, the citizens, are at the base of this going back to the "status antes". The hundreds of thousands of refugees forced from their homes, refugees in Bosnia, in Croatia, in Slovenia, in Germany and spread out over entire Europe. The heart of the question has been identified and what remains to be done is to put into practice a series of proposals made in these last months by the Radical Party or by some of its representatives. The fundamental points are the following:
1. Total isolation of the Serbo-Montenegro Federation by the international community for its fundamental responsibility in the Bosnian tragedy as well as for the war in Croatia and Slovenia and for the opression of the majority of the population in Kossovo.
2. The constitution of an international court, under the auspices of the UN, for crimes of war.
3. Administrative and technical support to the Bosnian cities and towns from cities and towns in the rest of Europe, in order to re-establish order in the registry offices and the personal and historical data of the towns which have been destroyed during the war so that the conditions can be created for the refugees to return home.
4. The immediate recognition of Macedonia.
5. The elaboration of an institutional order, quite the opposite of what has been discussed in Geneva, based not on a geographical division which makes the regions correspond to the ethnic communities and therefore justifies the "movement" of populations which has already taken place, but based on the reality of the existing regions.
6. The recognition, similar to the international status of the PLO, of the Kossovo parliament.
2.15 The party of diversity
Any European policy which guarantees the the rights of minorities, cannot leave aside the resolution of the Bosnian tragedy and therefore it is essential to understand which political and institutional mechanisms are needed on a European level in order to avoid the explosion of similar tragedies. At this stage we face the absence or substantial inadequacy, on a European level but also on a global level, of today's international institutions. We have already witnessed the serious linits of the community process for the integration of Europe. Limits which carry names such as "intergovernmental cooperation" instead of federalism, "oligarchic technocracy" instead of democracy but also the substantial neglect of the regional and minorities' realities, a gap which certainly has not been filled by the creation of a Regional Consultative Committee as provided for by the Treaty of Maastricht. This is another example of the E.E.C.'s inadequacy and it is not compensated for by other international institutions such as:
the European Council, completely absent since the beginning of the war in ex-Jugoslavia; the CSCE, also impotent; and the United Nations whose tragic inadequacy we witness every day. Before falling for the temptation to search for new European or global institutions or organs whose task is to manage minority groups' problems, (eg. European High Authority for Minority Groups) it seems clear to us that we should confirm and reinforce the main factor: the rights of all citizens. We are convinced that it is only with a functioning juridical system, with efficient laws which are applied in the protection of information, that the conditions for a real - and therefore difficult and tough - dialogue can be created. A dialogue between majorities and minorities, to present new political and institutional agreements which will allow every community to live its own diversity but side by side with others.
2.16 The party of the Gypsies
In the midst of the issue of minorities there is one particular one: that of the Gypsies. This is an issue which has re-emersed as a result of the acts of intollerance toward this group, in Germany, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, in Rumania and generally everywhere where communities of Rom are to be found. Recently 80,000 illegal immigrants originally from Rumania in Germany have been deported , the majority of these immigrants are of the Rom community. An old debate has surfaced again as a result of these events. The debate between "assimilation" and "integration" which was never resolved or closed but "put on ice" by the various Communist regimes or as the case was in the West, the economic growth allowed it to be contained or hidden. Neither the voluntaristic policy (a eufamism) used by the East, nor the dividends of the Welfare State policy in the West, both based on "assimilation" have reached their objective; The Gypsy communities have kept their identities even if for some of them a second has been added as
a result of the industrial revolution and the gradual disappearance of the artisanal classes. The central key to the question and from which one should start when dealing with the issue of the Gypsies, seems to us to be that of identity. It has, however been demonstrated that it is impossible to confirm an identity if the state has been practicing a policy of assimilation. The moment has therefore arrived to invent a policy which tends toward integration and is based on the acceptance of the particular character of the Gypsy community and its correlation with the various cultures amongst which it is living. It is therefore a question of creating the space in which the population of Gypsies can make their own transnational revolution. A revolution which, like the national revolutions of the last century, allows the population of Gypsies to confirm and live their linguistic and cultural characteristics. A revolution which, contrary to the revolutions of the last century, bases this confirmation on the interde
pendence of the Gypsies with the other European peoples, with whom they live. The reference to this revolution should be the United States of Europe. Many international Rom organizations are moving in this direction; Recently these groups managed to obtain recognition as European minorities by the European Council. This recognition is without doubt important but may not produce any effects unless some objectives with an easily identifiable end are found which will make this concept more comprehensible and visual. This is indeed a difficult task; it needs more thought and involvement by the gypsies who are members of the Radical Party; The following should therefore not be considered a finished proposal but only a first rough draft. We can start from a strong and firm base which is the transnational nature of the issue although the political problems from a practical point of view should not be underestimated. For the moment we would therefore like to present two possible alternatives as points of reference:
1. The promotion of a Rom European University where diplomats from different countries can receive a subsidiary training, to study the Rom language; 2. The creation of a Rom European Academy where scientists from this ethnic group can defend and promote their language and culture.
2.17 Communication and the right to language
We will start off with a paradox: the language used most frequently in the European Community and which will be used in the future in the European Union is the language of the country which is furthest from the European federalist ideals: English. Let's continue with an aberration: the costs today of the current system of communication in the E.C.: nine official languages (which means)" directions of translation) at a cost of 700.000.000 ECU, approximately 800 million dollars. In the near future, with the entrance of the EFTA countries, there will be 12 official languages and when the Visegrad countries (Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia and Hungary) enter, there will be 16. This number increases to 25 when the other central European countries join and 40 if there should be an extension to the countries in Eastern Europe, even more if we consider the total number registered on the European continent: 72. The most likely consequence of this paradox and this aberration is that the right to language , which is
a fundamental right, will not be so easily conceded. This is therefore a problem of democracy which can no longer be put aside, especially now when the lack of democracy is becoming increasingly more evident in the construction of the Community. The question of the protection of this issue is however not limited to the European perspective. One has only to turn to the United Nations and to many other procedures of regional integration. It becomes, however, a determining factor in the attempt to democratically and federally refound the process of unification. As an example we can quote the relative efficiency of a single European labor market (free circulation) without the insurance of conditions for communication. Further, the issue of linguistic democracy is an issue which concerns many states where there is a cohabitation of several different ethnic groups and thus also different languages. From Belgium with only 3 different languages to the countries of the ex-Soviet Union with 150 languages, or to the 16
languages and 500 dialects in India and to the majority of the African countries where, in addition to the official language (which is usually the inherited colonial language) ten to twenty other languages exist, languages which are often labelled as dialects by the west. Even in the Radical Party, with the development of the transnational project, we have faced the difficulties of communication. For example, during this session of the congress, the costs for interpretation ( 7 languages) and translation (4 languages) amount to 23 percent of the total costs. The issue of the right to language is one that is being faced and confronted by the international organizations and the procedures of international integration, in society in general, in the movements, or as in our case, the international or transnational parties. This is an issue which can, in the international integration, be connected to the broader issue of "democracy deficit" but it can also give the necessary neutral support to the surfacing of an
international cultural identity.
2.18 The party of linguistic democracy
It is therefore a question of succeeding in protecting the right to language, guaranteeing at the same time, international communication. In this historical moment, it seems to us that Esperanto would be capable of succeeding because, if it is
chosen as a means of communication by the E.C. member states or by the European Council, it would guarantee the equality of all citizens in the field of communication.
Which initiatives?
The struggle for linguistic democracy is not new in the Radical Party. In the last few years, several party comrades and friends have been fighting to spread information on this issue, together with the ERA (Esperanto Radical Association), and lately also bringing forth concrete proposals. Some initiatives are being developed. A feasibility study has been requested at the European Parliament for the advantages that the use of Esperanto as the official language of communication could bring .
Other possible objectives:
1. The selection of Esperanto as a "bridge language" in the European institutions, using it in the community's translation and interpreter systems. Such a request could be extended to other international organizations such as the UN, the CSCE, the European Council.
2. The adoption of Esperanto in the E.C. (as well as in other international institutions) as a juridical reference language in all official documents.
3. The right to language to be introduced in the various international conventions.
4. That Esperanto be adopted, in the European Council together with English and French, and in the UN together with English, French, Russian, Chinese and Speanish, as "guarantee language" (of the right to language) and, as such as, one more official language in these organizations.
5. That Esperanto be taught in the elementary education in several countries, even as an introductory tool.
This is a project which needs to be supported through a further development of the ERA, especially outside of Italy but it could also be defined for a parliamentary league: "for linguistic democracy - promotion of Esperanto".
2.19 News from the field of international law
Some - few - positive elements have emerged after the "fall of the Berlin wall" , elements which could take on an important role for the future of humanity if we are able to transform them from "precedents" to create the fundaments for a new international law on the one hand and if, together, we are able to reform the existing international institutions so that they are prepared to apply this new law. An example is the case of the Gulf war where the right of interference against a state which uses force against another state was actually practiced and not only theorized. Even if this the operation was directed by the Americans, it was still conducted under the auspices of the UN. A more recent example, and a step further along, is Somalia where the right-obligation of interference was used to temporarily replace a state in total dissolution. Another step in the right direction in Somalia is the fact that the military operations are all coordinated by the UN.
2.20 The party for UN reform
If the role of the UN still seems inadequate and insufficient, first and foremost in light of the current tragedy in Bosnia, it is quite clear that it is only on that level that we can identify tools capable of limiting the devastating effects of the principle of national sovreignty. There are three levels in urgent need of reform, in our opinion: - where the definition and adoption of the decisions take place; - the enforcement of the decisions; - international law and its enforcement in the different states and consequently the possibility for single citizens to appeal to the UN for the lack of respect or violation of their rights by a state. The first level concerns mainly the UN Assembly, the Security Council and, especially, the status of their five permanent member states. This is to all effects, an "intergovernmental" structure in which, as in the E.C., reigns the most ruthless logic of "do ut des" between the different member states, in particular between those of the Security Council. This is a stru
cture which does not know the mechanisms of public representation and therefore, just as in the E.C., is suffering from a democracy deficit. The proposal to reform the constitution of the Security Council, awarding a permanent seat to one country rather than another, has been put forth by several other parties but we are of the opinion that it would be preferable to introduce a democratic system and create a citizens assembly, a proper global parliament. The second level concerns the enforcement of the decisions taken. This level is also very dependent on the good will of the member states in general and the five permanent members in particular. There are two situations to deal with, the role and the legitimacy of the Secretary General, for which it may b difficult to find a positive solution without the installment of a democratic system, as mentioned above; The second concerns the secretary's real autonomy in enforcing the decisions take. The solution to this problem may lie in the separation of the milita
ry contingents from the UN by the member states capable of carrying out "peace keeping" as well as "peace making" activities. The third level concerns the constitution of a proper body of international right which could become the legal platform upon which the UN could base its decisions and of a Court of Justice which could pass sentences which would be enforced immediately by the member states and to which the citizens could appeal directly. A "supreme court against war crimes" should be incorporated within the framework of the Court of Justice, a sort of global Court of Assizes.
Which tools?
A Global League of Democratic Countries could be a suitable tool to use for this substantial reform. It could act as a powerful internal lobby within the UN for a democratic reform of its work rules and for the increase of its powers and jurisdiction, starting with setting limits to the national sovreignty of its members. In this general scope an evaluation should be made as to the possibility to reform the European Council on this basis. It is an organiwation which has recently expanded to many of the ex-Communist countries without being able to reform in a federal direction. On the other hand, the organization has achieved some aims which are far from marginal in the defense and promotion of human rights, in its forty years of existence. It is an organization which does have some functioning elements, such as the Parliamentary Assembly, which from a democratic point of view, far superior to those of the United Nations (which represents the states and not the citizens) and factors of intervention such as th
e binding norms of the European Court of Human Rights. This transformation would allow to break a logic of grouping of countries only on geographic or geo-political basis and therefore to avoid the risks of retreat on a theory which is centered on Europe and on the West. This is an option which could expand if to the constitutional grounds of the European Council -which are the defense of the fundamental rights of the individual- were added more general tasks of management and promotion of democracy. This is an option which would favor the interests of the poorer countries (particularly the African countries with new democracies), with economic, customary and financial advantages offered to those who fulfill the prerequisites of commitment to protect human and democratic rights.
2.21 The environmental disaster
There is no point in going into detail here on the environmental disasters of our planet, current or future. We will only identify an emblematic situation, in the East; in the South there is the terrible process of desertification of the Sahel and finally in the North the reform of the PAC (common agricultural policy) which we have previously mentioned.
2.22 The party of the European High Authority of the Rhine-Danube
What is happening between Slovakia and Hungary with regard to the issue of the dam on the Danube is without doubt a clear example -as well as a source of preoccupation- of how "transnational natural resources" can be sources of tension and potentially become open conflicts. This is not a recent discovery. In 1856 a "European Commission for the Danube" was created, gathering representatives from the rival countries and which was competent with regard to a series of issues concerning the river. This was an institution which changed several times in the years to follow being finally dissolved with the division of the world into two blocks. In the meantime, simultaneously with the fall of the wall, a gigantic project, the connection between the Rhine and the Danube which is revolutionary from the point of view of transportation by river in Europe, was finalized a few months ago. From many points of view, this is a new situation. We have already mentioned the tensions betwen Slovakia and Hungary but there is also
the very serious question of the embargo on Serbia which is being broken by several countries, using the Danube as one of the ways of transportation. There is obviously the huge and alsmost impossible issue of the environment. Impossible because of the lack of financial and technical resources in the ex-Communist countries, apart from the organizational problems regarding the traffic on a river route which crosses or borders nine countries (France, Holland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine). There are a series of problems and we have mentioned but a few, serious, difficult and, by nature, transnational, which need solutions and need international fora for the solutions. This is an issue which could be dealt with by a European High Authority for the Rhine-Danube equipped with the necessary tools to efficiently manage the numerous problems of this fundamental route of European transport. The organization would, ideally, be connected to or integrated into another existi
ng European institution ... the European Council? This could be a precedent for the management of several other problems which are of European interest.
2.23 The party of the United States of Western Africa
The idea of a Marshall Plan for the South is not new; We put forth this proposal 13 years ago when we started the big campaign against extermination by hunger. Even though this battle had many winning points, it was on the whole a failure because it did not bring about the fundamental changes in the policies of the North toward the South. This failure gave us, the Radical Party, the reasons and also the strength to start this madness which is the transnational project. Our idea is still valid, as many of the African realities today have shown, not least the situation in Somalia, but we cannot launch it to its full extent because we are still far from having completed our transformation from a prevailingly national to a transnational party. This does not mean that we can' t or that we shouldn't start to create some premises for a future commitment, we can mention some basic points around which we will make new proposals, as soon as we are able. One of the fundamental points, in our opinion, is the gathering o
f the countries of the South in regional groups, in a federal style. One of the objectives to pursue with both direct political action on the spot, as the first assembly of the A.R.E.D.A. (Association Radicale pour l'Etat de Droit en Afrique) has already demonstrated, as well as promoting the introduction of special criteria for countries that decide to develop the strategy of true and proper federations in the mechanisms of cooperation, especially in the E.C. For historical reasons of our past and of our current presence and activity in the Sahel region, for the particularly serious financial and social situation in these countries, for the drastic environmental situation due to the vast desertification of the entire region, because many countries in the region have recently initiated democratization processes and finally because they are attempting to organize themselves into an international grouping - the CAO (Communaute de l'Afrique Occidentale) - this could become the laboratory, the place where we sho
uld concentrate our persistent but - alas- little remaining energy.
2.24 The nonviolent party
We have "walked" across Europe and the world. We have crossed on going tragedies and dramas, unresolved problems...trying to show what would be possible and necessary to do IF... If the Radical Party had the strength from memberships, from contributions, from the commitment of thousands of members, if it had the strength from its capacity to live and act with nonviolence, if it were, therefore, strong in its existence...
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PART THREE
A DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE RADICAL PARTY OF TODAY
Our experience as a transnational party is still too limited to allow definite ideas about what the "ideal" statute of a transnational party should or could be like.
It is, however, possible and necessary to draw up a reform of the Radical Party statute which takes account of its current form and of its needs. Among these, of course, is the need to confirm the principles of political organization which have given the Radical Party statute the character of a manifesto of the political theory of liberty, principles which are radically different from those of the church-parties, the army-parties, the bureaucracy-parties and the corrupt and corrupting parties.
This is, of course, a first step; it is clear that the new statute will probably be added to and modified, even substantially modified, in the light of the experience that will gradually be gained during the development of the "new party" into an organized political body, and on the basis of a debate on the problems of the statute which has only just begun.
It is in this spirit and with this intention that the Secretary presents a draft reform of the statute to the Congress, not as a definitive proposal but as a starting point for discussion. The following pages are an attempt to expound the main lines and the criteria of this new draft statute.
FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT RADICAL PARTY STATUTE
It may be worth recalling first of all the fundamental characteristics of the present statute, and of the nature of the party, which we propose to maintain.
A party without party disclipline.
The Radical Party is founded on a rule of liberty, on the free assumption of personal responsibility. The Radical Party statute completely excludes the concept of party discipline; that is, in the final analysis, the regimentation of thought, which remains so even when it is a question of "democratic regimentation", based on majority decisions. Radical Party members, when they do not hold executive office, have only two obligations: to accept the statute and to pay the membership fee. They are not obliged to apply the decisions taken by the party, not even decisions taken by overwhelmimg majority; the decisions are, however, binding for the party organs and for those who accept executive office. The Radical Party is an association of members for the pursuit of political objectives which are freely chosen; an association aimed at increasing the opportunities for personal action, but which does not bind members to support positions which they do not agree with, and which no majority can force them to agr
ee with against their conscience.
The membership card: a sort of bus ticket.
There are only two conditions for joining the Radical party: payment of the membership fee and a commitment to respect the statute. There are no courts or committees that can accept or refuse membership. No-one can pass judgement on the conduct of members or expel them. This naturally means that the party cannot guarantee to cover its members, nor to assume political or moral responsibility for them; the members are completely responsible for their own actions and for the political positions they take up. The debate between them is never "juridically" sanctioned within the party; it is always merely a political debate. Thus the Radical Party is a "service", open to everyone, formed of free persons who remain free persons within the party. A sort of bus where those who pay for their ticket - their membership fee - have the right to complete the journey they have paid for, if they want: a right, and not an obligation.
The role of the congress motion.
In accordance with this framework, a decision only becomes binding, that is it only becomes a party decision in the full sense, when it is adopted by the Congress with a wide majority. It is not, in fact, a question of establishing the "official party position" to which all members are bound: it is a matter, rather, of finding out which initiatives and objectives attract sufficient consensus among members for the party as a whole - an instrument for common objectives - to adopt them as its own, whilst the party does not intervene on issues around which there is no general consensus. This accounts for the principle by which the annual Congress decides on a relatively small number of objectives, those around which general consensus among members has been reached.
In this way, by means of the Congress, in which all members have the right to take part and vote, and which is convened not at the will of the executive officers but at a fixed date, the Radical Party is constituted and reconstituted on the basis of the decisions taken by a majority of two-thirds of the voters. On this basis each member decides whether or not to renew his membership.
A party of this type evidently does not wish and is not authorized to "represent" its members, their ideas and their general interests. It is an instrument, a tool, not a church, an ethnic group, or an army. Its leaders only have a mandate to achieve the aims decided by each Congress of members; beyond this mandate they have no power to represent the members.
The Secretary and the Treasurer.
The figure of the Secretary is consistent with this overall framework. Elected directly by the Congress, he has full responsibility, and the consequent powers, for the implementation of the motion adopted, and answers directly to the next Congress.
Beside the Secretary, and like him elected by the Congress and responsible only to the Congress, the Treasurer has full political responsibility for the party finances; to some extent this gives him powers of veto over the actions of the Secretary, and makes him the "number two" in the party. This balance between the two executive organs of the party underlines one of the most striking characteristics of the statute and the political tradition of the party: the full recognition of the political centrality of finance and budget questions and of the political (even more than moral) necessity that everything regarding income and spending - a decisive aspect of any political body - should be open and transparent, and decided with full political responsibility.
An expensive party.
Related to this aspect is the problem of self-funding and the membership fees. Members join the party in order to support ideas, projects and political battles. People become Radical Party activists in order to uphold their own convictions and hopes. For this reason the party is, and intends to be, "expensive", with a minimum membership fee that is probably one of the highest of all the political parties in the world. This is the guarantee of its independence, the reason for its strength: only a party whose members believe it to be worth at least as much as they are prepared to spend, every day, on a newspaper can hope to represent great ideals.
The transnational and transdivisional party.
Finally, the aspect which has now become central and decisive in the life of the party: in a party with these characteristics there is obviously no incompatibility with membership of another party: in fact membership of another party is natural and almost necessary. The transnational characteristic of the party must be matched by a transdivisional quality: the appeal we make to democrats - who naturally choose different instruments of political action in the context of their own countries - is to be "also Radicals" rather than "only Radicals".
The Radical Party is not, in fact, in competition with any other party, especially with national parties. Its objectives are completely different: it is a party of ideals, of projects and battles, not an electoral party or a party of power. Its symbol is the portrait of Ghandi because its wants to stress that political nonviolence is the current form of political tolerance and democracy. It is, in short, a free association of people who wish to pursue objectives of human rights and democracy beyond frontiers, beyond parties, beyond the confines of traditional politics.
For this very reason the Radical Party as such does not take part in any form of elections. Its activists are obviously free to become candidates in any electoral list or to form electoral lists themselves.
In line with these considerations, the Radical party intends to be a fully-fledged transnational party, and not - like the Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat Internationals - a meeting place for the various national parties whose priority continues to be the national dimension. This explains the decision not to have any form of organization at national level, or at the level of different geographical areas (national sections or federations, etc.), for the natural development of things would inevitably lead to a transformation of the Radical Party into a federation or confederation of national groups.
THE CENTRAL POINTS OF THE DISCUSSION
The main questions of the discussion on the new statute can be grouped together as follows:
1) how to ensure that the Congress actually manages to express the common wishes of members who live so far apart and come from such different backgrounds;
2) how to avoid the formation of "national" Radical Parties and at the same time ensure that members can set up organizations or associations, necessarily on a local basis, to allow them to meet and work together;
3) how to give sufficient weight in the statute to the new nature of the transnational party as an authoritative party, mainly due today to the presence of so many parliamentarians from so many countries. Taking account of the fact that it is now obviously impossible to automatically include all the new parliamentarians in the executive organs of the party.
4) how to solve the many economic and logistic difficulties of organizing meetings of the party organs (the Congress, the Council).
THE CONGRESS MOTION
A transnational and transdivisional party can only come into being if it really manages to realize the model of "an encounter between different forces" on common objectives and in view of these objectives. This requirement is much more pressing for the "new party" than it was for the "Italian" Radical Party, just as the difficulties of achieving the aim are much greater due to the widely varying starting points, concerns and priorities of each member, and due to the fact that the problems of communication and mutual understanding are much more decisive.
What is crcial at this point is the way in which the common objectives are decided on, the way in which the Congress motion is adopted. Our experience in the "Italian" party was that the motion voted by majority in a Congress at which a large number of members were present managed to express the "general will" of the party. How can we reach the same result with a Congress such as that of the transnational party, in which quite a large proportion of members cannot take part? A motion which emerges only from the debate of those present at the Congress may not reflect the thoughts, the feelings, and the will of large sectors of the party, of the many members who are not able to attend the Congress for reasons of distance or cost; apart from the question of democratic legitimacy, the danger is that many people might find that the motion does not reflect their own priorities, that they may not feel it to be their own and therefore would not work for the realization of its objectives. This could threaten the
very existence of the party as a place of true encounter and unity between transnational and transdivisional forces.
We must find a procedure for the expression of the will of the Congress which leads the Congress to be the final stage of a process, the stage in which the choices made by the body of the party are defined and synthesized. At the same time we must protect the current form of the Congress, that is with the direct participation of members: compared to the system of delegation, this has the advantage of allowing more direct and more intense participation, although with the difficulties mentioned above. We must, therefore, provide for adequate preparation in the period leading up to the Congress. The solution we have decided on is to set up "Area Congresses" and a "Co-ordinating Committee" as a means of preparing the work of the Congress.
The idea of "Area Congresses" comes from the experience of the "Italian Congresses" of the Radical Party. It involves congresses in which members from certain geographical areas meet together. (They are not called national congresses to show that, where possible, the territorial area can include several countries; but clearly in most cases the congresses will be at national level. What is important is that all members of the Party should be able to attend.) There is, without doubt, a risk with area congresses: that they might lead to the birth of "national Radical Parties", and therefore alter the essential nature of the Party. In order to avoid this risk, we propose that these congresses should not elect organs, except representatives on the General Council and the Co-ordinating Committee. After the transnational Congress, the area congresses serve to give members the opportunity to discuss the implementation of the Congress motion in their own area, and to put forward proposals to the party organs. Be
fore the transnational Congress, on the other hand, the area congresses are called on to vote (by majority) on their political priorities and proposals for the Congress motion, and to nominate their represenatatives on the Co-ordinating Committee. The task of the Co-ordinating Committee is to draw up a political summary of the documents produced by the area congresses, underlining the points of convergence. The summary is then sent to all members and constitutes the basis for the congress debate.
In this way the transnational Congress will be able to work from a document that contains the elements that are common to most of the proposals of the area congresses and therefore represents an initial synthesis of the ideas that have developed in the party.
For these reasons, it is more essential than it was in the past to arrive at a motion approved by a qualified majority: our proposal is for a two-thirds majority. To this end, the Congress rules must include discussion and voting procedures that ensure that this objective can be achieved. For example: times and procedures for voting on Congress motions so that if a motion does not obtain the majority vote required it can be emended and voted on once again; or, in the case of a vote on opposing motions, a repetition of the vote on the motion which obtained a simple majority, as sometimes happens at American congresses in order to give full backing to a candidate elected by a small majority - until a sufficient common platform which reflects the "general will" of members is reached.
Again in order to ensure that the motion represents positions common to the majority of members, including those who are not physically present, in the definition of the procedures for the presentation of motions the rules of Congress establish that a motion cannot be accepted unless it is backed by at least one third of the members of the Co-ordinating Committee.
MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATIONS
One point which remains unchanged with respect to the old statute, and is in fact stated more explicitly, is the absence of obligations for members. One point which has been eliminated, on the other hand, is the requirement for members to form associations (a requirement that was laid down in theory by the old statute). Especially during the present phase, with the very different backgrounds and needs which are coming together for the first time, and with the fact that we still have to get to know each other sufficiently well, it would be pointless to try to dictate uniform rules governing the formation of associations; and since we cannot establish rules, it follows that we cannot establish obligations regarding associations.
Memebers can therefore form associations if and when they think it necessary; in no case, however, do such associations have the right to speak in the name of the party or to try to establish a monopoly over party members in a particular geographical area. The party as such exists from the level of the transnational Congress "upwards"; only the central organs are authorized to represent it or to speak in its name. The meeting place for the members in one country and the stimulus for the formation of associations is the Area Congress, which is convened by the party organs. The associations do not as such have representatives on the General Council; on the other hand, as we mentioned above, the Area Congresses elect representatives to the Co-ordinating Committee, the exact number to be established in proportion to the number of members in the respective areas so that all the various areas will be represented without the formation of national Radical Parties.
THE "PARTY OF PARLIAMENTARIANS"
In order to give sufficient weight to the presence of parliamentarians, the solution we propose is the constitution of an Assembly of Radical Parliamentarians, whose task would be to plan and co-ordinate initiatives in the various parliaments. The Assembly will designate 25 of its members to represent the parliamentarians on the party's General Council.
THE CONGRESS
Both for economic reasons and for political reasons (the time necessary for the new organs to take office, to plan their activities and bring them to successful conclusion), we cannot propose to continue to hold the Congress annually. We propose that it should be held once every two years.
A central role in the Congress will be played by the Co-ordinating Committee, which represents the orientation of the party as it has developed before the Congress. The Committee will present the document of synthesis in view of the discussion and drafting of the motion.
The Committee, formed in the months immediately preceding the Congress, completes its mandate and ceases to exist when the Congress itself comes to an end.
For the procedures for arriving at the vote on the motion, see the outline given above.
The agenda of the Congress will be approved by the General Council on the proposal of the Secretary. The proposed order of proceedings and rules of the Congress will be presented by the General Council, on the suggestion of the executive organs.
THE GENERAL COUNCIL
The General Council replaces the present Federal Council. Since the Congress involves the direct participation of members rather than of delegates, it obviously cannot elect the entire General Council. We propose that it should be composed as follows: 25 members elected by the Congress, 25 members elected by the Assembly of Parliamentarians, and the other members elected by the Area Congresses according to the system outlined above.
With regard to the duties of the General Council, too, we must remember that it is much more difficult and much more expensive to organize meetings than it was for the Federal Council of the Italian party. We propose that the General Council should ordinarily be convened once a year, with the possibility of convening extraordinary meetings.
One significant change with respect to the old statute is related to the fact that the Congress will be held once every two years: the proposal that the General Council, and not the Congress, should be responsible for discussing and approving the party accounts. The accounts must, in fact, be approved every year, which means that the task cannot be entrusted to the Congress. It is also our experience that it is extremely difficult to achieve serious discussion of the party accounts at meetings of the Congress.
Another change that we propose is the institution of a budget, to be examined once again by the General Council.
The General Council is also responsible, on the proposal of the Secretary, for the definition of the geographical areas relative to the Area Congresses. In view of the establishment of new rules to make it easier to obtain a qualified majority in Congress, we propose to abolish the Council's power to render binding a motion approved by the Congress with a simple majority; and also to abolish the Council's power to overturn, by unanimous vote, a decision of the Congress.
Apart from these changes, the powers of the General Council are substantially unchanged with respect to those of the present Federal Council. As well as expressing its opinions on the implementation of the motion, that is, the Council can decide with "congressual" powers on matters remitted to it by the Congress (for example, motions which the Congress has not had time to discuss, or matters believed by Congress to require further examination); thus, with "congressual" powers, it can decide on initiatives not dealt with by Congress, considering the fact that the party may well be called upon to take binding decisions in relation to events which occur between one Congress and the next.
EXECUTIVE ORGANS
As we have already said, there are no substantial changes in the framework of executive organs. As regards the Treasurer, the statute states explicitly that it is his duty to promote initiatives for self-financing and to find ways of attracting financial support.
THE PRESIDENT
The figure of the President is instituted by the statute, and is assigned the role of guarantor and interpreter of the statute. The President has the task of chairing the Congress, the General Council and the Co-ordinating Committee.
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DRAFT STATUTE OF THE RADICAL PARTY
PREAMBLE TO THE STATUTE
The Radical Party
proclaims justice and law, also political objectives of the Radical Party,
proclaims the respect of justice and law as the insuperable source of the legitimacy of the institutions,
proclaims the duty of disobedience, non-collaboration, conscientious objection, the supreme forms of nonviolent struggle for the defence, with life, of life, justice and law.
Calls on itself, and on every person who wishes to hope in life, in peace, in justice and in freedom, strictly to respect and actively to defend the following two fundamental laws:
The Declaration of the Rights of Man (with the hope that the expression will be changed to "Rights of the Person") and the European Convention on the Rights of Man, as well as those constitutions which respect the principles contained in the two charters; and to refuse to obey and acknowledge the legitimacy of those who violate them, who do not apply them, who reduce them to verbose and merely non-peremptory declarations, that is to non-laws.
Declares the commandment "do not kill" to have the value of a historically absolute law, without exceptions, not even that of legitimate defence.
STATUTE
1. THE PARTY
1.1. Structures and organs.
1.1.1. The Radical Party is a transnational political body.
The organs of the Radical Party are the Congress, the Assembly of Parliamentarians, the General Council, the Co-ordinating Committee, the Area Congresses, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the College of Auditors.
1.1.2. Members can form Radical associations.
Non-Radical associations and groups which pursue their own political ends can become federate members of the Radical Party.
1.2. Finances
1.2.1. The finances of the party come from the fees paid by individual members, the contributions of non-Radical associations or groups who become federate members of the party in accordance with art.4, from other contributions - including those of persons or bodies who have no associative links with the party - and also from specific activities and initiatives that are to be proposed, publicly and in advance, by the Secretary and the Treasurer, and from contributions from public sources (local, national, or international bodies), on condition that they are approved by the Congress or the General Council. The party accounts are public and are prepared in the form of accounts sheets drawn up according to the standards of orderly book-keeping. The criteria for the drawing-up of the accounts and the accounts sheets, as well as the budget, are decided by the Treasurer and approved by the General Council.
1.2.2 The minimum fee for membership of the Radical Party is set by the Congress in relation to the pro capita gross national product (GNP) of the country of residence of each member. For countries in which membership may lead to persecution by the authorities, payment of the membership fee is voluntary.
1.3. The members of the Radical Party
1.3.1. Any one can join the Radical Party. Membership is annual.
The conditions for membership of the party are acceptance of the present statute and payment of the membership fee set by the Congress.
Enrolments are collected by the executive organs of the party.
Members are not bound to any party discipline and, except in the case of resignation, cannot be deprived of their status as members for the entire period of the membership.
2. THE PARTY ORGANS
2.1. The Congress
2.1.1. The Congress is the the deliberative organ of the party, whose political orientation it establishes, setting out specific objectives and deciding on areas of activity. The ordinary Congress takes place every two years, and must be convened by the Secretary for the last two months of the two-year period. The extraordinary Congress can be convened by the Secretary, by the General Council (with an absolute majority of its members), and by one third of those members who have been in the party for at least six months.
The Congress is formed of the members of the Radical Party. Representatives of non-Radical associations and groups can attend in the numbers and the ways established by the agreements of support.
2.1.2. Policy motions adopted by a majority of two-thirds of members are binding for the executive organs.
The rules of the Congress establish procedures for the discussion and voting of motions to enable a two-thirds majority to be reached on general political motions. In laying down the procedures for the presentation of political motions, the rules also establish that they must be backed by at least one third of the members of the Co-ordinating Committee.
2.1.3 The Congress
a) elects the President of the Radical Party;
b) elects the Secretary of the Radical Party, and ratifies the Secretariat proposed by the Secretary;
c) elects the Treasurer of the Radical Party, and ratifies the Treasury Committee proposed by the Treasurer;
d) elects 25 members of the General Council;
e) elects the College of Auditors;
f) sets the membership fee.
2.2. The Assembly of Parliamentarians
2.2.1 The Assembly of Parliamentarians is the organ which, in collaboration with the other organs of the party, plans and co-ordinates action at legislative and parliamentary level for the implementation of the Congress motion.
It is formed of all the parliamentarians who are members of the Radical Party and is convened by the Secretary and chaired by the President of the Party.
Its meetings are attended by the Secretary and the Secretariat, and the Treasurer and the Treasury Committee.
In a special meeting during the Congress it elects 25 of its members to the General Council.
2.3. The General Council
2.3.1. The General Council is composed of:
- 25 members elected by the transnational Congress;
- 25 members elected by the Assembly of Parliamentarians;
- members elected by the Area Congress according to the following criteria:
areas with between 11 and 50 members of the RP = 1 member
areas with between 51 and 200 members of the RP = 2 members
areas with between 201 and 1000 members of the RP = 3 members
areas with more than 1001 members of the RP = 4 members
- representatives of non-Radical associations and groups who support the Party according to the criteria established by the agreement of support.
The Secretary, the Secretariat, the Treasurer and the Treasury Committee attend the meetings of the General Council, though without the right to vote.
The General Council is chaired by the President of the Party and meets once a year. Extraordinary meetings may be convened by the Secretary or on the request of at least one third of its members.
2.3.2. The General Council
a) approves the budget submitted to it by the executive organs before its first meeting, as well as subsequent updates. Approves the annual final accounts presented by the Treasurer and checked by the auditors;
b) deliberates, with congressual powers, on matters which have been remitted to it by the Congress;
c) expresses its opinion on initiatives for the implementation of the decisions of the Congress;
d) passes judgement on initiatives not dealt with by the Congress; when the judgement is expressed with a two-thirds majority, the executive organs must implement it;
e) expresses its opinion on initiatives regarding financial policy which are submitted to it by the Treasurer;
f) on the matters referred to in the previous points, it can make proposals and ask the executive for information;
g) on the proposal of the Secretary, it determines the geographical areas referred to in art.2.4.1.;
h) on the proposal of the Secretary, it ratifies by simple majority the federation agreements of non-Radical associations and groups;
i) on the initiative of the Secretary, it approves the agenda and the proposal for the Presidency, the rules, and the order of proceedings of the Congress; it presents a report to Congress.
2.4. The Area Congresses
2.4.1. The Area Congresses are attended by all the members in a particular geographical area, which may or may not coincide with a particular country. The areas are determined by the General Council, on the proposal of the Secretary, before the convocation referred to in point b) below.
The Area Congresses meet ordinarily once a year, within the following deadlines and with the following tasks;
a) within three months of the end of the transnational Congress, to discuss the implementation of the Congress motion in the particular geographical area and to propose consequent initiatives for the action of the executive organs of the party in the particular area.
On this occasion they elect their representatives on the General Council;
b) within the period between the seventh and the fourth month before the transnational Congress, to put forward indications of political priorities and proposals for initiatives to be included in the Congress motion. These indications and proposals must be adopted by a two-thirds majority.
On this occasion, each Area Congress elects one member to represent it on the Co-ordinating Committee, assigning him the task of illustrating the indications and proposals voted for and of supporting the views expressed by the Congress.
2.4.2. The Area Congresses cannot elect organs or adopt decisions that are binding for the organs of the party and associations. They are a forum for discussion among members and facilitate the constitution of associations of members.
2.5. The Co-ordinating Committee
2.5.1 The Co-ordinating Commitee is composed of the President of the Party, who chairs it, the Secretary, the Treasurer, and one representative of each Area Congress.
Its task is to co-ordinate and synthesise the different proposals for political priorities and initiatives adopted by the Area Congresses, so that, well in adavance of the Congress, it can send a basic platform for the elaboration of Congress motions to all members and then present the platform to the Congress.
2.6. The President
2.6.1. The President of the Party is elected by the Congress: his mandate lasts until the following Congress.
The President checks on the observance of the statute, settles the differences of interpretation of the statute between other party organs, chairs the Congress, with the help of the Presidency proposed by the General Council and ratified by the Congress, and chairs the General Council and the Co-ordinating Committee.
2.7. The Secretary
2.7.1. The Secretary is elected by the Congress and is responsible for the implementation of the policy of the Radical Party, in keeping with the general motion voted by the Congress. His mandate lasts until the following Congress. The Secretary is assisted by a Secretariat formed of a minimum of five and a maximum of ten members, nominated by the Secretary himself and ratified by the Congress or, with the authorization of the Congress, by the General Council. The Secretary can delegate specific duties to members of the Secretariat.
The Secretary is the legal representative of the Radical Party, with the exceptions referred to in art.2.8. In particular, in the exercise of this legal representation, he proposes all the judicial actions he believes necessary for the safeguard of the rights and the interests of the Party and represents the Party in such actions.
The Secretary
a) takes all the action he believes necessary for the achievement of the objectives that have been set;
b) can ask the opinion of the General Council on the implementation of the decisions of Congress and on the pronouncements of the Council itself;
c) proposes to the General Council initiatives on which the Congress has not given its opinion;
d) convenes the Assembly of Parliamentarians, the General Council, the Party Congress and the Area Congresses;
e) promotes agreements for the federation to the Party of non-Radical associations and groups to be submitted for ratification by the General Council.
2.8. The Treasurer
2.8.1. The Treasurer is elected by the Congress. His mandate lasts until the following Congress. He is assisted by a Treasury Committee composed of a minimum of three and a maximum of five members, nominated by the Treasurer himself and ratified by the Congress or, with the authorization of the Congress, by the General Council. The Treasurer can delegate specific duties to members of the Treasury Committee.
He administers the funds at the disposal of the Party and is responsible for their management. He promotes initiatives for self-funding and the acquisition of any other financial resources; he reports on these initiatives, to hear its opinion, to the General Council.
He is the legal representative of the Party in relation to all its financial and economic activities. In agreement with the Secretary, he presents the budget and subsequent updates to the General Council and presents the annual final accounts, once they have been approved by the auditors, to the General Council.
2.9. The College of Auditors
2.9.1. The College of Auditors is composed of three members elected by Congress. It has the power to revise and inspect the accounts; it approves the budget and presents a financial report on the final accounts to the General Council.
3. RADICAL ASSOCIATIONS
3.1.1. Radical associations are formed by members of the Party who join together to achieve specific objectives determined by the Congress motion or for independently determined political or cultural aims.
They speak in the name of the members who join them and not in the name of the Radical Party as a whole, and do not have the right to monopolize the organized presence of the Radical Party in a particular geographical area.
They are self-financed and create their own organs and regulations.
4. FEDERATED NON-RADICAL ASSOCIATIONS AND GROUPS
4.1.1. Non-Radical associations and groups which pursue their own aims, political, cultural or other, can become federate members of the Radical Party in order to carry out specific political initiatives for common aims. The federation of such associations or groups does not involve the enrolment in the Party of their members or supporters. The period of federation may also be limited in time or determined in advance.
Federation takes place on the basis of agreements between the executive organs of non-Radical associations or groups and the organs of the Radical Party. For the Radical Party the agreements are concluded by the Secretary and ratified by the General Council. The agreements specify the amount and the form of payment of the financial contribution to the federal party on the part of the association or group which becomes a federate member, the commitments for mutual support, and the forms and level of representation of the federate associations or groups on the organs of the party.
