Key note Speech by EMMA BONINO

Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

I should first like to thank the UK Government for organising this informal meeting, which is in many ways unprecedented.

It is in fact the first time that most of those involved in financing and implementing aid operations in Iraq, including the UN, the EU and a host of humanitarian organisations and NGOs, have been gathered round the same table. There was no doubt in my mind that even an informal gathering of this kind would attract some controversial attention, coming as it does in the aftermath of yet another serious confrontation between the Iraqi Government and the international community. The European Commission, however, has wholeheartedly supported this initiative as it firmly believes that it is high time to get government-to-government rhetoric behind us, and to start addressing the predicament of the Iraqi people in a decisive manner, with the help of individuals and organisations which have gained competence and expertise in the field. The people of Iraq need and deserve our attention, whatever the regime in Baghdad may think or say. And we in turn owe it to them that our discussions, which are also designed to exe

rt some positive influence on international assistance programmes - especially in the UN framework - do remain solely inspired by humanitarian considerations, and not by politics.

We are meeting at a crucial moment for the people of Iraq: one that I would imagine arouses seemingly contradictory feelings of moral distress and hope among qualified observers of the humanitarian situation in the country.

I say moral distress, because all the evidence shows that most Iraqis are still facing unbearable hardships brought about by the continuing deterioration of their rights to security, to health, to education and to work. These rights - in many ways elementary human rights - have been eroded as never before in Iraq's history since the 1990 Gulf crisis coming on top of 8 years of war against Iran.

I say "hope" because the chances that the plight of the Iraqi people may be eased have never been so great. I am thinking of course of the implementation of UNSC resolution 986, as amended in February by resolution 1153, authorising Iraq to negotiate the sale of oil to the value of 5.2 billion dollars over a period of six months as long as

the proceeds are used for strictly humanitarian purposes, namely the purchase of food and medical supplies. It is our task here today to draw, from our collective knowledge and expertise, imaginative and practical suggestions to help to translate these hopes into action as quickly as possible: bearing in mind that the reality of the situation on the ground in Iraq has so far failed to live up to the hopes raised by the entry into force of resolution 986.

As you know, I visited Iraq last August. This was the first official visit to Iraq by a European Commission official since the Gulf War: as such, it also attracted some controversial attention at that time - and not only in Iraq. My aim was to assess the humanitarian situation in both north and south, not least in view of the implementation of resolution 986. This visit was not without a very strong symbolic dimension. As you may know, the initial action of support to the Kurdish population of Iraq, in 1991, was the impetus which gave rise to the creation of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

And ECHO has never left Iraq since. It has spent nearly 230 million ecus since 1991, making it the country's main supplier of humanitarian aid. This figure does not include, incidentally, assistance provided through other Commission funds (such as de-mining), or bilateral assistance provided by the EU member States.

If I quote figures, it is to show that the European Union has made a sustained effort in recent years to help the people of Iraq. I also wish to pay tribute here to the work of NGOs, whose help on the ground has made it possible for the aid to be effective, even in extremely difficult circumstances.

Though the aid, which has spanned a wide range encompassing healthcare, drinking-water supplies, mine clearance, help for displaced persons, education and food, has had some impact, it is obviously not enough to meet the needs of some 22 million Iraqis bearing the brunt of the embargo.

I am convinced, (Mr, Madam) Chairman, that this Conference should not miss the opportunity to analyse, as impartially and as objectively as possible the reasons why the humanitarian balance-sheet for the people of Iraq remains generally unsatisfactory, despite the entry into force of resolution 986 in December 1996.

There is no doubt that some of the reasons are attributable to local political circumstances. Let me be more specific: the Kurds of northern Iraq are living in extremely precarious and volatile conditions caused by three distinct factors:

- first of all, the internecine conflict between Kurdish factions themselves;

- because of Turkey's refusal, despite repeated international appeals, to allow the transit of goods and relief workers via its land border with Iraq, as well as Turkish military operations, which have further destabilised the civilian population;

- last but not least, there is the threatening atmosphere generated by the Iraqi army: its operations in September 1996 led the UN Secretary-General to suspend resolution 986 temporarily.

In the centre and the south of the country, the Iraqi government's stance on the UN resolutions is similarly unacceptable and heavily penalises the civilian population, making it the hostage of a regime that has difficulties in complying fully with International Law.

But it would be unfair not to bear in mind that we, the international community, have also played a part in the disarray of Iraqi society. In particular the time gap between imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq and the alleviation through the oil-for-food arrangement has taken its toll on the Iraqi population.

This is a country that in 1990 was thought to be on the fast track to development. It was a country where two-thirds of the population were town-dwellers, 95% were literate and 90% had access to basic health services. Infant mortality, to give a telling example, had fallen to 40 per thousand at the end of the 1980s. Malnutrition, according to WHO, was no longer a public health problem.

Now, despite the shortage of reliable statistics, all the information gleaned from UN agency surveys and NGO reports leaves no doubt as to the decay of Iraq's social fabric. There is no need to go into specific details to illustrate this decline. All the world's television networks have shown shocking pictures of Iraqi hospitals operating without medicines; much of this, I could see for myself.

From a strictly humanitarian point of view, implementing the sanctions imposed on Iraq to the bitter end and leaving things at that, will not do.

The case of Iraq is, if anything, illustrative of the dilemmas facing the international community when it comes to devising effective sanctions against rogue States and governments. There is little doubt in my mind that it is perfectly legitimate to impose repressive sanctions in cases of major violations of international law, such as those perpetrated by the regime in Baghdad. No legal legitimacy, however, can ease the distress caused by the mere thought that ill-targeted or all-inclusive embargoes can and do cause misery and social disarray for too many innocent civilians, often, the most vulnerable. This is especially true given that the main targets of sanctions, in this case the Baghdad regime, too rarely end up being decisively weakened by such general measures; and may even be strengthened by the appeal they can make to popular solidarity and patriotic sentiment.

The Iraqi experience gives rise to a number of questions about whether we should not re-consider the way economic sanctions are drawn up, decided and applied.

It is in many ways morally unbearable to take responsibility for deliberately provoking the suffering of thousands if not millions of innocent civilians. The argument that the ultimate responsibility for this suffering lies with Saddam Hussein may sound good in New York: but it doesn't sound quite so convincing in Baghdad, Basrah, or Sulaymanyah, where ordinary people who never chose to antagonise the international community are nonetheless living in misery.

I am convinced that in finally implementing resolution 986, the international community had reached the same conclusion and wanted to do something about this increasingly intolerable humanitarian situation. The improved oil-for-food deal of resolution 1153 offers us a mechanism that could provide a solution to match the scale of the problem: provided that it is implemented quickly and properly on the ground.

However, as we know full well, the operation of the oil-for-food mechanism is dogged by any number of difficulties, and has yet to produce really satisfactory results. According to UN sources, by mid-January, 50% of the medicines delivered in phase 1 - that is the first half of 1997 - had not yet been distributed in the central and southern parts of the country. The figure for products delivered under phases 1 and 2 for water and hygiene supplies is only 25%. The three Northern Governorates have faced similar delays: by mid-March this year only 60% of contracts of phase 1 and 18% of phase 2 had been completed.

In dealing with some of these obstacles we have little room for manoeuvre. I mentioned political circumstances earlier. We also have to consider the recent fall in oil prices, which has jeopardised the implementation of resolution 1153 because of Iraq's current production constraints. But there are other obstacles that we can tackle if we have the will. I am thinking in particular of excessive red tape governing the working of the sanctions committee. The UN Secretary-General himself has recently acknowledged that the procedures for approving requests and delivering relief to the Iraqi people could be improved. We also have to get the Iraqi authorities on board since, let us not forget, they are responsible for drawing up the distribution plan for the whole country and for carrying out distribution of goods in the centre and south.

You will appreciate that at this stage of the proceedings I do not want to go deeply into the details of what needs to be assessed and analysed by this conference. It is up to the working parties that will be meeting over the next two days - the most important part of this event - to identify the major problems and suggest what practical steps could be taken, to make the oil-for-food deal work better. This is a matter of urgency, because if the programme's implementation was open to criticism when the amount involved was "only" 2,000 million dollars, the problems encountered may well be worse still when we are dealing with 5,000 million dollars. The picture is further complicated by financial and commercial interests involved in the delivery of goods; however legitimate, these non-humanitarian concerns may have already caused some disruption, and led to unnecessary delays. I would appeal to participants in this meeting to be rigorous in their analysis, to ensure that humanitarian considerations take preceden

ce over all others.

We must also bear in mind the concern that a massive influx of aid, in such a short time span, should not be allowed to create a culture of dependency either in Iraq or within the implementing agencies, which themselves have operational limits.

We should not, on the other hand, harbour any illusion that this package, however well implemented, will solve on its own all of Iraq's humanitarian problems. Problems such as mine clearance - northern Iraq is thought to have one of the densest concentration of mines in the world - drinking water, sanitation, rehabilitation of medical structures and displaced people have not really been taken sufficiently into account in the oil-for-food deal to date.

So the humanitarian work of both bilateral and multilateral agencies will have to continue. In its action plan for the first ten months of this year ECHO has allocated 10 million ecus as a complement to oil-for-food operations, for projects that will focus on assistance to victims of landmines, repairing water-supply and sewage networks, supplying medicines, caring for children in orphanages and homes for the disabled, and helping undernourished children. To improve its operational capabilities in the centre and south where 80% of the 1998 programme will be implemented, ECHO has appointed for the first time a Correspondent based in Baghdad.

With the latter's help, ECHO will continue to assess humanitarian requirements in the second half of the year, taking into account of course the results of the oil-for-food operations.

ECHO's assistance of 10 millions ECU might seem marginal compared to the amount foreseen by Resolutions 986 and 1153. Here I would like to emphasise two things: Firstly, ECHO's aid does not in any way replace aid through these resolutions, it complements it by filling certain gaps. Thus I cannot subscribe to the view of those that say that humanitarian aid outside oil-for-food would be better spent in other parts of the world. Furthermore, it is logical that ECHO's action decreases progressively as the effects of the oil-for-food deal are being felt and fill all the gaps.

(Mr, Madam) Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we are all well aware that we are dealing with an extremely complex situation, unfolding in a very uncertain environment. The Iraqi people have endured nearly 20 years of war and sanctions and need to be able to count on our support . We must remember that sanctions have humanitarian side-effects which affect innocent populations and which, if unchecked, can help to strengthen dictators rather than the intended weakening of their regime. The Iraqi people need to know that we will do everything in our power to help them and put Iraq back on the path of development that made it one of the most prosperous countries in the Middle East. It is buoyed by this hope that I want to wish this meeting every success.