In Afghanistan, the poppy cultivation has been one of the main means to finance the at least eight Islamic groups of resistance against the Soviet invasion of 1979, and the Afghan governments supported by Moscow. The official end of the civil war, with the fall of the Najibullah government in the Spring of 1992, far from reducing the poppy crops, is on the contrary intensifying them. The question now is not just that of finding the economic resources for the reconstruction, but also of financing the armed struggle for power among the winning factions - factions which can no longer count on the U.S. aid, which was discontinued on 21 December 1991 (44). As regards the reconstruction, thirteen years of civil war have caused almost one million casualties, over 500,000 invalid veterans, the destruction of a third of the villages, almost six million refugees (in Pakistan, Iran and in the West) on a population of about 17 million.

Several sources point out that this country is in fact producing quantities of opium far greater than the ones estimated by the U.S. Department of State: 800 tons in 1990 and as much as 3,000 in 1992 - the latter figures making Afghanistan the world's leading producer of the substance (45). The main areas of cultivation - the provinces of Badakshan, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand - are all at the borders with Pakistan, where there are also several refineries for the conversion of opium into heroin. The heroin is then exported to the West via Pakistan and Iran. The UNDCP has a permanent mission in Kabul; in 1990, it accomplished two projects for the replacement of the crops in Nangarhar and a preliminary survey in Badakshan (46).

In Pakistan, opium is grown and refined mainly in the North-Western part of the country, at the borders with Afghanistan, in tribal areas that enjoy a great political autonomy and where not all national laws are applied. "The attempts made to persuade the tribal leaders to eliminate the production of opium have been partially successful" (47). The Pakistani authorities, like the Thai ones, often have a twofold attitude toward the drug traffic: on the one hand, according to the annual report of the International Narcotics Control Board, they seem to co-operate with the U.N. programs for the eradication and the conversion of the crops; on the other they are careful not to disturb the traffickers, and do all they can to keep the capitals generated by this trade inside the country. In March 1992, the Pakistani central bank launched the sale of five-year certificates in dollars, pounds, Deutschmarks and yens, at interest rates much higher than the ones offered by the countries of issue of these currencies, and dr

awing attention, through advertisements on the international press, on the fact that no information on the origin of the funds and on the identity of the buyers would have been requested: the operation soon aborted as a result of the block in the sales on the U.S. market, decided by the Federal Reserve, explicitly concerned about a possible use of the Pakistani certificates for the laundering of the so-called narco-dollars (48).

Similarly to the role played by Thailand in South-East Asia, Pakistan is the country where most of the refinement and first marketing of the heroin produced in South-Western Asia is done. If the information on the dramatic increase in the production of opium in Afghanistan is plausible, the turnover of the Pakistani traffickers would be comparable to the ones estimated for their Thai counterparts: a couple billion dollars. However, with twice as many inhabitants, Pakistan's economy is about half that of Thailand.

In addition to producing hundreds of tons of opium every year on its own, Iran is a traditional transit site for the heroin of the region, which is then sent to Turkey and the Balkans, the final destination being Europe. The information on what goes on in the country is very scarce: generally speaking, it is believed that the authorities intervene very strongly against both consumers and traffickers, often resorting to summary executions. The vigilance at the border with Afghanistan was recently enhanced, while an anti-drug co-operation agreement of 1989 with the Pakistani government enabled a series of combined operations on both sides of the border (49). In spite of this, Washington continues to deny Teheran the status of co-operating country in the struggle against drugs - another example of how the U.S. judgement on the subject has little to do with the nature of the problem.

It is natural to wonder how producers and traffickers can survive in Iran, considering the pervasiveness of the social control in a regime which is known for its militant ideology - an ideology which includes a strong distaste for drugs. A possible explanation for this is that this trade is tolerated precisely because it is directed at undermining the so-called moral solidity of the Western societies. Another possible reason is the existence of a favourable environment: a second economy run by major businessmen and government officials, who take advantage, among others, of the difference between the official exchange and that of the private sector - in the second case, one dollar costs twenty times as much. Lastly, the need to attract capitals might have its importance: only $ 7 billion of the 27 established by the five-year of 1989 actually reached Iran in Spring 1992 (50).

The victory, at the legislative elections of April 1992, of the followers of President Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered to be a moderate figure, stressed the problem of a normalization in the relations with the West, and in particular with the United States. However, drugs do not seem to be a priority in the list of the U.S.'s conditions, at least not as much as nuclear proliferation, the struggle against terrorism, human rights and Iran's support to the Islamic fundamentalism (51).

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(44) Cf. Jawed Naqvi, "Drugs are central to control of city", The Times, 16 April 1992.

(45) Cf. Edward W. Desmond, "Where the Poppies Bloom - and Boom", Time, 16 July 1990; Tim McGirk, "Hope that is built on heroin", The Independent, 6 June 1992.

(46) Cf. INCB 1991 Report, p. 27.

(47) Ibidem, p. 28.

(48) Cf. "Pakistan Halts Sale of Bonds", IHT, 23 March 1992. Italian treasury bonds and certificates are also to the bearer and at extremely convenient rates: the only difference is they are in Italian liras.

(49) Cf. INCB 1991 Report, pp.27-8.

(50) Cf. Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Investment Pitch: For Most, It's Too Wild", IHT, 2-3 May 1992.

(51) Cf. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Weighs Reward for Iran but Can't Decide What or When", IHT, 8 June 1992.