ABSTRACT: Analyses behaviours, accomplishments and failures of the U.N. in the most important and emblematic peacekeeping operations: Somalia and Bosnia: their failure could mean a surge of "the classical pillars of international policy: non-interference, [...] use of force only in cases of direct threats to the national interests". The two missions in Somalia and in Bosnia are undermined by "opposite" defects. In the former Yugoslavia there is a refusal to "use military force". In Somalia instead it has been applied "excessively and too late". What is the lesson to be drawn from these experiences? According to the author, before resorting to military force, the international community should learn how to use "non-violent" methods ("monitoring centres", "bodies of disarmed volunteers", "Radio and Tele Liberty", etc). At any rate, a real U.N. "army" will need to be formed, diverting the resources that are now devoted to the national armies.

(1994 - IL QUOTIDIANO RADICALE, 9 November 1993)

It is paradoxical that the first attempts made by the U.S. to offer its military capacities to the international community should be judged according to the parameters of the unilateral ventures that were typical of the superpowers during the Cold War. The battle in Mogadishu on 3 and 4 October between the U.S. forces and the faction of General Aidid has caused deep shock in the American public opinion, which now views a withdrawal from the operation with favour. There is the danger that a failure of the missions in Somalia or in Bosnia could lead to a surge of the traditional pillars of international politics: non-interference in the domestic affairs of the States, use of force only in the event of a direct threat to its national interests.

This is a consequence of several mistakes, which are all related. While it is true that the U.N. is spending much of its credibility in the operations in Bosnia and in Somalia, it is unfortunately also true that it is making bad use of it - so bad that it could obscure the success of the major operation successfully completed in Cambodia. To some extent, the two missions are undermined by opposite defects: in the former Yugoslavia the international community refuses to use military force although it is evident that this would be the only way to stop the aggressors, avoid the division of the country and, ultimately, fulfil the operation's humanitarian tasks. In Somalia instead military force has been used excessively and too late: the factions could have been disarmed in the beginning, in parallel with the distribution of aid and thus causing little or no opposition; or they could have been lead both to cooperate in the humanitarian phase of the mission and to negotiate an agreement for the country's politica

l transition (as the U.N. representative seemed about to conclude in Somalia before Howe arrived).

What lesson can be drawn from the current events in Bosnia and Somalia? The first and most important one is that of listening to the suggestions of the military themselves, namely the Americans who insist on this aspect: the armed forces are used only as an ultimate solution, when the use of all other means has proven useless. The military must be charged with clear missions, with clear, well-defined objectives that can be pursued without any political interference in the execution of the operations.

But before resorting to a military intervention, the U.N. and the international community should learn how to explore other non-military, non-violent means that precede and possibly avert the use of force: for instance, setting up a monitoring centre capable of immediately alerting the crises before the conflicts break out openly.

The question is setting up, in all parts of the world, dozens of Radio and Tele Liberty (yes, on the model of the non-violent means which the West ultimately owes its victory to in the Cold War) to carry out aggressive information campaigns against violations of the rule of law. The problem is disposing of a body of unarmed volunteers, "recruited" thanks to legislative formulas of the kind introduced in the Italian law on conscientious objection thanks to a radical amendment, to which to entrust the more specifically and clearly humanitarian missions: distribution of food aid, health prophylaxis, reconstruction of civil institutions, etc.

Its crazy for the U.N. to use armed forces for missions of this kind, antagonizing the populations that receive the aid and causing frustration in the military themselves. The establishment of such structures and non-violent and non-military capacities as well as a U.N. "army" could be reached without huge difficulties, diverting on them the savings obtained with the disbanding of the anachronistic national armies.

Obviously, cases where the United Nations were to be forced to use both military force and civil resources must be foreseen. When, for instance, they are used in the trusteeship of a country, as occurred in Cambodia once the agreement of the four main factions had been reached. But it would also be possible in Bosnia or Somalia, despite the lack of agreement among the various factions. Everything is possible provided the obsession of giving purely military answers to political crises is done away with, and priority is given to non-violent and non-military solutions.

Marco De Andreis