Relinquishing the estimates on the turnover of the drug industry, and with it the theories on the international plots, it seems more useful and realistic to orient the survey in two directions.

Firstly, the costs of the struggle against drugs in the societies which consume it - neglecting, for reasons of order, the ones borne by the producing countries. It is an ascertained fact, for example, that the prohibition of trade and consumption of narcotics absorbs a considerable part of the police resources, of the customs and of the judicial system. By way of principle, quantity and costs of the penal proceedings for drug-related crimes can be established better than any estimate on the consumption of narcotics. It should also be possible to determine with accuracy the number of convicts for drug-related crimes: the imprisonment of these individuals involves an individual cost, which should be known, and an indirect collective cost on the global efficiency of the prison system - almost everywhere, in the West, in an overpopulation crisis (100). The number of operators and the budget resources which police and customs allot to the struggle against drugs should be known. Lastly, there are the costs of the

international bodies that deal with the phenomenon, which can also be determined (101). In other words, instead of trying to know what cannot be known - how much the traffickers benefit from prohibition - it would be better to try to know what cannot be known: how much the tax-payer pays for prohibition. Which, while it is not the only element of judgement on the entire problem, would certainly encourage the formation of a balanced evaluation of the results of the struggle against drugs in a prohibitionist regime.

Secondly, the behaviour of the occasional consumers. This aspect would deserve serious sociological surveys, as it is probably one of the keys to understand the probable consequences of a legalization of drugs. On a deeper analysis, the vast majority of drug consumers are not addicted. The problem, therefore, is understanding the role played by prohibition in this result. For example: to what point are prices boosted by the regime of illegality, and the threat of administrative and penal sanctions in limiting the consumption (102)? Or rather what is the role played by the consumers' capacity of self-regulation? Or: is illegality an obstacle or an incentive to the relinquishment of drug abuse?

Ultimately, investigating in the two directions outlined seems to us as the condition to take the discussion on the drug trade and the prohibitionist regime out of the hallucination of the mythical figures and of the plots - to take it to the more solid field of the rational choices.

---------------

(100) In Italy there have been, in 1991, almost 23,000 arrests for drug-related crimes; 34% of the convicts were drug addicts. Cf. Marcello D'Angelo, "I giovani si bucano meno", Il Giorno, 12 February 1992. Of 15,000 convicts in the U.S. federal prisons, about 13,000 have committed drug-related crimes. The U.S. prison system (federal, state and local prisons) contain over one million people, are at 116% of their capacity of reception and costs $18 billion yearly. Cf. National Drug Control Strategy, cit., pp. 32-43.

(101) Even the health care system of the various countries bears costs ensuing from the illegality of the consumption. Nonetheless, in this case, the effects of the end of prohibition are far less obvious: the drug addicts' therapy should continue, and probably be extended to a greater number of patients; rules on the quality of the substances sold and hygienic-sanitary controls should be introduced; and so on.

(102) In order to avoid the creation of a black market, the prices of the narcotics could be kept high also in a regime of legality, through a tax imposition.