As we said, Thailand is traditionally the country of the Golden Triangle where the activities for the refinement and marketing of opium are concentrated. According to estimates made by the Thailand Development Research Institute, the profits ensuing from the trade of drugs which originate or transit in Thailand, including amphetamines and marijuana, amount to $3,9 billion a year, the equivalent of 17% of the value of all Thai exports in 1989 (38).

Over the last two or three years, Bangkok seems to have started to take measure against drug-related activities: the programs for the eradication of poppy crops have effectively lead to a reduction of the locally-produced opium, whereas police operations have caused the transfer of a great number of refineries across the borders with Laos and Burma. A bill was passed in 1991, which aims to repress the trade: according to this bill, the drug traffic is a crime of conspiracy, and is punished with the seizure of goods and currency as well as with severe penalties against the corruption of private and public officials.

Obviously, it is too soon to judge on the effects of these new measures. The doubts about their actual effectiveness, however, are justified by the fact that it is a country where the leading class and the army seem to be heavily involved in the drug trade. In early 1992, Narong Wongwan, running for Prime Minister in the pro-military coalition that won the elections of 22 March, was forced to move aside after the U.S. Department of State revealed having denied him a visa the previous year because of his implication in the drug traffic (39).

He was replaced in the office of Prime Minister by the General and Head of the Armed Forces Suchinda Kraprayoon, who was also forced to resign on 24 May after popular demonstrations that were barely stifled by the army, with hundreds of victims. The Thai parliament then passed constitutional reforms aiming to keep the military away from politics (40). The democratic opposition obtained the majority in new elections held in September, but there is uncertainty as to the effect of all these political changes on the drug traffic.

Officially speaking, Laos also seems to be active in a campaign for the eradication of poppy crops, a campaign which, while it has not yet had major results on the global production of opium, has served the purpose of obtaining funds from the UNDCP and from the United States (Hovaphon project) for the conversion of the crops (41). Laos is a very poor country, whose modest revenues for flying over royalties on the Bangkok-Hong Kong route represent one of the main items on the assets side of the official balance of payments. The government, while unable to pay salaries to the army, has granted the regional commanders the faculty of self-financing themselves with the timber trade (42). It would be no wonder that, as in Burma, the timber trade were combined with the heroin trade.

Generally speaking, there seems to be a multiplication of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the governments of the region - including China with increasing frequency - with the declared purpose of co-ordinating the relative anti-drug strategies (43). Needless to add, there are grounded reasons to question the truthfulness of these efforts, in particular of the Burmese junta.

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(38) Cf. Rodney Tasker, "Blocking the drug flow", FEER, 24 October 1991.

(39) Cf. "Thai Denies Trafficking in Drugs, as U.S. Asserts", IHT, 28-29 March 1992; "La majorité parlamentaire a proposé le général Suchinda Krapayoon pour le poste de premier ministre", Le Monde, 7 April 1992.

(40) Cf. Philip Shenon, "Thais Move to Curb the Army", IHT, 26 May 1992.

(41) INCB 1991 Report, pp.23-4; United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report - Midyear Update, Washington, September 1991.

(42) Cf. "A dam shame", The Economist, 11 April 1992.

(43) Cf. Victor Mallet, "Golden triangle states agree on drugs fight", Financial Times, 16 March 1992.