The U.N. peace mission in Maputo is considered a success. People have stopped starving and the bloodshed has ceased. But this is no sensational news.

Boutros Ghali's envoy, Aldo Ajello, reports on the construction oc peace and on the link between its maintenance and the solution of the food problem. The answer lies, for the moment, in development programmes.

ABSTRACT: In October 1992, Mr. Ajello was appointed U.N. special representative for the peace operation in Mozambique. After a difficult start his mission is beginning to develop, and today it is considered a "success". Why? First of all because the warring parties "strongly want peace". In the second place because an effort has been made to be in "harmony with the local culture and traditions", without imposing external measures in developing the peace program and the election program. Lastly, a strong relation has been established between the peace operation and the aid programme. There follows a description of the mechanisms put into practice in order to carry out this mission work, where the problem of starvation has been tackled as the only solution to defuse the circle of bloodshed and violence. Thanks to this formula, starvation has disappeared in Mozambique and the cease-fire has been successfully implemented. Lastly the author provides a description of the measures put into practice to re-integrate

the military and the problems arising in this sector.

[followed by a short biography of Aldo Ajello]

(1994 - IL QUOTIDIANO RADICALE - 8 December 1993)

4 October 1992: the peace treaty was signed in Mozambique. 10 October: the United Nations Secretary General appoints me as his Special Representative for the peace operation in Mozambique. 15 October: I arrived in Maputo with twenty military observers and two civilian officials. The adventure begins. Today, a year later, the Mozambique operation has a staff of seven thousand units, 6500 soldiers and 500 civilians. Italy, Bangladesh, Botswana, Uruguay and Zambia have provided the majority of troops. After an adventurous start, when Renamo attacked 4 towns and villages, the situation was under control and peace was enforced without any further important violations of the cease-fire. The mission continues at a slower pace than was expected, but it heads in the right direction and it is appropriately considered a success. Next year, in October, it should come to an end with the first democratic elections.

What is the element that worked in Mozambique and did not work elsewhere? What is the peculiarity that has made the operation in Mozambique a success, so far at least, while many other missions face countless difficulties? First of all an objective difference. In Mozambique both parties have a strong desire for peace, and are willing to accept any compromise that may be necessary to obtain peace and consolidate it. The recent history of the post cold war period has shown that the United Nations can help the peace process but cannot impose it.

But there many other differences that should not be underestimated. Firstly, in order to be effective the peace process must be carried out in conformity with the local culture and traditions. Peace agreements are often developed with the characteristic parameters of the western culture, which does not always correspond to the African culture. The concept of constructive opposition, for instance, a pillar of the Western democracies, does not exist in the African tradition, where the leadership is single and unquestionable. There are instead cultural references that enable to integrate the elections with the African political tradition as a means to choose the leader. The concept of legitimation referred to the candidate's qualities, combined with the concept of dynastic legitimation proper, provides this link and makes feasible the election system without causing cultural traumas and consequently without falsehood. In Mozambique we took all of these factors into account and on the basis of an excellent peace

treaty, the result of two years of patient activity, we began building peace. Another important peculiarity is the relation between peace operations, emergency aid and development aid. When I arrived in Mozambique, I soon realized the importance of food aid for the success of my mission. The country was still suffering the consequences of a long period of drought. PAM and the Red Cross, with the support of the Mozambique agency for emergency aid, were distributing food aid among serious difficulties and dangers in the areas controlled by Renamo and in the ones controlled by the government. It was necessary for this aid to continue to be distributed without risks and restrictions, so that it could reach homogeneously the four groups it was intended for: demobilized soldiers, refugees, displaced persons and the local population. The lack of food aid, as well as a diversity in treatment among these four groups, would have automatically triggered an outburst of violence. In a country where there are millions of

weapons without any form of control, if food had lacked, an AK 47, best known as Kalashnikov, would have become the most effective means to obtain it and to secure the survival of one's own family.

In a situation of this kind any attempt to disarm the two armies, demobilize the soldiers and integrate them into civilian life would have been over-ambitious. The link between the operation for the establishment and maintenance of peace and the solution of the food problem struck me as extremely evident.

The equation hunger-violence, hunger-destabilization, hunger-war, which we had theorized when fighting against starvation, was there for me to solve if I wanted to carry out my mission successfully.

There was only one way to solve it: making the problem of starvation in the top priority of the peace mission in Mozambique.

First I had to guarantee the quantity of food that was necessary and make it available as soon as possible. Second, I had to secure its free circulation, guaranteeing the security of the communication lines through an adequate number of troops. Third, I had to check over its regular distribution. An efficient coordinating structure was needed, without implying additional costs to the mission's budge. The UNOHAC was thus created, consisting of personnel provided by the agencies committed in the aid themselves. UNOHAC was not a bureaucratic supra-structure that claimed to give instructions to the operative agencies. From the very beginning it was devised instead as a service structure. Under its protection the U.N. system proved that it can work harmoniously and efficiently. Thanks to the efficiency of the adopted formula, in Mozambique people are not starving any more, the cease-fire has been successfully implemented, and the bloodshed has stopped. In conclusion, Mozambique does not make the headlines, it is

not mentioned by the media and consequently it does not exist. In this way nobody knows that one of the most successful peace missions has been carried out thanks to food security as a condition and primary requirement for its maintenance.

The problem now is link emergency aid with the development problems, not just theoretically but in actual fact. Peace in Mozambique is possible thanks to the demobilization of at least 75.000 units, between officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The problem of integrating the soldiers into civilian life is relatively easy. With an integration compensation corresponding to six months of wages, and the supply of seeds and agricultural tools, these soldiers will return to their native villages and will take up their former life pattern. 16.000 soldiers have already been re-integrated, and we know that going back to their villages and to farming is their greatest ambition. The difficult part will be convincing 30.00 more to join the new army.

The situation for officers and non-commissioned officers is different. There are no less than 25.000 of them and they have a fairly high educational level. Many have attended military academies in the former Soviet Union or in other Eastern countries. Turning this particular category of military into proletarians or even worse into unemployed would make the whole process of demobilization unfeasible and would trigger a surge of destabilizing violence. A fresh outbreak of street violence has already been reported, fostered by unpaid soldiers. In other cases the troops rebel, take hostages and ask to be paid salary arrears.

For the time being the situation is under control thanks to the presence of U.N. troops. But the Mozambican soldiers who protest because they have not been paid are right, and repression is no solution. The only effective solution is the definition of development programmes ensuring a decent future for these soldiers in civilian life. Otherwise we will create the conditions for social conflicts that would irreparably destabilize the country. If we want to help Mozambique become a democratic country with a market economy we must encourage the creation and the strengthening of a national middle-class. It would be most inappropriate if the first step of our help were destroying the small middle-class that exists in the country.

---------------------------------------

From politics to U.N. missions

Aldo Ajello, 58, born in Palermo, was appointed Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Mozambique in October 1992, immediately after the Rome agreements between the government and the Renamo rebels were signed.

Ajello began his activity in the United Nations after about ten years of parliamentary activity. His political career began in 1976, when he was elected Senator on the lists of the Socialist Party; in the Senate he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission. Up to 1979 he was chairman of the European Parliament Commission for the Protection of the Environment and of Consumers.

In the same year he was elected to Parliament for Eastern Sicily on the lists of the Radical Party. At the Chamber he has been a member of the Finance and Treasury Commission, then of the Foreign Affairs Commission.

In 1984 he quit parliamentary activity. Mr. Ajello was appointed Under-secretary of the United Nations, and chairman of the European UNDP office in Geneva. He then moved in New York, where he ran the office for foreign relations for the same body. In 1992 he was appointed to Mozambique, with the office of deputy Secretary-General. He is a member of the Radical Party.