HAS THE PRESIDENCY BEEN HIJACKED?

by Alain Dauvergne

SUMMARY: High expectations for the Franco-German "joint presidency" of the EU have been dashed by domestic politics. Alain Dauvergne explains why, paradoxically, this could be to Europe's advantage.

(The European, 23-29 September 1994)

It is the first time in history that the presidency of the European Union has been held successively by the two great powers of Europe - Germany and France.

Advocates of a stronger Europe saw this quirk of the calendar, when it came up, as an historic opportunity to advance the cause of union - especially as these two countries' presidencies will be followed by two other large EU countries, Spain and Italy. It seemed the ideal combination to push through the institutional reform that is crucial if the European Union is to expand without falling apart.

In some quarters the euphoria stretched to talk of a Franco-German "joint presidency". But this fantasy went up in smoke on 30 May at the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse. Bringing the dreamers down to earth, Paris and Bonn mentioned nothing more than the need for "careful coordination". And, indeed, ministers and senior civil servants have been working very closely together in their numerous meetings.

It was in that spirit that the German, French and Polish foreign ministers met in Bavaria on 14 September. On 20 September Klaus Kinkel and Alain Juppé met for a Franco-German seminar with their respective ambassadors in central and eastern Europe. There are other examples: meetings between senior German, French, Spanish and Italian civil servants were held in Germany at the beginning of the summer, and another meeting is planned before the end of the year.

Such assiduousness is all very well, but it is a far cry from the kind of momentum that such a combination of presidencies would have produced only a few years ago. There are two reasons.

The first is that the German and French presidencies, once over, will both have been seriously distracted by important national elections.

The other is that the two countries do not see eye to eye - to put it mildly - on a number of important issues highlighted in the "thoughts" recently published by the CDU : industrial policy, the laws on competition, the long-term aims of the Common Agricultural Policy, European defence and its relationship with NATO. One could add a number of other points of disagreement, the very discussion of which is taboo in Paris and Bonn. For example, international trade, the issue of "Community preference", or the strict observance of the Maastricht conditions for the third phase of European Monetary Union.

The two countries are at odds even at the institutional level. For example, the French are reluctant to extend the powers of the European Parliament, whereas this is one of Germany's most pressing demands.

As for the famous "hard core" of five nations (Germany, France and Benelux) mooted by the Christian Democrats, it seemed to judge from the tenor of private conversations in Paris last spring, to have plenty of support. Now, however, it is rejected by both politicians and technocrats.

No doubt this change of French attitude is in large part a result of the coming presidential election in April or May, an event that will greatly undermine France's presidency which begins in January next year. Paradoxically, however, France's paralysis - which is going to last for eight or nine months - could be a good thing. The question of Europe is undoubtedly one of the most divisive issues in French political life. An almost two-thirds majority of the RPR vote against the Maastricht treaty and - its activists certainly haven't changed their minds since. The other main party of the majority, the UDF, is similarly split, with about two-thirds in favour of Maastricht and one-third against.

Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front and Philippe de Villiers, financed by Sir James Goldsmith, are against. Neither of the leading right-wing candidates for the presidency, Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur, can afford to take the risk of alienating an important part of their electorate. They therefore have no desire to take a strong stand on Europe.

The ambiguities on the Left are just as great. If Jacques Delors does not enter the arena they will be sorely tempted to dodge the

debate. Or at least the public debate - for behind those closed office doors the activity is intense.

The undeniable merit of the Germans is that they have put their European partners - and the French most of all - on the spot.

The questions have been put: someone will have to answer. But Paris is not ready. For decades, as the CDU report spells out, the French have been ambiguous. "France," it says, "must correct this impression; while there is no doubt about the sincerity of her pursuit of closer European integration, she often proves indecisive when it comes to taking concrete measures to this effect. She cannot countenance the possibility of abandoning the idea of the nation state - an idea which has long been little more than an empty shell."

No French leader today is willing to talk down the nation state. But, looking beyond the somewhat provocative tone of the German paper, it does ask one real question: does France really want more of "Europe", and how far down that road is she prepared to go?

Paris has never produced a clear doctrine on this point. Bonn - for the CDU text came with the Chancellor's blessing - has clearly taken its main partner by surprise. The challenge has been laid down, and France must come up with an answer.

The civil servants at the Quai d'Orsay are worlking on it and so are the officials a the Hotel Matignon. But you cannot develop a policy on such a complex and contentious subject in a week.

You need to think, to discuss. Above all, you need a sense of political direction.

The French have no choice but to play for time by hiding behind the pretext of the presidential election. But it is more than just a pretext. France really does have to wait until she has a new president to take a position. For only he can give a lead on this point and provide the necessary impetus.

French diplomats and politicians should use their long reprieve to think about two questions : is France ready to stake everything on Europe? And if not, what should her destiny be?

The Germans - or at least the CDU - have thought long and hard about themselves. France cannot and must not avoid the central question. The presidential election gives Paris the opportunity to tackle it properly - and the time.

* Alain Dauvergne is European editor of le Point.