IPI World Congress

(Boston 29 April - 3 May 2000)

Human Rights vs. Realpolitik: What is the Right Foreign Policy Mix for the 21st Century?

Speech of Emma Bonino

Introduction

The end of this century is likely to see the end of foreign policy as the prerogative of a charmed circle of politicians and diplomats. An arcane world, with its own language, codes and customs. This is changing, and rightly so.

Foreign policy choices are now on everyone's screen, nearly everywhere in the world and round the clock. CNN, BBC-World, Euronews, the Internet, non-stop Newswires bring into every office, into every household the awareness that people are demonstrating in Belgrade; that Russia is bombing Chechenya; that people are starving in the Horn of Africa; that stock markets are collapsing somewhere.

Our citizens see crises, conflicts, humanitarian tragedies unfolding in real time. They are increasingly vocal in their reactions to these events. They are often frustrated that little is being done in response.

More and more, entire sectors of public opinion across our nations - world-wide - coalesce under non-governmental flags, on any given issue: environmentalists, pacifists, human rights activists, and so on. Each and every major International Conference has its parallel parade of NGOs (Seattle and Washington will be cases in point).

Of course, it is easier to lobby for a single issue, without taking responsibility for the repercussion of "single-issue" policies. But governments have a duty to respond to these concerns. We can't leave the monopoly of good arguments to those representing "la société civile" (as if governments were, "per se", uncivil or less civilised!). And we need to be more open about how to reach decisions, what our options are, and, when necessary, where the limits to our action lie.

More media exposure means higher expectations from the public to justify our response. And greater responsibility ever to ensure that the response is right.

It used to be said that foreign policy is not a "vote-winner", in domestic politics. I doubt whether this is still true. It can certainly and all too easily become a "vote-loser".

The role of governments is increasingly under scrutiny in this respect. We the Europeans belonging to the EU can no longer limit our relations with the rest of the world to the economic sphere. We need rather to complement these with the development of an effective Common and Foreign Security Policy, including capabilities, both civilian and military, to enable us to intervene in cases of humanitarian crises. We have now to begin to take seriously our responsibilities as a global actor for regional security. These are not merely the results of reflections of politicians eager to throw their weght around. They are a reaction to the increasing interest and concern felt by Europe's public in the face of crises, humanitarian tragedies and conflicts.

Our citizens are no longer prepared to accept that Europe stands idly by whilst international law is flouted, and human rights systematically abused.

Globalisation and growing interdependence are likewise calling for a clear re-definition of national interests. Here as well, increasing public awareness of foreign affairs is an important factor. But it is not the only one.

Progressive governance should also mean, in this respect, increasing cooperation to strive for a society which is more just and equal, and not only within national borders.

This applies to development assistance, which is no longer in tune with economic trends. We must recognise that the generosity of the public, for instance in the face of humanitarian tragedies, often stes a striking example to governments and their treasuries.

Also, it applies to principles and values, as the foundation of foreign policy action. National interests (or common interests, in the case of EU) can no longer be defined by reference to narrow, or even regional, security considerations or imperatives. Not all values may be universal, but many are written in stone in international law and conventions. We have a collective duty to uphold these values, and not just on ethical grounds.

Principles, values and international law are at the heart of the debate launched by Kofi Annan in September last year, on the relations between collective (UN) "ingerence" and national sovereignty. These notions ought not to be seen as mutually exclusive. Governments of the day can no longer use sovereignty as a shelter, behind which massive and intolerable crimes can be perpetrated.

Yet, the backlash registered in New York (in many quarters: China, Non Aligned, Africans), against the thought-provoking speech of Kofi Annan, tells us that this debate will stay with us for some time. And that leadership and careful handling will be needed from all our capitals, for the UN to be able to deal with the Kosovos and East-Timors of tomorrow as an actor, rather than witness, in crisis management.

Putting the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law at the core of our international action is ultimately in our interest. Because if we succeed, we will have more reliable partners, more secure investments, fewer accident-prone and unstable regions, fewer and fewer man-made crises and tragedies to deal with. If this is what some commentators call today "Idealpolitik", as opposed to the somewhat more cynical, interest-driven definition of "Realpolitik", then I am a staunch supporter of Idealpolitik. Because I believe it serves our interests in the longer term, and because it is the best way for governments to account for their actions to Parliaments and public opinion. It is, in not so many words, the only way to conduct sustainable and defendable foreign policies in the coming years.

I am of course aware as anyone of the difficulty of converting values into practical policy. It will never be easy. But we need to be increasingly ready to do so.

We all have to adapt. In the words of the 19th century British statesman and writer Benjamin Disraeli:"Change is inevitable. In a progressive country, change is constant". There is one thing we can be sure about as we enter the next century, the changes we will face will be more rapid and far-reaching than ever. We shall have to adapt if we want to continue to shape events.

For Europe, this means adapting internally in order to respond externally. The Union will have to enlarge, and to take up more responsibilities for regional security and for projecting stability - and still remain efficient. Other actors will have to adapt: the UN, NATO, the IMF, even - I suspect - the US, where strains between branches of the legislative are no longer simply the by-product of electoral tensions.

Transnational challenges are already haunting us with an array of new problems and responsibilities: the spread of AIDS in the poorer parts of the globe; demographic trends and the need to govern migration flows; the fight against drugs and terrorism - to mention but a few.

The mere dimesion of those challenges, and the emergence of other global factors, whose influence grows at the same pace as economic globalisation (think of organised crime, of global media and of multinational cross-investment), make some commentators wonder whether we might be heading for an era of "powerless States". An era where State control over space and time is increasingly by-passed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication and information.

Global Governance - sharing sovereignty in the management of complex transnational problems - is the way ahead. Bearing in mind that the ultimate challenge is one of legitimacy and credibility of governments as political entities, as institutions, and as process.

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