DRAFT REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

* Et voilà.. With a warm spring sun, the first draft of the institutional committee report on the 1996 IGC has finally arrived.

M. MARTIN presented his text last tuesday March the 21st (see report in Conference federalism).

This text will be then put together with the Bourlanges report on the fonctionning of the Maastricht Treaty and (hopefully) adopted in the committee on april the 24th, to be finally voted in plenary on May the 17th. A couple of regular users of this conference will have to present amendements and are eager to hear suggestions and proposals for improving this pretty technical text, giving it a more "federalist" flavour.

So, the floor is yours: please send us as soon as possible your comments and draft amendements.

Federalist greetings,

Monica FRASSONI

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

16 March 1995

DRAFT REPORT

of the Committee on Institutional Affairs

on the development of the European Union

Rapporteur:Mr David MARTIN

Part A: Motion for a Resolution

A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

The European Parliament

- Having regard to the Corfu European Council's request to each of the EU institutions to produce a report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union (TUE);

- Having regard to the establishment of a Reflection Group which will help to prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and which is to begin its work in June 1995;

- Having regard to the report of its Committee on Institutional Affairs:

A. Firmly believes that the scope of the 1996 Conference should be an ambitious rather than limited one.

B. Considering that the enclosed analysis of the functioning of the TUE contained in the explanatory statement has shown that substantial changes are required as regards simplifying and clarifying the Treaty, and making its institutions and procedures more efficient, more open and more democratically accountable.

C. Considering that further enlargement of the EU is inevitable and desirable, but that such enlargement without prior major adaptation of the EU's existing structures and policies would risk paralysis and a dilution of the European Union.

D. Believes, in consequence, that the following four key objectives need to be attained at the Conference:(i) The existing texts should be redrafted, with a view to their consolidation, and to the creation of a simpler and more inspiring Treaty.

(ii) Further steps should be taken to ensure that the EU remains as close as possible to its citizens, and that political responsibility is exercised at the right level.

(iii) The EU's institutions and decision-making mechanisms should be reformed so that they become more efficient, open and democratically accountable.

(iv) The EU should be equipped with an appropriate framework of policies for its development in the 21st century.

I. PROPOSALS AS REGARDS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS THAT NEED TO BE MADE AT THE 1996 CONFERENCE

Objective 1: A simpler and more inspiring Treaty

1. Puts forward the following proposals as regards restating the basic principles of the European Union, and simplifying and consolidating the Treaty:

Restatement of basic principles

2. The preamble of the Treaty should be rewritten, so that it includes a statement of basic principles with which European citizens can better identify, and which would also make clear to applicant states the obligations they are undertaking in seeking membership of the Union:

A consolidated Treaty

3. The 1996 Conference should lead to practical improvements in the content and clarity of the existing Treaties. These should be simplified and consolidated. Out-of-date Treaty articles should be deleted, the existing complicated pillar structure should be reformed, and remaining relevant features of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and EURATOM Treaties should be directly incorporated within the main Treaty. Such a task could be prepared by a technical working group in advance of the IGC.

4. Foreign and security policy (including defence), and justice and home affairs should be brought within the Community system, but specific features of the former "pillars" (such as a right of initiative for Member States, and requirements for unanimity or special majorities) could be retained for certain items, for a transitional period to be determined at the Conference.

Objective 2: A European Union which is as close as possible to its citizens

5. Puts forward the following proposals to ensure that the European Union comes closer to its citizens by providing greater meaning for the concept of EU citizenship, by having more open decision-making and by ensuring better implementation of theexisting principles of "subsidiarity" and "proportionality":

Greater substance for the concept of EU citizenship

6. The concept of European citizenship is currently one of very limited scope, and needs to be reinforced:

(i) the Treaty should contain a clearer commitment at the outset as regards respect both of the fundamental rights of all those resident within the EU, but also of the special rights linked to European citizenship, on the lines of those contained in the European Parliament's resolution of November 1990;

(ii) the access of the Union to the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should be ensured;

(iii) the rights contained in the Social Chapter approved by the European Council in Strasbourg should be incorporated into the Treaty, as should the rejection of racism and xenophobia;

(iv) there should be a clear statement of the principle that all EU citizens have a right to information on EU matters.

Open decision-making

7. One of the most important ways in which EU decision-making can be made more accessible to its citizens is by making the process much more open. This principle should be more explicitly stated in the revised Treaty, and detailed implementing mechanisms should also be set down. Inter alia, this should ensure that the Council meets in public when acting in its legislative capacity, and that public access to EU documents is greatly improved.

Respect of all EU languages

8. The general principle should be clearly maintained that no reductions should be introduced in the number of official EU languages, since there should be no discrimination between individual EU citizens as regards whether they can use their own official language. Any practical arrangements derogating from this principle in particular circumstances must be made with the full agreement of all concerned.

Implementing subsidiarity

9. It is essential that political responsibility within the EU be exercised as close as possible to its citizens, and that decisions which have to be taken at EU level do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. Major new institutional reforms are not required, however, in these respects at the 1996 Conference and the challenge instead is to ensure better implementation of these two existing principles of "subsidiarity" and "proportionality", which should apply at all levels within the Union.

10. New fields of competence are not required at EU level, and the present divisions in the Treaties between areas of exclusiveand concurrent competence of the EU and of Member States do not need to be altered. Establishment of a fixed list of competencies would, however, be too rigid, too hard to achieve and is, anyway, unnecessary given the existing safeguards against over-centralisation.

11. Article 235 should be retained but only used as a last resort. Any actions taken using this legal base should involve co-decision for the European Parliament.

Objective 3: More efficient, open and accountable institutions and decision-making mechanisms

(a) Institutions

12. Puts forward the following proposals to ensure that the European Union institutions become more efficient, open and accountable by clarifying their respective roles, reviewing their existing composition, ensuring a broader-based process of nominations for top EU positions, introducing a greater degree of flexibility into Council and European Council Presidencies and strengthening the democratic scrutiny of EU actions:

The respective roles of the EU institutions and other bodies

13. The 1996 Conference should concentrate not on transferring new powers to the EU institutions, but on clarifying who does what and on ensuring that all the EU institutions become more efficient, open and accountable:

(i) the Commission's current role and independence should be reasserted and its existing powers should not be unbundled, but nor should it have uncontrolled powers of decision not subject to review by Parliament or Council;

(ii) where independent agencies and other organisations are entrusted with EU tasks they should carry out these tasks within a framework which ensures proper coordination and control at EU level;

(iii) the Council and Parliament should be established as equals in all fields of EU legislative and budgetary competence;

(iv) the Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors should play their proper role in all areas which are primarily subject to inter-governmental decision-making and should have the necessary resources to carry out these tasks;

(v) the European Court of Justice should have the full means to ensure respect for EU laws and of the EU institutional balance;

(vi) the consultative role of the Committee of the Regions, which should consist of elected members of regional or local authorities, needs to be reinforced by providing it with separate premises and staff;

(vii) there should be increased accountability of the European Investment Bank to EU institutions;

Efficiency of the institutions : the question of numbers

14. The question of numbers will have to be reviewed at the 1996 Conference if the EU is to be further enlarged, and if the EU institutions are to function properly. For each institution, however, the criterion of efficiency will have to be balanced against the need to take account of the interests of both large and small Member States.

15. The principle of equality of treatment among Member States is of particular importance in the case of the collegiate Commission, where Union rather than national interests must be defended but where this can better be done with awareness of individual national perspectives and cultures.

There should thus continue to be at least one Commissioner per Member State. The larger Member States should no longer automatically be entitled to a second full Commissioner;

16. The number of members within the European Parliament cannot be indefinitely increased, and should be limited to 700.

17. The number of judges at the European Court of Justice and at the Court of First Instance is close to reaching the maximum number consistent with their continuing efficiency, and recommends, once the European Union is further enlarged, that a new system be introduced, whereby there is less than one judge per Member State. Each Member State, however, should continue to have at least one judge at either the European Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance.

18. No further increase should be permitted in the existing number of Members at the European Court of Auditors.

Reinforcing the independence of judges and Members of the Court of Auditors

19. The independence of Judges and Advocates-General at the Court of Justice, of Judges at the Court of First Instance and of Members of the Court of Auditors could be reinforced by enabling them to serve only one, non-renewable term of office of 9 years.

A broader-based process of nominations for top EU positions

20. The President of the Commission should be directly elected by the European Parliament from among a list of names put forward by the European Council. The rest of the Commission should then be put together by agreement between the President and the national governments before coming to Parliament for a final vote of investiture as a college.

21. The European Parliament should have to give its assent to all nominations to the European Court of Justice (Judges and Advocates-General), to the Court of First Instance and to the Court of Auditors and finally to the Executive Board of the European System of Central Banks.

The balance between collegiate and individual responsibility within the Commission

22. The Commission should continue to have a collegiate responsibility, and there should be no general right of European Parliament censure of individual commissioners. The European Parliament should have the right, however, that is already enjoyed by the Council and the Commission, by virtue of Articles 157 and 160 of the Treaty to apply to the Court of Justice for compulsory retirement of an individual Commissioner under certain circumstances (the President of the Commission should also be fully enabled to reshuffle Commission portfolios at his or her own initiative, after consulting the European Parliament).

Presidencies of the Council and European Council

23. The present system of 6 month Presidencies should not be abandoned, but a greater degree of flexibility could be introduced.

Complementary role of EP and national parliaments in democratic scrutiny of EU actions

24. No significant EU decisions should be taken without adequate opportunity being given for direct democratic scrutiny at the appropriate level and in the appropriate form. All Treaty articles, including those in the second and third pillars, should be reviewed with this test in mind. The implementation of EU decisions should also be subject to more systematic democratic scrutiny than at present.

25. Democratic control at EU level will be best achieved by partnership between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, and not through conflict between them as to who is responsible for what. In this context, the role of national parliaments could be reinforced in several ways:

(i) A revised version of existing declaration no. 13 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union could be directly incorporated into the Treaty, encouraging governments to provide sufficient time for national parliaments to give their views on new EU legislation without causing undue delay to Union decision-making;

(ii) national parliaments (as well as the Council) might usefully be more closely associated with the EU's annual legislative programme, which should help to determine EU priorities and to act as a filter for inappropriate or disproportionate initiatives;

(iii) national parliaments should also be entitled to go to the European Court of Justice with a right to call for the annulment of EU acts on the specific grounds that the EU institutions have acted "ultra vires".

(b) Decision-making mechanisms

Simplifying and reducing the number of decision-making procedures26. - There should only be three decision-making procedures, the co-decision, assent, and consultation procedures. The existing co-operation procedure should be abolished;

- the assent procedure should be restricted to Treaty revision, international agreements, enlargement and adjustments to own resources;

- the consultation procedure should be restricted to decisions in the field of common foreign policy and security;

- in all other areas, the co-decision procedure should apply.

27. The co-decision procedure should also be simplified, for example, so that it is ended when there is agreement between Council and Parliament at first reading stage. The phase of intention to reject should be dropped. The procedure should also be ended if there is no agreement within the Conciliation Committee.

28. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of introducing the principle of equivalent deadlines for Parliament and Council in their first readings on draft legislation.

Further extension of majority voting in the Council

29. Further extension of majority voting is required if the European Union is to function efficiently. For certain areas of particular sensitivity, reinforced qualified majorities (.....) should be required, notably as regards Treaty amendments, levels of own resources, enlargement and certain decisions in the fields of foreign policy and security. (During a transitional period the rule of unanimity in these areas could be maintained.)

30. Voting within the Council should reflect the interests both of individual Member States and of their populations. Adjustments are thus required to existing voting strengths within the Council by a re-weighting of the votes of those Member States with the largest populations. (As an alternative, the idea of requiring double majorities of states and of populations for certain sensitive issues should also be explored.)

A new framework for implementing measures ("Commitology")

31. Existing "Commitology" procedures should be simplified, and greatly reduced in number. General responsibility for implementing measures should be devolved to the Commission (which may use an Advisory Committee to help in the formulation of the measure), but the Council and Parliament should be informed of the measures proposed, and should each have the opportunity to reject the Commission's draft decision, and to call either for new implementing measures or for full legislative procedures.

Budgetary procedures

32.

(i) There should be a unitary budget for the European Union,incorporating the European Development Fund, Community borrowing and lending and expenditure under the second and third pillars;

(ii) The European Parliament should be associated with revenue raising, by giving it a right of assent over own-resource decisions, and the system of revenue should make it possible for citizens to identify clearly what resources are allocated to the Union;

(iii) the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure should be reviewed to permit the European Parliament to act as an equal partner for all expenditure;

(iv) the principle of multi-annual financing should be incorporated into the Treaties;

(v) the financial effort required to permit enlargement needs to go hand in hand with the promotion of greater fiscal fairness, and the development of a system of budgetary equalisation.

International agreements

33. The Articles of the Treaty dealing with international agreements should be consolidated, and the respective roles of the Commission and Council should be clarified, and the democratic role of the European Parliament before, during and after the negotiating process should be reinforced.

Objective 4: EU policies for the 21st century

34. The EU will have no credibility in the eyes of its citizens unless it has an appropriate framework of policies for the years to come. The 1996 Conference will not primarily be about the detailed development of such policies but, besides the necessary institutional changes, a number of specific policy adjustments will also have to be considered.

Implementing Economic and Monetary Union

35. The convergence criteria set down in the Treaty of European Union do not require further modification but economic policy coordination between the Member States needs to be reinforced if there is to be a balanced and stable EMU. There must also be greater democratic accountability for the whole EMU process.

A more effective and integrated EU foreign policy

36. EU foreign policy should ensure a better integration of political, commercial, security and development policy considerations, and there should be a better overall strategic framework, forward planning capacity and coordinated secretarial support for such a policy.

Better defined security and defence policies at EU level

37. Closer links must be developed between the European Union and the Western European Union. There should also be a review of the European role in the Partnership for Peace, in the Organisationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and in the United Nations, of the possibility of a more integrated policy on armaments and arm exports, of the role of the EU in crisis management in and outside Europe, of the issue of a guarantee of mutual assistance and its possible scope, and of the possible forms of participation (or non-participation) in EU actions of those Member States which have a tradition of neutrality. Two general principles could usefully, however, be established at the outset, firstly, that no country should be forced to take part in a common action when it does not wish to do so, but, secondly, that no one country should be able to block other countries taking such action.

Progress in the field of justice and home affairs

38. In view of the fact that these matters so closely overlap with other policy areas where the Community method applies, the best remedy for the lack of results under the "third pillar" would be its full incorporation into the Community domain. At the very least, however, existing restrictions on the Commission's right of initiative should be removed and the existing provisions permitting progressive transfer of all matters under K1 (1-6) into the area of Community competence should be used (with a new requirement for qualified majority voting rather than unanimity), and should be extended to cover all K1 matters. The roles of the Court of Justice, Court of Auditors and European Parliament should all be strengthened and a proper timetable of activities should be drawn-up for the achievement of the main objectives in this field.

The need for more integrated policy-making in other areas

39. The energy policy aspects of the ECSC and EURATOM Treaties and other energy policy considerations should be integrated within a common energy policy framework.

Agriculture policy should be better integrated with food policy, rural development and environmental considerations, and agricultural price fixing should be better incorporated within the normal budgetary process.

Social policy as a core EU area of competence

40. Social policy should be a core area of EU competence, since major differences from one EU state to another create severe distortions within the internal market. The Social Charter should thus be directly incorporated within the Treaty, and the British opt-out should be ended.

II. WHO TAKES PART, WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS?

41. A certain degree of variable integration and of institutional flexibility already exists in the European Union. In view of the increasing diversity of the EU, further flexible arrangements may well be required in the future. However, in spite of the need for some flexibility, there must also be limits to its scope.

42. In the light of the above, the following criteria are putforward:

(i) a single institutional framework should be maintained for the European Union, and evaluation of any flexible arrangements should take full account of their institutional implications;

(ii) the "acquis communautaire" should be maintained, and, while existing objectives and policies may have to be attained by new means in the future, they should not be undermined;

(iii) in particular, the concept of EU-wide solidarity, and the promotion of economic and social cohesion, must be maintained as central principles;

(iv) there should be a definition of certain core areas for EU action, such as social policy, where opt-outs by those capable of participating would risk harming the integrity of EU policies as a whole;

(v) the European Union should continue to set the same objectives for all its Member States to the maximum possible extent, with flexibility (such as a derogation for a transitional period) being permitted when individual Member States have genuine difficulty in meeting certain commonly agreed objectives or decisions. Flexible arrangements when countries are unwilling, as opposed to unable, to participate in a particular policy should be kept to an absolute minimum, and then only granted when they do not clash with the criteria established above;

(vi) any proposals which would lead to a "Europe à la carte", and which could undermine the European Union's internal market and solidarity and its external identity, should be resisted;

(vii) adding to areas of cooperation outside the Treaty framework (as in the case of the Schengen Agreement) poses great institutional risks, not least those of reduced openness and democratic accountability.

43. If, at the 1996 Conference, a single state or a small minority were to seek to block the fundamental structural and institutional changes necessary to make the European Union more effective and more democratic, then "opt-outs" and other flexible arrangements would no longer be sufficient. Ways of moving forward without the minority would then have to be more rigorously examined.

44. An instrument should also be provided which would permit a Member State to leave the European Union, subject to certain criteria.

III. FOLLOW-UP MEASURES

45. Calls for the following steps to be taken as regards follow-up to this resolution and to the work of the Reflection Group, and, in particular, concerning the 1996 negotiating process, and the procedures for ratifying the final outcome of those negotiations:

During the Reflection Group Phase

46. Regular meetings should be held at which the two representatives of the European Parliament on the Reflection Group should report back to the Parliament on the issues being discussed within the Group. Open invitations could also be issued to Members of national parliaments to take part in these meetings.

47. Consideration should be given to the holding of a large hearing (or series of hearings) on the issues at stake in the 1996 Conference, to give as many people and groups as possible a chance to give a brief statement of their views.

48. A broad-based debate should then be held on the final report of the Reflection Group, giving the maximum opportunity for national parliaments, Europe-wide associations and European citizens in general to comment on its recommendations.

The negotiating phase

49. The negotiating phase of the 1996 Conference should involve more open debate than at previous IGCs, and the role of both national parliaments and of the European Parliament should be reinforced:

(i) a consultative conference of parliaments could meet at the beginning and at the end of the revision conference:

(ii) two Members of the European Parliament should attend as observers at the ministerial meetings of the Conference, and documents submitted to Ministers should be made available to the public;

(iii) The inter-institutional conference should lay down the guidelines for European parliamentary participation in the negotiations;

The ratification process

50. The role of the European Parliament in the ratification process should be enhanced (so that it has to give its assent on the outcome).

51. Consideration should be given to holding a Union-wide referendum to ratify any Treaty provisions, on the grounds that a collective decision affecting the whole of Europe is at stake. As an alternative, Member States could agree to hold any national referenda (or their respective parliamentary votes) at the same time or within a few days of each other.

Future revision of the Treaty

52. One of the issues at stake in the 1996 Conference should be the nature of the revision process itself. As a minimum, existing Article N of the Treaty should be reformed to ensure that the European Parliament is put on the same footing as the government of any Member State or the Commission, in being able to submitproposals for the amendment of the Treaty. (Alternatively, or additionally) The Treaty should be amended to provide for future revisions to be approved jointly by the Parliament and the Council before being submitted to national parliaments for ratification.

53. Moving away from the principle of future Treaty revision by all Member States is premature (but consideration could be given to adopting a solution in the longer-term that might be based on a high double majority of Member States and of populations).