A. IRAQ

I. Purpose of Mission

The prime purpose of the mission was to make an assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs throughout Iraq in the light of the implementation of Resolution 986 which allows limited sales of oil for specific purposes, including humanitarian imports.

Apart from site visits, it was arranged to meet as many NGO and International Organisation partners as well as Member State representatives as possible.

The mission was accompanied by press - written and visual - from Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain, with a French journalist having dropped out at the last minute.

Courtesy calls were requested by the Kuwaiti authorities, from whose territory humanitarian flights to Baghdad now operate, and insisted on by Baghdad. Meetings also took place with the northern Iraq leaders.

II. Effect of Resolution 986 and internal Iraqi balance

With over 2,000 mio $ available every six months that the resolution is renewed, any programme of humanitarian aid which the Commission could provide would be dwarfed. The majority of 986 aid is for food and specific humanitarian imports for government of Iraq (GOI) controlled territories, but 13% of the total is specifically for food and humanitarian items for the Kurdish controlled areas.

While this percentage gives higher per capita benefits to the North, which was still the subject of objection to us by both KDP and PUK leaders, the mission was convinced that food and basic needs are much greater in GOI areas.

The current ECHO programme, evolving from a virtual lack of support to GOI areas, now gives a virtual 50-50 split between the North and the South. Any further programmes should at least maintain the current balance.

The implementation of Resolution 986 is far from providing instant solutions to the problems of the Iraqi peoples. Even when the weighting of various sectors had been established in the agreed programme between the GOI and the UN, each individual contract has to be approved by the Resolution 661 (Sanctions) Committee. Such approval can be the subject of lengthy delays, which led to other comments both from the Central and Northern authorities.

The UN operates extensive monitoring systems in the GOI areas, and undertakes direct deliveries in the North. Even they reckon that while supplies are improving, the agreed pipeline will not be operational until the end of September.

This means that the availability of basic drugs throughout the country is virtually non-existent, although even an emergency decision now would be unlikely to relieve the situation before the planned supplies arrive. In the north, the supplies could be arriving even later, as the Minister for Health disengenuously claimed that quality checks must be even more thorough for that region to avoid allegations of bad or wrong medicines being supplied. Our NGO partners pointed out that this often meant that medical supplies for anywhere in the country were at the limit of their shelf life when they reached their destination.

The implementation of Resolution 986 must therefore be examined both to speed up its processes and to cover essential areas currently not or barely covered.

Such areas identified by the mission, apart from the hopefully short term one of medical supplies, were mine clearance and its effects, the relief of internally displaced persons and potable water supplies.

Any further ECHO programme should therefore concentrate on these sectors, with the hope that 986 aid will have been so adjusted that it can be ended in about a year. The aim of a humanitarian aid withdrawal in such a medium term was strongly criticised by one of the member states present in Baghdad, arguing here as elsewhere for a strengthening of a European presence and activity.

The Northern authorities particularly pressed for infrastructural and development assistance to the extent that 986 does not cover such areas in future. This would seem to be more a DG IB rather than ECHO activity. To the extent that such programmes were mentioned by the GOI, water supply projects, particularly in the south which was visited by one member of the team, could continue to be classified as humanitarian provided they are kept on a small scale.

III Meetings with Authorities in Iraq

The main meeting in Baghdad was with Tariq Aziz, who, as First Deputy Prime Minister, remains the number two of the Baghdad regime.

The Commissioner opened the meeting by stressing the aim as a humanitarian needs assessment mission in the light of resolution 986.

The initial reply was also on a very cordial note with thanks for the assistance provided, and the claim that it was not in the EU's interest to retain sanctions against his country, as those, particularly parliamentarians, who had visited realised. It only later became clear that he counted London with Washington on his list of opponents of a return to normality. He also stressed that relations with these areas of the north under KDP control were "almost normal", while Talabani was not being "realistic".

As Mr Aziz stressed his desire for a cooperation between civilised nations, insisting that all major major conditions for the lifting of sanctions had been met, although admitting that some "minor" ones had not, the Commissioner reminded him that a dialogue required two to approach it in a serious manner. Outstanding problem areas where Iraq needed to make a concrete positive gesture were:

(i) cooperation with the monitoring mission of UNSCOM: here the the new chairman gave an opportunity for a fresh start,

(ii) human rights: even many of these parliamentarians who had visited Iraq were still worried about the human rights situation, this was certainly true of the European Parliament. A step could be made at the September meeting of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

(iii) the situation of the unaccounted POWs. Here Mr Aziz seemed surprised that this could be of importance and linked to human rights.

Mr Aziz, as did the Minister of Health, underlined the need for goods to come in via Baghdad, as this was otherwise subverting the territorial integrity of the country. The Commissioner stressed that the Community accepted all international borders, and that she would examine the practicalities for our partners of such a transport arrangement with them, as she would the possibility of an ECHO correspondent (see later section). She was, however, insistent that normality could not return overnight, that each must must do their own job but that ECHO would continue to alleviate suffering.

Apart from the points already mentioned, the Minister of Health stressed the importance of potable water and medicines. The Minister of Education, whom we only visited at his insistence, was un unreconstructed ideologue who was surprised that there were no Americans in the party.

In the northern area, we met both with the KDP under Mr Barzani and its administration, and with the PUK Prime Minister and a full team.

Both parties stressed the need for extra funds from 986 to be given to their region, particularly for development projects and felt that they should have both a greater control over the allocation of the funds and over our partners who implemented the projects. They were uneasy about the GOI influence at the UN in determining the six-monthly 986 allocations.

Each side claimed the EU should get involved in establishing a peace process between them, although obviously in each case it was the other side which was at fault.

The KDP undoubtedly has more revenues at the moment, given its control of customs receipts at the Turkish and now Iranian border, and while this is a strong bone of contention with the PUK, the latter has to be "pragmatic" and has its own import/export route with Iran.

The KDP Prime Minister feared that despite the gaps in the programme, many of the NGOs would cease operating given the preponderance of 986, while several of the NGOs we met in the PUK area seemed more interested in remaining for ideological reasons, taking no notice of the effects of 986.

IV Problems of implementing aid

Although the GOI authorities stressed the importance of all goods transiting Baghdad, only the Red Cross family does so at the moment. None of the NGOs in the north felt that such a route would be practicable, citing the example of Equilibre, which has not been able to work in the North since it started operations in Baghdad.

While staff can come into the northern areas through Syria, this requires the use of a very small boat, so it is impracticable for most supplies.

Our partners were therefore virtually unanimous on the needs to pressurise Turkey to reopen its supply route. The Commissioner had to inform them that there had been yet another troika demarche the previous week, but still without success.

It should however be noted that some regional entrepreneurs can deliver virtually any goods quickly, albeit at a high financial cost.

The question was also repeatedly raised of the desirability or otherwise of an ECHO correspondant in Baghdad. Pressure was particualrly great from one of the member states resident in Baghdad, and supported by the other two.

This needs to be carefully considered taking into account:

(i) the fact that with a 50% balance of the programme in the GOI area, some control is desirable.

(ii) the hopefully growing effectiveness of 986 should lead to a phasing out of ECHO's presence in the medium term.

(iii) any positive decision on Baghdad must not be allowed to reduce pressure on Turkey to reopen its frontiers to free access for humanitarian goods.

(iv) the way in which any ECHO representative would be seen as implying a deliberate increase in EU presence, however specialised his activities.

V Field Visits and Meetings with our partners

Discussions were had in three general meetings as well as on-site with all our partners currently in Iraq.

It was clearly explained to them that our future programme would have to be one of filling in the gaps left by the current 986 plan. While this was generally accepted, together with the areas of mines and their effects, IDPs and medicines, some felt that their programmes were special cases, worthy of continuing to receive ECHO funding. This was particularly true for those undertaking supplementary feeding programmes.

Of the projects visited, the most spectacularly successful was the Hospital for Mine Victims - although certain other trauma patients are also treated - operated by the Italian NGO. Emergency. It appears to have the highest level of competence, cleanliness and enthusiasm, although it seemed unlikely that even they would be able to save a mine-clearance expert injured that day and whom we saw leaving the operating table.

The demining programmes itself was explained by the British NGO, MAG, and it seems essential to continue this programme, for which 986 only allocates 2 mio $ to the entire area including administration, even if one might have hoped to be able to use other partners with whom we have positive experiences in the field.

Visits to 3 ICRC potable water projects, two near Baghdad and one in Basran, confirmed the vital importance of this sector where over 1500 sites have been identified as in need of repair or expansion.

IFRC food distribution, visited in Mosul but spread throughout the country, implemented by the Iraqi Red Crescent under the nominal responsibility of the Netherlands Red Cross, showed that some families do need supplementary food at this point in time, but the choice of beneficiaries is not necessarily impartial.

A visit to the main hospital in Baghdad, where a Spanish NGO, MPDL, is to distribute drugs, showed the need for such a project, again at this point in time.

Other visits included a restored children's centre in Erbil (KLA - GB), a model farm and training centre (Heidelberg Help - Germany) previously funded by DG IB also near Erbil, and a prosthesis workshop and fitting centre, previously funded through Handicap International - France.

VI Member State debriefings

At present only Spain has an Embassy, with a chargé at its head in Iraq. France has an interests section under the tutelage of Romania, while Italy has one under Hungary.

While all three felt an interest in building up a concrete EU presence in the country, only one felt the need to expand humanitarian activities despite the weight of 986.

All three had been kept fully informed of the planning of the mission, and were given an analysis of our visits and discussions prior to leaving Baghdad.

Member State representatives, and others, in Kuwait were also given a briefing prior to a dinner there on our return.

VII Overall conclusions

Sanctions have brought on poverty and threatened infrastructural collapse, in a previously developed country, while probably cementing support for the regime in the areas controlled by it, which are the worst affected.

Any sudden lifting of sanctions might also have a destabilising effect as vast sums of money would become available with no control as to how it would be allocated.

986 with its 4,000 mio $ per year of implementation is therefore a unique opportunity to relieve humanitarian needs while continuing political pressure.

The 986 process must however be improved, with faster approval by the 661 Committee as well as a better coverage of all needy areas.

In the meantime ECHO must adapt its programme to cover these and only these areas, which will ensure its effect is not dwarfed by 986.

Such areas remain, at this point in time, mines and their effects, IDPs and potable water.

The question of any ECHO correspondent in Baghdad will have to be carefully examined in the light of the above, and the time frame during which ECHO is likely to remain operational, on the assumption that 986 does become fully effective.

As to the constructive dialogue called for by Tariq Aziz, it should be remembered that this will only work when the Iraqi regime advances positively in the fields of weapons inspection, human rights and prisoners of war.

B. KUWAIT

Although Kuwait was only intended as an unavoidable transit stop, the Kuwaitis made an official visit of it, giving meetings with the Foreign Minister/Acting Prime Minister as well as the Minister of Defence.

The Acting Prime Minister, perhaps more pro-western than some of the Kuwaitis, stressed that the Iraqi region was a whole and that there could be no useful dialogue or settlement while Saddam remained in power. While Kuwait was currently one of the best protected countries in the world, both through direct military protection as well as its alliances, this might not last for ever, and the country had to be prepared.

He cited Turkey, Iran, Jordan and, more recently, Abu Dhabi as breaking sanctions.

The Minister of Defence asked to see the delegation because of his responsibility for human rights and missing POWs. He claimed that despite now attending the quarterly meetings on the subject, Iraq still does not give any reliable information. In this context the Commissioner was more than happy to add this point into her discussions with the Iraqi authorities.

Overall the Kuwaities viewed the visit as one of great importance, and convinced that it was humanitarian rather than the first step in a change of policy towards Iraq, received it very well.