A muddle in the jungle

The Andean coca wars

Illegal drugs

IT IS not Vietnam, nor will it become so. But once again the United States

is preparing to commit lots of cash, military hardware and advisers to a

battle in a foreign jungle. This one is in southern Colombia, where an

embattled president, Andres Pastrana, faces daunting problems.

These include left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries.

Political violence caused almost 300,000 Colombians to flee their homes last year;

the better-off have been terrorised by kidnapping and extortion. The

country is also home to the worldÆs biggest illegal drugs industry: it accounts

for about 80% of the cocaine and some of the heroin imported by the United

States, and has displaced Peru as the worldÆs main source of coca, the

raw material for cocaine. This is the main front in the developed worldÆs

war against the supply of drugs. And, to make matters worse, ColombiaÆs

economy is reeling from its worst slump since the 1930s.

On taking office in 1998, Mr Pastrana boldly launched peace talks with the

FARC, the largest guerrilla group. But they have moved slowly. The war

continues, amid widespread scepticism about the FARCÆs intentions. At the

same time, Mr Pastrana has turned to the United States for help. Bill Clinton

is sympathetic, and now Congress is debating an administration request for

more aid, which would take total American assistance to Colombia to $1.6

billion over the next two years.

Mr Pastrana leads a democracy, albeit an imperfect one, and deserves

international support. But the proposed aid is ambiguous in purpose, and its

results may disappoint. The largest chunk is to set up and train three special

anti-drugs battalions, equipped with 63 helicopters, including 30 fast,

modern Blackhawks. Their mission is to ôpush into the coca-growing regions

of southern Colombiaö, in mountainous jungles now controlled by the FARC.

Once secured, the police would go in to wipe out the coca plantations.

The supply-sidersÆ plan

Its backers present this as a plan to staunch the flow of drugs to the

United States. But the motivation seems to be a fear that the FARCÆs

insurgency is now out of control, and is a threat to other countries in the

region. In practice, the new battalionsÆ target will be the FARC. Since the

FARC gets lots of money (perhaps as much as $500m a year) from taxing and

protecting the drugs trade, this new southern push would not only help to

prosecute the international war on drugs but also weaken the guerrillas,

persuading them to seek peace.

That, at least, is the theory. Yet if the main aim were to support the

pursuit of peace, the aid proposal might look very different. To achieve

peace, Colombia needs stronger democratic institutions, capable of guaranteeing

security and justice for its citizens (including demobilised guerrillas).

And it needs radical reform of its armed forces. Despite Mr PastranaÆs

efforts, they continue to suffer from two serious failings. First, they remain

a largely reactive force, lacking mobility and relying too heavily on

poorly trained conscripts. Second, many military commanders retain close links

with the paramilitaries. The belief runs deep that paramilitary violence

will hasten peace. In fact, it does the opposite. It is as unacceptable as

the violence of the guerrillas.

Yet the American aid proposal looks as if it will merely bolt three shiny

new anti-drugs battalions on to an abusive and unreformed military force.

That imbalance is familiar. After more than a decade of American aid,

ColombiaÆs national police are capable of staging sophisticated operations

against drugs gangs, involving months of surveillance and intricately

co-ordinated raids. Yet they are incapable of acting as an efficient constabulary,

providing the average Colombian with security against crime, kidnapping or

assassination.

Meanwhile, back in the United States

That is not by chance. Aiding the Colombian police has been adopted as a

political cause by a group of congressional Republicans who believe that one

of the cheaper and more effective ways to deal with the United StatesÆ

addiction to drugs is to stop their production at source. That approach is

also reflected in the annual ôcertificationö process, which this week

again saw the United States stand in unilateral judgment over its neighboursÆ anti-drugs efforts.

Belief in supply-side remedies has come to be shared by some officials in

the Clinton administration. They argue that the sharp fall in coca

production in Peru and Bolivia in recent years is proof that a combination of

stepped-up repression and programmes to help former coca farmers can achieve the

complete elimination of coca in those countriesùand in Colombia (see

article).

It is a heady vision, but a flawed one. In fact, these policies have

fuelled ColombiaÆs conflict. The increase in Colombian coca (and thus in the

FARCÆs income) is a direct consequence of its reduction elsewhere. That is

just the latest example of the ôballoonö effect: squeeze the drugs

industry at one point, and it reappears somewhere else. Already

drugs-trafficking gangs, with all their corruption and violence, have spread across Latin

America from Mexico to Brazil.

The reason is elementary. Demand calls forth supply. Prohibition and

repression merely increase the price; and, where cocaine is concerned, they have

failed to increase it enough to have any significant effect in reducing

consumption. After more than a decade of the United StatesÆ war against

cocaine at the source, the price of the drug in the United States remains

stable, the supply abundant. The number of hard-core takers remains stable,

too, although casual consumption has been declining since the mid-1980s.

Latin Americans pay a high price for the drugs trade: it corrupts their

societies from top to bottom. If this price is ever to be reduced, Americans

will have to look not just at the supply but also at the demand for drugs.

That means they will have to consider alternative policies at home, even at

decriminalisation. This is a war that will not be won with helicopters.