BLUEPRINT FOR A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

by Frank Vibert *

(The Financial Time, 21-9-1994)

A recent report on European integration from the German Christian Democrats recommended that "the Commission...take on the features of a European government". Such a prospect will cause anxiety among members of the European Union wishing to see it develop a decentralised structure. So what approach should they take to this CDU suggestion?

One answer would be to do nothing and hope the recommendation fades away. However, in view of suggestions elsewhere in Europe, including the European parliament's view that the Commission's powers be increased, that would be unwise. The alternative would be to accept that the functioning of the EU's key institutions needs to be reviewed. As part of such a review, the Commission's role would need a thorough examination, and the 1996 inter-governmental conference provides the opportunity.

There are two views of the future role of the Commission. One is that it should increasingly take on the character of the "government" of Europe. The other is that it should become a more effective manager of the Union's programmes. The two views conflict. They reflect different assessments of where the weaknesses lie in the Union's present institutional arrangements, as well as fundamental differences about where institutional responsibilities for core functions in the Union should lie.

The role of a modern government is to determine the direction of public policy and, where legislation is necessary, to initiate, prepare and attempt to carry through that legislation. There are two bodies that can potentially perform this role in the European Union. One is the Commission. The other is the Council of Ministers, acting in the light of more general guidelines set by heads of governmnent.

The role of manager of public programmes is carried out in modern government either by specialised, agencies or within the departments of the civil service. The view, that the Commission should develop as "manager" envisages. It as an agency of government (Council of Ministers) and in the role of civil service. This does not necessarily mean that the Commission would become directly responsible for the execution of policy in all areas. Much of the responsibility must continue to rest with member states. However, the Commission would need to develop its role as "honest broker", mediating policy differences between member states.

There is a reasoned case for not developing the Commission as Europe's government. Any democratic government would, require electoral legitimacy. The Commission could not continue as an appointed body. It would have to be elected either by the European parliament, or by direct popular vote in the Union (most plausibly, through an election to select its head). In the first case, parliament would gain a level of control over the government unmatched by any other democratic representative assembly. In the second case, to vest such powers in a single person would seem a colossal mistake in the light of Europe's history. Either "solution" would be enormously centralising.

The case against the Commission developing as the government of Europe cannot simply rest on a negative agenda. The capacity of the Council of Ministers to set policy and to run business in a more orderly way will need to improve. This will call for changes in voting, in the presidency arrangements and in the Council secretariat.

Developing the Council of Ministers as the government of Europe also raises questions about democratic legitimation. The Council cannot be dismissed by the directly elected European parliament. Thus there would develop a separation of powers more akin to the American system than the "fusion" of powers often held to be characteristic of parliamentarian democracies. National parliaments would have a role in the legitimation of policies carried into the Council by their own ministers. This in turn means that the relationship between national parliaments and the European parliament would have to be much more carefully structured.

If some member states wish to run ahead of the rest and implement their own view of the institutional development of Europe, as suggested by the CDU document, they should be aware that such action is likely to divide Europe again. The concept of a multi-track, multi-speed Europe is one of managed differences. To assign responsibility for core functions in a way which also affects key institutional relationships could, however, lead to unmanageable divergence. Nobody, least of all the German Christian Democrats, really wishes, to see this happen.

Frank VIBERT

* The author is deputy director of the European Policy Forum