Toward a Sensible International Drug Policy

March 1992

The Drug Policy Foundation

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Summary: Trends in Drug Production and Trafficking

and Recommendations for a Sensible Drug Policy

Introduction: Time to Reassess International Drug Policy

Section 1: U.S. Drug Policy Overemphasizes Law Enforcement

and Militarization

Section 2: The State of the Drug War in Latin America

· Colombia

· Peru

· Bolivia

· Panama

Section 3: The Andean Strategy - A "New" Policy Repeats

Old Mistakes

Section 4: Conclusions and Recommendations

Appendix: Drug Policy Foundation

Boards of Directors and Advisors

* * *

THE ANDEAN STRATEGY RECONSIDERED

Worldwide Trends in Drug Production and Trafficking

Indicate Failure of U.S. Approach

· According to the U.S. State Department, drug supplies worldwide have increased since 1987. Total production of mature coca leaf has increased from 291,100 to 337,100 metric tons; opium production has gone from 2,242 metric tons a year to 3,249; and total production of marijuana outside of the U.S. has increased from 13,693 to 23,650 metric tons.

· Countries that have been the focus of the drug war continue to be heavily involved in drug production, processing and transit. In Colombia, new cartels have joined the Cali cartel in replacing the

Medellin group after its fracturing, and these organizations are turning to heroin trafficking as well. The U.S. General Accounting Office reports that Panama is now more involved in the drug trade than when Gen. Manuel Noriega was in charge. The drug wars in Bolivia and Peru are stalled due to local resistance and other

threats.

· More countries in Latin America are getting involved in various aspects of the drug business, including Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina and Suriname.

· Even though U.S. expenditures on the drug war have escalated, drug seizures have remained stable-not even keeping up with expanded drug production. Availability of drugs in the United States has increased.

THE ANDEAN STRATEGY RECONSIDERED

Recommendations for an Alternative International Drug Policy:

· Cease militarization of the drug war abroad, beginning by ordering home all Defense Department personnel and other quasi military representatives of U.S. agencies fighting the drug war. They are an overly expensive component of the drug war, producing little impact and threatening to entangle the United States in political wars, especially in Peru.

· Stop glossing over human rights issues in anti drug efforts. The Bush administration has consistently ignored the implications of its own reports on human rights violations by the Peruvian and Colombian militaries. The practice of providing aid in spite of ongoing rights violations can only be seen as an encouragement to those institutions and as a disgrace to the United States.

· Reverse U.S. anti drug funding priorities for the Latin American region. Current drug policy funding is split heavily in favor of military and law enforcement aid instead of economic development assistance. New priorities should reflect the real hope for reducing drug trafficking, specifically alternative industries and responsible development in the source countries.

· Stop pressuring Latin American countries to adopt the U.S. drug war. In particular, the so called anti drug"certification standard" requiring compliance with all U.S. drug war initiatives for economic aid should be abolished. The Andean nations should not be forced to use their militaries domestically. The use of herbicides in eradication campaigns should be ceased immediately.

· Open a full debate on U.S. drug control policy in Peru. While the risks posed by a militaristic U.S. drug policy are great everywhere in the Andean region, in Peru the drug war has led the U.S. to take sides in a 12 year old civil war. This entanglement threatens to escalate imminently. The American people should be allowed their say before the U.S. commitment becomes irreversible.

· Focus on demand reduction in the United States instead of trying to control drug supply abroad. The first step to making demand reduction a serious commitment is reversing current drug budgeting priorities, which now favor law enforcement over prevention and treatment by a 70 30 percent margin.

· Consider a wide range of alternatives to the current drug war strategy. The current approach to drug policy has brought slim rewards for increasing investment and risk. It is time to seriously consider other approaches.

INTRODUCTION

Time to Reassess

International Drug Policy

As the Cold War has come to a close, the United States still has not seen an end to the threat of war. Indeed, U.S. military personnel and other representatives of our nation are stationed abroad in a conflict that threatens to heat up soon - the drug war. Before this fight escalates, all Americans need to reflect on what has brought the country to this point, what risks are being run and whether the direction should be reversed before it is too late.

In February 1992, the Drug Policy Foundation released the National Drug Reform Strategy, a report focused on domestic drug policy that urged the Bush administration to reverse its priorities. Focus on prevention, health and treatment rather than arrests, incarceration and other penalties, the report concluded.

The Andean Strategy Reconsidered focuses on international drug policy issues - primarily those raised by the administration's Andean Strategy - and comes to similar conclusions. We see increasing militarization of the drug war both at home and abroad producing little positive return, suggesting a need to reformulate policies before bad situations are made worse. As the National Drug Reform Strategy stated, it is time now for change to salvage the future:

The president's drug war is failing to achieve its stated objec tives and is doing more harm than good. As our nation plans for the year 2000 and beyond, it is imperative that the mistaken approach to drugs that has dominated the last several decades be reconsidered seriously. It is time to turn the corner and focus on methods that work to reduce drug abuse and corollary social problems.

These words apply just as well to the international arena. Problems with the Bush administration's international drug strategy are appearing on every front. While the administration acknowledges some of the strategy's faults and recognizes its lack of progress, it offers no reorientation of the strategy or any genuinely new ideas. Administration officials would prefer to stay the course, rather than acknowledge the reality of their failure.

Our concern is that this course, pursued unchecked by the administration and its congressional allies, will have profoundly negative consequences in the Andean region while failing to eliminate drug production and trafficking. It is time for a full reevaluation of United States anti drug policy abroad - what it can accomplish, what its risks are, what means are reasonable for use in the pursuit of anti drug goals and whether the effort should be relaxed rather than persistently expanded.

The Bush adminstration's predictable defense of its international drug control policies should be seen for what it is. All manner of anti drug efforts are claimed to be essential components of a "comprehensive" multi front strategy. In fact this claim is merely a plea for individual aspects of drug policy not to be evaluated in their own right.

In a democracy, policies such as the Andean Strategy - a wasteful, dangerous adventure that has no chance of meeting its ultimate goals - are supposed to be open to debate. It is hoped that this report will contribute to the development of informed opposition to our counterproductive anti drug efforts abroad.

SECTION 1

U.S. DrugPolicy

Overemphasizes Law

Enforcement and Militarization

Eradication lnterdiction Focus

Shirks Core Problems, Creates New Ones

International drug control policy under Presidents Reagan and Bush has emphasized eradication and interdiction of supply in source countries. Increasingly these efforts are taking on a militaristic character at the behest of U.S. policymakers. The Andean Strategy, unveiled in the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy, is the Bush administration's blueprint for intensifying this trend. The underlying economic and political problems in source countries that spur cultivation and production of illicit drugs receive comparatively little attention.

In a fundamental sense, U.S. led anti drug efforts are based on flawed assumptions about what can and should be done about drugs. Anti drug planners seem determined not to recognize that the invisible hand of the illegal drug trade cannot be squelched by an iron fisted foreign policy. Their failure to learn from history threatens the peoples of the United States and the Andean region alike.

'Supply Reduction' is Really Supply Diversion

Attempts to reduce the supply of drugs flowing out of producer countries tend to divert the supply and to create new sources, rather than stamping out production of the targeted drugs. The reasons are basic: poverty in source countries and the profitability of illicit drugs.

More than one million people in the Andean region are directly involved in the trade in raw coca and processed cocaine. Millions more benefit indirectly from the drug business. The three nations targeted most heavily by the Andean Strategy - Peru, Colombia and Bolivia - are among the poorest nations in Latin America. Bolivia alone derives about $600 million a year - half of its gross national product - from the coca trade.

The drug war is an unconventional war being fought with helicopters, herbicides and foot soldiers against economic forces. Even if the president, the Congress and foreign governments agree on various plans for increased law enforcement and military spending, better intelligence and more drug eradication campaigns, progress in supply reduction will remain elusive. Frustration with this most basic reality is creating pressures for unprecedented militarization of the drug war abroad.

It should be noted, however, that even if the many obstacles to U.S. interdiction and eradication efforts could be overcome, the hoped for effects on drug prices and availability would still be unlikely to materialize. As the U.S. General Accounting Office pointed out in a survey of supply reduction efforts, much of the price growth for cocaine occurs after the drug reaches the United States. Thus, impacting the drug at various stages of its production has little effect on the price of cocaine on the street. "Getting tougher" with militarization clearly has little potential value.

Pressure Building to Make Drug War a 'Real' War

Ronald Reagan was the first U.S. president to declare the illegal drug trade a "national security" threat. Efforts to militarize anti drug efforts abroad have been stepped up since that time, particularly under President Bush, bringing the drug war to new levels and creating tremendous new risks for little probable return.

The analogy to war for the effort to control drug production and use has become increasingly more accurate. On both the domestic and international fronts, U.S. policy continues to emphasize militaristic law enforcement oriented efforts at the expense of long term, non belligerent policies. From 1989 to 1990, for example, the number of Department of Defense flying hours devoted to anti drug operations nearly tripled, from 18,436 to 48,025 hours. That figure was over 10 times the annual average in the 1986 1988 period. These numbers reflect an increasing Pentagon commitment to the war on drugs.

Notably, that commitment has been opposed at many stages of its escalation by officials within the Pentagon itself. Most recently, Department of Defense personnel balked at plans developed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy to have the agency take chief responsibility for the anti drug mission, supplanting other federal agencies. These officials see the anti drug mission for the quagmire that it is. Yet policymakers have not changed their tune.

Though each of the Andean nations has been reluctant to do so, they are gradually expanding their use of military force to combat drug production and trafficking. They have been inspired to follow the U.S. lead by a combination of carrot and stick measures. Through the so called anti drug "certification standard," begun in the Omnibus Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, all economic aid to many of the nations of Latin America is now conditioned on cooperation with U.S. initiatives, especially those involving more military and law enforcement efforts.

Risks of Militarization include U.S. Entanglement

The predominance of military and law enforcement goals in the Andean Strategy's implementation has created an environment in which human rights concerns are downplayed, fundamental social problems in the producer countries are ignored and the unintended consequences of U.S. leadership of anti drug efforts threaten fragile democracies. In short, the major risks of U.S. led supply reduction campaigns are reversals in other crucial areas of concern to the United States and the nations of Latin America.

The ultimate risk of supply reduction efforts abroad is that U.S. forces could be drawn into a political war in the Andean region, particularly in Peru. Already hundreds of U.S. advisers, including Special Forces Mobile Training Teams, Drug Enforcement Administration personnel, and representatives of the Coast Guard and Customs Service are involved at some level in Andean anti drug efforts. The Jan. 12, deaths of three Americans in a helicopter crash in Peru - which some reports blame on gunfire from the Shining Path guerrillas - highlight the dangers faced by anti drug workers. Future deaths of U.S. troops or federal agents could easily trigger a full scale intervention, as happened in Panama in late 1989.

Many of these risks are open questions because the Bush adminstration has not established any limits on long term U.S. involvement in anti drug operations. Instead, it is plunging ahead, raising the stakes and increasing drug war militarization, all in the expectation that tangible results will materialize sometime soon. Unfortunately, as frustration builds, pressure to make the drug war a "real" war will increase.

SECTION 2

The State of the Drug War in Latin America

From Cartagena to San Antonio: Andean Nations Coerced to Join U.S. Strategy

On Feb. 15, 1990, President Bush met with the presidents of Bolina, Colombia and Peru in Cartagena, Colombia. The first "drug summit" was called to coordinate the nations' roles in the Bush administration's new international drug policy, the Andean Strategy. The Strategy's three short term objectives are: "to strengthen the political will and institutional capability of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia" for the drug fight, "to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and military activities of the three countries against the cocaine trade," and "to inflict significant damage to the trafficking organizations which operate within the three countries."

The U.S. commitment to militarization of the drug war provided a backdrop to the summit. It took place in the wake of the invasion of Panama and a planned deployment of U.S. Navy ships off the shore of Colombia, feared by local leaders to portend a "blockade" of the country. The Peru delegation threatened to boycott the summit due to the militaristic posturing of the United States, but agreed to come when the consequences of failing to show - a cutoff of aid - became clear.

There were rumblings at the summit from the South American delegations, who were concerned about being ramrodded into militaristic efforts while the United States failed to emphasize the real solution - reduction of domestic drug demand. Recognizing this concern, the final summit declaration said the purpose of the meeting was to "reduce both the supply and the demand for illegal drugs." Other concerns were addressed in a vow that all the involved nations would "act within the framework of respect for human rights; they reaffirm that nothing would do more to undermine the war on drugs than disregard for human rights."

But the heavy focus of U.S. efforts since Cartagena has still been on law enforcement and supply reduction efforts, with comparatively little going to demand reduction. Human rights issues have also been glossed over in the pursuit of Andean Strategy goals.

To date, the White House has by and large gotten its way in implementing the Strategy, both from Congress and the Andean nations. Indeed, the military goals of the administration have been bolstered by non Andean Strategy funding from the Pentagon drug war budget. Yet whatever the "spin," progress is minimal.

New problems created by international anti drug policy under the Bush administration are already beginning to show themselves.

The San Antonio Summit: Reaffirmation Instead of Re evaluation

The second "drug summit" is slated to be conducted in San Antonio, Texas on Feb. 26, shortly after publication of this report. It will undoubtedly focus on rallying support for the original agreement and having the nations involved congratulate one another for the minor progress made since the first summit.

The Bush administration clearly would like to claim that tremendous progress is being made, but any honest evaluation of the state of the Andean nations after only two years of the Bush administration's strategy shows that progress will continue to be slow in coming. The ominous signs of the risks of the anti drug strategy are also showing somewhat more clearly.

The prominence of militaristic anti drug objectives in our foreign policy toward the Andean nations has bred unfortunate results. These include the ignorance of serious human rights problems and the escalating involvement of U.S. money, equipment, troops and agents in counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, the drug trade has hardly been affected. In the expectation that the Bush adminstration will attempt to gloss over the true state of the drug war in Latin America, we offer the following rundown on events since the Andean Strategy's implementation.

Colombia: New Cartels and New Drugs

Even prior to the Cartagens summit, Colombia was on the American drug war bandwagon. The country has been a proving ground of sorts for the Andean Strategy. Coordinated efforts against drug trafficking have brought some of the desired short term results - most notably the fracturing of the Medellin cartel - but have utterly failed to control the supply of drugs. Thus, the Colombia example should be instructive as to the viability of the strategy itself

The drug war in Colombia might well be over, for all practical purposes. When the Medellfn cartel declared "total war" on the Colombian government in reaction to its anti drug efforts, mayhem broke out. Now that the battle has ended with peace intiatives from both sides, the Colombian people are war weary and unlikely to support any anti drug efforts that bring the kind of chaos the conflict with Medellfn did. The Cali cartel, which by many reports has replaced the Medellin group, has no use for anti govermnent violence, preferring to work more quietly. Even if, at the urging of U.S. anti drug strategists, the Cali group were successfully put down, any of the 150 to 200 other trafficking syndicates the State Department estimates exist in Colombia could move in.

Colombia is sure to be a source of frustration to U.S. policymakers who saw promise in the government's previous anti cartel stance. The new government of Cesar Gaviria has sought to reduce drug trade violence through all means possible, even through accomodating the traffickers. The government has instead focused on fighting a number of armed insurgent groups. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. anti drug aid and equipment have been used to fight these battles on a regular basis, due to the determination that the anti drug and counterinsurgency efforts are linked.

U.S. anti drug objectives are in jeopardy, considering the understandable reluctance of the Colombian government to fight a full fledged anti cartel battle and the fact that it has switched gears to fighting insurgent groups instead. Extradition of traffickers from Colombia to the United States, one of the top priorities of U.S. policymakers, has been abandoned by the Colombian government as part of its settlement with the cartels. Eradication of coca growing in Colombia, the third largest cultivator of the plant, is at a standstill, affecting at most five percent of the estimated crop. Reports that the cocaine cartels have now expanded into the heroin trade, with opium grown in Colombia's mountainous regions, demonstrate that the drug situation is becoming more complex rather than dissipating.

One of the major goals of anti cocaine efforts in Colombia has been to disrupt cocaine processing. Hundreds of labs have been attacked each year, but these attacks have simply dispersed operations. Processing plants have been reported in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Distribution operations have moved to Panama, El Salvador and Guatemala.

Continuing human rights violations call into question the wisdom of U.S. aid to the Colombian government and military. Though the State Department blames much of the ongoing violence in Colombia on traffickers and insurgents, it also acknowledges the poor record of the army and police. According to a 1991 U.S. government summary of the human rights situation, "members and units of the Army and the police participated in a disturbing number of human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, torture, and massacres, and . . . the Army is reluctant to distinguish between guerrillas and non combatants during counterinsurgency operations." With many other countries, such an assessment would lead to sanctions, not U.S. aid. Clearly, drug war priorities are obscuring others in Colombia.

The Colombian experience has been a bloody battle and an uneasy peace, diversification of all parts of the cocaine trade and expansion by the traffickers into new drugs. Far from eliminating the phenomenon of illegal drug production and trafficking, U.S. led eradication, interdiction and cartel disruption efforts have repeated the last two decades' frustrating experiences fighting drugs. The situation in Colombia has virtually returned to square one, with only the names and faces changed. Meanwhile, to pursue its objectives the United States is turning a blind eye to dire human rights problems. This is the kind of experience we can expect in the future if the Andean Strategy is continued.

Peru: The Drug War Mixes with a Civil War

"We are just beginning in Peru. . . we and the Peruvians cannot fight with law enforcement alone in the Upper Huallaga Valley unless the Peruvian military is there fighting the Sendero Luminoso."

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America Michael Skol, in testimony before the Task Force on International Narcotics Control, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 1990

Much as the pursuit of Cold War objectives in the Third World blinded U.S. policymakers to the negative sides of numerous regimes, the drug war is becoming a policy imperative that drives marnages of convenience with ignoble Latin American forces. Current U.S. policy towards Peru is a case in point.

Peru, where about half of the world's supply of coca leaf is grown, is without question the most complex staging area for the war against drug supply. The country's economy is reeling from a deep recession and recent economic "shock therapy" measures instituted by newly elected president Alberto Fujimori. The government is suffering a major crisis of authority, with whole regions of the nation's territory under the control of two militant insurgent groups, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Corruption plagues both the army and the Peruvian National Police, the principal agencies involved in anti drug efforts. An October, 1991 General Accounting Office report notes that civilian government control over these arms of the govermnent is flagging, despite some U.S. officials' claims to the contrary.

Because serious drug control in Peru cannot be accomplished unless the guerrilla movements are beaten back from their strongholds in the coca growing regions, U.S. led anti drug efforts there are reliant on counterinsurgency efforts. This reality has driven U.S. efforts to aid the Peruvian military's campaign against insurgents in addition to the national police force's efforts to attack drug production and transit. This military cooperation carries the risk of escalating U.S. involvement past a point where Congress or the American people have agreed the fight should go.

In the name of the drug war, the U.S. has already joined the bloody 12 year old Peruvian civil war. The U.S. role currently involves monetary aid, technical assistance, troop training by U.S. Special Forces units, intelligence aid and provision of military equipment. Direct aid to the Peruvian military began very recently.

The fight, however, is indeed "just beginning," as the assistant secretary of state for South America says above. The State Department's 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report lists several near term objectives for U.S. Peruvian cooperation that would necessarily involve conflicts with the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru: "destroying clandestine lab infrastructure, denying airstrips to traffickers, denying traffickers essential chemicals through control of roads and rivers. . . (and) restoring law enforcement to areas currently under narco guerrilla control."* U.S. policymakers have not yet delineated any limits to the escalating American involvement in Peru, even as the war threatens to heat up substantially in the near future.

Even elimination of the guerrilla threat would not necessarily help end drug trafficking in Peru. The Peruvian drug czar, economist Hernando de Soto, resigned at the end of January in protest over corruption in the military and national police. De Soto charged that elements of both were themselves reaping profits from the drug trade - a charge made by many others as well. He also charged that the assassination of a peasant leader who supported some of de Soto's alternative development plans was carried out by "arms of the state." If true, these allegations demonstrate that Peru's economic reliance on the drug trade could well drive its continuance even after a successful anti insurgency campaign. Only the identities of the individuals deriving profits from protecting the trade would change.

The Peruvian government, while anxious to receive help for its fight with the guerrilla groups, has balked at some aspects of the U.S. anti drug strategy. The U.S. plan has been shifted somewhat due to strong Peruvian sentiments that the drug war priorities of the United States do not reflect Peru's urgent needs. Only law enforcement aid was provided in fiscal year 1990, when military aid was declined by president Alan Garcia. After Fujimori's 1990 election, a proposed $36 million grant to the nation's military was also rebuffed.

After several months, the Peruvian president offered his own anti drug plan with a much heavier focus on economic needs. This plan is now being implemented. Out of a total $84 million bilateral aid package recently approved by Congress, $24 million is military and law enforcement aid. Of the $60 million labeled "development assistance," $50 million is geared for repayment of Peru's international debts.

A major and continuing concern in Peru is human rights. The Peru vian govermnent's campaign against armed insurgents has been based on a strategy of meeting brutality with brutality. According to the human rights group Americas Watch, the Peruvian military has participated in "executions disappearances and torture with a frequency which reveals these criminal practices to be integral to the counterinsurgency policy." According to a GAO summary, a February 1991 State Department report found that "military personnel were responsible for widespread and egregious human rights violations and that the number of violations increased from 1989 to 1990," as the Andean Strategy was being implemented. A U.S. official told the GAO in 1991 that he had seen a Peruvian policeman cut the ears off the dead body of an alleged insurgent. The explanation provided by a State Department official was that "the police sometimes cut the ears off their victims as proof of a kill."

U.S. officials have tried to downplay the importance of human rights concerns, which almost sank proposed military aid to Peru in the last session of Congress. For instance, officials from the State Department and other executive branch agencies have consistently said the human rights situation is improving, despite continuing terror tactics by the military. They contend that whatever the situation, aid might help reduce human rights abuses. Human rights groups and members of Congress worry that instead the money could be seen as a reward for cooperation with the United States and as a sign that human rights concerns do not play a role in determining policy.

While the Bush administration is gauging anti drug progress in terms of small drug seizures and levels of Peruvian cooperation, a serious battle looms on the horizon. The United States has firmly established itself on the side of the brutal Peruvian military despite human rights and corruption concerns. The more aid the United States provides, the more both sides will have staked in future events. This course is fraught with danger, but the administration has avoided talking about the commitment it has taken on in the name of the drug war.

* The relationship between the armed insurgency movements and drug trafficking is more complicated than U.S. officials make it out to be. Whereas the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters and other officials routinely refer to the Shining Path fighters as "narco guerrillas," the rebels are not traffickers per se, as the term implies. They do derive revenues from the drug trade in the form of protection money and "taxes" levied on sales in the regions they control. But the Shining Path's fanatical Maoist ideology rejects the use or trafficking of drugs. "Narco guerrillas" is therefore a misleading label that obscures the fact that it is more a matter of short term convenience that drives the link between the guerrillas and the drug trade.

Bolivia: Poverty Drives Drug Trade and Cooperation with Drug War

Bolivia, the poorest nation in South America, has been subjected to some of the most vigorous U.S. anti drug efforts, before and after the Andean Strategy's implementation. Both military and economic strategies have been pursued. Every initiative has been lauded as a success, but the real story is evident from the facts: Bolivia is still the second leading producer of coca leaf and recently became the second leading producer of refined cocaine.

Due to economic devastation, Bolivian peasants have turned to coca production. The bottom fell out of the economy in the early 1980s, in part because the country's top industry, tin, collapsed. Unemployment doubled, the GNP dropped one fifth, and incomes for those still working fell 30 percent or more. The new number one industry, coca cultivation, accounts for one third of Bolivia's agricultural production, half of its GNP and half of its export earnings. One fifth of Bolivia's working population relies on coca for subsistence. Unfortunately, the U.S. drug control strategy does not deal realistically with these fundamental Bolivian economic problems.

Instead, the U.S. strategy exploits the fact that the Bolivian government desperately needs all the assistance - economic and otherwise - that it can get. The congressionally mandated "certification standard" can be used by U.S. anti drug strategists to threaten the government into accepting a wide range of initiatives. Partly by using the threat of an aid cutoff, the United States has pressured a reluctant Bolivian government to use its military against its own citizens. Resistance to such efforts is strong in Bolivia because prior involvement of its militari in the drug fight resulted in a bloody military coup in July 1980.

Serious concern about aid to the Bolivian military also exists in the United States, due to consistent reports of widespread involvement by the military in drug trafficking. The ordinarily difficult process of tracking military aid and assuring its use in U.S. approved initiatives has been complicated by this specter of corruption.

Though most Bolivian experts point out that alternative crops and development programs hold the only hope for shrinking the coca industry, U.S. intiatives still push interdiction and eradication. In May 1990, the Bolivians acquiesced to U.S. pressure to implement Andean Strategy plans and agreed to use their military in the drug war once again. In return, the United States released $33.7 million in financial assistance for the anti drug effort.

While it is too soon to judge the results of the U.S. led effort, there are no early signs of success. Indeed, there are early signs of failure. A number of highly ambitious eradication goals set by the U.S. have not been met. On Dec. 5,1991, for example, the United States had to postpone a deadline for Bolivia to eradicate 2,225 hectares of coca, which had been required prior to the release of $22 million in U.S. aid. The postponement is illustrative of the U.S. dilemma in Bolivia: strategists must constantly weigh whether punishing the country for non compliance would bring the government into line with U.S. objectives or if it would eliminate any hope of future cooperation.

Past anti drug efforts in Bolivia have sparked the growth of tremendous opposition to U.S. influence and anti drug operations. This rare phenomenon of above ground support for coca production is unique to Bolivia because of the wide recognition of the country's reliance on the illegal trade. A coca growers' federation is a major player in Bolivian politics. U.S. anti drug operations have generated popular protests including strikes, road blockages and mass demonstrations. Bolivian officials justifiably fear the potential for riots and political violence that could follow a serious crackdown on the coca trade.

Bolivia was the site of one of the only full blown U.S. military attacks on the drug trade, the 1986 Operation Blast Furnace. The operation directly used U.S. troops and military equipment to destroy labs and to shut down the drug trade through a small scale occupation. But Blast Furnace had to be terminated due to intense regional and Bolivian opposition. Soon the industry recovered, with renewed attention to making growing and processing opera tions less accessible to future raids. The experience of Blast Furnace made Bolivians powerfully resistant to U.S. military efforts and has probably foreclosed such options for the future.

Another U.S. plan has attempted to undercut the coca business by paying farmers $2,000 per hectare of their land not to grow coca. Despite the obvious problems with such a strategy, including verification, corruption and the expansion of coca growing in other regions, some limited success has been noted. Voluntary eradication by farmers temporarily reduced the size of the Bolivian coca crop during 1989 and 1990. But the payments were often slow to get to farmers, and alternative crops did not develop sufficiently in the period when most of the voluntary eradication took place. Reports of farmers growing coca on new land also deflated hopes for the payment program, which is now stalled.

Probably the greatest risk presented by U.S. led supply reduction efforts in Bolivia is the undermining of civilian govermnent. Since its independence from Spain in 1825, Bolivia has been ruled by military governments a majority of the time. Only recently have democratic institutions begun to flourish. The Andean Strategy undermines the country's civilian govermnent by making Bolivia's president appear to be answering to U.S. desires rather than the will of the people. The strategy's military aid component meanwhile strengthens anti democratic forces in the military, who are still unlikely to seriously confront drug trafficking in their country.

The Andean Strategy is doing nothing to build Bolivia's nascent democracy or its sagging economy. Preferring military and law enforcement efforts, U.S. anti drug planners are giving little attention to the fundamental role coca plays in the survival of masses of Bolivian peasants. The coca industry will continue to thrive despite frontal assaults until the root causes of coca production are addressed.

Panama: Invasion Brought Only Temporary Relief

While Panama is not a part of the Andean Strategy per se, the country has been a high priority in the Bush administration's anti drug efforts. The December, 1989, invasion of Panama shows both the willingness of the Bush administration to pursue military solutions to drug related problems and the fragility of victories in the drug war.

When 24,000 U.S. troops invaded Panama shortly after President Bush declared his war on drugs, the main purpose was to seize General Manuel Antonio Noriega for trial on drug related charges. But since the invasion, drug related activity - including money laundering and transshipment of illicit drugs - has increased dramatically. Some reports say drug activity has increased five to seven fold. It appears that the capture of Gen. Noriega merely decentralized drug related activities in Panama.

The transitory nature of the success of Operation Just Cause mirrors the experience of most other U.S. led anti drug operations. Drug trafficking is so endemic to the region that even a superpower's presence has been unable to quell it. In part acknowledging this, a recent Pentagon survey of seven possible war scenarios included a hypothetical takeover of Panama by drug traffickers. That possibility remains despite the 1989 invasion, providing potent evidence that military efforts provide short term solutions at best.

SECTION 3

The Andean Strategy:

A 'New'Policy

Repeats Old Mistakes

The Andean Strategy devised by the Bush administration is not a new plan. It is largely a repeat of past efforts at supply control. Lip service is offered to the real solutions, but the strategy's focus is unmistakably on militarism. Unfortunately, like too many areas in drug policy, the Andean Strategy shows no recognition of this nation's past experiences attempting to control drugs.

Before this course is pursued much further, a realistic review of our country's experiences in fighting drugs abroad should be undertaken. Indeed, Congress could easily justify withholding Andean Strategy funding pending a serious review and debate on the merits of the administration's plans. Following is a brief exploration of the frustrating history of U.S. led drug supply control efforts during the last two decades.

The Heroin Experience

Our experience with heroin since the 1960s has demonstrated that supply control is doomed to failure. We have seen short term successes evaporate and the heroin supplying industrg expand. Ironically, the victories achieved by many nations working together to combat the heroin trade offer a clear prescription for trying radically different strategies in the future.

In the late 1960s, the primary sources for heroin were Turkey and France. Turkey was the cultivation center, and France the production and distribution center for world supply. By 1972, U.S. drug policy focused on these two countries and succeeded in shutting off those sources through a combination of law enforcement and diplomacy.

Yet the heroin supply did not cease. Success in Turkey resulted in an explosion in heroin production across the globe. By 1974, the Mexican share of the heroin market jumped from its 1972 level of 38 percent to 77 percent. With traffickers closer to U.S. borders, smuggling routes were less taxing and heroin imports continued.

Policymakers failed to learn from the experience with Turkish heroin and tried the source targeting approach again. Beginning in 1976, the United States began spraying herbicides on Mexican opium crops. The efforts were partly successful in achieving their limited objectives. But the disruption of Mexican production merely created an opportunity for the heroin market in Southeast Asia's "Golden Triangle" region to expand. Today, the opium crop in Southeast Asia is practically untouchable, having moved gradually into the hands of organizations and countries where the U.S. has no influence what so-ever - particularly in Myanmar (formerly Burma), Iran and Afghanistan. The State Department's 1991 International Narcotics Control Strategy notes that the opium crop surviving in Myanmar alone could satisfy the world's total heroin demand.

Another effect of limited successes in suppression of the heroin trade was that the United States saw the production of significantly more potent heroin substitutes. These fruits of international eradication were produced in labs within the United States.

Past eradication efforts have not affected current levels of heroin use or availability. Indeed, experts point to the threat of a new wave of heroin use upon looking at data for the last few years. According to the State Department, the supply of heroin is up all over the world. There are numerous reports that the Colombian cocaine cartels are getting involved in the heroin market. Mexico is again a major opium producer.

The source targeting policy of the last two decades has resulted in a more dispersed market, no decline in heroin use and expenditures of billions of tax dollars that made drug problems worse. The major guidance this experience should offer is a call for reconsidering our international drug policy approach. Some efforts are unmistakably wasted while others are insufficiently pursued.

The Marijuana Experience

The U.S. experience with marijuana supply has been very similar to the experience with heroin. The first significant marijuana interdiction program was Operation Intercept. This program, pursued by the Nixon Administration in September 1969, attempted to stop marijuana coming across the Mexican border. Commerce between the countries was brought to a standstill when the Nixon administration essentially militarized the border, searching one out of three cars intending to cross.

The short term effect was a reduced supply of marijuana As a result, marijuana users switched to whatever drug was available. Some experts postulated that young people were switching to heroin. Most notable at the time was an increase in prescription drug use.

In a very short time, smugglers adjusted to the interdiction program and found new routes of entry. Traffickers shifted from using mainly the highways to using the air and water to smuggle their product. Soon there was a marijuana glut. Thus, Operation Intercept resulted in new forms of drug abuse and new ways of getting marijuana into the United States.

Drug warriors decided to try again. In the mid 1970s, they sprayed herbicides on marijuana growing in Mexico. The result was predictable. The marijuana business in another country, Colombia, expanded and a new marijuana market in the United States was developed. In addition, American entrepreneurs began producing high grade marijuana. Once again attempts to eradicate a drug at its source actually made drug control more difficult by dispersing, rather than eliminating, supply.

The ultimate effect of the marijuana trade's growth in Colombia was the dramatic expansion of the cocaine trade based there. As Colombian marijuana traffickers became familiar with smuggling routes and built their operations, they realized they could earn even higher profits by smuggling cocaine. In addition, they realized that the more lucrative cocaine was also much easier to conceal for smuggling purposes than bulky marijuana. Once they were able to expand production of the drug, the Colombian drug lords began insisting that their American marijuana importers take part of their shipments in cocaine. This sales practice helped to build a base for further sales.

Soon the high profit cocaine trade became the nearly exclusive focus of many of the Colombian organizations. While today the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters congratulates the Colombian government and U.S. efforts for helping quell the local marijuana trade, it is clear that the industry merely shrunk in Colombia as the drug lords switched to a higher profit product.

Meanwhile, the Mexican marijuana trade expanded in the late 1980s. The country is now the largest single supplier of the drug for the U.S. market. Since marijuana eradication efforts began in Mexico and it has now climbed to the top of the list of supplying countries, there might be no clearer evidence that anti drug victories are fleeting 80 long as demand exists.

SECTION 4

Conclusions and Recommendations

Success in Andean Strategy

Would Not Help U.S. Drug Problem

Even if all of the complesities in the Andean region and supply reduction were overcome and we enjoyed success in our drug control strategy there, history shows it would not solve or even reduce drug problems in the United States. Sources would shift, new trafficking organizations would rise, and in time, the drug business would be stronger and harder to reach than ever. The Bush administration shows no grasp of this most basic dilemma.

Even if, in an ideal world, all of the foreign producers of illegal drugs could be eliminated, new drugs could be produced in labs within the United States to satisfy demand. We know this from our nation's expenence with marijuana; previous international eradication campaigns created a still thriving domestic pot industry. Clearly, no solution - not even a partial solution - to the problem of drug abuse is to be found in militaristic efforts abroad. But the momentum is still behind such efforts, and it is building rather than receding.

Superpower Status Useless for Economic Fights

The rise of the United States to the status of "sole, pre eminent world power," as declared by President Bush in his recent State of the Union address, and the recent Desert Storm victory may create a dangerous confidence in our nation's ability to solve problems militarily when other efforts fail to achieve desired outcomes. If there is one lesson that the collapse of the Soviet system should provide to current drug war generals, it is this: even the resources and military know how of a superpower cannot defeat the laws of economics. Our nation's international drug policy is using the wrong weapons for a war on supply, demand and price.

'Harm Reduction' Should Guide Domestic and International Drug Policy

As long as drugs are illegal and the trade in them exists, the most reasonable hope we can have is to reduce the harm caused by the existence of vast illicit enterprises. "Harm reduction" principles should guide our domestic efforts to control drug abuse as well as our international drug policy.

First, the path of militarization must be reversed. The Drug Policy Foundation has worked against militarization here at home, with a lawsuit against the U.S. government for its use of active duty troops in marijuana eradication efforts in California. In Drug Policy Foundation v. Bennett, C 90 2278, (Northern District of California), we have achieved preliminary success in our suit seeking an injunction against the use of troops in drug enforce ment. We believe such efforts threaten to erase the line between civilian and military rule.

The sending of U.S. military aid and the participation of U.S. advisers in anti drug operations abroad are both matters of serious concern, as they come at the expense of efforts focused on the underlying economic problems in source countries. To reduce the negative impacts of the drug trade, the two factors that determine its size and scope must be attacked. We must focus our efforts on demand reduction in the United States through education and treatment programs. Meanwhile, we should be targeting resources sent to producer nations to pro development programs that enable peasants to participate in the legal economy rather than producing drugs.

Recommendations for a Sensible International Drug Policy

There are a number of pragmatic steps that can be taken to develop a sensible drug control strategy. We outlined steps that applied to the domestic front in our National Drug Refonn Strategy issued in February 1992. In applying this approach to international policy, the Drug Policy Foundation recommends the following:

· Cease militarization of the drug war abroad, beginning by ordering home all Defense Department personnel and other quasi military representatives of U.S. agencies fighting the drug war. They are an expensive component of the drug war, producing little impact and threatening to entangle the United States in political wars, especially in Peru.

Militarization impedes progress in economic initiatives by making them secondary concerns. Many alternative crop programs and other development efforts are non starters, while military plans have expanded every year since the Andean Strategy's inception. This is the inexcus able result of flawed prioritization.

· Stop glossing over human rights issues in anti drug efforts. As long as U.S. military aid plays any role in the drug fight in Latin America, human rights concerns should figure heavily in decisions to release such funds. The Bush administration has consistently ignored the implications of its own reports on human rights violations by the Peruvian and Colombian militaries. The practice of providing aid in spite of ongoing rights violations can only be seen as an encouragement to those institutions and as a disgrace to the United States.

· Reverse U.S. anti drug funding priorities for the Latin American region. Current drug policy funding is split heavily in favor of military and law enforcement aid instead of economic development assistance. In addition to specifically appropriated funds, military aid also comes from the budget of the Defense Department and other agencies. New priorities should reflect the real hope for reducing drug trafficking: alternative industries and re sponsible development in the source countries.

· Stop pressuring Latin American countries to adopt the U.S. drug war.

- The so called anti drug "certification standard" requiring compliance with all U.S. drug war initiatives for economic aid should be abolished. The standard has only been used against countries with which the United States maintains no real relations. Still, it is used regularly to threaten Andean and other countries with aid cutoffs, as if the aid were not essential to anti drug goals as well. It is time to end this offensive charade and expand development aid programs.

- The Andean nations should not be forced to use their militaries domestically. All of these countries have at some time been controlled by military governments, so their reluctance to use their militaries for law enforcement missions should be respected.

- The use of herbicides in eradication campaigns should be ceased immediately. Not only do herbicides entail obvious enviromnental risk, their use has a history of failure and of creating expanded opposition to anti drug efforts.

· Open a full debate on U.S. drug control policy in Peru.

The risks posed by a militaristic U.S. drug policy are great everywhere in the Andean region. In Peru the drug war has led the U.S. to take sides in a 12 year old civil war. This entanglement threatens to escalate imminently. The American people should be allowed their say before the U.S. commitment becomes irreversible.

· Focus on demand reduction in the United States instead of trying to control drug supply abroad. The first step to making demand reduction a serious commitment is reversing current drug budgeting priorities, which now favor law enforcement over prevention and treatment by a 70 30 percent margin. Other recommendations for reorienting domestic drug war priorities can be found in the Drug Policy Foundation's 1992 National Drug Reform Strategy.

· Consider a wide range of alternatives to the current drug war strategy. U.S. drug policy planners have produced a series of hackneyed anti drug ideas in recent years. In general, these ideas are ignorant of past U.S. experiences. Too much faith is placed in the value of adding money and increasing militarization, with too little attention to the waste and risk involved.

It is time to examine alternatives to persistently expanding the drug war. Focusing efforts against drugs on public health measures would be a helpful first step. Various stages of decriminalization or legalization might follow. At any rate, the goal of harm reduction should replace the fantasy notion of"stamping out" drugs.

Especially with regard to our international drug policies, we should listen to ideas from the leaders of other countries. For instance, the 1990 platform of Peru's Cambio 90 party (whose candidate, Alberto Fujimori, is now president) suggested that a legal market for coca based products could reduce the scope of the illicit drug trade while providing employment for peasants. The products mentioned included pharmaceuticals - cocaine hydrochloride is used medically in the United States - as well as coca tea, which is sold in some parts of Latin America today and was legal in the United States through the early 1900s.

Final Thoughts

We closed our domestic National Drug Reform Strategy with thoughts that are appropriate for this international strategy as well:

The drug war is an unconventional war being fought against an unconventional enemy - ourselves. It is time now for all Americans to come to a solemn realization: we cannot help our neighbor by fighting our neighbor.

Drug czar Bob Martinez, President Bush and the Congress have a historic opportunity to learn from the last two decades of intense but failed drug war. We can then make the necessary changes in drug policy to help create a safer, healthier America

Or the administration can persist in repeating the mistakes of the past.