5. The Maastricht Treaty comes up short regarding the democratic functioning of the institutions, especially because of the hostile attitude of France, during the preliminary negotiations, toward an increase of power for the European Parliament. For this reason the CDU/CSU reminds France that though "there is no doubt about your basic desire to continue along the road toward European integration, there is often indecision when it comes to taking concrete steps, since the idea prevails that sovereignty for the national state cannot be renounced, even though for some time now the latter has represented only an empty shell". This represents a clear statement on the historical eclipse of the national state, which should be carefully considered not only by the French politicians. 6. While monetary sovereignty should be transferred to the federal core once the single currency is achieved, foreign and security policies should be gradually handled in common at the European level because "in a community of states tha

t conceives of itself as a union, all the members must benefit from the same statute for external security". 7. As far as the procedure for achieving the federal core is concerned, the CDU/CSU recognizes that this could place in doubt the principle of unanimity called for in article N of the Maastricht Treaty. In this case there would be a break with the past, since all the fundamental decisions have always been taken in the Community with the consensus of all its member countries. However to the extent that some countries desire to slow down or even stop the community's forward momentum, those in favour of continuing along the road toward federation must be allowed to do so. For this reason also the European Parliament must assume its own responsibilities. It must "immediately be invited to collaborate closely and with complete trust in the preparation of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. At the same time, and without priority, it would be well to grant an important role to the participation of the nat

ional parliaments in the creation of the political will in Europe". The experience of the Maastricht Treaty reveals in fact that without the participation of public opinion during the preparatory phase the ratification procedure risks leaving ample room to the enemies of European unity. Only the effective participation of the representatives of the European citizens in the definition of the future European constitution can legitimate the 1996 reform. 8. Finally, there is a strong appeal to the press and to intellectuals, who often contribute negatively to the formation of European public opinion. Contrary to those who limit themselves to exploiting the superficial and transitory moods of public opinion (which if necessary are revealed through polls), the CDU/CSU states: "Contrary to the unrealistic and dangerous declarations at both the level of legal theory and the political level that some intellectuals give themselves up to, as well as certain politicians, uninformed and with the gift of gab, the vast maj

ority of citizens is perfectly aware of the need for a united Europe. ... Deep down the citizens are well aware that the interests of Germany can only be realized in the context, the space and with the intermediation of Europe". These proposals, as it was easy to foresee, set off a storm of protest, and the enemies of a united Europe immediately took to the offensive. The British prime minister, Major, who at one time had come out in favour of the idea of a hard core, changed his mind when faced with a precise choice and came up with an inconsistent counterproposal: that of a Europe with a variable geometry. This proposal would allow each country in the union to choose those policies which are most agreeable to them, as Britain did in rejecting the social policy and reserving for itself a similar renunciation for the single currency. If this proposal is accepted, then in the end we would have a Europe in which the centrifugal forces would take away all cohesion and coherence from the union, which would be le

ft without heart and soul. But the true reasons for Major's reaction are revealed in the Economist (9/94). "From a practical point of view," writes one of the most euro-sceptic weeklies, "if France and Germany move unhesitatingly toward the monetary union, there is little Britain or anyone else can do to stop them". In this case Britain would be faced with an "agonizing choice", as occurred when the Community was founded, when it decided - wrongly according now to the Economist - to remain out of it. The other objection consists in the false accusation of a desire to divide the European union into class A and class B countries, as if those countries which do not intend to make the federal choice would be discriminated against. The Italian government and almost all the parties (except for the PPI) have rejected the idea of the hard core using arguments having no foundation since, as the CDU/CSU rightly observes, the hard core already exists and is formed by that group of countries which have kept the EMS aliv

e. Italy has only itself to blame. Its governments have in fact preferred the easy way, in other words devaluation, to the virtuous one of financial reform and the reduction of the budget deficit. In any event, the true obstacle to Italy's entry into the federal core is not economic in nature but political. No one is asking Italy to meet the Maastricht parameters by 1997. She only needs to undertake a serious plan for reducing the public debt by 1999, as Belgium, which is supposed to take part in the hard core from the start, is doing. But the real problem is the present government's anti-federalist orientation. As long as it upholds, directly or indirectly, the ideas of the British government - as occurred during the recent conference at Oxford, where a representative of the Italian government took part in the drafting of an anti-federalist manifesto - it is obvious that the Italian government implicitly excludes itself from the federal core. In France too, however, the same politicians who had come out in

favour of a Europe of concentric circles became hesitant to accept the federal aim of the firm nucleus when faced with the precise and detailed proposals of the CDU/CSU. The battle for the European federation has thus reached a decisive point. The enemies of federalism are coming out into the open because they realize what is at stake. The fact that Chancellor Kohl's party has come out in favour of the hard core should be considered as an important step forward, but it should not let itself be carried away by illusions. The struggle ahead will be a hard and difficult one. We are only at the start of a hard confrontation which will involve all the European political forces and all the governments. Guido Montani

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