The mission took place at a critical juncture of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, i.e. when UNSC Resolution 986 (oil for food) had just entered its implementation phase, thus giving Iraq an opportunity to restore basic humanitarian services towards levels previously enjoyed in the country.

Since 1991, Iraq has been a major humanitarian theatre, with ECHO the largest donor providing over MECU 200.

Despite Resolution 986, there remain certain gaps in the areas covered. These will require both close monitoring of the allocations of the 986 funds and an improvement in the speed of its approval procedures. The most serious gap is currently one of basic medicines which is likely to last until the end of September: unfortunately even supplies authorised by ECHO now would not arrive during the extreme crisis period.

Apart from even basic medical supplies, serious gaps remain in the areas of mine clearance together with its consequences, internally displaced persons, as well as potable water and sanitation.

It is evident that humanitarian needs are at least as great in the government of Iraq controlled areas of the centre and south as in the Kurdish controlled areas of the north of the country, which received proportionately more funding.

Provided that 986 is correctly implemented in the best interest of all the Iraqi peoples, one should be able to envisage a reduction of other humanitarian aid to the country, with a view to a cessation of ECHO activities in about 12 months time.

The ease with which the mission was able to move around the country depended on agreeing to take certain political contacts. Here, Tariq Aziz, the ongoing number 2 of the regime, continued his known policy of saying it was only in the economic interests of Washington and oil-producing capitals to continue a policy of sanctions and that the EU should be seeking a civilised dialogue with his government.

Mr Aziz also claimed that all major conditions for the lifting of sanctions had been met, thereby admitting that some "minor" ones remained. When pressed by the Commissioner on the missing - mainly Kuwaiti - Prisoners Of War (P.O.Ws) and the need to respond positively at the September Human Rights Commission in Geneva, he sought to avoid a direct answer. The Commissioner also referred to the possibility of progress offered by the new Chairman of UNSCOM.

In the North while a meeting was possible with M. Barzani of the KDP, J. Talabani of the PUK had not returned from a visit to North America, so the meetings there were with members of his administration and politburo. Here, both factions claimed to want elections throughout the north, each blaming the other for difficulties in holding them. Indications from some of the NGOs and the UN were that much of the local population, exhausted by the continued intra-Kurdish disputes and often actual fighting, would almost prefer a return to the times of Baghdad control when material conditions had been better. Certain PUK expressions in favour of an independent even part country, i.e. Suleimaniya - based, seem to have little support.

Both leaders stressed their wish to have a higher percentage of the 986 money, preferably directed toward infrastructure and development projects, although their region currently receives about 33% more per capita then Government of Iraq (G0I) controlled areas.