by Marco De AndreisIt's hard for a country used to acting unilaterally to conform to multilateralism and interdependence
ABSTRACT: Analyses the reactions in America following the crisis of the U.N. missions in Bosnia and Somalia. While criticism to the commitment in the Horn of Africa has grown, it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. government decide to leave the mission in Somalia to resume a "realist approach". Discusses whether a foreign policy that calls itself such is really realistic. Problems today are global, "democracy and rule of law coincide perfectly with the interests of any given person", namely with those of an American citizen. On the other hand, "it is objectively hard for a country used to acting unilaterally to conform to multilateralism, interdependence, and discussing their actions on the international scene with others". Also, "this is unknown territory for everyone". There are things that an important organization such as the U.N. cannot learn to do overnight. That is why continuing the project is pushing them forward is another of the "insane" and "unrealistic" objectives of the transnational radical par
ty.
(1994 - IL QUOTIDIANO RADICALE, November 12th 1993)
Whether we like it or not, the United State's guidelines play a key role in the future of the United Nations. This both for historical reasons (the U.N. is an American invention) and financial ones (the Americans provide for a quarter of the U.N. budget and almost a third of peace-keeping operations costs). Unfortunately, the unquestionable difficulties the U.N. missions in Bosnia and Somalia are facing have given a helping hand to the so-called realists, i.e. those who believe that force regulates international relations, and that each State should do no more than pursue its own national interests. Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and secretary of State under the Nixon Administration, misses out on no opportunity to repeat that the United States should never have gotten involved in Somalia, and that it would do good to withdraw as soon as possible. The Soviet antagonist having disappeared, there are no vital interests to be defended in the Horn of Africa, and the safety of the U.S. citizens does n
ot depend on what is going on in Mogadishu. Judging from the opinion polls, these U.S. citizens seem for the most part to favour the withdrawal of the troops from Somalia.
In theory, President Clinton should take little heed of Kissinger and his opinions, since his electoral foreign policy platform envisioned instead multilateralism and the pursuit of global interests based on consent. But in practice this American administration is so seriously at a loss when it comes to defining foreign policy that a complete swing back to the realist approach cannot be ruled out.
But are the realists truly realist? To what extent are theories and men that have characterized the cold war still in contact with reality? Very little, in our view, and this is clearly revealed by the narrow-mindedness with which the question of the national interest is still posed. Is it not in the interest of the citizens of any nation that the law regulate relations among individuals and among States? The fact that entire populations are being decimated by malnutrition or war can only jeopardize, in the long term, the safety of the remaining inhabitants of the earth. We need only think of the phenomenon of the refugees. Democracy and rule of law coincide perfectly with the interests of any given person. Particularly so if this person is a U.S. citizen, since these concepts underlie that country's set of political values; and secondly because their upholding should no longer be subordinated to the need of avoiding a nuclear conflict, as it was during the cold war in Kissinger's time. These considerations,
which are so self-evident to the transnational radical party, sound relatively new in the American political debate. Partly because it is objectively hard for a country used to acting unilaterally to conform to multilateralism, interdependence, and discussing their actions on the international scene with others. And also because this is unknown territory for everyone, not just the U.S.: the Charter of the United Nations has never been fully applied, and these are but the first attempts of the international community. Groping in the dark and committing miscalculations is only logical. But the only solution is to keep on trying, drawing on past experience. With hindsight we now know a lot of things: that the Serbian expansionism should have been stopped at its onset; that the Somali factions should have been disarmed while delivering humanitarian aid for the population; that, always in Somalia, it would have probably been better to negotiate with all factions rather than to concentrate all forces against one
in particular. And so on.
The capability of handling the instruments of mediation, the peaceful solution of the conflicts, the preventive measures, the threat and use of military force, is not something a complex and massive organization such as the United Nations can easily learn. A number of specific circumstances, moreover, have further complicated matters. It is a well-known fact, for instance, that the current Secretary-General Boutros Ghali has a particularly strong personality, which ultimately conflicts with what Washington considers an implicitly acquired right, i.e. commanding operations where there is a strong U.S. participation. However, there is no alternative but to continue affirming the international law and extending the role of the United Nations. This is proved also by the fact that the American public opinion itself, which seems to favour a withdrawal from Somalia, deems unacceptable that Haiti is prevented from inaugurating the democratically elected president. The case of Haiti is a far cry from the nonchalance
and determination with which the United States invaded Granada ten years ago.
Both the U.N. and the United States are halfway through the crossing, and pushing them forward is another of the "insane" and "unrealistic" objectives of the transnational radical party.
Marco De Andreis.